Business Description
Masco Corporation is a prominent global manufacturer and distributor of home improvement and building products, serving markets across North America, Europe, and other international regions. The company operates through two main segments. Its Plumbing Products division offers a vast array of items, from fixtures like faucets, showerheads, and valves to comprehensive bathing solutions such as tubs, shower bases, sinks, and toilets. This segment also provides high-end offerings like spas, exercise pools, and fitness systems, alongside crucial plumbing system components made from brass, copper, and composites, as well as connected water technologies, thermoplastic solutions, and PEX tubing. These products are sold under numerous recognized brands, including DELTA, HANSGROHE, KRAUS, HOT SPRING, and ENDLESS POOLS. The Decorative Architectural Products segment enhances both the aesthetic and functional aspects of homes. Its portfolio includes various paints, primers, specialty coatings, stains, and waterproofing products, along with associated applicators. It also supplies diverse cabinet and door hardware, functional hardware, wall plates, closet organization systems, and picture hanging accessories. Additionally, this segment provides decorative bath hardware, mirrors, shower doors, and a wide selection of indoor and outdoor lighting fixtures, such as ceiling fans, landscape lighting, and LED systems. Key brands in this segment include BEHR, KILZ, LIBERTY, and KICHLER. Masco distributes its extensive product range through a broad network of channels, encompassing plumbing, heating, and hardware wholesalers; home centers and online retailers; independent hardware stores; electrical and landscape distributors; lighting showrooms; building supply outlets; and various mass merchandisers. Masco Corporation was founded in 1929 and is headquartered in Livonia, Michigan.
Business History
Generated: Jun 16, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:00am (11d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.88
Total Equity: -$186.00M
Shares: 210,000,000
Total Debt: $3.20B
Cash: $647.00M
EBITDA: $1.38B
Total Debt: $3.20B
Cash: $647.00M
Revenue: $7.56B
Revenue: $7.56B
Revenue: $7.56B
Total Equity: -$186.00M
Tax Rate: 24.4%
Equity: -$186.00M
Total Debt: $3.20B
Cash: $647.00M
Current Liabilities: $1.57B
Long-Term Debt: $3.15B
Total Debt: $3.20B
Total Equity: -$186.00M
Shares: 210,000,000
Shares: 210,000,000
CapEx: -$156.00M
Shares: 210,000,000
Stock Price: $74.33
Net Income: $810.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Masco is a textbook mature_earner: revenue has actually declined from $8.38B (2021) to $7.56B (2025), yet gross margin expanded from 34.2% to 35.5% and operating margin held in a tight 15-17% band, peaking at 17.5% in 2024. That is the signature of a disciplined operator with pricing power and cost control in a soft demand environment — they are protecting unit economics rather than chasing volume. FCF has averaged ~$870M/yr over five years ($866M in 2025), and OCF/NI of 1.48x with accruals at -5.6% of assets confirms earnings are backed by real cash.
Capital return is the standout: diluted share count has fallen from 251M to 210M (-4.4% CAGR), buyback/SBC ratio of 5,926% means management is genuinely shrinking the float, not laundering comp. Earnings quality flags are clean (Beneish -2.67, Altman Z 4.12 safe). The blemish is the balance sheet — net debt of $2.56B against only $647M cash — but at ~3x FCF coverage of net debt, this is a constraint, not a survival issue. Insider activity is neutral; the March 2026 Payne sales (~$1.1M total) are immaterial relative to scale.
The real quality question is durability: revenue is down ~10% over five years. Is this housing-cycle softness or share loss? Margins suggest the former, but the trajectory deserves watching — a great mature_earner compounds per-share FCF, and Masco is doing that mechanically via buybacks while the underlying business stagnates.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Whether revenue decline is end-market (housing/R&R weakness) or share loss in Plumbing Products vs. Decorative Architectural segments
- Customer concentration with Home Depot/Lowe's (Behr is famously HD-exclusive) — single-customer risk
- Debt maturity schedule and weighted average coupon — refinancing risk on the $2.56B net debt
- Whether buybacks are funded by FCF or incremental debt — debt levels over the 5-year buyback period
- Net income jump from $406M (2021) to $842M (2022) despite revenue only growing 3.6% — was 2021 depressed by one-timer?
- Organic vs. M&A/divestiture composition of revenue decline (Masco divested Cabinetry/Windows in prior years)
The valuation stack lines up bearish: EPV floor $44, anchored-PE $68, composite FV $55.87, and signal-adjusted FV $48.49 — every method sits below the $74.33 print, implying ~25-35% downside to deserved value. Even the most generous anchor (anchored-PE at $67.64) leaves no margin of safety; it implies you're paying full multiple on mid-cycle earnings with the top line already contracting.
What's priced in: continued R&R resilience, sustained premium pricing in Plumbing, and the buyback continuing to manufacture per-share growth. That's plausible but not cheap — it's the bull case as base case. Earnings quality is high (no haircut needed), and the business is genuinely Strong (quality 67), which justifies pushing deserved value toward the upper end of the range (~$60-65), but not to $74. The gap isn't catastrophic, but it's clearly on the wrong side of fair.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- R&R volume vs price split in latest segment disclosures — is pricing masking unit declines?
- Forward guidance on Plumbing margin sustainability into 2025
- Buyback pace and remaining authorization — how much of EPS growth is share count
- New residential construction exposure % and order book commentary
- Any one-time gains/insurance recoveries inflating reported margins
MAS sits in the worst sentiment quadrant for a cyclical: a 'cyclical-late-stage' narrative with fragile durability, low cult coefficient, and a bear case (cracking affordability, rolling-over starts, R&R cycle turn) that is louder and more topical than the bull case. With beta 1.31 and consumer-cyclical exposure, the neutral tape (VIX 17, S&P off 1.8% from highs, 10y at 4.47%) lands harder here than on a defensive compounder - any risk-off twitch gets amplified. Momentum is already negative (-2.6% CAGR, weakening cash gen), confirming flows are not on this name's side. Analyst tone is the one offset: consensus Buy with a $82.6 target (~11% upside), but zero revisions this month signals a stale, backward-looking endorsement that has not been refreshed against the housing-rollover narrative - a classic divergence where sell-side lags the story. No fresh positive news catalyst, no AI/secular halo, no cult bid. Net pressure is a moderate headwind: nothing is crashing the stock, but nothing is pushing it up either, and the prevailing housing-affordability story leans against it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Housing starts and existing-home-sales prints - any further rollover hardens the bear narrative
- Whether sell-side begins cutting targets (revision count turning negative would confirm the analyst-tone divergence resolving down)
- 10y yield direction - a break below 4.2% would partially relieve the housing-sentiment overhang
- Any peer (Fortune Brands, Whirlpool) commentary that sets sector tone into earnings
- VIX behavior - a move above 20 would amplify the beta-driven headwind materially
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:05am (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $8.4B | $8.7B | $8.0B | $7.8B | $7.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $5.5B | $6.0B | $5.2B | $5.0B | $4.9B |
| Gross Profit | $2.9B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $2.7B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.4B |
| Operating Income | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.3B |
| Net Income | $406.0M | $842.0M | $908.0M | $822.0M | $810.0M |
| EBITDA | $951.0M | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.4B |
| EPS | $1.63 | $3.65 | $4.04 | $3.77 | $3.88 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:00am (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $926.0M | $452.0M | $634.0M | $634.0M | $647.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $3.4B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.7B | $2.8B |
| Total Assets | $5.6B | $5.2B | $5.4B | $5.0B | $5.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $3.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $5.5B | $5.4B | $5.2B | $5.1B | $5.1B |
| Total Equity | -$179.0M | -$480.0M | -$126.0M | -$280.0M | -$186.0M |
| Retained Earnings | -$652.0M | -$947.0M | -$596.0M | -$693.0M | -$688.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:05am (11d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $930.0M | $840.0M | $1.4B | $1.1B | $1.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$128.0M | -$224.0M | -$243.0M | -$168.0M | -$156.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $802.0M | $616.0M | $1.2B | $907.0M | $866.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$52.0M | $1.0M | -$136.0M | $107.0M | $14.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.0B | -$914.0M | -$353.0M | -$751.0M | -$571.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$400.0M | -$474.0M | $182.0M | $0 | $13.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:00am (11d ago)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$7.8B $7.7B – $7.9B
|
$8.0B $8.0B – $8.2B
|
$8.3B $8.3B – $8.3B
|
$8.4B $8.3B – $8.5B
|
| EBITDA |
$2.0B $2.0B – $2.0B
|
$2.0B $2.0B – $2.1B
|
$2.1B $2.1B – $2.1B
|
$2.1B $2.1B – $2.2B
|
| Net Income |
$897.7M $882.9M – $912.5M
|
$996.6M $971.3M – $1.0B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.1B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.2B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:05am (11d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +3.6% | -8.2% | -1.7% | -3.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -5.2% | +3.4% | +1.2% | -5.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | -8.8% | +1.0% | +2.7% | -7.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +107.4% | +7.8% | -9.5% | -1.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +52.1% | +3.3% | -5.6% | -1.8% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:04am (11d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-08 | Stevens Charles K. III | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | Sandeep Reddy | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | PLANT JOHN C | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | PAYNE LISA A | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | O'HERLIHY CHRISTOPHER A | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | Ffolkes Marie A | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | Denari Aine | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | Coombe Gary A | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-08 | Alexander Mark R. | A-Award | 2,650.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-07 | PAYNE LISA A | S-Sale | 14,729.00 | $63.66 | $937,648 |
| 2026-03-07 | PAYNE LISA A | S-Sale | 2,006.00 | $63.66 | $127,702 |
| 2026-03-06 | Shah Jai | F-InKind | 4,410.00 | $63.66 | $280,741 |
| 2026-02-25 | Westenberg Richard J. | F-InKind | 6,565.00 | $71.86 | $471,761 |
| 2026-02-25 | Stone Jennifer A | F-InKind | 4,767.00 | $71.86 | $342,557 |
| 2026-02-25 | Shah Jai | F-InKind | 1,954.00 | $71.86 | $140,414 |
| 2026-02-25 | Nudi Jonathon | F-InKind | 2,501.00 | $71.86 | $179,722 |
| 2026-02-25 | Marshall Richard Allan | F-InKind | 515.00 | $71.86 | $37,008 |
| 2026-02-25 | Cole Kenneth G. | F-InKind | 1,671.00 | $71.86 | $120,078 |
| 2026-02-25 | Eisman Heath M | F-InKind | 379.00 | $71.86 | $27,235 |
| 2026-02-26 | Eisman Heath M | S-Sale | 747.00 | $71.92 | $53,721 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 3:00am (11d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-22 | $0.32 | 2026-05-11 | 2026-05-22 | 2026-06-08 |
| 2026-02-20 | $0.32 | 2026-02-10 | 2026-02-20 | 2026-03-09 |
| 2025-11-07 | $0.31 | 2025-10-29 | 2025-11-07 | 2025-11-24 |
| 2025-08-08 | $0.31 | 2025-07-31 | 2025-08-08 | 2025-08-25 |
| 2025-05-23 | $0.31 | 2025-05-09 | 2025-05-23 | 2025-06-09 |
| 2025-02-21 | $0.31 | 2025-02-11 | 2025-02-21 | 2025-03-10 |
| 2024-11-08 | $0.29 | 2024-10-29 | 2024-11-08 | 2024-11-25 |
| 2024-08-02 | $0.29 | 2024-07-25 | 2024-08-02 | 2024-08-19 |
| 2024-05-23 | $0.29 | 2024-05-10 | 2024-05-24 | 2024-06-10 |
| 2024-02-21 | $0.29 | 2024-02-08 | 2024-02-22 | 2024-03-11 |
| 2023-11-09 | $0.29 | 2023-10-26 | 2023-11-10 | 2023-11-27 |
| 2023-08-10 | $0.29 | 2023-07-27 | 2023-08-11 | 2023-08-28 |
| 2023-05-25 | $0.29 | 2023-05-11 | 2023-05-26 | 2023-06-12 |
| 2023-02-22 | $0.29 | 2023-02-09 | 2023-02-23 | 2023-03-13 |
| 2022-11-09 | $0.28 | 2022-10-26 | 2022-11-10 | 2022-11-28 |
| 2022-08-11 | $0.28 | 2022-07-28 | 2022-08-12 | 2022-08-29 |
| 2022-05-26 | $0.28 | 2022-05-13 | 2022-05-27 | 2022-06-13 |
| 2022-02-24 | $0.28 | 2022-02-08 | 2022-02-25 | 2022-03-14 |
| 2021-11-10 | $0.24 | 2021-10-27 | 2021-11-12 | 2021-11-29 |
| 2021-08-12 | $0.24 | 2021-07-29 | 2021-08-13 | 2021-08-30 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Starting from the raw tape: Masco's revenue has compressed from $8.68B (2022) to $7.56B (2025), a ~13% peak-to-trough decline, while net income held remarkably flat ($842M → $810M). That's the signature of a well-run cyclical with genuine pricing power and disciplined cost takeout — gross margin actually expanded from 31.2% in 2022 to 35.5% TTM. FCF of $866M on a $15B market cap is a ~5.8% FCF yield, and the dividend at 1.97% is comfortably covered. The quarterly trajectory is less reassuring though: Q2'25 rev of $2.05B was down vs Q2'24's $2.09B, and Q1'26 at $1.92B vs Q1'25 $1.80B shows a +6.7% YoY bounce with margin recovery to 11.1% — that's actually a positive inflection the synthesis seems to ignore. The "decelerating" tag looks stale against the most recent print.
The negative book value is the elephant. It almost certainly reflects years of aggressive buybacks (Masco has been a serial repurchaser, shrinking share count materially post-Watts/cabinet divestitures), not operating losses — the ROIC of 26% and ROA of 18.5% confirm the underlying business earns real returns on capital. So the "financial fragility from negative equity" framing in Market Forces is sloppy: this is engineered capital return, not distress. Net debt is unstated but Masco has historically run ~2x leverage with investment-grade ratings. Calling this a "deteriorating value trap" with a 26% ROIC is a category error.
Where I push back hardest is on the synthesis fair value of $48.49. At $866M FCF, that implies a ~$9.8B equity value, or roughly an 11x FCF multiple on a business with 17% operating margins, brand portfolio (Delta, Behr, Hansgrohe), and ~75% R&R exposure (less cyclical than the model assumes — R&R is decay-driven, not start-driven). 18x P/E and 12.9x EV/EBITDA on a trough-ish earnings base isn't obviously cheap, but it's not a 35% overvaluation either. A more defensible mid-cycle frame: normalize NI at $900M (between current $810M and 2023's $908M), apply a 17-18x multiple for a quality compounder with mid-single-digit long-term EPS growth via buybacks, and you get $63-68 fair value. The stock at $74 is modestly rich, not dramatically overvalued. The narrative layer's "$25 of story premium" is closer to $8-10 of story premium if you use a reasonable mid-cycle anchor instead of a trough DCF.
The contrarian case the models miss: Masco may be at or past the cyclical bottom. Q1'26 showed YoY revenue growth and margin expansion simultaneously — the first such print in the dataset. If mortgage rates ease into 2026 and existing-home turnover (the key R&R driver) recovers from generational lows of ~4M annualized back toward 5M+, Masco has meaningful operating leverage. The insider sale of 14,729 shares in March is small and isolated; the May awards are routine comp. There's no insider exit signal here. That said, the bear has real points: housing affordability remains broken, R&R has been cushioned by lock-in homeowners doing in-place upgrades (a finite tailwind), and Masco's revenue CAGR of -2.6% over 5 years is genuinely poor. If you assume mean reversion downward — i.e., the prior cycle peak benefited from a COVID-era pull-forward in renovation spend — then $48 isn't crazy.
Net verdict: I dissent partially from the synthesis. The "overvalued by 35%" call leans on a DCF that treats current earnings as peak rather than mid-cycle, and the Market Forces "value trap / financial fragility" framing misreads the negative book value. But the synthesis is directionally right that you're paying full price — 18x TTM P/E on a cyclical with -2.6% revenue CAGR, an FCF that has compounded at -14%, and macro headwinds isn't a steal. The Q1'26 inflection is one data point, not a trend. Fair value is more like $62-68 than $48; current $74 embeds ~10-15% optimism premium on housing recovery timing. Not a short, not a buy here — wait for either a $60-handle entry or two more quarters confirming the margin/revenue re-acceleration
GPT Critique
The raw data on Masco Corporation paints a picture of a company managing to maintain profitability amidst declining revenues. The revenue drop from $8.68 billion in 2022 to $7.56 billion in 2025 (a 13% decline) is significant. However, net income has remained relatively stable, decreasing only slightly from $842 million to $810 million. This stability in net income, despite declining revenues, suggests effective cost management and pricing power, as evidenced by an increase in gross margin from 31.2% to 35.5%. The company's robust free cash flow of $866 million provides a healthy 5.8% FCF yield, supporting the dividend yield of 1.97%. However, the negative book value is concerning, indicating potential issues in balance sheet strength, despite the high ROIC of 26%. This suggests that the company is generating strong returns on invested capital, albeit with a fragile balance sheet due to what appears to be aggressive share buybacks.
I find myself in partial agreement with Opus's analysis. Opus contends that the negative book value is a result of engineered capital return through buybacks, not financial distress, which aligns with the high ROIC and ROA. I concur that the "financial fragility" narrative is misleading if interpreted from just the negative equity perspective. However, Opus's assertion that the fair value is closer to $63-68, rather than the synthesis's $48.49, seems optimistic. The underlying assumption is that Masco's current earnings are mid-cycle rather than peak, which is debatable given the ongoing macroeconomic headwinds and the company's -2.6% revenue CAGR over five years. Furthermore, I agree with Opus that the current price embeds a premium for a housing recovery that may not materialize as quickly as expected.
Where I diverge from Opus is in the assessment of the valuation synthesis. While Opus critiques the synthesis's $48.49 fair value as overly conservative, I find the synthesis justified when considering the broader macroeconomic conditions and Masco's recent financial performance trends. The company's declining revenue and negative growth rates in earnings and free cash flow (-5.6% and -14% CAGR, respectively) warrant caution. The narrative that Masco is at or past the cyclical bottom, based on one quarter of improved margin and revenue, is premature. This single data point does not establish a trend, especially when broader market headwinds remain significant.
A careful skeptic might argue that both the Delvantic AI Findings and my analysis underestimate the potential for a sustained recovery in the housing market and, by extension, Masco's R&R segment. They might point to historical precedents where cyclical downturns were followed by robust recoveries, suggesting that the market is overly pessimistic about Masco's future growth potential. However, such a recovery would need to be evidenced by consistent improvement over multiple quarters, which has yet to be observed.