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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for PulteGroup, Inc. (PHM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-20): Designation Low · Gem Score -27 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 38 · Value -70 · Sentiment -82 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $80.78 vs $123.13 at analysis
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PulteGroup, Inc.
PHM NYSEPulteGroup, Inc. is a U.S. residential homebuilding company that designs, constructs, and sells homes for a range of buyers, including first-time purchasers, move-up families, and active-adult customers. Its portfolio includes single-family detached homes as well as attached housing such as townhomes, condominiums, and duplexes, supported by well-known brands including Centex, Pulte Homes, Del Webb, DiVosta Homes, and John Wieland Homes and Neighborhoods. The company also acquires and develops land for residential communities, helping shape neighborhoods and master-planned developments across the United States. Beyond home construction, PulteGroup provides financial services that include mortgage banking, title insurance, and closing-related services, creating an integrated homebuying experience. Headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia and founded in 1950, PulteGroup plays a significant role in the U.S. housing market through its broad product mix and end-to-end residential offerings.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 11.12
Total Equity: $12.99B
Shares: 199,537,000
Total Debt: $43.90M
Cash: $1.98B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $43.90M
Cash: $1.98B
Revenue: $17.31B
Revenue: $17.31B
Revenue: $17.31B
Total Equity: $12.99B
Tax Rate: 23.8%
Equity: $12.99B
Total Debt: $43.90M
Cash: $1.98B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $43.90M
Total Debt: $43.90M
Total Equity: $12.99B
Shares: 199,537,000
Shares: 199,537,000
CapEx: -$122.72M
Shares: 199,537,000
Stock Price: $123.13
Net Income: $2.22B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 5:50am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $13.9B | $16.2B | $16.1B | $17.9B | $17.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.6B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $1.9B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $2.2B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $7.44 | $11.07 | $11.79 | $14.82 | $11.21 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $7.43 | $11.01 | $11.72 | $14.69 | $11.12 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 5:30am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.8B | $1.1B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $2.0B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $13.4B | $14.8B | $16.1B | $17.4B | $18.0B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $63.9M | $77.3M | $73.5M | $31.1M | $43.9M |
| Total Liabilities | $5.9B | $5.9B | $5.7B | $5.2B | $5.1B |
| Total Equity | $7.5B | $8.9B | $10.4B | $12.1B | $13.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $4.2B | $5.6B | $7.0B | $8.7B | $9.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 6:20am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.0B | $668.5M | $2.2B | $1.7B | $1.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$72.8M | -$112.7M | -$92.2M | -$118.5M | -$122.7M |
| Free Cash Flow | $931.2M | $555.8M | $2.1B | $1.6B | $1.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$836.9M | -$4.9M | -$123.3M | -$355.8M | -$24.5M |
| Dividends Paid | -$147.8M | -$144.1M | -$142.5M | -$167.7M | -$176.7M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$897.3M | -$1.1B | -$1.0B | -$1.2B | -$1.2B |
| Net Change in Cash | — | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 2, 2026 5:50am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +16.5% | -1.0% | +11.7% | -3.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +34.5% | -0.6% | +18.5% | -28.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 12:20pm (20d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-16 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-17 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-16 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-16 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-17 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-18 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-17 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-17 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-18 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-18 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-15 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-16 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-17 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-13 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-21 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-09 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-14 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-14 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-17 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-12 02:04A +1σ run of quarters pays -45%; a −1σ run costs 59%. Ratio -0.8:1 (μ -7.2%, σ 4.4% , 6 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.7 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($123.13) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -5% | 13.4% | $70.46 | -43% |
| Base — stabilizes | -10% | 11.6% | $53.01 | -57% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -15% | 9.9% | $39.24 | -68% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -12% | 11.6% | $48.50 | -61% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | -3% | 11.6% | $67.18 | -45% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -12% | 11.6% | $49.89 | -59% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-02 06:31The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: TTM revenue is roughly $16.4B ($3.98+$3.41+$4.61+$4.40) versus prior-year TTM of $17.6B, so we're -7% YoY on the top line, and TTM net income is ~$1.91B versus $2.63B a year ago, -27%. Q2'26 margin of 11.9% is actually a sequential improvement from Q1'26's 10.2%, but the trajectory from 2024's 18.6% peak margin down through 13.3% (Q3'25), 10.9% (Q4'25), 10.2% (Q1'26) is unmistakable margin compression. This is not a "trough" — this is a stock still in the process of normalizing off peak. Book value is $12.99B, so at $23.45B market cap we're at 1.8x P/B on a company earning ~15% ROE and falling. Debt is essentially zero ($43.9M against $1.98B cash) — the balance sheet fortress is real and undisputed.
Where I part company with the synthesis: the $92 DCF fair value looks anchored to normalized mid-cycle earnings that we may not see for two years. If TTM EPS is around $10 and still declining (Q1+Q2 2026 annualized runs closer to $8.60), and margins are compressing another 200-300bps toward historical mid-cycle 9-10%, then normalized EPS is arguably $7-8, not the $11 the market is implicitly capitalizing. At a cyclical 9x trough multiple on $7.50, you get $67 — well below the synthesis's $92. The Market Forces model calling this a "cyclical value trap" is closer to the truth than the DCF composite. On the other hand, the Thesis Evaluation's -10 score understates how much optionality the pristine balance sheet gives Pulte to buy back stock through the trough — FCF was $1.75B in 2025 against a $23B cap, that's a 7.5% FCF yield funding aggressive repurchase.
The contrarian argument that no model articulates cleanly: homebuilders historically bottom on P/B, not P/E, precisely because earnings collapse into troughs. PHM at 1.8x P/B is nowhere near the 0.8-1.1x that marked the 2008-2011 and 2018 bottoms. If you believe we're mid-cycle-rolling-over rather than late-cycle-bottoming, the P/B compression argument alone suggests fair value in the $70-85 range even before earnings math. Conversely, the bull case nobody's crediting enough: rate cuts in 2026 could re-accelerate order books faster than the cyclical bears assume, and Pulte's zero-debt structure means it doesn't have the refinancing overhang KBH or others carry. But that's a rate call, not a Pulte call — you'd express it through XHB, not single-name.
Data quality flags: no gross or operating margin disclosure in the annual snapshot is annoying for a company where mix (Del Webb active-adult vs entry-level Centex) drives everything. The "revenue_confidence: low, decelerating" tag is correct and material — this is not a business where you can trust NTM estimates within 10%. I dissent from the synthesis's $92 fair value as too generous and side with the Market Forces headwinds framing: this is a hold-your-fire situation, not an entry. Fair value bracket $75-90, with entry only compelling below $85 or after a Q4 print confirming margin stabilization. At $123, you're paying peak-normal multiples for a company in cyclical downshift with a fortress balance sheet as your only real margin of safety. The synthesis says -25% overvalued; I'd say -30 to -35% overvalued and would not chase any bounce until either P/B compresses to 1.3x or quarterly margins re-expand for two consecutive prints.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not “cheap cyclicality,” but a company still earning very good money while its profit structure is clearly rolling over. Revenue peaked at $17.95B in 2024 and slipped to $17.31B in 2025, only a 3.6% decline, but net income fell from $3.08B to $2.22B, down 27.9%. That gap matters: it says the issue is not simply volume noise, it is margin normalization. You can see it quarter by quarter. In 2024’s December quarter PHM printed an eye-popping 18.6% net margin on $4.92B of revenue; by 2025 the run-rate had settled more into the 10.9%-13.8% range, and the first half of 2026 is weaker still at 10.2% and 11.9%. On a trailing four-quarter basis using the data provided, revenue is about $16.4B and net income about $1.91B, implying an 11.6% net margin versus 17.2% for full-year 2024 and 12.8% for full-year 2025. The market is not paying a heroic multiple at 11.1x annual earnings, but it is also not paying a distressed trough multiple for a business whose earnings base is still declining at a much faster rate than sales.
The balance sheet is the best part of the story and the reason I am not outright bearish. PHM has just $43.9M of debt against $1.98B of cash, debt-to-equity of effectively zero at 0.0034, and generated $1.75B of free cash flow in 2025 on only $122.7M of capex. That is extraordinary financial resilience for a homebuilder. Book value is $12.99B, so at a $23.45B market cap the stock trades around 1.9x book — not demanding if returns stay elevated, but not obviously cheap if ROE is drifting down with margins. A 17.1% ROE on the latest annual remains strong, yet that is already well below the earnings peak implied by 2024’s $3.08B profit. The stock at $123 is basically asking investors to believe that current earnings are close enough to mid-cycle and that the company can keep converting cash while waiting out the rate environment. I think that is mostly fair, but not a bargain: the fortress balance sheet deserves a premium to weaker builders, yet the income statement no longer supports paying up for “structural” housing scarcity as if cyclical gravity has gone away.
The biggest contradiction in the bearish model outputs is that they lean hard on a fair value around $90 as though PHM were a fragile late-cycle story. The raw data do not support fragility. This company is overcapitalized, cash generative, and profitable even after a sharp earnings reset. If trailing earnings are around $1.91B, the stock is closer to 12x that figure; for a net-cash homebuilder still earning double-digit net margins, that is not expensive in absolute terms. But the contradiction cuts both ways: the bullish instinct to call 11x earnings “obviously cheap” also misses that those earnings are not stable. Recent quarter net income is down roughly 28% year over year on only 3%-10% revenue declines, which is exactly what late-cycle homebuilding de-rating looks like. To me the correct read is neither value trap nor screaming mispricing. It is a high-quality cyclical being valued about where it should be until either orders and pricing stabilize or margins keep sliding toward a more normal single-digit level.
The strongest case against my read is straightforward: if 2025 was the reset year, the stock is cheap. Even after the drop from $3.08B of net income in 2024 to $2.22B in 2025, PHM still produced $1.87B of operating cash flow and $1.75B of free cash flow, while carrying nearly $2.0B in cash and virtually no debt. A company with those numbers at 1.4x sales and 1.9x book could easily deserve well above $123 if housing supply remains constrained and mortgage rates merely stop getting worse. The 2026 June quarter revenue of $3.98B versus $4.40B a year earlier is down 9.5%, but net margin at 11.9% was actually better than the immediately preceding 10.2% in March, so one could argue margins are settling rather than collapsing. If investors decide 2024 was abnormal and 2025-2026 are just the new base, then 11x earnings for a dominant, cash-rich builder with demographic tailwinds can look outright attractive. I weigh that argument less heavily because I do not see evidence yet that earnings have bottomed; I see evidence that they are still stepping down.
What would change my mind is simple. I would turn more constructive if PHM can put up two things at once: renewed top-line growth and proof that net margins can hold around 12% or better. Concretely, if the next few quarters show revenue back above prior-year levels while quarterly net income stops posting 20%-plus declines, then the stock would deserve a higher multiple and I could justify $135-$145. I would turn clearly bearish if revenue keeps slipping into the mid-single digits down year over year and margins head toward 9%-10%; on roughly $16B of revenue, that would imply earnings power closer to $1.5B-$1.6B, making $123 too rich and pushing fair value closer to $95-$105.
Grok Reading
PulteGroup’s numbers describe a clean post-peak comedown, not a collapse. Annual revenue rolled over from $17.95B in 2024 to $17.31B in 2025 (−3.5%), while net income fell harder—from $3.08B to $2.22B (−28%)—as net margins compressed from the mid-teens/high-teens prints of 2024 (15.6–18.6%) into the 10–13% band that has defined every quarter since. The first half of 2026 continues that pattern: $3.41B then $3.98B of revenue and $347M then $472M of net income, for a trailing run-rate that annualizes uncomfortably close to $2B of earnings if the seasonal second half only partially recovers. Free cash flow remains real at $1.75B on just $123M of capex, ROE is still 17%, and the balance sheet is essentially unlevered ($44M debt against $1.98B cash and $13.0B of equity). That combination—declining but still double-digit-margin earnings, fortress liquidity, and a 11.1× trailing P/E / 1.4× sales—is the entire story. The stock is being priced as a mid-cycle earner that has already given back its peak, not as a distressed cyclical.
The quantitative stack that spits out a $90–92 fair value and a −25% overvaluation signal is too punitive on that fact set. Capitalizing $1.75B of FCF at 10× to justify $92 ignores that a net-cash homebuilder still clearing ~12% net margins and 17% ROE has rarely been consigned to a trough multiple while the industry is still shipping $17B of houses. A more coherent range sits nearer $105–115 (roughly 11–12× a normalized $2.0–2.1B earnings power and ~12–13× FCF), which still leaves $123 modestly rich but nowhere near the 25% air pocket the composite claims. The “value trap / wait for capitulation” market-forces line also over-reaches: revenue confidence is low and the trend is decelerating, yet absolute profitability and cash conversion have not broken. Structural underbuilding since 2008 and the Del Webb 55+ franchise are not narrative vapor; they are visible in the resilience of gross activity even as price/mix and incentives pressure margins.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward and numerate. Earnings CAGR is already −7.7% and FCF CAGR −8.9%; the 2024 $913M quarter looks like a cycle high that will not be revisited soon; Q1 2026’s 10.2% margin and $347M print show how fast profitability can gap lower when closings slow; and affordability (price × rate) has no internal fix inside PHM’s control. If 2026 full-year net income settles at $1.7–1.8B rather than $2.0B+, the forward multiple expands to 13–14× on still-falling numbers, and the 34% premium the narrative layer is carrying above a $92 DCF becomes indefensible. That is the smart bear’s sheet: you are paying a mid-cycle multiple for what may still be early- to mid-decline earnings, financed by a story about permanent supply scarcity that rate shocks or a mild recession can puncture. I weigh it seriously—enough to refuse a buy—but not enough to endorse the $92 anchor, because zero net debt and $1.75B of FCF buy time and optionality that pure earnings-power models discard.
I would flip to outright undervalued only if two or three consecutive quarters show net margins stabilizing above 12.5%, net new orders and community count turning positive on a year-over-year basis, and forward EPS consensus re-anchoring above $11 with mortgage rates sustained below ~6%. I would flip more decisively bearish (and closer to the model’s $92) if H2 2026 revenue fails to seasonally recover above $4.2B per quarter or if net margins breach 10% on the downside while cancellations rise—evidence that the affordability reset is still ahead rather than behind.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
PulteGroup shows the hallmarks of a well-run mature cyclical: $1.98B liquid cash, $1.94B net cash, Altman Z of 4.48 (safe zone), and $1.75B of trailing FCF that fully self-funds operations. Revenue has grown from $13.9B (2021) to $17.3B (2025) with net income roughly $2.2B-$3.1B across the cycle, showing the business held profitability through a difficult rate environment for housing. Diluted shares fell from 259.9M to 199.5M, a -6.4% CAGR, with buyback-to-SBC of 2262x - management is a heavy net repurchaser and per-share value is being concentrated, not diluted. The main blemish is earnings quality: OCF/NI of 0.6x and accruals at 6.6% of assets in the latest period suggest reported net income is running ahead of cash conversion, a common but real issue in homebuilders where WIP inventory and land spend absorb cash. Net income dropped from $3.08B (2024) to $2.22B (2025) on flat-to-down revenue ($17.95B to $17.31B), hinting margin pressure has arrived. Still, over the full window FCF cumulates to ~$6.9B against ~$12.5B net income - decent but not tight cash conversion typical of a land-heavy builder. The picture is a solid, cycle-tested operator with strong solvency and shareholder-friendly capital return. It is not a fortress-tier compounder because it is inherently cyclical, capital-intensive, and shows cash-vs-earnings slippage in the current period, but it is clearly above average in operating discipline for its industry.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Land inventory and lot option mix in the 10-K - is the cash-vs-earnings gap driven by disciplined land banking or bloating WIP?
- Gross margin trajectory by quarter through 2025 to gauge whether pricing/incentives are compressing further
- Debt maturity ladder and any off-balance-sheet land banking obligations
- Insider transaction detail - are the buybacks being offset by any large insider selling?
- Cancellation rates and backlog trends in latest 10-Q to confirm demand direction
Price is $123.13 against a composite fair value of $90.02 and signal-adjusted FV of $92.01 - roughly 25% above deserved value. The two methods bracket the answer sensibly: DCF at $76.45 reflects normalized cash flows for a rate-sensitive cyclical, while anchored-PE at $117.16 leans on current (arguably peak) earnings power. Even the more generous method sits below spot, which tells you the market is paying for the optimistic case. Quality is strong (disciplined buybacks, low leverage, real FCF), which justifies a premium to book/DCF - but not this much. Cash conversion of 0.6x OCF/NI is a real haircut on reported earnings, and pricing a late-cycle homebuilder on trailing PE assumes the supply-tightness narrative holds through the next rate move. The bull case (structural underbuild, scale, buybacks) is entirely in the price; the bear case (rate re-acceleration, margin normalization) is not. Margin of safety is negative - you are underwriting the bull outcome at cost.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Order backlog trends and cancellation rates in latest 10-Q
- Gross margin trajectory - guidance for next 2 quarters vs current levels
- Land spend and lot count growth - is management leaning in at the top?
- Incentive/buydown costs embedded in ASP - true realized margin
- Buyback pace vs FCF - sustainability at current price
The pressure on PulteGroup right now is net negative and specifically shaped by its identity as a high-beta (1.21) cyclical homebuilder. The prevailing narrative is a 'cyclical-late-stage' story with fragile durability and no cult support - meaning the market is willing to sell first and ask questions later on any crack. That crack is arriving: a fresh Apollo/Slok note today framing housing as a drag on GDP is exactly the kind of macro-narrative headline that de-rates the entire builder cohort, and PHM has no idiosyncratic story (no AI angle, no secular growth halo) to insulate it. Macro context amplifies the hit rather than mutes it. The 10y at 4.75% keeps mortgage rates elevated, which is the single variable the bear case hangs on, and a neutral-to-slightly-soft tape (S&P off 2.2%, VIX 16.3) offers no risk-on cover for a 1.21-beta cyclical. Momentum is already rolling over (recent -3.5% vs 3.8% long-term trend, three-year deceleration), signaling the tape has begun pricing the bear leg of the narrative. Nothing in the flow is currently pushing UP on this name - no upgrade cycle, no positive catalyst, no rotation into housing. Net: a real, persistent headwind, not a decisive collapse.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any shift in 10y yields or mortgage rate prints - a move back toward 4% would flip the narrative pressure
- Homebuilder analyst target revisions and downgrade cadence following the Slok/housing-drag narrative
- Whether the housing-weakness story broadens (starts, permits, cancellations) or fades within the news cycle
- Sector rotation flows in ITB/XHB relative to S&P as a real-time sentiment gauge
This is a financing-cost story, not a demand-preference story. The single variable that decides PHM's trajectory is the 30-year mortgage rate, which tracks the 10-year at 4.75%. Households want the houses; they cannot make the payment without a builder-funded buydown, and each buydown is a direct transfer from gross margin to closing volume. Layer on macro headwinds and a flat curve, and both the volume and the margin line stay pressured through at least the next two prints. The structural offset is real and unusual for a cyclical: the U.S. is short housing stock, formation continues, and there is no 2008-style shadow inventory, so the recovery mechanism is a rate move rather than years of absorption. That makes the shape of this business a deep near-term trough with intact long-run earnings power — but the timing of the inflection sits entirely outside management's control, which is why the structural rung earns Holding rather than Growing.
When we made this prediction on Sep 2, 2026, PHM was $123.97. We expect it to be $110.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $95.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 2, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.