Business Description
GitLab Inc., through its subsidiaries, develops software for the software development lifecycle in the United States, Europe, and the Asia Pacific. The company offers GitLab, a DevOps platform, which is a single application that leads to faster cycle time and allows visibility throughout and control over various stages of the DevOps lifecycle. It helps organizations to plan, build, secure, and deploy software to drive business outcomes. The company also provides related training and professional services. The company was formerly known as GitLab B.V. and changed its name to GitLab Inc. in July 2015. The company was founded in 2011 and is headquartered in San Francisco, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 1, 2026 7:52pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 7:49pm (25d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.35
Total Equity: $990.67M
Shares: 165,800,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $229.58M
EBITDA: -$59.14M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $229.58M
Revenue: $955.22M
Shares: 165,800,000
Revenue: $955.22M
Revenue: $955.22M
Revenue: $955.22M
Total Equity: $990.67M
Tax Rate: -21.8%
Equity: $990.67M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $229.58M
Current Liabilities: $652.14M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $990.67M
Shares: 165,800,000
Shares: 165,800,000
CapEx: -$10.83M
Shares: 165,800,000
Stock Price: $33.79
Net Income: -$55.96M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The headline read is genuinely good: revenue compounding from $253M (FY22) to $955M (FY26), gross margin steady at ~88%, operating margin improving from -51% to -7.4%, $1.26B net cash (22% of market cap), $222M FCF, Altman Z 5.11, Beneish -3.15, OCF/NI of 1.33x. Survival risk is zero and the mechanical earnings-quality checks are clean. The pipeline's 'Net Insider Buying' label is wrong — the tape shows 3 tiny buys vs $94M in sales and the May 2026 activity is Sijbrandij converting 15.1M Class B shares and immediately offloading; this is structural selling, not conviction.
The forensic catch is dilution. Diluted shares went 144.7M → 165.8M (14.6% over four years, ~3.5% CAGR) while SBC runs 22.5% of revenue — meaning roughly $215M/yr of the $222M FCF is effectively being handed to employees in stock the company isn't buying back (buyback/SBC = 0.1%). Cash FCF is real; per-share FCF creation is far weaker than the headline suggests. The 'Weak Cash Flow Quality' flag from the pipeline likely reflects exactly this: FCF is heavily SBC-add-back dependent.
Narrative-vs-numbers reconciliation: growth is decelerating (51% → 36% → 31% → 26%), which is the exact trajectory you'd expect if GitHub Copilot/Enterprise bundling is compressing the addressable enterprise win rate. At ~6x sales ex-cash on a business growing 26% with structural SBC drag and a well-resourced competitor bundling for free inside Microsoft 365/Azure, the price requires the platform-consolidation bull case to actually play out. Fair, not cheap.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 7:56pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $252.7M | $424.3M | $579.9M | $759.2M | $955.2M |
| Cost of Revenue | $30.0M | $51.7M | $59.7M | $85.1M | $120.7M |
| Gross Profit | $222.7M | $372.7M | $520.2M | $674.1M | $834.5M |
| Operating Expenses | $351.6M | $584.1M | $707.6M | $816.8M | $905.0M |
| Operating Income | -$129.0M | -$211.4M | -$187.4M | -$142.7M | -$70.5M |
| Net Income | -$155.1M | -$173.4M | -$425.7M | -$6.3M | -$56.0M |
| EBITDA | -$127.7M | -$205.8M | -$180.9M | -$131.7M | -$59.1M |
| EPS | $-1.06 | $-1.16 | $-2.75 | $-0.04 | $-0.35 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 7:52pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $884.7M | $295.4M | $288.0M | $227.6M | $229.6M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.7B |
| Total Assets | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $241.6M | $306.3M | $677.2M | $545.0M | $652.1M |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $292.2M | $344.5M | $715.0M | $578.0M | $686.5M |
| Total Equity | $774.9M | $771.0M | $559.8M | $775.9M | $990.7M |
| Retained Earnings | -$553.3M | -$725.6M | -$1.2B | -$1.2B | -$1.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 7:56pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$49.8M | -$77.4M | $35.0M | -$64.0M | $232.9M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$3.5M | -$6.1M | -$1.6M | -$3.8M | -$10.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$53.4M | -$83.5M | $33.4M | -$67.7M | $222.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $26.1M | $61.7M | $0 | -$20.2M | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $-590,000 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $601.8M | -$586.8M | -$9.9M | -$60.3M | $1.9M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 7:49pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$1.3B $1.3B – $1.3B
|
$1.5B $1.5B – $1.5B
|
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.7B
|
$1.9B $1.9B – $2.0B
|
| EBITDA |
$428.8M $422.1M – $442.2M
|
$489.1M $489.1M – $489.1M
|
$559.7M $552.6M – $583.3M
|
$635.7M $627.6M – $662.4M
|
| Net Income |
$170.5M $152.1M – $188.9M
|
$232.6M $37.2M – $428.0M
|
$198.1M $194.8M – $209.0M
|
$248.7M $244.6M – $262.3M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 7:56pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +68.0% | +36.7% | +30.9% | +25.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +67.4% | +39.6% | +29.6% | +23.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -63.9% | +11.3% | +23.9% | +50.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -11.8% | -145.5% | +98.5% | -784.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | -61.1% | +12.1% | +27.2% | +55.1% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 7:55pm (25d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-17 | HENSHALL DAVID J | A-Award | 7,555.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-17 | Bedi Sundeep | A-Award | 7,555.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-17 | SULLIVAN GODFREY | A-Award | 7,555.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-17 | BOSTROM SUSAN L | A-Award | 7,555.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-17 | BLASING KAREN | A-Award | 7,555.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-17 | Mundy Simon | F-InKind | 2,394.00 | $27.29 | $65,332 |
| 2026-06-22 | Mundy Simon | F-InKind | 1,514.00 | $26.17 | $39,621 |
| 2026-06-17 | Steward Ian | F-InKind | 10,961.00 | $27.29 | $299,126 |
| 2026-06-17 | Schulman Robin | F-InKind | 7,839.00 | $27.29 | $213,926 |
| 2026-06-17 | Staples William | F-InKind | 26,425.00 | $28.31 | $748,092 |
| 2026-06-15 | Mundy Simon | A-Award | 55,330.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-15 | Sijbrandij Sytse | S-Sale | 102,635.00 | $28.39 | $2.9M |
| 2026-06-15 | Sijbrandij Sytse | S-Sale | 13,565.00 | $28.83 | $391,079 |
| 2026-05-14 | Sijbrandij Sytse | C-Conversion | 15,134,451.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-18 | Sijbrandij Sytse | S-Sale | 10,792.00 | $24.09 | $259,979 |
| 2026-05-18 | Sijbrandij Sytse | S-Sale | 105,408.00 | $24.93 | $2.6M |
| 2026-05-14 | Sijbrandij Sytse | C-Conversion | 15,134,451.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-30 | Mundy Simon | A-Award | 17,592.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-29 | Steward Ian | A-Award | 197,090.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-29 | Steward Ian | A-Award | 234,631.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue went $169M → $183M → $196M → $211M → $214M → $236M → $244M → $260M. That's a clean sequential ramp, but YoY by quarter tells a more nuanced story — Q1 FY26 was +27% YoY, Q2 +29%, Q3 +25%, Q4 +23%. So the "26% growth" headline is masking a clear deceleration into the most recent print. The net income line is also messier than the synthesis admits: FY25 booked -$6.3M but FY26 worsened to -$56M despite $196M more revenue and 87% gross margins. Where did the incremental gross profit go? Opex. The "approaching profitability" narrative is actually moving backwards on a GAAP basis even as FCF explodes to $222M — meaning SBC is doing heavy lifting in the FCF-to-NI bridge, which is exactly what the "Weak Cash Flow Quality" secondary signal is flagging.
The synthesis calls 6.0x P/S "reasonable" for 26% growth with 23% FCF margins. I'd push back. At $5.7B market cap on $955M revenue and decelerating to ~23% exit growth, the comp set is Atlassian, Datadog, Snowflake — and GTLB is trading at the low end because the market has *already* re-rated it. The 35% drawdown isn't an opportunity; it's the market correctly pricing in that Q4 deceleration and Microsoft's GitHub Copilot bundling pressure. The narrative model's "fragile durability / platform-monopoly" read is the sharpest take in the file — GitLab does not have a moat comparable to GitHub's network effects, and every quarter where growth steps down 200bps is a quarter where the multiple compresses further. The market-forces flag of 2.22x accrual ratio deserves more weight than the synthesis gave it — that's the kind of number that precedes a guide-down.
The insider data needs scrutiny. The "Net Insider Buying" tag is misleading — the two 15.1M share C-Conversions on 2026-05-14 are almost certainly option exercises or RSU conversions, not open-market purchases. The actual open-market activity is S-Sale (selling) and A-Award (grants), with zero P-Purchase entries visible. Market-forces called out "extreme insider selling (371:1)" — that's the more honest read. So the secondary-signals layer is contradicting the market-forces layer, and market-forces is right. Also worth noting: the balance sheet tile shows "Total debt: —" and "Total equity: —" which means I'm flying partially blind on leverage and book value, though $229M cash against $222M FCF generation means liquidity isn't the concern — dilution is. SBC running hot enough to flip $222M FCF into -$56M NI is meaningful shareholder cost that the P/S multiple doesn't capture.
A contrarian bull would argue: FCF inflected from -$70M to +$222M in one year (157% CAGR is real), gross margins at 87% give massive operating leverage if opex discipline arrives, and at 6x sales for a 25%-grower with positive FCF, this is cheaper than it's been since IPO. Fair. But the contrarian bear — which I find more compelling — argues: deceleration is monotonic (27→29→25→23), Microsoft is bundling Copilot+GitHub Advanced Security into enterprise agreements that directly compete with GitLab Ultimate, SBC is masking real dilution, and "Rule of 40" achievement depends on growth NOT decelerating below 22% while FCF margin holds — both of which look fragile. The synthesis verdict of "Reasonable Premium" is too soft; this is a show-me stock where the next two prints determine whether it goes to $45 or $22. I dissent from the synthesis. Fair value on a 20% forward growth assumption with 20% FCF margins and a 5x sales multiple is ~$28-30. Current $33.79 is roughly fair, not a "reasonable premium" worth buying — it's a hold-or-trim with asymmetric downside if Q1 FY27 prints sub-22% growth.
GPT Critique
Upon reviewing GitLab's financials, my attention is drawn to the consistent revenue growth juxtaposed against persistent net income losses. The company has shown an impressive revenue increase from $424.3M in FY2023 to $955.2M in FY2026, translating to a robust compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 28.3%. Yet, despite this top-line expansion and healthy gross margins of 87%, net income remains negative, culminating in a $56M loss in FY2026. This indicates substantial operating expenses, likely driven by aggressive reinvestment in growth and potentially significant stock-based compensation (SBC), evidenced by the disparity between free cash flow (FCF) and net income. The FCF surge to $222M from a negative $70M the previous year suggests cash flow strength, albeit potentially distorted by SBC.
Opus suggests that the market has already re-rated GitLab appropriately due to its deceleration in revenue growth to 23% YoY and competitive pressures from Microsoft. I concur with this assessment; the deceleration is evident and concerning. GitLab's margins remain under pressure, and the narrative of approaching profitability is undermined by increasing losses, despite the FCF positivity. Opus also critiques the 6.0x price-to-sales (P/S) ratio as potentially overvalued given the growth deceleration and competitive landscape, particularly from Microsoft’s bundled offerings. I agree with Opus here, as the current valuation seems to reflect a more optimistic growth trajectory than what recent data supports.
Disagreeing with Opus, I find the narrative around insider transactions requiring greater clarification. Opus mentions extreme insider selling, but the data shows significant C-Conversions likely related to RSUs or options, which doesn't directly equate to bearish sentiment. Still, the lack of visible open-market purchases warrants caution and aligns with Opus's skepticism on insider confidence. Additionally, Opus notes the absence of total debt and equity figures, which complicates a full analysis of leverage and book value, but given the cash position and positive FCF, liquidity seems stable, though dilution remains a concern due to high SBC.
A skeptic might argue that the market's focus on deceleration overlooks GitLab's potential for operational leverage if expense controls are tightened. They could posit that the FCF growth, despite net losses, reflects an underlying business strength that could capitalize on future cost efficiencies. However, the skeptic would also need to address the competitive risks from Microsoft's GitHub, which could erode GitLab's market position and growth prospects.