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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Cigna Group (CI) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Watch · Gem Score +31 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 22 · Value 37 · Sentiment 0 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $296.47 vs $283.06 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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The Cigna Group
CI NYSEThe Cigna Group is a global health company that provides a broad range of health services and solutions to individuals, employers, health plans, and government organizations. Through its Evernorth Health Services segment, the company delivers pharmacy benefit management, home delivery and specialty pharmacy services, specialty drug distribution, and care delivery and management solutions that support cost-effective and clinically focused care. Its Cigna Healthcare segment offers comprehensive medical coverage and coordinated health solutions across U.S. commercial, government, and international markets, serving employers and other institutional clients as well as individuals. The Other Operations and Corporate segments encompass remaining business activities and centralized functions, including certain ongoing and exited businesses, corporate overhead, and shared services. Headquartered in Bloomfield, Connecticut, and founded in 1792, The Cigna Group plays a significant role in the managed health care and health services sector by integrating benefits, clinical programs, and pharmacy capabilities to support access to healthcare and coordinated patient care.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 22.18
Total Equity: $41.87B
Shares: 268,563,000
Total Debt: $592.00M
Cash: $7.68B
EBITDA: $11.98B
Total Debt: $592.00M
Cash: $7.68B
Revenue: $274.90B
Revenue: $274.90B
Revenue: $274.90B
Total Equity: $41.87B
Tax Rate: 19.2%
Equity: $41.87B
Total Debt: $592.00M
Cash: $7.68B
Current Liabilities: $56.34B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $592.00M
Total Equity: $41.87B
Shares: 268,563,000
Shares: 268,563,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 268,563,000
Stock Price: $272.28
Net Income: $5.96B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:34pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $174.1B | $180.5B | $195.3B | $247.1B | $274.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $117.6B | $124.8B | $133.8B | $182.5B | $215.0B |
| Gross Profit | $56.5B | $55.7B | $61.5B | $64.6B | $59.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $48.6B | $47.3B | $52.9B | $55.2B | $50.7B |
| Operating Income | $7.9B | $8.4B | $8.5B | $9.4B | $9.2B |
| Net Income | — | — | $5.2B | $3.4B | $6.0B |
| EBITDA | $10.9B | $11.4B | $11.6B | $12.2B | $12.0B |
| EPS | $15.87 | $21.54 | $17.57 | $12.25 | $22.33 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $15.73 | $21.30 | $17.39 | $12.12 | $22.18 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:27pm (58d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $5.1B | $5.9B | $7.8B | $7.6B | $7.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $36.1B | $30.1B | $37.4B | $48.9B | $47.8B |
| Total Assets | $154.9B | $143.9B | $152.8B | $155.9B | $157.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $43.6B | $41.2B | $48.7B | $58.0B | $56.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $107.7B | $99.0B | $106.4B | $114.6B | $116.0B |
| Total Equity | $47.2B | $45.0B | $46.4B | $41.2B | $41.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $32.6B | $37.9B | $41.7B | $43.5B | $47.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:34pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $7.2B | $8.7B | $11.8B | $10.4B | $9.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.8B | $0 | -$447.0M | -$131.0M | -$597.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$318.0M | -$500.0M | -$1.5B | $1.5B | $261.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.3B | -$1.4B | -$1.5B | -$1.6B | -$1.6B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$7.7B | -$7.6B | -$2.3B | -$7.0B | -$3.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$4.7B | $428.0M | $2.4B | $594.0M | -$1.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:34pm (57d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +3.7% | +8.2% | +26.6% | +11.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -1.5% | +10.4% | +5.1% | -7.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +6.0% | +1.4% | +10.3% | -2.3% |
| Net Income Growth | — | — | -33.5% | +73.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +4.5% | +1.9% | +5.4% | -1.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:27pm (58d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-04 | $1.56 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-05 | $1.56 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-04 | $1.51 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-04 | $1.51 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-03 | $1.51 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-05 | $1.51 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-04 | $1.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-04 | $1.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-04 | $1.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-05 | $1.40 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-05 | $1.23 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-05 | $1.23 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-06 | $1.23 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-07 | $1.23 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-05 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-06 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-07 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-08 | $1.12 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-06 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-07 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-03 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays +4%; a −1σ run costs 50%. Ratio 0.1:1 (μ 11.3%, σ 8.0% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 24.5 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($283.06) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +9% | 17.3% | $2,664.59 | +841% |
| Base — stabilizes | +6% | 15.0% | $2,102.10 | +643% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 12.8% | $1,618.57 | +472% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +10% | 1.1% | $185.68 | -34% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +19% | 1.3% | $295.29 | +4% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +3% | 1.0% | $142.94 | -50% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-02 00:51The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw tape: Cigna is compounding revenue at roughly 18% (2021 $174B → 2025 $275B) but that's almost entirely Express Scripts pass-through pharmacy dollars, not economic earnings power. The real numbers to watch are operating income ($7.94B → $9.20B over five years, ~4% CAGR) and net income which is genuinely noisy — $5.16B (2023) → $3.43B (2024) → $5.96B (2025). Gross margin has compressed from 32.5% (2021) to 21.8% (2025); operating margin sits at 3.35% and net at 2.17%. That is the signature of a business where the PBM pass-through is inflating the denominator faster than value accrues. Quarterly trajectory is fine but unspectacular — Q2 2026 revenue $71.67B (+6.7% YoY) with $1.66B NI (2.3% margin, flat to Q2 2025's 2.3%). No margin expansion is happening. The 73.5% "recent earnings YoY" is base-effect noise from a weak 2024 comp.
Balance sheet is workable but not pristine: $31.5B debt vs $7.7B cash, $41.9B equity, current ratio 0.85 (normal for a payor holding float, but no cushion). Operating cash flow $9.6B against a $75B market cap gets you ~13% operating yield — that's the actual bull case, not the synthesis model's $485 fair value. On ~$21-22 forward EPS at 12.8× P/E, CI is priced like a low-growth, regulatory-risk healthcare utility, which is defensible. The synthesis composite claiming $485-493 fair value (+74%) is almost certainly overweighting a DCF that treats reported revenue growth as economic growth — a common error with PBM-heavy names. UNH trades at ~20× because its MLR discipline and Optum ROIC are structurally better; the CI discount is not a gift, it's a rating.
Where I part ways with the prior stack: the Thesis Evaluation (-7, bearish tilt on PBM reform) is closer to right than the Synthesis (undervalued +74%). The Narrative layer correctly flags "fallen-angel/fragile" — this is exactly a name where the story resolves binary within 12-24 months on FTC/Congressional PBM action and MLR trends. The contrarian argument even against my own moderate view: if PBM reform lands softer than feared (looking increasingly likely given lobbying success and a divided Congress), and Evernorth's $9.6B OCF proves durable, CI at 8.3× EV/EBITDA and 0.28× sales is genuinely cheap — a re-rate to 15× earnings gets you $330-350 without heroics. Insider activity is unhelpful: small option-exercise-and-sell patterns, no cluster buying, no cluster dumping — call it neutral and move on. FCF CAGR of -9.9% is the single most damning number in the file and nobody above weighted it enough; earnings quality is deteriorating even as GAAP NI recovers.
Net: I dissent from the synthesis's "undervalued +74%" as unserious — that number is an artifact of methodology, not a real fair value. I partially agree with the "undervalued" direction but at a far more modest magnitude. Fair value on 14-15× normalized ~$22 EPS is $308-330, so CI at $283 is maybe 10-15% undervalued, not 74%. The right posture is a starter position sized for a name with real binary regulatory risk, not a table-pound. Catalysts to watch: (1) Q4 2026 MLR print and 2027 guide, (2) any FTC final rule on PBM rebate practices, (3) Evernorth segment margin disclosure — if it compresses below 4%, the thesis breaks. The 2.17% net margin leaves zero cushion for a bad MLR quarter, which is why the stock trades where it does. Prior models are directionally right that CI is cheap but wildly overshoot the magnitude by relying on revenue-anchored DCFs in a business where 92% of "revenue" is pharmacy pass-through.
GPT Reading
What stands out to me is that Cigna is not a broken business at all; it is a very large, still-growing, low-margin healthcare intermediary being valued like growth has largely ended. Revenue went from $195.3B in 2023 to $247.1B in 2024 and then to $274.9B in 2025, with the latest two quarters at $68.5B and $71.7B showing 11%-12% year-over-year top-line growth. That is strong for a company at a $74.8B market cap. The issue is not demand; it is conversion. Operating income was $8.54B in 2023, $9.42B in 2024, and then actually slipped to $9.20B in 2025 despite nearly $28B of incremental revenue. Gross profit also fell sharply from $64.6B in 2024 to $59.9B in 2025 even as revenue rose, a clear sign of mix shift and/or margin pressure. So the story the numbers tell is simple: scale is growing, but each new dollar is lower quality than the last.
That said, the market may be over-penalizing that deterioration. At 12.8x earnings, 0.28x sales, and 8.3x EV/EBITDA, Cigna is priced as if earnings are at risk of shrinking materially, yet the evidence so far is more “margin squeeze” than “franchise impairment.” Net income rebounded from $3.43B in 2024 to $5.96B in 2025, and the first half of 2026 produced $3.31B versus $2.85B in the first half of 2025, up about 16%. Quarterly net margins remain thin at 2.3%-2.4%, but they are at least stable, not collapsing. Operating cash flow of $9.6B against $5.96B of net income is also decent earnings support for a payer/PBM model, even if the missing FCF history keeps me from declaring the cash story pristine. Balance sheet risk looks manageable: $31.5B of debt is meaningful, but against $41.9B of equity and a business generating nearly $10B of annual operating cash flow, it is not remotely distressed.
The contradiction I see in the model outputs is that the extreme undervaluation case to nearly $500 feels too aggressive given the underlying economics. This is not a hidden compounder earning 8%-10% net margins that the market has simply ignored. It earns about 2.2% net margins and 3.4% operating margins, and 2025 proved that revenue growth can coexist with flat-to-down operating profit. On the other hand, the more bearish PBM-doom framing also overstates what the actual data shows today. If the market truly believed a severe structural earnings reset was imminent, I would expect clearer degradation in quarterly profitability, cash conversion, or leverage metrics than we have here. Instead I see a mature franchise with decent ROE of 14.2% and ROIC of 11.3%, growing revenues double digits but deserving a discount to best-in-class peers because incremental economics are weak. My read is that fair value is above the current price, but nowhere near the heroic DCF outputs; this looks more like a 14x-15x earnings stock than a 20x one.
The best case against my view is that 2025 may be the warning, not the aberration. Revenue surged 11.2% recently, but annual operating income still declined from $9.42B to $9.20B and gross profit fell by $4.7B year over year. In a business this low-margin, small pricing or utilization errors matter enormously. The current ratio below 0.85 also reminds you this is not a balance-sheet-fortress story. If Evernorth or the insurance operations are structurally less profitable than investors assumed, then 12.8x earnings is not cheap at all; it is fair for a business with regulatory overhang, margin compression, and poor incremental returns on growth. The insider tape is not helpful either: what we see is mostly awards, exercises, and sales, with no obvious open-market buying to signal management sees the stock as mispriced. A smart bear would also note that Cigna’s earnings rebound in 2025 came with an odd mismatch versus weaker operating profit, which makes me cautious about treating the headline EPS recovery as fully clean.
What would change my mind is straightforward. I would get more bullish if the next few quarters show revenue still above 8%-10% while operating margin recovers from roughly 3.3% toward 3.6%-4.0%, and if full-year operating cash flow holds comfortably above net income again. That would show the 2025 pressure was temporary and that scale is starting to convert. I would turn bearish if revenue keeps growing double digits but operating income remains flat or declines again, or if quarterly net margin slips below 2.0% for multiple periods; that would confirm the company is buying growth at unattractive economics. At $283, I think the market is right to apply a discount, but wrong to price Cigna like a no-growth utility with hidden structural decay.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers tell a story of aggressive top-line scale colliding with real margin erosion. Cigna grew revenue from $247.1B in 2024 to $274.9B in 2025 and is still printing $68–72B quarters into mid-2026, yet gross profit fell from $64.6B to $59.9B and operating income slipped from $9.42B to $9.20B. Net income nearly doubled to $5.96B, which looks like a recovery until you notice the improvement is below the operating line while the core insurance-plus-PBM engine is diluting. Net margin sits at 2.2%, operating margin at 3.4%, and the trailing PE of 12.8x on a $283 stock is cheap only if you believe those thin margins stabilize. Free-cash-flow CAGR of –9.9% against an 18.7% revenue CAGR and 7.4% earnings CAGR is the clearest quantitative contradiction: the business is getting bigger and less cash-generative at the same time. Balance-sheet leverage is manageable (D/E 0.75, $31.5B debt against $7.7B cash and $41.9B equity), ROE of 14.2% and ROIC of 11.3% are respectable for a mature earner, and the 2.2% dividend with a 27% payout is sustainable—but none of that erases the gross-margin compression from roughly 26% to 22%.
The valuation models’ ~$485–493 fair value and 74% upside claim are detached from the operating trajectory. At 0.28x sales and 8.3x EV/EBITDA the stock is not expensive, and a mid-teens multiple on mid-single-digit earnings growth would support something closer to the low-to-mid $300s, not nearly $500. The “fallen angel” narrative correctly identifies that the market has de-risked Evernorth synergies and PBM spread capture; the thesis score of –7 is directionally right that regulatory survival of the rebate/spread model is the dominant binary. Recent quarterly NI of $1.65–1.66B on rising revenue shows the franchise is still earning, and the 73.5% earnings yoy bounce is real even if quality is uneven. Insider activity is noise—option exercises paired with sales, no cluster signal. I read CI as a cash-flowing mature healthcare franchise trading at a discount that partially, but not fully, prices the structural PBM and medical-cost risks.
The strongest case against this view is that the market is correctly pricing a permanent step-down in PBM economics and that FCF will keep lagging reported earnings. A smart opponent cites the gross-profit dollar decline despite $28B of incremental revenue, the sub-1.0 current ratio, decelerating quarterly revenue trend, and the fact that UnitedHealth still commands a large premium for a reason—better execution and less contested pharmacy economics. They would also note that 2024’s $3.43B NI already showed how quickly earnings can gap down, and that any serious federal restriction on spread pricing or rebate retention would hit Evernorth harder than the 12.8x multiple assumes. I weigh that risk seriously—it is why I reject the 74% upside composite—but I do not treat it as already fully priced into a mid-teens normalized earnings power with a 2%+ yield and positive operating cash flow of $9.6B. The discount looks excessive relative to the still-intact scale advantages and the absence of an imminent cash-flow cliff in the reported quarters.
What flips the verdict is concrete: two consecutive quarters of medical loss ratio deterioration or explicit PBM legislation that bans spread/rebate capture would push me to fairly valued or overvalued near $280; conversely, operating margin re-expansion above 4% with FCF reconverging toward the $6B NI run-rate and clean 2026–27 guidance would justify a move toward $350+ and a higher-conviction undervalued call.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that decides this case is the stability of operating income: $8.54B (2023), $9.42B (2024), $9.20B (2025) — a three-year band of less than 10% variance on a $275B revenue base. That is the earnings engine, and it is not deteriorating. The 2024 net income dip to $3.43B (from $5.16B in 2023) despite *higher* operating income tells you the problem was below the operating line — investment losses, a tax item, or a one-time charge — not a business impairment. The 2025 recovery to $5.96B and Q1 2026 net income of $1.65B (up 25% from $1.32B a year earlier) confirm the 2024 print was a trough, not a trend. On a normalized $5.5–6.0B earnings base, the 12.3x P/E is at the low end of the 12–18x regime that healthcare plans and PBM-integrated insurers command.
The EV bridge reinforces this. Market cap $73.56B, less $7.68B cash, plus $592M debt, gives an enterprise value of roughly $66.5B. Against $9.2B of operating income, that is 7.2x; against the stated EBITDA (implied ~$12.2B from the 5.47x EV/EBITDA), it is 5.5x. For a business generating 14.2% ROE on $41.9B of equity, with a 2.26% dividend yield and a 27% payout ratio that leaves substantial room for buybacks or dividend growth, 5.5x EBITDA is not the multiple you assign to a company in structural decline. The net cash position of ~$7.1B means the equity is effectively paying 11.2x for the earnings stream, not 12.3x. The P/S of 0.27x is a meaningless artifact for an insurer whose revenue is dominated by pass-through medical claims; I set it aside entirely.
The prior model layer is where the briefing breaks down. The Valuation Synthesis lands on a $479.51 fair value, a 74% premium to the current price. That implies roughly 80x normalized earnings or a DCF terminal growth rate that no healthcare plan sustains. I reject it outright as a units error or a model that double-counted the Evernorth services revenue as if it were a standalone SaaS business. The Market Forces "avoid" signal leans on "heavy insider selling" and "deteriorating cash generation," neither of which survives contact with the data. The last ten insider transactions are option exercises (M codes) with same-day sales of 899, 3,903, and 14,292 shares — compensation mechanics, not conviction. Against a float of roughly 270 million shares, that is 0.007% of the float. There is no open-market P-Purchase, but there is also no large discretionary S-Sale. The "deteriorating cash generation" claim rests on a blank free-cash-flow line and a −9.9% FCF CAGR computed from a field the source did not populate; operating cash flow of $9.60B in 2025 is solid and the capex line is blank because a PBM/insurer does not build factories. The 18.7% revenue CAGR in the Momentum block does not reconcile with the annual data (2021 $174B to 2025 $275B is a 12.2% four-year CAGR); the 2024 revenue jump of 26.5% over 2023 is likely a reporting or consolidation change, and the same-quarter YoY for Q1 2026 is +4.6%, not the 11.2% the system reports.
The strongest case against my read is the regulatory overhang, and it is not trivial. PBM transparency legislation, price-fixing litigation, and the political risk of a government-mandated pharmacy benefit structure are real threats to the Evernorth margin that supports the 14% ROE. A smart opponent would point to the 2024 earnings trough as evidence that medical cost inflation can compress the insurance book faster than pricing can respond, and that the 25% Q1 2026 earnings jump is off a depressed base rather than a structural inflection. They would also note that the 4.6% same-quarter revenue growth is modest for a company the market once paid 20x for, and that the 0.85 current ratio, while normal for an insurer, leaves little working-capital cushion if claims experience deteriorates in a single quarter. I weigh this risk as already substantially embedded: the stock has traded at 12x for a sustained period, the 40% discount to the sector leader referenced in the prior models has been the norm, not the exception, and the 27% payout ratio signals management is not under pressure to return capital aggressively. The risk is real but it is the price of entry, not a hidden landmine.
What would change my mind in either direction: a Q2 2026 print showing operating income below $2.0B (implying a full-year run-rate under $8B) would confirm the 2024 trough was not a trough but a new normal, and I would cut my multiple to 10–11x, pushing fair value below $250. Conversely, a legislative package that caps PBM spread pricing or mandates formulary transparency would compress the Evernorth margin by 100–200bps, which on a $9B operating-income base is a $1–1.5B earnings hit that the current 12x multiple does not absorb. On the upside, a sustained Q2/Q3 2026 operating margin above 3.5% (vs. the 3.35% annual) combined with a dividend raise above 3% would justify 15x and a $310+ target.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Cigna is a mature earner throwing off substantial cash: FCF of $9.60B in 2025 on $274.9B revenue, with OCF/NI of 2.31x and negative accruals (-3.7% of assets) indicating clean earnings. Beneish M of -2.16 shows no manipulation flags. Share count has fallen from 341M (2021) to 268.6M (2025), a -5.8% CAGR, meaningfully concentrating per-share economics. Altman Z of 2.68 sits in the grey zone, consistent with a levered but stable insurer/PBM. The business trajectory is more mixed than the top line suggests. Revenue grew from $174B to $275B (about 58% over four years), but gross margin compressed from 32.5% to 21.8% and operating margin from 4.6% to 3.3%. Net income of $5.96B in 2025 is still below 2023's $5.16B on 41% more revenue, suggesting the growth is lower-quality (likely PBM/Evernorth pass-through). Liquid cash of $8.73B against net debt of -$22.73B means the balance sheet is a working constraint, not a cushion. Insider activity skews heavily to sales ($68M sold vs $1M bought), consistent with option-driven compensation rather than a red flag, but there is no conviction buying. Overall this is a well-run, cash-rich mature earner with disciplined capital return, but margin erosion and leverage prevent a higher grade.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment mix shift: how much of margin compression is Evernorth/PBM pass-through vs actual profitability erosion in insurance
- Medical loss ratio trend in the health benefits segment - is underwriting deteriorating
- Debt maturity schedule and refinancing needs against the $22.7B net debt position
- Whether buybacks are being funded by debt issuance vs pure FCF
- Client concentration and retention in Express Scripts/PBM given industry pricing pressure
The e2e composite fair value of $485.85 implies 74% upside, but that number leans heavily on an anchored-PE of $705 that assumes a re-rating back to historical multiples the market clearly no longer awards managed care. The EPV floor of $266 sits essentially at today's $283 price, so on a no-growth, cash-earnings basis the stock is already valued for a stall. A sober middle - roughly 10-11x depressed earnings on Cigna's ~$28-30 normalized EPS plus modest Evernorth optionality - lands deserved value around $340-400, giving a 20-40% gap versus price. What is priced in: the bear case that MLR pressure persists, Evernorth synergies underwhelm, and per-share growth stays stalled (net income flat while revenue exploded, per the quality lens). What is not priced in: the strong OCF conversion, aggressive buyback shrinking the share count, and a Solid quality grade with clean earnings. Margin of safety is real but modest - not a table-pounder given rising net debt and deteriorating margins. Verdict: modestly cheap, not deep value. I would want to see it below $255 to underwrite the bear case with margin, or I take a starter here and let the buyback do the work.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- 2024 MLR trajectory and guidance for 2025 - the single biggest input to normalized earnings
- Evernorth segment margin and client retention - the linchpin of the integrated-model thesis
- Buyback pace and net debt trajectory - determines whether per-share value actually compounds
- Any one-time charges suppressing reported EPS versus true earnings power
None surfaced.
None surfaced.
Drug-cost inflation and specialty pipeline expansion mechanically enlarge Cigna's largest revenue pool, and 4.75% long rates lift investment income on reserves. Offsetting: macro headwinds pressure employer headcount (the ASO/commercial membership base), and the policy environment — drug pricing, PBM transparency, lapsing exchange subsidies — is the most active source of variance in the model. Net: the world adds revenue and adds regulatory risk to the same segment.
When we made this prediction on Sep 2, 2026, CI was $283.89. We expect it to be $355.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $255.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 2, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence UNSETTLED
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
adjusted_earnings
flips up 5%
cost_of_capital
flips down 5%
excess_cash
flips down 5%
shares
flips down 5%
trailing_eps
flips down 10%
adjusted_pe
flips down 10%