Business Description
Symbotic Inc., an automation technology company, provides robotics and technology to improve efficiency for retailers and wholesalers in the United States. It offers The Symbotic System, a full-service warehouse automation system that reduces costs, improves efficiency, and maximizes inventory. The company is based in Wilmington, Massachusetts.
Business History
Generated: Jun 1, 2026 6:53pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:50pm (25d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.16
Total Equity: $221.32M
Shares: 108,670,159
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.24B
EBITDA: -$48.00M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.24B
Revenue: $2.25B
Shares: 108,670,159
Revenue: $2.25B
Revenue: $2.25B
Revenue: $2.25B
Total Equity: $221.32M
Tax Rate: 1.8%
Equity: $221.32M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.24B
Current Liabilities: $1.73B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $221.32M
Shares: 108,670,159
Shares: 108,670,159
CapEx: -$79.03M
Shares: 108,670,159
Stock Price: $48.40
Net Income: -$16.94M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The headline numbers look transformational: revenue went from $252M (2021) to $2.25B (2025), gross margin recovered to 18.8%, and FCF swung from -$102.5M in 2024 to +$787.9M in 2025. Net cash is $1.24B, Altman Z 9.79, no Beneish flags. On the surface, a self-funding automation platform. But the cash flow profile is wildly lumpy — FCF was +$97M, -$166M, +$210M, -$103M, +$788M over five years — which is the signature of milestone/deposit-driven working capital on large Walmart deployments, not steady operating cash. OCF/NI of -11x and accruals at -26% of assets confirm cash is running massively ahead of accounting earnings (still a $-16.9M net loss in 2025), which the module reads as 'high quality' but is more honestly read as customer prepayments masking an unprofitable business.
The dilution story is the killer. Diluted shares went 50.7M → 108.7M in four years — a 21% CAGR, more than doubling — with SBC at 8.2% of revenue and zero buyback offset. At a $31B cap on $2.25B revenue (13.8x sales) for a company still losing money on an operating basis (-5.1% op margin), every point of per-share value is being handed to employees and early holders. And right on cue: SoftBank/SVF dumped 11.2M shares for $563.6M on May 27, 2026 at ~$50. That is not a trim — that is a sponsor exit at the exact price the AI critique flagged as overvalued. Combined with 39 sells / 0 buys over 12 months ($572M sold), the smart money is leaving through the front door.
The bull case requires (a) the FCF print to be a new baseline rather than a working-capital pull-forward, (b) customer diversification beyond Walmart, and (c) dilution to decelerate. None of those are evidenced in the data here. The bear case — lumpy project revenue, single-customer concentration, dilution machine, sponsor exit — is consistent with everything on the tape.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:57pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $251.9M | $593.3M | $1.2B | $1.8B | $2.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $241.5M | $493.7M | $967.4M | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Gross Profit | $10.4M | $99.6M | $209.5M | $279.1M | $422.6M |
| Operating Expenses | $132.8M | $240.0M | $432.7M | $395.8M | $537.6M |
| Operating Income | -$122.4M | -$140.4M | -$223.2M | -$116.7M | -$115.0M |
| Net Income | -$122.3M | -$79.0M | -$23.9M | -$13.5M | -$16.9M |
| EBITDA | -$117.9M | -$134.4M | -$189.9M | -$60.1M | -$48.0M |
| EPS | $-19.03 | $-0.13 | $-0.37 | $-0.08 | $-0.16 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:53pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $156.6M | $353.5M | $258.8M | $727.3M | $1.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $260.4M | $605.4M | $991.8M | $1.4B | $1.9B |
| Total Assets | $280.5M | $631.3M | $1.1B | $1.6B | $2.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $337.0M | $523.0M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $1.4B | $562.3M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.9B |
| Total Equity | -$1.1B | $7.2M | $82,000 | $197.2M | $221.3M |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.2B | -$1.3B | -$1.3B | -$1.3B | -$1.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:57pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $109.6M | -$148.2M | $230.8M | -$58.1M | $866.9M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$12.2M | -$18.0M | -$21.3M | -$44.4M | -$79.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $97.4M | -$166.2M | $209.5M | -$102.5M | $787.9M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$141.8M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $98.4M | $196.8M | -$92.5M | $469.4M | $516.8M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:50pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$3.6B $3.3B – $4.1B
|
$4.5B $4.4B – $4.5B
|
$5.4B $5.1B – $6.0B
|
$6.8B $6.4B – $7.5B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.2B $1.1B – $1.4B
|
$1.6B $1.5B – $1.6B
|
$1.9B $1.8B – $2.1B
|
$2.4B $2.2B – $2.6B
|
| Net Income |
$76.5M $71.5M – $81.4M
|
$82.7M $64.4M – $101.0M
|
$321.7M $297.7M – $362.2M
|
$353.2M $326.9M – $397.7M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:57pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +135.5% | +98.4% | +51.9% | +25.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +853.8% | +110.2% | +33.2% | +51.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | -14.7% | -59.0% | +47.7% | +1.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +35.4% | +69.8% | +43.5% | -25.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | -14.0% | -41.3% | +68.4% | +20.1% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:56pm (25d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | KRASNOW TODD | J-Other | 2,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | KRASNOW TODD | J-Other | 2,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | KRASNOW TODD | J-Other | 2,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | KRASNOW TODD | S-Sale | 483.00 | $45.97 | $22,201 |
| 2026-06-01 | KRASNOW TODD | S-Sale | 348.00 | $47.02 | $16,365 |
| 2026-06-01 | KRASNOW TODD | S-Sale | 1,101.00 | $47.90 | $52,739 |
| 2026-06-01 | KRASNOW TODD | S-Sale | 68.00 | $48.51 | $3,299 |
| 2026-06-01 | KANE CHARLES | J-Other | 2,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | KANE CHARLES | J-Other | 2,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | KANE CHARLES | J-Other | 2,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | KANE CHARLES | S-Sale | 2,000.00 | $45.99 | $91,980 |
| 2026-05-27 | SVF Sponsor III (DE) LLC | S-Sale | 5,590,000.00 | $50.42 | $281.8M |
| 2026-05-27 | SOFTBANK GROUP CORP. | S-Sale | 5,590,000.00 | $50.42 | $281.8M |
| 2026-05-23 | Kuffner James | M-Exempt | 9,749.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Kuffner James | S-Sale | 3,878.00 | $53.51 | $207,501 |
| 2026-05-23 | Kuffner James | M-Exempt | 9,749.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-22 | KRASNOW TODD | J-Other | 19,655.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-22 | KRASNOW TODD | J-Other | 19,655.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-22 | KRASNOW TODD | G-Gift | 5,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-22 | KRASNOW TODD | G-Gift | 5,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Reading the raw tape first: revenue has compounded from $252M (FY21) to $2.25B (FY25) — a 73% CAGR — and the most recent quarter ($676.5M) annualizes to ~$2.7B, with sequential growth of 7.4%, 2.0%, 4.5%, 7.7% across the last four quarters. That's decelerating, as flagged, but still ~25% YoY. Gross margin moved from 4% to 18.8% — real operating leverage on hardware/integration revenue is rare and notable. Net income just crossed into the black ($2.0M and $2.6M the last two quarters) after a string of small losses. The eye-catcher is the cash flow statement: $866.9M operating CF and $787.9M FCF on $2.25B revenue (35% FCF margin) while GAAP operating income is -$115M. That gap is almost certainly customer deposits/deferred revenue from Walmart and GreenBox prepayments — i.e., it's working-capital float, not earnings power. The "Poor Cash Flow Quality" tag in the secondary signals is correct and the synthesis underweights it.
On valuation: $31B market cap on $2.25B FY25 revenue is 13.8x sales; on TTM run-rate (~$2.5B) it's ~12.4x; on forward $2.7-3.0B it's ~10-11x. For an industrial integrator with 19% gross margins and roughly breakeven GAAP, that's still a software multiple on a systems-integration business. Reverse-DCF math: to justify $31B you need something like $5-6B revenue and 15%+ operating margins by 2030 — plausible only if (a) Walmart's 42-site rollout completes on schedule and (b) at least 5-10 new tier-1 retailers sign on. Today's reality is that Walmart + GreenBox is essentially the entire backlog. That's not "customer concentration risk" as a footnote — it IS the business.
Where I disagree with the prior models: the synthesis says "High Conviction Required" which is a dodge — it's effectively a hold rating dressed up. Market Forces is more honest ("avoid at current levels") and I lean that direction, but for a different reason than insider selling. The 5.59M-share sale on May 27, 2026 at ~$48 is ~$270M from a single filer — that's not "trimming," that's a meaningful unloading, and it's happening AFTER the stock already halved from $88. Insiders who held through the drawdown and are selling at $48 are telling you they don't see $80 returning soon. The pre-flight thesis is right that the 45% drawdown reflects either concentration or competitive concerns — I'd add a third: the market is realizing the $787M FCF is float, not earnings, and as deployment cadence normalizes that working-capital tailwind reverses. EV/EBITDA of 910x isn't a "bad multiple," it's telling you EBITDA is essentially zero on $2.25B of revenue — five years in.
The contrarian case I'd actually take seriously: gross margin going from 4% → 19% in four years is not a fluke, and if it reaches 25-28% as scale and software/services mix grow, the model works at a much lower revenue base than bulls assume. Symbotic genuinely has no direct public-market comp — AutoStore is smaller and weaker, Ocado is a different model, Amazon Robotics is captive. If Walmart's rollout proves out and one more anchor (Target, Kroger, Albertsons) signs, the narrative re-rates fast. But "fragile durability" in the narrative read is correct: this stock is one missed deployment quarter or one Amazon-Robotics-goes-external announcement from $30. At 12x forward sales with breakeven earnings, no margin of safety, decelerating sequential growth, and insiders dumping into the bounce, I dissent from "High Conviction Required" as too neutral. Fair value on a probability-weighted scenario (40% base $35, 35% bull $65, 25% bear $20) is roughly $40 — below current. The FCF number is misleading; the customer base is one name; the multiple still demands perfection.
GPT Critique
Symbotic Inc. presents an intriguing case as an industrial player with a rapid revenue growth trajectory, rising from $251.9M in 2021 to $2.25B in 2025. This represents a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 73%, marking it as a standout in the industrial machinery sector. Recent quarterly revenue figures show continued growth, with the latest quarter at $676.5M. However, this growth has been accompanied by a slim net income margin, just crossing into profitability in the last two quarters with margins of 0.3% and 0.4%. The balance sheet reveals a strong cash position of $1.24B but lacks transparency on total equity, which is essential for assessing financial robustness. The company's cash flow statement is another point of interest, showing substantial operating cash flows of $866.9M, which is likely influenced by working capital adjustments such as customer deposits, rather than pure earnings strength.
Opus argues that Symbotic's current valuation is overextended, pegging a fair value between $35-40 due to float-inflated free cash flow and insider selling at $48. I agree with Opus's assessment of overvaluation, particularly given the 13.8x sales multiple that seems unsustainable for a company with such thin margins and an EV/EBITDA ratio of 910x, indicating negligible earnings. Where I diverge is on the implications of insider selling. While Opus considers this a strong signal of overvaluation, I am more concerned about the single-customer dependency, with Walmart and GreenBox constituting the bulk of the business. This concentration risk is more ominous than insider sales, as it fundamentally challenges the business model's resilience.
I concur with Opus that the narrative economics surrounding Symbotic are fragile. The market appears to price in a flawless execution of growth strategies, expecting significant expansion into new tier-1 retailers, which is far from assured. The historical pattern of insider transactions, particularly large block sales, does underscore management's potential lack of confidence in the stock's near-term price recovery. However, I see potential in the gross margin expansion from 4% to 19%, suggesting operational leverage that could be capitalized upon if the company successfully diversifies its client base.
A careful skeptic might argue that both views underestimate the potential for Symbotic to leverage its technological edge in a rapidly automating retail sector. If the company can secure additional anchor clients beyond Walmart, this could catalyze a narrative shift. The skeptic would highlight the ongoing improvements in gross margin as evidence of Symbotic's capacity to transition towards a more software-centric model, potentially supporting higher multiples.