For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Edison International (EIX) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-11): Designation Low · Gem Score -31 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -53 · Value -16 · Sentiment -58 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $110.89 vs $70.14 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Edison International
EIX NYSEEdison International is an electric utility holding company that provides clean and reliable energy and energy services through its subsidiaries. Its core business is Southern California Edison, one of the largest electric utilities in the United States, which supplies and delivers electricity to residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, and public-sector customers across a broad service area in central, coastal, and Southern California. The company also operates Edison Energy, which offers energy advisory and sustainability services for commercial and industrial clients. Edison International plays an important role in the U.S. utilities market by supporting electricity transmission and distribution, grid reliability, energy efficiency, renewable energy integration, and customer-focused energy solutions. Headquartered in Rosemead, California, Edison International serves as a key infrastructure provider in one of the country’s most populous and economically important regions.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 11.55
Total Equity: $19.26B
Shares: 386,000,000
Total Debt: $40.39B
Cash: $158.00M
EBITDA: $10.33B
Total Debt: $40.39B
Cash: $158.00M
Revenue: $19.32B
Revenue: $19.32B
Revenue: $19.32B
Total Equity: $19.26B
Tax Rate: 21.5%
Equity: $19.26B
Total Debt: $40.39B
Cash: $158.00M
Current Liabilities: $10.54B
Long-Term Debt: $36.07B
Total Debt: $40.39B
Total Equity: $19.26B
Shares: 386,000,000
Shares: 386,000,000
CapEx: -$6.52B
Shares: 386,000,000
Stock Price: $70.15
Net Income: $4.46B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 29, 2026 4:35am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $14.9B | $17.2B | $16.3B | $17.6B | $19.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $13.4B | $15.7B | $13.7B | $14.7B | $12.2B |
| Operating Income | $1.5B | $1.5B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $7.1B |
| Net Income | — | — | $1.2B | $1.3B | $4.5B |
| EBITDA | $3.8B | $4.1B | $5.3B | $5.9B | $10.3B |
| EPS | $2.00 | $1.61 | $3.12 | $3.33 | $11.58 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.00 | $1.60 | $3.11 | $3.31 | $11.55 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 29, 2026 4:00am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $390.0M | $914.0M | $345.0M | $193.0M | $158.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $5.5B | $7.1B | $6.8B | $7.2B | $7.7B |
| Total Assets | $74.7B | $78.0B | $81.8B | $85.6B | $94.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $8.6B | $10.3B | $8.6B | $8.4B | $10.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $24.2B | $27.0B | $30.3B | $33.5B | $36.1B |
| Total Liabilities | $57.0B | $60.5B | $63.8B | $67.8B | $74.8B |
| Total Equity | $17.8B | $17.5B | $17.9B | $17.7B | $19.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $7.9B | $7.5B | $7.5B | $7.6B | $10.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 29, 2026 4:35am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $11.0M | $3.2B | $3.4B | $5.0B | $5.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$5.5B | -$5.8B | -$5.4B | -$5.7B | -$6.5B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$5.5B | -$2.6B | -$2.0B | -$693.0M | -$715.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $4.4B | $4.9B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $3.1B |
| Dividends Paid | -$988.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.2B | -$1.3B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | $0 | $0 | -$200.0M | -$32.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $305.0M | $523.0M | -$385.0M | $152.0M | $36.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 29, 2026 4:35am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +15.5% | -5.1% | +7.7% | +9.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +0.4% | +77.1% | +11.5% | +142.1% |
| Net Income Growth | — | — | +7.3% | +247.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +9.3% | +29.9% | +9.7% | +76.0% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 29, 2026 4:00am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-07 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-07 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-07 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-07 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-07 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-07 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-07 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-07 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-08 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-28 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-28 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-03 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-30 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-29 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-29 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-01 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-30 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-30 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-29 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-29 04:47The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: EIX is a $28B market cap regulated utility with $40.4B of debt against $19.3B equity (2.1x D/E), $158M cash, and negative FCF of -$715M in 2025 as capex ($6.5B) swamped operating cash flow ($5.8B). The 2025 reported net income of $4.46B — driving that 6x P/E — is materially inflated by lumpy items: Q1 2025 shows a 37.7% net margin and Q4 2025 shows 35.4%, versus 7-14% in every other quarter. Strip out those two spikes and normalized earnings look closer to $2.0-2.5B, putting a "clean" P/E at 11-14x, not 6x. The synthesis model's $119 DCF fair value almost certainly extrapolates the flattered 2025 op income of $7.09B (vs $2.9B in 2024 and $2.6B in 2023) — that's a garbage-in problem, not a hidden compounder.
The pre-flight note that the earnings spike "appears anomalous (likely wildfire settlement or regulatory item)" is exactly right and should have flowed downstream, but the synthesis engine ignored it and produced a +70% upside signal anyway. That's the central contradiction in the prior model stack: pre-flight flags the earnings as non-recurring, momentum then reports 93% earnings CAGR and 247% YoY as if it's real, and synthesis anchors fair value on that inflated base. The narrative layer at least honestly frames the debate — fallen-angel with unresolved wildfire tail risk — but its "anchored" designation is generous when the fundamental anchor itself is a one-time gain. A 4.9% dividend yield with a 29% payout ratio on real (not GAAP-inflated) earnings is more like a 50-60% payout, which is normal for a utility, not the fortress coverage the bull story implies.
The contrarian case a skeptic would press: California wildfire liability is not a solved problem. AB 1054's wildfire fund is finite ($21B), and a single catastrophic season (Eaton Fire exposure is live) can burn through utility contributions and force equity issuance. EIX carries 2.1x debt/equity with 0.73 current ratio and needs to fund $6.5B/yr of capex indefinitely in a rising-rate environment — every 100bps of refi cost on $40B of debt is $400M of pretax income, roughly 20% of normalized earnings. Interest coverage on normalized EBIT is thin. The insider tape is uninformative — all April 2026 grants, one tiny 500-share sale — no cluster buying that would signal management sees the discount as real. Decelerating quarterly revenue trend (Q1 2026 at $4.10B is the weakest print in the series) undercuts the rate-base growth story.
I dissent from the synthesis "fair_value / +70% upside" framing and land closer to fairly-valued-to-modestly-undervalued. On normalized ~$2.2B earnings and ~55M shares, EPS is roughly $5.70, and a peer-appropriate 13-14x multiple (discounted from the ~17x sector for genuine California/wildfire overhang) gets you $74-80 — call it 5-15% upside plus a 4.9% yield, so a 10-20% total return case, not 70%. The market's 6x headline P/E is not mispricing so much as correctly discounting a non-recurring earnings base. The narrative layer's bear thesis (California-specific liability trap, capex ROI compression) is the more honest read of why the discount exists. I'd own EIX as a yield-plus-modest-capital-return utility position, not as a 70% mispricing. Fair value $75-82; not a table-pounder either way, and the thesis genuinely does hinge on wildfire season outcomes and the next GRC decision — measurable via Eaton Fire settlement disclosures and CPUC rate case rulings over the next 2-4 quarters.
GPT Reading
At $70, EIX looks cheap on the surface and only cheap on the surface. The 6.1x P/E, 1.4x book, and 4.9% dividend yield scream utility bargain, but the earnings base behind that multiple is clearly distorted. 2025 net income was $4.46B on $19.32B of revenue, versus $1.28B on $17.60B in 2024 and $1.20B in 2023. That is not the profile of a suddenly transformed regulated utility; it is the profile of a company with large episodic items running through the P&L. You can see it in the quarterly margins: 37.7% in 1Q25 and 35.4% in 4Q25, surrounded by more normal-looking 7.6% to 14.5% quarters. For a regulated electric utility, reported earnings are a poor anchor when they jump from roughly $1.2B to $4.5B in one year while free cash flow remains negative. If I normalize earnings closer to the 2023-2024 run rate plus modest rate-base growth, the stock is not trading at 6x earnings; it is closer to a low-teens multiple, which is much less obviously mispriced.
The balance sheet is the real governor on valuation. EIX ended 2025 with $40.39B of debt against just $158M of cash and $19.26B of equity, a debt-to-equity ratio of 2.1x and a current ratio below 0.73x. Operating cash flow of $5.80B sounds solid until you put it beside $6.52B of capex, leaving free cash flow at negative $715M. That is not unusual for a utility in investment mode, but it does mean the equity story depends on uninterrupted capital-market access and constructive regulation. A utility can carry heavy leverage if its allowed returns, recovery mechanisms, and legal environment are stable; California wildfire exposure means EIX does not get to enjoy the same valuation as a plain-vanilla southeastern utility. The market is not irrational for haircutting a business that is simultaneously levered, capex-hungry, cash-flow negative after investment, and exposed to low-frequency/high-severity liabilities.
What stands out most is the contradiction between model-driven “massive upside” logic and the underlying quality of the earnings stream being capitalized. EV/EBITDA at 6.5x and P/B at 1.4x are not demanding if you believe the 2025 step-up is durable and liability risk is over-feared. I don’t. Revenue growth is respectable — from $14.91B in 2021 to $19.32B in 2025, about 6%-7% annualized on the annual figures — but that is exactly what a utility should produce through rate base and tariff recovery. It does not justify treating 2025 profitability as a new steady state. The dividend looks covered on the reported 28.6% payout ratio, yet if normalized earnings are materially lower than 2025’s $4.46B, that cushion is less generous than it appears, especially with external funding needs. My read is that the stock deserves a discount, just not because the franchise is weak; it deserves one because accounting earnings overstate distributable economics and because tail risk belongs in the multiple.
The best argument against my caution is straightforward: even after normalizing away some of the 2025 jump, the stock may still be inexpensive. Annual revenue rose to $19.32B, recent quarterly revenue was up 9.8% year over year, and 1Q26 net income of $531M on $4.10B of revenue was still better than many historical quarters without relying on the most extreme 2025 spikes. If the regulatory construct allows most wildfire-related and grid-hardening costs to be recovered, then the right lens is not free cash flow but rate-base compounding. On that view, negative FCF is a feature of utility growth, not a flaw, and 1.4x book for a sector leader with a near-5% yield could be undemanding. A smart bull would also say the market has already embedded a very large California-risk discount, so any evidence that catastrophic liability outcomes are less severe than feared could rerate the stock quickly.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2025 was not a one-off earnings mirage and that the liability discount should compress. Concretely, if EIX can produce something like $2.0B-$2.5B of annualized net income excluding unusual items, keep quarterly margins in a sustainable low-teens range rather than bouncing between 8% and 35%+, and move operating cash flow meaningfully above capex so free cash flow approaches breakeven without equity dilution, then I would view $70 as too low. Just as important would be legal and regulatory clarity that caps wildfire downside or confirms timely cost recovery. Absent that, I think investors anchoring on the headline 6x P/E are paying too little attention to how fragile that “E” is.
Grok Reading
The numbers that jump out first are not the headline multiples but the earnings quality behind them. Edison printed $4.46B of net income in 2025 on $19.32B of revenue—more than triple the $1.28B earned in 2024 and nearly four times the $1.20B of 2023—while operating income leapt from $2.93B to $7.09B. The quarterly pattern exposes the distortion: margins swung from 37.7% and 35.4% in two quarters down to 7.6% and 12.9% in others, and the first quarter of 2026 already snapped back to a more ordinary $531M of net income on $4.10B of revenue. A 6.1x trailing P/E and 6.5x EV/EBITDA are therefore optical bargains built on non-recurring items, almost certainly wildfire-related recoveries or regulatory true-ups rather than a new steady-state earnings power. Strip the spike and you are looking at something closer to a mid-teens multiple on normalized mid-$1B to low-$2B earnings—still inexpensive for a regulated electric utility, but no longer a deep-value mirage.
What is durable is the top line and the reinvestment cycle. Revenue grew from $14.91B in 2021 to $19.32B in 2025 (roughly 8.7% CAGR), with recent year-over-year still near 10%. Operating cash flow of $5.80B easily funds the dividend at a 28.6% payout and a 4.9% yield, even while free cash flow runs negative $715M on $6.52B of capex. That capex is the rate-base growth engine; for a California IOU it is the primary path to allowed returns. Balance-sheet leverage is the real constraint: $40.39B of debt against $158M of cash, a 2.1x debt-to-equity ratio, and a 0.73 current ratio leave little margin for error on refinancing or an unexpected liability spike. ROE of 23% and a 37% operating margin are not sustainable regulated returns—allowed ROEs live nearer 9–11%—so any model that capitalizes the 2025 print at a clean-utility multiple is overstating intrinsic value by a wide margin. The $111–$119 composite fair-value figures in the prior synthesis look unreasonably optimistic once earnings are normalized; a more grounded range sits nearer $85–95, still implying meaningful upside from $70 but not seventy percent.
The market narrative is correctly focused on California wildfire tail risk and the PG&E precedent, and that story explains most of the discount to peer multiples. Yet the data also show a company that continues to grow rate base, collect a mid-single-digit yield, and generate multi-billion operating cash flow while the regulatory recovery mechanisms have improved since the last crisis cycle. Insider activity is noise—mostly routine awards and a trivial 500-share sale—and does not signal distress. The contradiction I catch is between the rule-based “mature earner” label and the secondary flag of weak FCF quality: this is a classic heavy-capex utility, not a free-cash compounder, and it should be underwritten on rate-base ROE and regulatory lag, not on a single year’s inflated net income.
The strongest case against this read is straightforward: if even half of the 2025 earnings power proves sticky through higher authorized rate base and wildfire-hardening cost recovery, then the stock is dramatically cheap, the 6x multiple is real, and $110-plus is achievable without heroic assumptions. Bears who stay short also have to explain why revenue keeps compounding near 9–10% and why the payout ratio remains so conservative if the equity is truly impaired. I weigh that argument down because the quarterly mean-reversion is already visible in early 2026, the balance sheet cannot absorb another multi-billion unrecoverable hit without dilutive consequences, and regulated returns simply do not stay at 23% ROE. The discount is partly earned; it is not pure panic.
What would flip the verdict is a clean full-year 2026 net income print that holds above roughly $2.2–2.5B without one-time credits, paired with any material reduction in wildfire liability reserves or a constructive CPUC decision that locks in higher equity returns on the incremental grid and vegetation-management spend. Conversely, another large uninsured fire season or a punitive regulatory order that strands capex would justify the current discount and push the stock toward the low $50s.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Edison International is a California regulated electric utility (SCE) - a mature earner with revenue growing from $14.9B in 2021 to $19.3B in 2025 and reported operating margins expanding sharply to 36.7% in 2025 (likely reflecting wildfire cost recovery/regulatory items rather than a true structural step-up). Net income of $4.46B in 2025 looks strong on paper, and OCF/NI at 2.68x with negative accruals (-2.8% of assets) suggests reported earnings are not being inflated by aggressive accrual choices. Share count is essentially flat (0.4% CAGR), so per-share value is not being diluted away.
The problem is the balance sheet and cash conversion. Net debt is roughly $40.2B against $158M of liquid cash, short-term debt of $4.32B dwarfs cash, and FCF has been deeply negative every year shown (-$5.5B, -$2.6B, -$2.1B, -$693M, -$715M). Altman Z of 0.81 sits in the classical distress zone. This is structurally a capex-heavy, debt-financed utility whose 'runway' math looks alarming in isolation but is masked by continuous access to capital markets - that access is the entire business model, and it is contingent on regulatory outcomes and wildfire liability resolution. Insider tape is unremarkable: routine director awards and small $37K sales by one officer, no meaningful buying.
Quality read: earnings integrity looks acceptable, dilution discipline is fine, but survival math depends wholly on continued capital-market access and regulatory support, and free cash flow has never turned positive in the window shown.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Composition of 2025 net income jump to $4.46B - how much is one-time wildfire cost recovery or regulatory true-ups vs recurring earnings
- Status of AB1054 wildfire insurance fund contributions and any outstanding uninsured wildfire liability claims
- Maturity ladder and weighted average cost of the $40B+ debt stack, and whether any covenants are near triggers
- SCE authorized ROE and current GRC cycle status with the CPUC
- HoldCo (EIX) vs OpCo (SCE) debt allocation and structural subordination
The e2e composite fair value of $111 and signal-adjusted $119 imply ~60-70% upside, but these need heavy sanity-checking. The anchored-PE method spits out $205 which is absurd for a California utility with negative FCF and an Altman Z of 0.81; that number is a runaway and should be discounted. The EPV floor of $17.56 is the other extreme, reflecting near-zero owner earnings once you charge for maintenance capex. Triangulating: a fair regulated-utility multiple of ~13-15x on normalized EPS (EIX has guided ~$5.50-6.00 range historically) lands deserved value in the $75-90 zone before wildfire haircut, call it $70-80 after a prudent liability discount. Against a $70 price, that is essentially fair to modestly cheap - maybe 5-15% below deserved, not 70%. What's priced in: the market already sees the wildfire tail, chronic negative FCF, and California regulatory friction. What's not fully priced: constructive AB1054 protection, rate-base CAGR into grid hardening, and a normalization of the fear discount if no major fire season materializes. The gap is real but modest, not a fat pitch.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest wildfire liability accrual and AB1054 fund balance
- 2025 rate case outcome and authorized ROE
- Actual maintenance vs growth capex split to test the EPV floor
- Equity issuance guidance - dilution risk from funding negative FCF
- Forward EPS guidance for normalized multiple math
The dominant force on EIX today is a live, name-specific narrative shock: PG&E just dropped 7.5% on Aug 28 into an Aug 31 legislative deadline on California wildfire-liability protections, and EIX is the co-defendant in that same narrative complex (Eaton Fire meetings still being scheduled). This is a classic fallen-angel setup where the story, not the fundamentals, sets the price, and the story is loudest exactly this week. Analyst tone and momentum are constructive (strong positive trend, 8.7% CAGR), but they are being drowned out by binary regulatory-headline risk into a hard date. The macro tape is a mild risk-on (+35, VIX 14), which normally helps, but on a beta-0.65 regulated utility the market backdrop barely registers - the tape doesn't rescue a name whose price is being set by Sacramento, not the S&P. Net: moderate, directional headwind pressure with an identifiable near-term catalyst that could flip it either way.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Aug 31 California wildfire-liability legislative outcome - binary catalyst that could flip pressure to strong tailwind or strong headwind
- Any target-price revisions or downgrades from utility analysts in the wake of the PG&E move
- Whether EIX trades in sympathy with PG&E day-of, or decouples (a decoupling would signal narrative fatigue)
- 10y yield direction - a rally in bonds would materially ease the utility-cohort press
The world is spending enormously to rebuild and expand electric grids — electrification, renewable interconnection, and rising large-load demand all push authorized utility investment up, and regulators broadly permit recovery. That is a structural tailwind EIX cannot easily lose access to: SCE is the monopoly wire in a large, essential service territory. The counter-current is that the same climate transition that creates the capex also creates the wildfire liability, and California is the epicenter of both. So EIX sits at the intersection of the strongest secular demand story in utilities and the sharpest tail risk in the sector. Higher long rates make the capex more expensive to fund and make the gap between authorized ROE and true cost of capital the quiet governor on real growth.
When we made this prediction on Aug 29, 2026, EIX was $70.14. We expect it to be $75.50 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $60.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 29, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.