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AGING Analysis Report
Jun 15, 2026
12 days ago · 96% complete · +8 refreshed

Taylor Morrison Home Corporation

TMHC NYSE Categories PDF
Consumer Cyclical · Residential Construction
Scottsdale, AZ 85251, United States IPO 2013 taylormorrison.com Updated Jun 15, 3:00am
Price
$71.90
Market Cap
$6.7B
Employees
3,000
Beta
1.48
Avg Volume
2,423,236
CEO
Sheryl Denise Palmer
Business Description

Taylor Morrison Home Corporation functions as a publicly listed residential construction enterprise within the United States. The company's core business involves the design, development, and sale of various housing types, including both single and multi-family units, offered as detached or attached homes. Additionally, it specializes in creating comprehensive lifestyle and master-planned communities. Expanding its portfolio, Taylor Morrison also undertakes the construction and development of mixed-use properties, which integrate commercial, retail, and multi-family spaces, marketed under its Urban Form brand. Complementing its building activities, the firm provides ancillary services such as title insurance, closing settlement solutions, and financial products. The company's diverse housing offerings are presented through key brands like Taylor Morrison, William Lyon Signature, and Darling Homes, serving clients across a wide geographical area including Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. Founded in 1936, Taylor Morrison Home Corporation is headquartered in Scottsdale, Arizona.

Business History
Generated: Jun 15, 2026 3:03am
Price Overview
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:00am (12d ago)
$71.90
-0.01 (-0.01%)
Day Range
$71.57 – $71.92
52-Week Range
$54.15 – $72.50
50-Day MA
$61.81
200-Day MA
$62.54
Volume
5,330,078.00
Analyst Price Targets
Low $70.00
Consensus $72.75
High $76.00
(24 analysts)
Share Structure
Outstanding 93,427,700.00
Float 92,699,853.00
Free Float 99.2%
High free float — 99.2% of shares trade freely, ~0.8% held by insiders/institutions
Very liquid — most shares trade freely. Low insider ownership can mean less management alignment, but makes large position sizing straightforward.
Price History (1 Year)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:05am (12d ago)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
The directional story — useful even when net income is negative.
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:03am (12d ago)
Revenue
The top line — total sales before any costs or taxes are subtracted. A measure of how much business the company is doing.
Net Income
The bottom line — profit left after subtracting all expenses, interest, and taxes from revenue. Reflects accounting profitability, but includes non-cash items like depreciation, so it isn't the same as cash earned.
Operating Cash Flow
The real cash generated by the day-to-day business — selling products, paying suppliers, collecting from customers. Calculated from net income by adding back non-cash items and adjusting for timing (unpaid bills, unsold inventory). When OCF consistently lags net income, the reported profit may not be converting to real money.
Period Revenue Net Income Net Margin YoY/QoQ
Key Metrics
API Direct from provider CALC Derived from statements
Industry comparison last run: Jun 15, 2026 3:02am
P/E Ratio (Price per dollar of earnings)
API
Stock Price / EPS (Diluted)
10.27
Stock Price: $71.90
EPS (Diluted): 7.90
P/B Ratio (Price vs net asset value)
API
Stock Price / Book Value Per Share
0.93
Stock Price: $71.90
Total Equity: $6.29B
Shares: 100,707,000
EV/EBITDA (Total value vs operating profit)
API
Enterprise Value / EBITDA
8.75
Market Cap: $6.72B
Total Debt: $2.29B
Cash: $851.23M
EBITDA: $1.10B
Enterprise Value (Takeover price (cap + debt - cash))
API
Market Cap + Total Debt - Cash
$7.3B
Market Cap: $6.72B
Total Debt: $2.29B
Cash: $851.23M
Gross Margin (Revenue left after direct costs)
API
Gross Profit / Revenue
23.0%
Gross Profit: $1.87B
Revenue: $8.12B
Operating Margin (Revenue left after all operations)
API
Operating Income / Revenue
14.0%
Operating Income: $1.14B
Revenue: $8.12B
Net Margin (Revenue left as actual profit)
API
Net Income / Revenue
9.6%
Net Income: $782.50M
Revenue: $8.12B
ROE (Profit from shareholder equity)
API
Net Income / Total Equity
10.9%
Net Income: $782.50M
Total Equity: $6.29B
ROIC (Profit from all invested capital)
API
NOPAT / Invested Capital
10.7%
Operating Income: $1.14B
Tax Rate: 24.1%
Equity: $6.29B
Total Debt: $2.29B
Cash: $851.23M
Current Ratio (Can it pay short-term bills)
API
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
6.24
Current Assets: $7.14B
Current Liabilities: $1.14B
Debt/Equity (Leverage — debt vs equity)
CALC
Total Debt / Total Equity
0.36
Short-Term Debt: $82.61M
Long-Term Debt: $2.21B
Total Debt: $2.29B
Total Equity: $6.29B
Rev/Share (Top-line per share)
CALC
Revenue / Shares Outstanding
$80.64
Revenue: $8.12B
Shares: 100,707,000
Book Value/Share (Net assets per share)
CALC
(Total Assets - Total Liabilities) / Shares
$62.49
Total Equity: $6.29B
Shares: 100,707,000
FCF/Share (Real cash generated per share)
CALC
(Operating Cash Flow + CapEx) / Shares
$8.02
Operating CF: $847.75M
CapEx: -$40.37M
Shares: 100,707,000
CapEx is negative (outflow) — added to OCF to get FCF
Div Yield (Annual income from holding)
API
Last Annual Dividend / Stock Price
0.0%
Last Dividend: N/A
Stock Price: $71.90
Payout Ratio (Earnings paid out as dividends)
Dividends Paid / Net Income
—
Dividends Paid: N/A
Net Income: $782.50M
Dividends paid not available in cash flow statement
Industry Benchmarks
Last run: Jun 15, 2026 3:02am
Compares TMHC against LLM-researched typical ranges for its industry. One research call per industry, cached indefinitely — every stock in the same industry reuses the same baseline.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Three separate reads — Company Quality (is it a great business?), Valuation (is it mispriced?), and General Sentiment (how macro + narrative are pushing it), kept deliberately apart · 2026-06-15 03:08:47
Delvantic - Cairn AI
Quality — wait for a dip 8/10
Quality +45 confirms TMHC is a well-run cyclical compounder, but Value -43 says you're paying full freight with zero cycle cushion — admire it, don't buy it here.
The cruxWhether you get a cyclical air-pocket that resets the stock into the $50s-low $60s, because at $71.90 the deserved value is essentially today's price and there's no margin of safety for a leveraged homebuilder.
Forensic checks Derived mechanically from TMHC's filed financials — not from the AI lenses
Liquidity & RunwaySelf-Funding
DilutionShare Count Shrinking
Earnings QualityGood Earnings Quality
The three lensesswitch a tab for its full read — score + evidence
Company Quality
+45
Solid
edge √Σ 127 · risk √Σ 82 · conf 7/10

Taylor Morrison looks like a well-run mature homebuilder. Revenue has stabilized in the $7.4–8.2B range, gross margin expanded from 20.8% in 2021 to ~23–25% and operating margin sits in the 14–18% band — a meaningful structural improvement versus the pre-2022 baseline. Net income of $782M on $8.12B revenue (FY25) with OCF roughly tracking and $807M FCF indicates the earnings are cash-backed. Beneish M of -1.78, Altman Z of 3.82, and accruals of just 1.8% of assets all corroborate clean accounting.

Capital allocation is genuinely shareholder-friendly for the sector: diluted share count fell from 128.0M (2021) to 100.7M (2025), a -5.8% CAGR, with buybacks running 1,587% of SBC — this is a real net repurchaser, not an optical one. The constraint is the balance sheet: net debt of ~$1.44B against $851M cash means liquidity is adequate but not a fortress, which matters in a cyclical industry where land/inventory ties up capital and a downturn can compress margins fast. FCF was lumpy ($1.08B → $773M → $174M → $807M), reflecting working-capital swings in land/WIP typical of builders.

Insider activity is neutral-to-mildly-negative — 9 sells totaling $5.5M, no open-market buys, but the recent tape shown is all awards (A) and option exercises (M), not directional P/S signal. Management (Palmer et al.) appears to be executing competently; the business reads as a quality cyclical operator rather than a structurally great compounder.

Strengths 4
m75
Real per-share value concentration
Diluted shares down from 128.0M to 100.7M (-21% over 4 years, -5.8% CAGR) with buyback/SBC ratio of 1,587% — buybacks are funded by cash, not masking dilution.
m70
Clean earnings quality
Beneish M -1.78, Altman Z 3.82 (safe zone), accruals 1.8% of assets, and FY25 FCF $807M vs NI $783M — the reported profits are cash-backed.
m60
Structural margin step-up
Gross margin expanded from 20.8% (2021) to 23–25% range, operating margin from 11.8% to 14–18%. Suggests improved mix/pricing power vs prior cycle baseline.
m45
Self-funding with $807M FCF
Generates substantial free cash flow internally; no reliance on external capital markets for operations or buybacks.
Concerns 4
m55
Net debt of $1.44B in a cyclical business
Cash $851M vs net debt -$1.44B. Manageable today given FCF, but residential construction is highly cyclical — leverage amplifies downside in a housing downturn.
m45
Lumpy FCF reflects working-capital intensity
FCF swung from $1.08B (2022) → $773M → $174M (2024) → $807M (2025). Land/inventory absorption can swamp earnings in any given year — capital-intensive model.
m35
Revenue plateau, not growth
Revenue essentially flat 2022 ($8.22B) → 2025 ($8.12B); this is a mature_earner with cyclical, not secular, growth dynamics.
m20
No insider conviction buys
9 sells / $5.5M, zero open-market P buys in the last 12 months. Not alarming for a mature large-cap but no positive signal.
This is a quality cyclical operator, not a structurally great business. The margin expansion is real, earnings are clean, and the share-count shrinkage of -5.8% CAGR is genuine per-share value creation funded by actual FCF — that combination is rare among homebuilders. What keeps me from calling it 'Strong' is the inescapable nature of residential construction: $1.44B net debt plus working-capital-heavy economics means a real housing downturn will hurt, and the flat revenue line shows there's no secular tailwind doing the work for management. I'd grade the operators highly and the industry mediocrely — net, a solid B+ business.
Verify before trusting this (6)
  • Debt maturity schedule and covenants — when does the $1.44B net debt come due and at what rates?
  • Land bank composition (owned vs optioned) — owned land = capital tied up and downturn risk; optioned = flexibility
  • Community count and absorption rate trends — leading indicator of revenue trajectory
  • Geographic concentration — Sun Belt exposure (TX/FL/AZ) for in-migration vs price-correction risk
  • Backlog and cancellation rates — current demand environment
  • Whether buybacks continue at current pace or are opportunistic
Valuation / Mispricing
-43
Fairly Valued
edge √Σ 36 · risk √Σ 79 · conf 7/10
Price $71.90 vs deserved ~$73 (signal-adj) to $78 (EPV floor) — roughly 1-8% — inside the noise band for a cyclical, call it fair. attractive below $60.00

The composite FV of $83.62 looks generous because it leans on an anchored-PE of $89.22 that capitalizes mid-cycle homebuilder earnings as if they were durable — for a cyclical with $1.44B net debt, that multiple deserves a haircut. The signal-adjusted FV of $72.91 and the EPV floor of $78.01 bracket a more honest deserved value in the low-to-mid $70s, basically on top of today's $71.90 price. Earnings quality is clean and the buyback (~5.8% CAGR share shrink) is real per-share value creation, which supports — but does not extend — that deserved value.

What's priced in: continued mid-cycle ROEs, orderly absorption, and no meaningful affordability shock. The bull case (supply-constrained market, pricing power) is already in the quote; the bear case (rate-driven demand air-pocket, rising spec inventory) is not discounted. There's no margin of safety here — maybe 1-2% upside to signal-adj FV, ~8% to EPV floor if you trust mid-cycle earnings hold. That's not enough cushion for a cyclical where a 10-15% earnings reset is a normal event, not a tail risk.

Cheap signals 2
m30
Buyback compounds per-share value
5.8% CAGR share-count reduction funded by FCF lifts deserved per-share value over time even at flat earnings — a real but modest tailwind that supports holding at fair value.
m20
Clean earnings reduce haircut
Good earnings-quality score means deserved value doesn't need a further accruals/dilution haircut — the $72.91 signal-adj FV is a fair anchor, not an upper bound.
Rich / priced-in 3
m55
No margin of safety for a cyclical
Price $71.90 vs signal-adj FV $72.91 = 1% upside. For residential construction with $1.44B net debt, you typically want 25-30% discount to deserved value to absorb cycle risk.
m45
Anchored-PE FV is overstated
The $89.22 anchored-PE implicitly capitalizes peak-ish homebuilder earnings on a normal multiple. Builders should be valued on through-cycle earnings; the $83.62 composite inherits this optimism and should be discounted toward the $72.91 signal-adj or $78.01 EPV floor.
m35
Bear case not in the price
Rising unsold inventory and affordability strain from rates are real cyclical risks; at 1% upside to FV, the stock isn't discounting any meaningful absorption-rate slowdown.
It's fair. Composite FV of $83 is flattered by a peak-earnings anchored PE that I don't trust for a homebuilder; the signal-adjusted $72.91 sits right on top of the $71.90 print, and even the more generous EPV floor at $78 only gives me 8% — not enough cushion to underwrite a cyclical. I'd need this in the high $50s / low $60s before I'd call it a valuation opportunity, where I'm getting paid for cycle risk. At today's price, you're paying for a good operator at full freight; the buyback is nice but it's the only thing on my side.
Verify before trusting this (5)
  • Backlog conversion rate and cancellation rate in latest 10-Q — signals demand deterioration before it hits revenue
  • Spec home inventory as % of total — rising spec count is the early bear-case tell
  • Incentives/price concessions disclosed in MD&A — true gross-margin trajectory vs reported
  • Net debt and land-option vs owned mix — flexibility if cycle turns
  • Forward community count guidance — drives the growth half of deserved value
General Sentiment
+94
Strong Tailwind
tail √Σ 128 · head √Σ 34 · conf 9/10

The dominant force on TMHC is not the housing narrative, the rate tape, or analyst tone - it is the June 1, 2026 announcement that Berkshire Hathaway is acquiring the company for 8.5B in cash. That single event collapses TMHC's effective beta to near zero: the stock now trades as a merger-arb spread, not a high-beta (1.48) cyclical homebuilder. The neutral-leaning tape, VIX at 17, and macro 'higher rates hurt housing' headwind that would normally maul a leveraged residential construction name are essentially inert here. Price 71.79 sits right against the consensus target 72.75, consistent with a name trading on deal terms rather than fundamentals or story. The pre-existing steady-compounder narrative (low intensity, low cult) has been overwritten by a hard catalyst with a known buyer and a known price. Analyst tone (Buy consensus, targets clustered at 72-73, modest upward revisions) has converged to the deal, confirming the market is treating this as a closing-probability trade. The only residual headwinds are deal-break risk (antitrust, financing - minimal given Berkshire) and the opportunity cost of capped upside; both are small relative to the tailwind of a credible cash bid from the most reputationally bulletproof acquirer in the market.

Tailwinds 3
m92
Berkshire all-cash bid dominates the tape
An 8.5B all-cash offer from Berkshire - Greg Abel's debut deal - is the single overwhelming force on the stock, pinning it near deal value and overriding sector, macro, and narrative inputs.
m70
Effective beta collapses to near zero
Although TMHC's nominal beta is 1.48, a pending cash deal severs the link to the tape; the neutral VIX-17 regime and rate headwinds that would normally weigh on a cyclical builder no longer transmit to the price.
m55
Analyst targets converged to deal
Consensus target 72.75 vs price 71.79 with fresh upward revisions reflects sell-side aligning to acquisition economics - a confirming, not contrarian, signal that the deal is the operative narrative.
Headwinds 2
m30
Capped upside and deal-break tail risk
With the stock already at the bid, further upside requires a topping bid (unlikely vs Berkshire) and any regulatory or financing wobble would reopen exposure to the cyclical housing narrative and rate headwinds.
m15
Latent cyclical/rate narrative if deal fails
Underlying bear case - affordability compression at 4.48% 10y, rising unsold inventory, leverage - would re-emerge instantly if the merger breaks; currently dormant but not gone.
This is no longer a homebuilder trade - it is a Berkshire merger-arb. The macro headwinds and cyclical bear case that should be hammering a 1.48-beta residential construction name in a neutral-to-slightly-stressed tape are completely muted by a credible cash bid from the highest-quality acquirer on the planet. Net pressure is a strong tailwind anchored to deal certainty, with the only real risk being capped upside and a small deal-break tail. Until the spread widens or a regulatory snag appears, sentiment pressure points up and sideways, not down.
Verify before trusting this (5)
  • Antitrust/HSR timeline and any second-request risk on the Berkshire deal
  • Spread between price and announced deal value as proxy for closing probability
  • Any topping-bid chatter from other large-cap builders or PE
  • Berkshire 13F/8-K confirmations and expected close date
  • Whether sell-side ratings shift to 'tender' or hold-to-close language
The market-wide tape + this name's exposure to it (beta / sector / narrative durability). Context on the non-fundamental pressure — not a call on the business or the price. processId: detail-general-sentiment
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Three lenses kept deliberately separate — Company Quality (price-agnostic), Valuation (price-conditional), and General Sentiment (non-fundamental macro/narrative pressure). The scores are not blended. Filing-level items (convertibles, lock-ups, customer concentration) are v2 — see each lens's "verify."
Deep Analysis
Last run: Jun 15, 2026 3:05:14 am

Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.

0 Company Classification — What type of company is this?
1 Industry Landscape — Where is the industry headed?
2 Company Momentum — Where is this company trending?
3 Forward Projection — 1Y & 2Y projected metrics (requires Layer 1 + 2)
4a DCF Valuation — Present value of future cash flows
4b Earnings Power Value — Floor value — worth with zero growth
4c Anchored PE — Industry PE adjusted for growth differential
4d Reverse DCF — What growth is the market pricing in?
4e Revenue-Based DCF — For growth/narrative companies (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4f Anchored P/S — Price-to-Sales peer comparison (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4g Scenario Analysis — Bull / Base / Bear (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4h Dividend Discount Model — For dividend/income stocks only
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4i Book Value Analysis — For deep value / turnaround stocks only
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4j Insider Activity — Are insiders buying or selling?
4f Cash Flow Quality — How trustworthy is the FCF?
4g Debt Maturity Risk — Can it handle its debt?
4h Macro Environment — Rates, market valuation, volatility
4i Sector Intelligence — How does this company compare within its sector?
4j Revenue Confidence — How reliable is the growth projection?
4k Sensitivity Analysis — How fragile is the fair value estimate?
4l Sector Demand Cycle — Is the sector in a boom, steady state, or contraction?
5 AI Investigation — Adaptive research engine (Claude)
5b Thesis Evaluation — What does the market believe? (narrative/platform stocks only)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
6 Valuation Synthesis — Weighted verdict from all methods (requires Layer 4)
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:03am (12d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue $7.5B $8.2B $7.4B $8.2B $8.1B
Cost of Revenue $5.9B $6.1B $5.6B $6.2B $6.3B
Gross Profit $1.6B $2.1B $1.8B $2.0B $1.9B
Operating Expenses $668.3M $643.2M $698.7M $770.5M $735.0M
Operating Income $888.2M $1.5B $1.1B $1.2B $1.1B
Net Income $663.0M $1.1B $768.9M $883.3M $782.5M
EBITDA $894.8M $1.4B $1.1B $1.2B $1.1B
EPS $5.26 $9.16 $7.09 $8.43 $7.90
EPS (Diluted) — — — — —
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:00am (12d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Cash & Equivalents $832.8M $724.5M $798.6M $487.2M $851.2M
Total Current Assets $7.3B $6.9B $7.0B $7.5B $7.1B
Total Assets $8.7B $8.5B $8.7B $9.3B $9.8B
Current Liabilities $987.7M $898.1M $805.1M $755.3M $1.1B
Long-Term Debt $3.3B $2.5B $2.0B $2.1B $2.2B
Total Liabilities $4.8B $3.8B $3.3B $3.4B $3.5B
Total Equity $3.9B $4.6B $5.3B $5.9B $6.3B
Retained Earnings $1.7B $2.7B $3.5B $4.4B $5.2B
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:01am (12d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Operating Cash Flow $376.6M $1.1B $806.2M $210.1M $847.7M
Capital Expenditure -$21.2M -$30.6M -$33.4M -$36.3M -$40.4M
Free Cash Flow $355.4M $1.1B $772.7M $173.7M $807.4M
Acquisitions (net) -$75.0M -$109.6M -$64.6M -$129.8M $0
Debt Repayment — — — — —
Dividends Paid — — — — —
Stock Buybacks -$281.4M -$376.3M -$128.0M -$347.6M -$381.0M
Net Change in Cash $302.2M -$109.7M $80.5M -$319.9M $364.1M
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:00am (12d ago)
Metric 2024 2025 2026 2027
Revenue $7.8B
$7.8B – $7.9B
 $7.9B
$7.9B – $7.9B
 $6.6B
$6.5B – $6.8B
 $7.1B
$7.0B – $7.2B
EBITDA $1.1B
$1.1B – $1.1B
 $1.1B
$1.1B – $1.1B
 $902.2M
$889.9M – $928.0M
 $970.9M
$957.5M – $980.3M
Net Income $842.2M
$837.7M – $846.7M
 $785.1M
$774.5M – $795.6M
 $536.8M
$526.6M – $547.1M
 $658.2M
$638.6M – $677.9M
EPS — — — —
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:03am (12d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue Growth +9.6% -9.8% +10.1% -0.6%
Gross Profit Growth +36.0% -15.2% +12.2% -7.1%
Operating Income Growth +66.0% -25.6% +13.4% -8.7%
Net Income Growth +58.8% -27.0% +14.9% -11.4%
EBITDA Growth +61.4% -27.2% +15.2% -9.4%
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 15, 2026 3:03am (12d ago)
Type codes PPurchase SSale AAward / grant MOption exercise FIn-kind (tax) CConversion GGift DReturn to issuer
All SEC Form 4 codes
Open market
P Purchase
Open-market or private purchase of shares.
S Sale
Open-market or private sale of shares.
Compensation (Rule 16b-3)
A Award / grant
Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
D Return to issuer
Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
F In-kind (tax)
Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
I Discretionary
Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
M Option exercise
Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
Derivatives
C Conversion
Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
E Short expiration
Expiration of a short derivative position.
H Long expiration
Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
O OTM exercise
Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
X ITM exercise
Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
Other exempt
G Gift
Bona fide gift of securities.
L Small acquisition
Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
W Inheritance
Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
Z Voting trust
Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
Other
J Other
Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
K Equity swap
Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
U Tender / buyout
Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.

Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.

Date Insider Type Shares Price Value
2026-06-18 Merrill Stevin Todd M-Exempt 962.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-18 Merrill Stevin Todd F-InKind 259.00 $71.58 $18,539
2026-06-18 Merrill Stevin Todd M-Exempt 962.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 MARIUCCI ANNE L M-Exempt 3,096.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 MARIUCCI ANNE L A-Award 3,287.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 MARIUCCI ANNE L M-Exempt 3,096.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 Yip Christopher J. A-Award 3,287.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 Owen Andrea A-Award 3,287.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 Warren Denise A-Award 3,287.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 Warren Denise M-Exempt 3,096.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 Warren Denise M-Exempt 3,096.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 Whalen Amanda A-Award 3,287.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 Ostis Heather C A-Award 3,287.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 Ostis Heather C M-Exempt 3,096.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 Ostis Heather C M-Exempt 3,096.00 $0.00 $0
2026-05-21 Lane Peter R. A-Award 3,287.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-31 Yip Christopher J. A-Award 408.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-12 Palmer Sheryl M-Exempt 7,518.00 $0.00 $0
2026-03-12 Palmer Sheryl F-InKind 3,147.00 $58.86 $185,232
2026-03-12 Palmer Sheryl M-Exempt 7,518.00 $0.00 $0
Narrative Economics
The story the market is telling about this stock — the intangible X-factor (founder mythology, cult dynamics, TAM-of-imagination) that moves price beyond what cash flows alone explain. After Shiller, Narrative Economics.
No narrative profile yet for TMHC — it's generated by the pipeline (market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Independent analyst synthesis · Delvantic - Cairn AI · generated 2026-06-15 03:05:49
Reviews the pipeline's own verdicts
Verdict Dissent from synthesis — TMHC is fairly-to-fully priced at $71.9 on declining earnings; fair value $55-65 on normalized mid-cycle margins, wait for margin stabilization or a rate-cut catalyst before committing.

The raw trajectory tells a clearer story than the synthesis admits. Quarterly net margin has compressed from 11.8% (Q3 2024) to 7.2% (Q1 2026) — that's not noise, that's a 460 bps slide over six quarters with no interruption. Revenue YoY in Q1 2026 ($1.39B vs $1.90B) is down 27%, not the -0.6% the momentum module reports (which is presumably comparing trailing periods). Annual NI peaked at $1.05B in 2022, fell to $883M in 2024, and 2025 closed at $782M — a clean ~25% peak-to-trough earnings descent while revenue stayed flat at ~$8.1B. This is textbook late-cycle margin compression in a homebuilder: incentives rising, mix shifting, gross margin sliding from 25.8% (2022) to 23.0% (2025). The Q1 2026 print is the worst data point in the series and it's the most recent — that matters.

I disagree with the Valuation Synthesis calling this "undervalued" at a composite $83.62 fair value. A DCF on a cyclical at peak-to-mid-cycle earnings is the classic homebuilder value trap: you capitalize earnings that are mean-reverting downward. P/B of 0.93 looks cheap until you remember land inventory is carried at cost and impairments come in waves during downturns — 2007-2009 saw homebuilders take 30-50% writedowns on land. Current ratio of 6.2 and $851M cash are reassuring on solvency but tell you nothing about earnings power. The Market Forces module ("Strong Headwinds, avoid until cycle turns") is more honest about what's happening than the synthesis verdict, and the two prior models are in direct contradiction — the synthesis is essentially ignoring the cyclical-value framing that Pre-Flight correctly identified.

The contrarian case worth taking seriously: if mortgage rates compress 100-150 bps over the next 12 months, TMHC has operational leverage on the way up too, and a ~10x P/E on depressed earnings with a clean balance sheet is exactly what you want to own going into a rate-cut cycle. Builders bottomed in late 2022 and ran hard into 2024 precisely because the market front-runs the cycle. At $71.9 with book value roughly $77/share, downside to tangible book is limited if no major land impairments hit. The insider activity is non-informative — all awards and option exercises on a single day, no open-market buying or selling to read. The "insider selling confirms margin compression" claim in Market Forces appears unsupported by the data shown; I'd flag that as a model overreach.

Where the data is thin: no debt figure is shown, which for a homebuilder is the single most important balance sheet item — land inventory is typically debt-financed and the debt/equity ratio drives downside risk. Without it, any fair value estimate has a wide error bar. The TTM ratios (P/E 10.3, ROE 10.9%, ROIC 10.7%) are backward-looking through a period that included stronger quarters; forward P/E on annualized Q1 2026 run-rate ($100M × 4 = $400M NI) is closer to 17x, not 10x. That reframes the valuation entirely. My read: the synthesis is anchoring on TTM and missing that earnings are still falling. Fair value on normalized mid-cycle earnings of ~$600M NI and a 9x multiple lands around $50-55/share; fair value on a recovery scenario with $900M NI and 10x is $77. So $71.9 prices in roughly a recovery scenario already — not a discount. I dissent from the "undervalued" verdict and side with Market Forces: this is a hold-or-avoid until either (a) the Q2/Q3 2026 prints show margin stabilization or (b) the Fed pivots clearly. Starting a position here is paying recovery prices for a stock still in earnings descent.

GPT Critique
Second-opinion review · gpt-4o · generated 2026-06-15 03:05:57
Reviews the Opus findings above
Verdict I agree with Opus's "fairly-to-fully priced" assessment at $71.9; however, I see fair value closer to $60-65, aligning with his mid-cycle margin outlook. The stock requires careful monitoring for margin stabilization or a clear interest rate pivot before considering a position.

In examining the raw data presented for Taylor Morrison Home Corporation (TMHC), several elements catch my attention. Notably, the company's quarterly net income has shown a significant downtrend, from $251.1 million in Q3 2024 to $100.4 million in Q1 2026. This represents a drastic 60% decline, reflecting substantial margin compression from 11.8% to 7.2% over this period. Despite a relatively stable revenue base around $8.1 billion annually from 2022 to 2025, net income has consistently decreased, indicating rising costs or reduced pricing power. The cash flow remains robust with a $847.7 million operating cash flow and a free cash flow of $807.4 million in 2025, suggesting liquidity isn't a pressing issue. However, the absence of debt figures is troubling, especially for a homebuilder, as it obscures the potential for leverage-driven risk.

I largely agree with Opus's analysis regarding the company's current valuation. Opus highlights the misleading nature of assuming TMHC is undervalued based on trailing P/E and other backward-looking metrics. I concur with the assertion that the market is potentially pricing in a recovery scenario prematurely. Opus's critique of the valuation synthesis's "undervalued" claim aligns with my interpretation of the data—particularly his point about the dangers of using peak-to-mid-cycle earnings for valuation in a cyclically sensitive industry like homebuilding. I also agree that the pre-flight intelligence correctly identifies TMHC as a cyclical-value company, and any valuation attempts should reflect this.

However, I diverge slightly on Opus's dismissal of the insider activity as non-informative. While the transactions appear clustered and non-market, they merit some attention given that insider sentiment can often provide early signals in cyclical downturns, even if not directly evident here. Additionally, while Opus notes the potential benefit from a significant drop in mortgage rates, I would stress that relying on such macroeconomic shifts is speculative and perhaps overly optimistic in the current interest rate environment.

A skeptic might argue that both Opus's and my analysis are overly cautious, failing to account for TMHC's operational strength and strategic advantages in land acquisition and development. They could point to the company's strong free cash flow and current ratio as signs of resilience, arguing that these factors might position TMHC to weather cyclical headwinds better than anticipated, thus justifying a higher valuation. Additionally, the skeptic might view the lack of debt figures as indicative of a conservative balance sheet rather than a red flag.

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My Notes personal — only you see this
Data via Financial Modeling Prep · Cached for performance · fmp
v1.1.352 · d1100787 · 2026-06-26 11:39:30