For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Gem · Gem Score +42 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 60 · Value 28 · Sentiment -2 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $137.93 vs $117.89 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
CM NYSECanadian Imperial Bank of Commerce is a leading Canadian financial institution offering comprehensive banking and wealth management services. It operates through four primary business segments: Canadian Personal and Small Business Banking, which delivers financial advice, products, and services to personal and business clients; Canadian Commercial Banking and Wealth Management, providing relationship-oriented banking and wealth solutions; U.S. Commercial Banking and Wealth Management, offering similar services to clients in the United States; and Capital Markets, which supplies integrated global markets products, investment banking advisory, corporate banking, and research to corporate, government, and institutional clients worldwide. The bank serves approximately 14 million personal banking and business customers, primarily in Canada and the U.S., with a focus on retail, commercial, and institutional sectors. Founded in 1961 and headquartered in Toronto, Ontario, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce plays a significant role in North American financial markets as one of Canada's major banks.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.09
Total Equity: $45.77B
Shares: 983,547,258
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $8.80B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $8.80B
Revenue: $20.70B
Revenue: $20.70B
Revenue: $20.70B
Total Equity: $45.77B
Tax Rate: 22.7%
Equity: $45.77B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $8.80B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $45.77B
Shares: 983,547,258
Shares: 983,547,258
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 983,547,258
Stock Price: $118.67
Net Income: $5.99B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:45am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $14.2B | $15.5B | $16.6B | $18.2B | $20.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $4.8B | $5.3B | $5.6B | $4.4B | $6.9B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $4.6B | $4.4B | $3.5B | $5.1B | $6.0B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $4.96 | $4.76 | $3.67 | $5.18 | $6.13 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $4.95 | $4.75 | $3.67 | $5.17 | $6.09 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:45am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $24.6B | $22.4B | $14.8B | $6.1B | $8.8B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $595.2B | $670.5B | $693.3B | $740.4B | $793.7B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $562.7B | $634.7B | $655.5B | $698.5B | $747.9B |
| Total Equity | $32.6B | $35.8B | $37.8B | $41.9B | $45.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $18.3B | $20.5B | $21.6B | $23.8B | $25.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:45am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$2.4B | $16.1B | $8.6B | $7.9B | $9.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | -$2.2B | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$6.4B | -$2.2B | -$7.6B | -$8.7B | $2.7B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:45am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +9.1% | +6.8% | +9.8% | +13.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -3.3% | -19.7% | +42.4% | +18.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:45am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-29 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-27 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-27 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-28 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-27 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-27 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-28 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-27 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-27 | $0.64 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-27 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-27 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-23 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-27 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-27 | $0.64 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-25 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-27 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2021-06-25 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2021-03-26 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2020-12-24 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-12CIBC's economics run through a very large non-interest expense line — contact centres, branch service, back-office adjudication, AML/KYC review, and capital-markets middle office — all of which are language-and-document work that cheap inference can compress without touching the balance sheet that generates the revenue.
Canadian retail profitability rests on inert deposits and low-friction mortgage renewal; AI agents plus Canada's consumer-driven banking framework make rate-shopping and switching a background task, raising deposit betas and pushing mortgage spreads toward broker-market pricing.
Whether AI-driven comparison and agentic switching materially lifts deposit costs and renewal churn before expense savings show up. Watch the deposit beta on personal chequing/savings, renewal retention rates, and the efficiency ratio in Canadian P&SB quarter over quarter.
An OSFI charter with CDIC-insured funding, decades of primary-chequing relationships and payroll direct-deposit anchoring, Payments Canada rail access, and a capital base regulators supervise — none of which cheaper software creates.
AI Lens thesis
CIBC is not an information business that AI can substitute; it is a licensed balance sheet wrapped in an information business. Cheap intelligence hits the wrapper: service, adjudication, compliance review, advisory documentation, trade support — plausibly several hundred basis points of efficiency ratio over five years, and CIBC starts with less peer-relative efficiency headroom to give away than it once had. The balance sheet itself is untouched: credit risk, capital and deposit insurance remain scarce and regulated. The genuine AI transmission risk is not disintermediation of the bank but disintermediation of customer inertia — the Big Six earn an oligopoly spread partly because switching is annoying, and agentic finance is a machine for making annoyance free. Net: cost tailwind is fairly reliable, revenue-side erosion is slower but structural, and the Canadian oligopoly means savings get partly competed into pricing.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Credit adjudication and collections done with far richer, faster models can lower provisions through a cycle; a persistent few basis points off PCL ratios is worth more to CIBC's earnings than most of the headcount savings being discussed.
Downside Wealth management advice fees are the softest revenue unit — as AI-generated planning becomes adequate and visible, the ~1% managed-money fee on mass-affluent books is the first price to be argued down, and it is high-margin revenue CIBC has been leaning into.
Outcome range spread 40
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-20 11:13The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
CIBC's raw numbers show a bank that just printed FY2025 revenue of $20.99B (+13.8% YoY) and net income of $6.07B (+18.3% YoY), capping a two-year earnings recovery from the $3.60B trough in FY2023. That trough is the tell: FY2023 NI collapsed 20% below FY2021's $4.63B on credit provisioning and the U.S. commercial real estate write-downs, and the subsequent snap-back is what's producing the flattering 29.9% earnings CAGR. Normalizing through the cycle, NI has grown from $4.63B (2021) to $6.07B (2025) — roughly 7% annualized, not 30%. ROE of 13.1% is respectable but not the 15%+ level required to justify 2.5x book on a durable basis, and ROA of 0.75% is thin even for a Canadian oligopolist. At $117.84, 19x trailing earnings is well above CIBC's 10-12x historical band; the stock has re-rated on multiple expansion, not just earnings.
The prior models contradict each other sharply and the disagreement is the signal. The Valuation Synthesis says undervalued with a $140 fair value (+19.5%), while Market Forces flags cyclical peak earnings, and Thesis Evaluation scores -18 with the explicit warning that 19x P/E bakes in perfection. The Narrative layer splits the difference by calling it "anchored" and fundamentally driven. I side with Thesis Evaluation and Market Forces. The Synthesis $140 target is almost certainly extrapolating the 29.9% earnings CAGR or the 13.8% recent revenue growth, both of which are polluted by the 2023 provisioning base effect. Take FY2023 out and this is a mid-single-digit grower priced like a compounder. The Pre-Flight note that "P/B of 2.5x expects ROE compression" has the causation backwards — 2.5x book at 13% ROE implies the market expects ROE to *expand*, which is the opposite of what happens when provisions normalize and NIM compresses as the BoC cuts.
The contrarian case for staying long is real but narrow: Canadian bank oligopoly pricing, a 2.47% dividend yield that's covered ~2x by earnings, $46.4B of equity, and $9.83B of operating cash flow provide genuine downside protection. If NIMs hold because deposit betas fall faster than asset yields in a cutting cycle, and if the U.S. commercial book stops bleeding, FY2026 EPS could hold flat rather than decline — in which case the multiple survives. But that's a "no bad news" thesis at a multiple that already prices good news. The Canadian housing market and CIBC's outsized domestic mortgage exposure (relative to RY/TD's diversification) is a tail risk the models mostly hand-wave past. Data gaps to flag: no debt figure (odd for a bank — presumably deposits and wholesale funding aren't broken out here), no segment-level provisioning trajectory, no NIM series, and no CET1 ratio. For a bank, those are the *only* numbers that matter and we're flying without them.
I dissent from the Synthesis "undervalued at $140" verdict. The composite is being fooled by the 2023 earnings trough acting as a denominator. My read: CIBC is fairly valued to modestly overvalued at $117.84, with fair value in the $100-110 range on normalized earnings of ~$5.2-5.5B and a fair 11-13x multiple, plus dividend. The setup is asymmetric to the downside: provision normalization is mechanical (as the Bear thesis correctly notes at weight 72), rate cuts compress NIM, and the multiple has no room to expand from 19x. The 2.5% yield isn't enough compensation for cyclical earnings risk when GICs pay 4%+. I wouldn't short it — Canadian bank shorts are widowmakers and the dividend floor is real — but new money here is buying the top of a cyclical recovery at a structural growth multiple. Wait for either a re-rating to 14-15x (roughly $95) or evidence that the U.S. commercial book has stabilized and ROE is pushing back toward 15%. The Narrative layer's "fundamentals doing all the work" is right about the *type* of story but wrong about the direction — the fundamentals are working against the current multiple, not for it.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say CIBC has recovered sharply, but the valuation now assumes that recovery is durable enough to deserve a premium multiple. Revenue has climbed from $14.42B in 2021 to $20.99B in 2025, an 11.8% CAGR, while net income went from $4.63B to $6.07B despite the ugly dip to $3.60B in 2023. That means 2025 earnings are only about 31% above 2021 after four years and after a cyclical trough, not the kind of compounding that normally justifies 19.1x earnings and 2.5x book for a bank. The 2025 net margin of 28.9% is solid, and ROE at 13.1% is respectable, but that is the core issue: respectable is not the same as exceptional. A bank earning a 13% ROE trading at 2.5x book implies the market is paying almost 19% in implied P/E-to-ROE terms for a business whose returns do not clearly exceed the multiple being awarded.
What stands out most is the mismatch between the “cheap Canadian bank” narrative and the actual quoted valuation. At $107.56B market cap against $46.41B of equity, investors are valuing the franchise at a very healthy premium to book even though there is no evidence here of structurally superior profitability. If anything, the income history argues the opposite: 2022 net income was $4.48B, 2023 fell to $3.60B, 2024 rebounded to $5.13B, and 2025 reached $6.07B. That is a cyclical earnings path, not a smooth compounding machine. The model output calling the stock undervalued around $138-$141 looks too generous to me because it appears to extrapolate recent revenue and earnings momentum without fully penalizing how rate-sensitive and credit-cycle-sensitive bank earnings are. Operating cash flow of $9.83B supports dividend safety and capital flexibility, but banks are ultimately valued on normalized earnings power and book value growth, and on that basis I think CIBC is priced more like a high-quality steady compounder than like a bank coming off a favorable spread cycle.
The other thing I do not like is how little room there is for disappointment at this price. A dividend yield of 2.47% is not enough by itself to cushion multiple compression if earnings flatten. For a large diversified bank, a sub-2.5% yield and a 19x P/E mean investors are getting neither a distressed entry point nor an income-heavy total return setup. If 2025 net income of $6.07B is close to peak-ish earnings power under recently favorable conditions, then paying nearly 18x-19x for that stream is aggressive. I would be more constructive if the same earnings base were offered nearer 14x-15x earnings or closer to 1.8x-2.0x book, which would imply a share price materially below today’s $117.84. My base read is that the stock has rerated ahead of fundamentals and now sits in the zone where okay results are unlikely to be enough.
The best counterargument is straightforward and not trivial. Revenue has expanded by $6.57B since 2021, net income is at a new high, and ROE above 13% with a nearly 29% net margin is a strong outcome for a regulated bank. If one believes 2023 was the true aberration and 2024-2025 represent a higher recurring earnings base, then 2025’s 18.5% earnings growth and 13.8% revenue growth are not just rebound noise but evidence of durable franchise improvement. On that interpretation, the premium to book is justified because book value is being monetized efficiently, and the market cap of $107.56B against almost $10B of operating cash flow is not outrageous. I weigh that argument less heavily because the provided history is too short and too cyclical to prove a structural step-up, while the multiple already prices in a good deal of that optimism.
What would change my mind is simple: if CIBC can hold ROE at or above 13%-14% while continuing to grow revenue high single digits and net income into the $6.5B-$7.0B range over the next year without relying on benign credit or unusually supportive margins, then today’s valuation would look more defensible. Conversely, if earnings slip back toward the $5.0B-$5.5B range or revenue growth falls toward low single digits, the 19x P/E should not survive. I would become bullish on weakness closer to the low $90s, and I would turn more constructive at the current price only if the next annual print demonstrates that 2025 was not a cyclical high-water mark but a new normalized earnings floor.
Grok Reading
CIBC’s five-year revenue climb from $14.42B to $20.99B is the cleanest part of the tape: an 11.8% CAGR and a fresh 13.8% year-over-year print that looks nothing like a stagnant utility. Net income tells a more cyclical story—$4.63B in 2021, a trough of $3.60B in 2023, then a sharp recovery to $5.13B and $6.07B—so the 29.9% earnings CAGR is mostly the bounce off that trough, not a permanent re-rating of franchise power. At $117.84 the stock is capitalizing that $6.07B at roughly 19x earnings and 2.5x book against a 13.1% ROE and a thin 2.47% dividend yield. Operating cash flow of $9.83B against $46.41B of equity is solid, and the 28.9% net margin is excellent, but ROA of 75 basis points is ordinary bank economics dressed up by a rate cycle that has already peaked. The numbers say a mature Canadian oligopoly member had a very good two years; they do not say earnings power permanently stepped up to justify a multiple 50–70% above the historical 11–13x Canadian bank range.
The valuation synthesis calling for $141 (+19.5%) is the main object I reject. It leans on the recent earnings run-rate as if reserve releases and elevated net interest margins are a new steady state, while the same briefing flags mechanical margin compression and unavoidable provision normalization as the two heaviest bear weights. A 2.5x price-to-book on 13% ROE only works if the market is underwriting either a durable ROE lift toward the mid-teens or multi-year mid-teens earnings growth; neither is visible in the organic growth profile once rates roll over. Revenue confidence is high and the bank sits above sector benchmarks on several metrics, but that is already in the price after the move from the low $70s to $118. On traditional bank math—capitalizing mid-cycle earnings at a mid-cycle multiple—fair value clusters nearer $105–120, which leaves the shares fully valued to modestly rich at $117.84 rather than 20% cheap.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and numerate: revenue has compounded at nearly 12% through a messy rate and credit cycle, net income is up 69% from the 2023 low, cash generation covers the franchise, and Canadian banking remains an oligopoly with real pricing power and a growing wealth-management mix. A bull can fairly say the 19x multiple is the market correctly recognizing higher structural profitability and that any “discount” to a $140 DCF is free money for patient holders. I weigh that less heavily because the earnings CAGR is heavily trough-distorted, ROE has not broken into the 15–16% zone that would validate 2.5x book, and the dividend yield at 2.5% no longer compensates for multiple risk the way a 4% yield once did. The bear masses on margin compression and provision normalization are mechanical, not narrative; they do not require a recession to bite, only a normalization of the 2023–25 tailwinds already fading in the rate strip.
I would flip constructive on a sustained print of ROE at or above 15% with net interest margin holding within 10–15 basis points of the recent peak through the next two rate-cut quarters, or on a forward P/E compressing back toward 14x while earnings still grow mid-single digits. Conversely, a decisive break of $6B in annual net income or credit provisions re-accelerating toward 2023 levels would confirm the multiple is simply too high and push the stance firmly toward overvalued.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has compounded from 14.4B in 2021 to 21.0B in 2025 (roughly 10% CAGR) with net income growing from 4.63B to 6.07B, a clean recovery after the 2023 dip to 3.60B (credit provisioning cycle). Operating cash conversion is strong, with OCF/NI at 1.73x and FCF of 9.83B in 2025, comfortably funding the dividend and regulatory capital needs. Liquid cash of 8.92B and no external funding dependence support the mature-earner profile. Diluted share count moved from 923.7M to 983.5M over five years (~1.6% CAGR) - modest dilution typical of a DRIP-active Canadian bank, with SBC negligible at 0.1% of revenue. The 2024 dip to 705.8M shares looks like a data artifact (likely a period-average vs point-in-time issue) rather than a real buyback. The Altman Z of 0.16 flagged as distress is a false positive - the Z-score is not meaningful for banks whose balance sheets are structurally leveraged by deposits; Canadian Big Six banks are among the most regulated and capital-supervised institutions in the world. Accruals are clean at -0.4% of assets. The business is a classic oligopoly participant with stable ROE, protected by the concentrated Canadian banking structure, though exposed to Canadian housing/consumer credit cycles.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- CET1 ratio and OSFI capital buffer position
- Provision for credit losses trend and allowance coverage ratios (2024-2025)
- US office CRE exposure remaining and impairment status
- Actual share count reconciliation (2024 705.8M figure looks anomalous vs 2023/2025)
- Uninsured mortgage exposure and HELOC book quality
- Net interest margin trajectory and deposit beta
The e2e composite pins fair value at $137.93 (signal-adjusted $140.83) against a $116.82 price, implying ~19% upside. The anchored-PE method is the sole driver, which for a mature Canadian bank is a defensible anchor - earnings are the right lens for a diversified deposit-taker with stable ROE. Earnings quality is good, so no haircut is warranted; the Solid (60) quality grade supports paying a normal multiple rather than a punitive one. That said, a single-method FV deserves some humility, so I trim deserved value to roughly $130-135 - still meaningfully above spot.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- PCL (provisions for credit losses) trajectory in next 1-2 quarters, particularly US commercial
- Canadian residential mortgage renewal wave impact on NIM and delinquencies
- CET1 ratio and buyback pace
- Any guidance on efficiency ratio and expense discipline
The macro tape is modestly risk-on with a low VIX (14.9) and the S&P only 1.2% off highs, which is a light tailwind for a beta-1.28 name, but CM is a Canadian money-center bank, not a high-octane growth story, so the tape barely lands here. Narrative intensity is explicitly minimal and durability is high - the market is not telling a hot story about this stock, positive or negative, so there is no momentum trade to ride and no story-collapse to fear. Recent news flow is benign to mildly constructive: a Simply Wall St style piece flagging it as still cheap after a 247% run, a routine board appointment, and an AI advisor tool award - none of which move the tape meaningfully. The one recent 3.09% down day was tagged insufficient_data and attributed to broad sector/profit-taking, not a narrative crack. Analyst tone is not flagged as diverging. Net: this is a low-drama, dividend-and-book-value name where fundamentals do the work and sentiment is close to neutral, with a faint risk-on lean.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether Canadian bank peer tape (RY, TD, BNS) is rotating with CM or diverging - a sector-wide bid would flip this to a tailwind
- Any target-price revisions or downgrades in the next earnings cycle that would signal analyst tone breaking
- VIX behavior and 10y yield path - a rates-down move would materially help the whole Canadian bank cohort
- Whether the 'still cheap after 247% run' framing spreads or dies - a value-momentum narrative could form
CIBC is not an information business that AI can substitute; it is a licensed balance sheet wrapped in an information business. Cheap intelligence hits the wrapper: service, adjudication, compliance review, advisory documentation, trade support — plausibly several hundred basis points of efficiency ratio over five years, and CIBC starts with less peer-relative efficiency headroom to give away than it once had. The balance sheet itself is untouched: credit risk, capital and deposit insurance remain scarce and regulated. The genuine AI transmission risk is not disintermediation of the bank but disintermediation of customer inertia — the Big Six earn an oligopoly spread partly because switching is annoying, and agentic finance is a machine for making annoyance free. Net: cost tailwind is fairly reliable, revenue-side erosion is slower but structural, and the Canadian oligopoly means savings get partly competed into pricing.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Efficiency ratio trend by segment
- Headcount vs. revenue growth
- Technology spend as % of expense
- Canadian open-banking rollout timing
- Primary chequing account retention
- Mortgage renewal retention rate
- Wealth fee rate on AUM
- Deposit beta on personal accounts
The world is paying Canadian banks for the tail of a rate cycle: assets repriced upward, credit fears that never fully materialized releasing back into earnings, and asset prices lifting fee revenue. That is a real but finishing tailwind. Beneath it, CM's structure is intact — an oligopoly deposit franchise, four diversified segments, and a U.S. platform that supplies the only genuine geographic runway. What the world is changing underneath: Canadian household credit formation is the slowest engine in the mix (a decade of borrowing pulled forward), so future growth has to come disproportionately from wealth/fee businesses and the U.S. book rather than domestic mortgage volume. That is a lower-growth, higher-return-on-capital mix — good for stability, insufficient for double digits. AI intermediation is not a near-term threat to the deposit/lending unit economics; it is a cost-line story. So: growth persists, its composition shifts, and its rate steps down.
When we made this prediction on Aug 20, 2026, CM was $116.28. We expect it to be $130.75 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $108.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 20, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.