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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Comcast Corp (CMCSA) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score +15 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 29 · Value 5 · Sentiment -51 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $68.82 vs $27.02 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Comcast Corp
CMCSA NASDAQComcast Corp is a diversified media and technology company that provides broadband, wireless, video, and business connectivity services through brands such as Xfinity and Comcast Business. The company also operates across media, studios, streaming, and theme parks, giving it a broad footprint in consumer communications, entertainment, and out-of-home experiences. Its business segments include Residential Connectivity and Platforms, Business Services Connectivity, Media, Studios, and Theme Parks, which together support households, small businesses, advertisers, and content distributors. Comcast Corp plays a central role in delivering network access, premium entertainment, live sports, news, and digital advertising services across the United States and select international markets. Based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Comcast Corp remains one of the most recognized names in cable, broadband, and media services.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.39
Total Equity: $97.38B
Shares: 3,709,000,000
Total Debt: $5.96B
Cash: $9.48B
EBITDA: $36.88B
Total Debt: $5.96B
Cash: $9.48B
Revenue: $123.71B
Revenue: $123.71B
Revenue: $123.71B
Total Equity: $97.38B
Tax Rate: 23.7%
Equity: $97.38B
Total Debt: $5.96B
Cash: $9.48B
Current Liabilities: $33.52B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $5.96B
Total Equity: $97.38B
Shares: 3,709,000,000
Shares: 3,709,000,000
CapEx: -$11.75B
Shares: 3,709,000,000
Stock Price: $25.47
Net Income: $20.00B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 13, 2026 12:28am (55d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | — | $121.4B | $121.6B | $123.7B | $123.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $95.6B | $107.4B | $98.3B | $100.4B | $103.0B |
| Operating Income | $20.8B | $14.0B | $23.3B | $23.3B | $20.7B |
| Net Income | $14.2B | $5.4B | $15.4B | $16.2B | $20.0B |
| EBITDA | $34.6B | $27.9B | $37.7B | $38.1B | $36.9B |
| EPS | $3.09 | $1.22 | $3.73 | $4.17 | $5.41 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.04 | $1.21 | $3.71 | $4.14 | $5.39 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 13, 2026 12:12am (55d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $8.7B | $4.7B | $6.2B | $7.3B | $9.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $24.8B | $21.8B | $24.0B | $26.8B | $29.6B |
| Total Assets | $275.9B | $257.3B | $264.8B | $266.2B | $272.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $29.3B | $27.9B | $40.2B | $39.6B | $33.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $177.9B | $175.2B | $181.3B | $179.9B | $175.3B |
| Total Equity | $98.0B | $82.0B | $83.5B | $86.3B | $97.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $61.9B | $51.6B | $52.9B | $57.0B | $66.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 13, 2026 12:28am (55d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $29.1B | $26.4B | $28.5B | $27.7B | $33.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$9.2B | -$10.6B | -$12.2B | -$12.2B | -$11.8B |
| Free Cash Flow | $20.0B | $15.8B | $16.3B | $15.5B | $21.9B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.4B | -$12.0M | $0 | -$119.0M | -$1.3B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $2.6B | $1.1B | $1.4B | $2.7B | -$2.2B |
| Dividends Paid | -$4.5B | -$4.7B | -$4.8B | -$4.8B | -$4.9B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$4.7B | -$13.3B | -$11.3B | -$9.1B | -$7.2B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$3.0B | -$4.0B | $1.5B | $1.1B | $3.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 13, 2026 12:28am (55d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | — | +0.1% | +1.8% | 0.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -32.6% | +66.0% | -0.1% | -11.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -62.1% | +186.6% | +5.2% | +23.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | -19.5% | +35.1% | +1.2% | -3.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 13, 2026 12:12am (55d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-07 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2026-07-01 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-01 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-14 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-01 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-02 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-02 | $0.33 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-08 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-02 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-03 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-02 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-02 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-03 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-03 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-04 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-03 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-04 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-05 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-05 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-04 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-03 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays +56%; a −1σ run costs 5%. Ratio 12.1:1 (μ 1.0%, σ 3.1% floored by sector, 10 pairs).
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($27.02) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +0% | 17.3% | $67.88 | +151% |
| Base — stabilizes | +0% | 15.0% | $59.43 | +120% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +0% | 12.8% | $51.01 | +89% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +1% | 6.2% | $27.79 | +3% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +4% | 8.9% | $42.25 | +56% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -2% | 6.4% | $25.76 | -5% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-24 23:52The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Starting from the raw numbers: revenue is flat — $123.71B in 2025 vs $123.73B in 2024 vs $121.57B in 2023, a 0.9% three-year CAGR that is basically GDP-minus. Recent quarterly trajectory shows Q2 2026 revenue at $29.94B, down from $31.20B in Q3 2025 and $32.31B in Q4 2025 — that's a ~5% sequential erosion into a seasonally weaker print, not stabilization. The Q2 2025 net income of $11.12B (36.7% margin) is clearly a one-off (likely Versant/spin-related or tax item) and inflates the trailing earnings CAGR of 14% — strip it out and normalized NI is running $2-3.5B/quarter, i.e. $10-13B annualized, meaningfully below the $20B reported 2025 figure. So the "5x P/E" is closer to 7-9x on clean earnings. Still cheap, but not the freakish bargain the headline suggests.
The balance sheet line reading "total debt $5.96B" and D/E of 0.061 is almost certainly wrong or captures only short-term debt — Comcast's actual gross debt is ~$100B, and EV/EBITDA of 2.5x is not credible for this company (real figure is ~7x). This matters because the synthesis fair value of $77-84 (nearly 3x current price) leans on those EV multiples looking absurdly cheap. Correct the debt and the "no-growth floor" argument weakens materially — the equity is levered, and a business with flat revenue, structurally declining video subs, and Peacock still bleeding does not deserve a re-rating to a 15x multiple. FCF of $21.89B against a $96B market cap is a real 23% FCF yield — that IS cheap — but sustainability depends on capex staying at ~$12B while fiber overbuilders (AT&T, T-Mobile FWA, municipal fiber) force defensive spending higher.
Where I part company with the synthesis: the "+210% upside to $83" number is fantasy anchored on broken balance-sheet data and a one-quarter earnings spike. The narrative model is more honest — this is a fallen angel where the bear case (cord-cutting, wireless cannibalization, Peacock losses) is mainstream consensus, not exotic. Broadband subs have been net negative for six consecutive quarters at Comcast; that's the whole ballgame for the connectivity segment, which is the profit engine. The thesis-eval score of +7 (barely positive) is closer to reality than the synthesis's screaming buy. Insider activity is genuinely neutral-to-negative — gifts and option exercises, zero open-market buying despite a supposedly 67% discount to intrinsic value. If insiders thought this was $83 stock, they'd be buying.
The contrarian-to-the-contrarian read: at $27, you're paid a 4.9% dividend covered 4x by FCF, with a 24% payout ratio leaving enormous buyback capacity ($21.89B FCF - $6B dividend = $15B+ available). Management has been shrinking the share count. Even if revenue is flat forever and margins compress 200bps, a 10% shareholder yield (div + buyback) on a durable-if-declining cash cow justifies $35-42, not $27 and not $83. Fair value is somewhere in the $35-45 range — undervalued, but the models overshooting to $83 damages their credibility and would set up a retail investor for disappointment when the re-rating stops at $38. The right trade is a starter position sized for a 30-50% return over 2-3 years plus dividend, not a 3-bagger. Fragility is real: if broadband ARPU rolls over or FWA takes another 3-4M subs, the FCF number I'm anchoring on drops to $17-18B and fair value compresses to $30. Buy, but modestly, and don't confuse cheapness with the synthesis's implausible fair-value math.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say Comcast is cheap, but not as absurdly cheap as the headline 5.0x P/E and 2.5x EV/EBITDA suggest, because the data set plainly contains at least one major earnings distortion. 2025 net income was $20.0B on just $20.67B of operating income, and the June 2025 quarter alone shows $11.12B of net income on $30.31B of revenue and a 36.7% margin; that is not representative operating performance for a cable/media utility. Strip out the obvious one-time benefit and the story is still solid, just less spectacular: revenue has been essentially flat for four years at $121.4B-$123.7B, operating income has sat in a fairly tight normalized band around $20B-$23B except for 2022, and cash generation remains the real anchor with $33.64B of operating cash flow and $21.89B of free cash flow in 2025 after $11.75B of capex. On a $95.9B market cap, that is a roughly 23% FCF yield. Even if true normalized earnings power is materially below the reported $20B, the stock is still priced like a business already in ex-growth decline.
What stands out to me is that the business is being valued as though the flat revenue base is about to break downward hard, yet the actual reported top line has been remarkably resilient. Quarterly revenue has stayed in a narrow $29.9B-$32.3B range for eight quarters, and annual revenue in 2025 was $123.71B versus $123.73B in 2024. That is not growth, but it is not collapse either. Meanwhile, the operating margin in 2025 was 16.7%, down from 18.8% in 2024 and roughly in line with a mature, capital-intensive franchise absorbing mix shifts and competitive pressure without losing economic coherence. The balance sheet data also looks oddly conservative for a company of this size: $9.48B of cash against just $5.96B of total debt and debt/equity of 0.06. I suspect that debt figure may understate Comcast’s true gross debt versus economic reality, so I would not build a bull case around “net cash”; but even taking the numbers at face value only partially, there is clearly no sign here of a capital structure under strain. Add a 4.9% dividend yield with a 24.5% payout ratio, and the market is offering investors a lot of current return for a business that, in the supplied data at least, has not yet shown the feared revenue air pocket.
That is why I do not buy the ultra-bearish market narrative at $27. Comcast looks like a low-growth harvest machine, but harvest machines with stable $20B+ operating cash earnings and nearly $22B of free cash flow do not usually belong below 1x sales and around book value unless the decline is visibly accelerating. Here, the recent quarter was $29.94B of revenue versus $30.31B a year earlier, basically flat, while net income excluding unusual comparisons appears to be in a sustainable multi-billion-per-quarter zone: $3.53B in June 2026, $3.33B in September 2025, $3.38B in March 2025, $3.63B in September 2024. That supports the “mature earner” frame much more than a “melting ice cube” frame. I would not touch the model-driven fair value near $80; that assumes too much faith in reported earnings and probably too little respect for structural cable/media erosion. But I also think the current quote embeds too much nihilism. A business with this cash profile and this level of revenue stability should trade meaningfully above $27 unless the next leg down in broadband and media is much sharper than what these figures show.
The best case against my read is straightforward and serious: flat revenue can be the calm before decline, and Comcast’s multiple may be low because the market sees poor quality in that stability. The annual operating income erosion from $23.31B in 2023 and $23.30B in 2024 to $20.67B in 2025 matters; that is more than 11% compression even before worrying about the suspect earnings boost. Recent quarterly net margins also weakened to 6.7%-6.9% in late 2025 and early 2026 before rebounding, suggesting volatility that a “utility-like” bull case tends to gloss over. If broadband competition from fixed wireless and fiber overbuild is eating into the highest-return part of the franchise, then today’s FCF could be a peak harvest number rather than a durable base. The current ratio under 0.9 also reminds you this is not a pristine balance-sheet compounder but a mature operator constantly funding capex, content, and network needs. Most importantly, the market may be discounting not this year’s income statement but the next five years of mix degradation: legacy video shrinks, media assets face secular pressure, and the market refuses to capitalize temporary cash flows at healthy multiples. That is the smart bear argument, and it is why I stop at “undervalued” rather than “screaming bargain.”
What would change my mind is not another accounting-heavy EPS print but evidence on operating durability. If annual revenue breaks below roughly $120B and operating income trends under $19B, the low multiple is probably deserved because the decline thesis has moved from feared to observed. Likewise, if free cash flow drops from $21.9B into the mid-teens without a clear temporary capex explanation, the equity rerates from cheap to trap. On the other side, two or three more quarters of revenue holding around $30B and normalized quarterly net income staying above $3B would make it much harder to justify a sub-$30 stock; that would support a valuation at least in the low-to-mid $30s even with no growth story at all.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a cash machine the market has abandoned. Comcast generated $123.71B of revenue in 2025—essentially unchanged from $123.73B the year before—and converted that into $33.64B of operating cash flow and $21.89B of free cash flow after $11.75B of capex. At a $95.88B market cap the FCF yield is roughly 23 percent; the trailing P/E is 5.0x, EV/EBITDA 2.5x, and EV/sales 0.75x. Net income printed $20.0B, but that figure is distorted by the $11.12B quarter in June 2025 (36.7 percent margin), which is almost certainly a one-time item; strip it out and a more normalized earnings run-rate nearer $11–12B still leaves the stock at high-single-digit earnings multiple and a mid-teens FCF yield. Balance-sheet leverage is negligible on the supplied figures—$5.96B of debt against $9.48B of cash and $97.38B of equity—while ROE sits at 20.5 percent and ROIC at 16.8 percent. The dividend yields 4.9 percent on a 24.5 percent payout, so the company is returning capital without straining the free-cash-flow engine. Revenue is flat (0.9 percent CAGR), yet earnings and FCF have compounded at 14–16 percent, telling a story of cost discipline and mix shift that the 0.81x sales multiple simply refuses to acknowledge.
What stands out is the sheer disconnect between cash generation and price. A no-growth perpetuity of $22B FCF discounted at even a punitive 12 percent cost of equity is worth more than $180B; the market is capitalizing that stream at roughly half that level, which is only coherent if investors believe free cash flow is about to enter a multi-year freefall. Quarterly trends reinforce stability rather than collapse: the last eight quarters of revenue oscillate in a tight $29.9–32.3B band, and the two most recent prints ($31.46B and $29.94B) show no acceleration of decline. Operating margin compressed from 18.8 percent in 2024 to 16.7 percent in 2025, and recent net margins have drifted into the high single digits outside the one-time spike, but the absolute dollar FCF remains enormous. Insider activity is noise—mostly gifts and routine awards—so there is no insider confirmation of either thesis. The rule-based label “mature earner” and the pre-flight “harvest mode” framing are directionally right on the business model, yet the valuation synthesis’s $78–84 fair-value range is not fantasy; it is simply what a modest multiple re-rating on durable cash flow produces.
The strongest counter-argument is that the market is correctly pricing terminal decline. Revenue has gone nowhere for three years, operating income fell from $23.3B to $20.7B, and the latest four quarters of net income excluding the outlier average closer to $2.8B—implying the “cheap” multiple is partly an artifact of a non-recurring gain. Fixed-wireless substitution and utility fiber overbuilds are real share thieves in the connectivity base; media networks and the video bundle continue to erode; Peacock’s path to meaningful contribution remains unproven in these numbers. If the reverse-DCF implication of roughly –10 percent FCF growth materializes, today’s 23 percent yield compresses into a value trap and the 4.9 percent dividend becomes the entire return. A smart opponent would also note that the current-ratio of 0.88 signals limited short-term liquidity cushion and that macro headwinds plus sector-wide multiple compression leave little catalyst for re-rating. Those points have merit: the growth is not there, the one-time earnings inflate the headline P/E, and narrative durability is fragile precisely because the bull case needs stabilization that has not yet shown up in top-line momentum.
I would flip to neutral or bearish if two consecutive quarters show revenue declining more than 3 percent year-over-year while FCF falls below $4.5B per quarter, or if management signals a structural step-down in broadband net adds and ARPU that forces a cut to the dividend trajectory. Conversely, evidence that Peacock reaches contribution-margin breakeven and connectivity revenue re-accelerates above 2 percent would justify the higher end of the valuation range and push conviction higher.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that decides this case is the 24.5% payout ratio sitting on top of a 4.9% dividend yield. Comcast is returning roughly $4.7B in dividends against $21.89B of free cash flow, meaning management is retaining 75 cents of every dollar it generates. For a company with flat revenue (0.9% five-year CAGR) and a structurally declining video business, that retention is not fueling growth — it is building a cash cushion and quietly de-risking the balance sheet while the market prices the stock as if the cash flow is about to evaporate. The Q2 2025 net income of $11.12B (36.7% margin) is a one-time item that inflates the 2025 annual figure to $20.00B; stripping it and replacing with a normal ~$3.0B quarter puts clean 2025 earnings near $11.9B, and the trailing four clean quarters (Sep '25 through Jun '26) sum to $11.20B. Against that, the 5.0x P/E the canonical metrics report is an artifact of the outlier; the honest multiple is closer to 8.6x on TTM clean earnings or 6.6x on 2024's $16.19B.
The EV bridge reinforces the cheapness. Using the balance sheet as presented — $95.88B market cap, $9.48B cash, $5.96B debt — EV is roughly $92.4B, yielding 4.2x FCF and 2.5x EBITDA. I flag the debt figure as suspiciously low for a cable operator with $11.75B annual capex; Comcast's historical capital structure implies materially more leverage, and if true debt is $30–40B, EV rises to $116–126B and EV/FCF stretches to 5.3–5.8x. Even at the higher end, that is well below the 8–12x range where healthy telecoms and cable operators typically trade, and the 20.5% ROE and 16.8% ROIC are at the top of the sector, not the bottom. The 1.03x P/B on a 20% ROE business is a 1.0–1.3x book anchor at best, suggesting the equity is not richly priced.
The prior models' $77.53–$83.77 composite fair value is not supported by anything in the raw data. That range implies 6–7x FCF with embedded growth, or 15–18x clean earnings — multiples appropriate for a software toll-booth, not a flat-revenue cable operator whose top line has been $121–124B for four consecutive years. The "fallen-angel" narrative and the thesis fragilities (fixed wireless acceleration, fiber overbuild) are the correct risks to track, and the 0.9% revenue CAGR confirms the market's core concern is legitimate: this is not a growth story. What the prior models get wrong is the magnitude of the discount. The stock is cheap, but not 210% cheap. A defensible fair value, applying 10–12x to $13B normalized earnings (the median of 2023's $15.4B, 2024's $16.2B, and clean 2025's ~$12B) or 7–9x to $22B FCF, lands in the $36–$44 range per share. That is 33–63% above $27.02, which is meaningful but not the triple-digit re-rating the synthesis implies.
The strongest case against my read is the revenue trajectory itself. Four years of $121–124B revenue with a 0.9% CAGR is not "steady" — it is a slow bleed masked by broadband ARPU gains offsetting video subscriber losses. The earnings "growth" (14% CAGR) is coming from cost discipline and mix, not top-line expansion, and cost cuts have a floor. Peacock's cash burn is not visible in the segment data provided, but the 2022 net income of $5.37B (vs. $15–16B in 2023–24) hints at how quickly the media/entertainment cycle can turn. If the video decline accelerates beyond what broadband can offset, the $22B FCF figure erodes, and at 4.2x FCF the margin of safety compresses fast. The insider data is pure compensation mechanics — A-Awards, G-Gifts, one option exercise, one in-kind tax withholding — with zero open-market purchases, so there is no conviction signal to lean on.
What would change my mind: a quarterly print showing broadband ARPU declining or video subscriber losses accelerating beyond ~150K per quarter would confirm the structural decline is outrunning the fiber pivot, and I would cut fair value toward $25–28 (fairly valued at current price). Conversely, a quarter where Peacock shows positive EBITDA or the company announces a special dividend / buyback funded by the retained FCF would validate the "harvest mode" thesis and push fair value toward the upper end of my range. The 2026-10 Q3 print is the next real data point.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Comcast throws off elite cash flow: FCF of $21.89B in 2025 on $123.71B revenue (about 18% FCF margin), with OCF/NI at 2.44x and negative accruals of -5.6% of assets - hallmarks of clean, cash-backed earnings. Net income has climbed from $5.37B (2022) to $20.0B (2025), operating margin has held in the mid-to-high teens (16.7-19.2%), and the company is a genuine net buyer of its own stock, with diluted share count falling from 4.65B to 3.71B (a -5.5% CAGR) and buybacks running 7x SBC. That is a mature, self-funding cash machine. The concerns are structural, not acute. Revenue has essentially flatlined ($121.4B to $123.7B over four years) - the cable/broadband core is not growing, so all per-share progress depends on buybacks and margin defense. Altman Z of 1.36 sits in the distress zone; for an asset-heavy telco with a large debt stack this partly reflects capital structure rather than imminent risk, but liquid cash of $9.5B against a $95.9B market cap is modest and net cash of only $3.54B implies substantial gross debt. Insider tape is directionally neutral - awards, gifts, tax withholdings, no open-market buying and only trivial sales. Nothing screams bad behavior; nothing signals conviction either. Net: a well-run, cash-integrity-strong mature business with real leverage and no growth engine visible in the numbers.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Gross debt schedule and maturity wall - net cash of $3.54B with $9.5B liquid implies large gross debt; confirm 10-K debt table and covenants
- Subscriber trends in cable/broadband - is the flat revenue masking core cord-cutting offset by Peacock/parks/business services?
- Segment margin bridge for 2025 OpM decline to 16.7% - is Peacock/streaming still a drag and on what trajectory?
- Capex intensity and whether the $21.89B FCF is sustainable or benefiting from a capex trough
- Content/sports rights renewal commitments off balance sheet
The e2e composite fair value of $77.53 (210% upside) fails the sanity check - it implies Comcast should trade at roughly 3x today's price, which would require reversing cord-cutting and re-rating cable to growth-stock multiples. I discount that method heavily. The EPV floor of $59.92 is more useful but still generous given secular video decline. A grounded deserved value on a mature, mid-single-digit-FCF-declining cable/parks/media mix is closer to $33-38 per share (roughly 8-9x earnings, ~10% FCF yield), versus $27.02 today.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Broadband subscriber net-adds trajectory in latest 10-Q - stabilization vs accelerating losses
- Peacock segment losses and path to breakeven in transcripts
- Theme parks post-Epic Universe cash contribution guidance
- Net debt trend and refinancing schedule at current rates
- Capex intensity as fiber overbuild and wireless MVNO scale
The macro tape is neutral-to-mildly-constructive (VIX ~16, S&P near highs), and with a 0.65 beta CMCSA barely feels the market wind either way. So the pressure on this name is almost entirely narrative-driven, not macro-driven. The story the tape tells is 'structurally declining cable': cord-cutting, wireless cannibalization, sub losses, Peacock still unproven. That narrative is only moderate in intensity but fragile in durability, and the 68% gap between DCF and price shows the market has essentially refused to underwrite any of the bull case. That is the definition of a sentiment headwind pinning a name below its fundamentals. Recent news flow reinforces the bearish frame rather than breaking it: a defensive 'new service to retain customers as they leave' headline, the media-consolidation drama around Paramount/WBD (which reminds investors Comcast/NBCU is a sub-scale content player in a scale game), and Netflix headlines that keep the streaming-winner narrative firmly attached to someone else. There is no positive catalyst in the flow and no cult bid; analyst tone is not screaming upgrades. Net: a steady, unglamorous headwind - not a crash risk, just a lid. The low beta and defensive cash flows prevent it from being a Strong Headwind; the absence of any narrative rescue prevents it from being Balanced.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any inflection in broadband net-adds or Peacock subs/ARPU that would crack the secular-decline story
- Whether the Paramount/WBD deal outcome triggers a media re-rating that drags CMCSA up by association
- Target-price revisions or a notable sell-side upgrade breaking the consensus torpor
- A sector rotation into value/defensives that would give the low-beta cash flows a bid
The connectivity world is shifting from scarce pipes to abundant substitutes: fixed wireless access on excess 5G capacity and subsidized fiber overbuilds have turned broadband from a local duopoly into a contested market, capping the price/tier engine Comcast leaned on for a decade. Simultaneously, video economics are migrating from bundled carriage fees (high margin, Comcast-favorable) to direct streaming (lower margin, content-cost heavy), so every subscriber Comcast retains is worth less. Offsets are real but smaller in scale: SMB connectivity, wireless resale on someone else's radio network, advertising tech, and experiential assets (parks) that cannot be disintermediated. Net effect: a large, cash-generative asset base whose revenue base is defensible but whose per-unit earnings power drifts down. Macro headwinds (10y 4.74, sector demand -1) argue against a near-term reacceleration in consumer connectivity or advertising.
When we made this prediction on Aug 25, 2026, CMCSA was $27.23. We expect it to be $29.80 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $24.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 25, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
adjusted_earnings
flips down 25%
cost_of_capital
flips up 25%