Business Description
Klaviyo, Inc., a technology company that provides a software-as-a-service platform to enable its customers to send the right messages at the right time across email, short message service (SMS), and push notifications. The company offers Klaviyo, a marketing automation platform that sends personalized and targeted messages. Its products include email marketing solution to track every click and purchase to optimize campaigns; SMS, a text marketing solution for ecommerce growth and retention; and mobile push solution that reaches customers directly on their lock screen with mobile push notifications. The company also provides Review solution to get the product reviews; and a customer data platform that helps store, analyze, and use data at scale. It serves individuals, small and medium enterprises, and companies in North America, Western Europe, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. The was incorporated in 2012 and is based in Boston, Massachusetts.
Business History
Generated: Jun 1, 2026 6:39pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:37pm (25d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.11
Total Equity: $1.20B
Shares: 290,896,895
Total Debt: $120.75M
Cash: $1.06B
EBITDA: -$49.16M
Total Debt: $120.75M
Cash: $1.06B
Revenue: $1.23B
Shares: 290,896,895
Revenue: $1.23B
Revenue: $1.23B
Revenue: $1.23B
Total Equity: $1.20B
Tax Rate: -4.1%
Equity: $1.20B
Total Debt: $120.75M
Cash: $1.06B
Current Liabilities: $282.23M
Long-Term Debt: $95.99M
Total Debt: $120.75M
Total Equity: $1.20B
Shares: 290,896,895
Shares: 290,896,895
CapEx: -$28.47M
Shares: 290,896,895
Stock Price: $18.37
Net Income: -$31.77M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The mechanical forensic picture is genuinely clean: $1.06B liquid cash, $944M net cash, $189.5M TTM FCF, Altman Z of 9.15, Beneish M of -2.95, and accruals at -17.6% of assets (cash flow comfortably exceeds reported earnings). Revenue compounded from $290.6M (2021) to $1.23B (2025), gross margin is stable at ~75%, and operating losses have narrowed from -27% to -5.5%. This is a self-funding business with effectively zero survival risk — the bear case is not about going broke.
The trap is in the cap table and the insider tape. Diluted shares went 251.9M → 242.9M → 266.3M → 290.9M — that is ~9% growth in the last year alone, not 3.7%, and buybacks recover only 20.6% of SBC. SBC at 13.1% of revenue means roughly $160M/yr of the $189.5M FCF is essentially funded by issuing stock to employees — 'cash FCF' minus SBC is barely positive. Meanwhile the insider tape labeled 'Net Insider Buying' shows ZERO open-market P-buys; every recent transaction is C-conversion → S-sale (Bialecki dumped $6.1M in two days), F-InKind tax withholding, or option exercise-and-flip. The $300K 'buy' in the upstream label is almost certainly a misclassified option exercise. Insiders are uniformly distributing.
Valuation: $5.5B market cap on $1.23B revenue = ~4.5x sales, or ~3.7x ex-cash. Against 28%+ growth and accelerating FCF that is not expensive — but it requires that growth doesn't decelerate into Shopify/HubSpot bundling pressure. Reasonable, not screaming cheap.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:43pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $290.6M | $472.7M | $698.1M | $937.5M | $1.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $84.7M | $128.0M | $177.9M | $221.3M | $312.5M |
| Gross Profit | $205.9M | $344.7M | $520.2M | $716.2M | $921.5M |
| Operating Expenses | $285.2M | $399.8M | $850.8M | $800.2M | $989.3M |
| Operating Income | -$79.2M | -$55.0M | -$330.6M | -$84.1M | -$67.8M |
| Net Income | -$79.4M | -$49.2M | -$308.2M | -$46.1M | -$31.8M |
| EBITDA | -$73.8M | -$46.0M | -$317.0M | -$66.4M | -$49.2M |
| EPS | $-0.32 | $-0.20 | $-1.27 | $-0.17 | $-0.11 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:39pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $327.9M | $385.8M | $738.6M | $881.5M | $1.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $356.1M | $427.5M | $803.5M | $979.7M | $1.2B |
| Total Assets | $464.4M | $629.1M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $77.0M | $85.0M | $130.6M | $199.9M | $282.2M |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $96.0M |
| Total Liabilities | $2.7B | $1.7B | $174.3M | $239.3M | $384.0M |
| Total Equity | -$2.2B | -$1.0B | $914.8M | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| Retained Earnings | -$2.2B | -$2.3B | -$799.0M | -$845.2M | -$877.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:43pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$22.7M | -$23.6M | $119.4M | $166.0M | $218.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$14.2M | -$18.2M | -$9.4M | -$17.2M | -$28.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$37.0M | -$41.8M | $110.0M | $148.7M | $189.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $-500,000 | $0 | $0 | -$2.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$140.4M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $174.3M | $59.0M | $352.7M | $142.9M | $183.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:37pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$1.8B $1.8B – $1.8B
|
$2.2B $2.2B – $2.2B
|
$2.6B $2.6B – $2.7B
|
$3.1B $3.1B – $3.1B
|
| EBITDA |
$269.0M $264.5M – $273.4M
|
$319.7M $319.5M – $319.8M
|
$387.9M $382.6M – $392.8M
|
$458.1M $451.9M – $463.9M
|
| Net Income |
$302.7M $281.2M – $324.3M
|
$371.0M $364.7M – $377.3M
|
$448.0M $440.1M – $455.4M
|
$488.7M $480.1M – $496.8M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:43pm (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +62.7% | +47.7% | +34.3% | +31.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +67.4% | +50.9% | +37.7% | +28.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | +30.5% | -500.7% | +74.6% | +19.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +38.0% | -526.6% | +85.0% | +31.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +37.7% | -589.1% | +79.1% | +25.9% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 1, 2026 6:43pm (25d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-18 | Whalen Amanda | S-Sale | 14,000.00 | $13.23 | $185,220 |
| 2026-06-11 | Oulman Roxanne | C-Conversion | 8,169.00 | $0.00 | $8 |
| 2026-06-09 | Oulman Roxanne | A-Award | 14,822.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-11 | Oulman Roxanne | C-Conversion | 8,169.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | St. Ledger Susan | A-Award | 14,822.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Ceran Jennifer | A-Award | 14,822.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Weisman Tony | A-Award | 14,822.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-09 | Fernandez Gomez Luciano | F-InKind | 1,746.00 | $14.78 | $25,806 |
| 2026-05-26 | Bialecki Andrew | C-Conversion | 212,529.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Bialecki Andrew | C-Conversion | 212,529.00 | $0.00 | $213 |
| 2026-05-26 | Bialecki Andrew | S-Sale | 212,529.00 | $14.61 | $3.1M |
| 2026-05-18 | St. Ledger Susan | C-Conversion | 9,334.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-18 | St. Ledger Susan | C-Conversion | 9,334.00 | $0.00 | $9 |
| 2026-05-18 | St. Ledger Susan | S-Sale | 9,334.00 | $14.27 | $133,196 |
| 2026-05-19 | Bialecki Andrew | C-Conversion | 200,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | Bialecki Andrew | C-Conversion | 200,000.00 | $0.00 | $200 |
| 2026-05-19 | Bialecki Andrew | S-Sale | 200,000.00 | $14.88 | $3.0M |
| 2026-05-15 | Edmond Landon | F-InKind | 22,340.00 | $14.38 | $321,249 |
| 2026-05-15 | Fernandez Gomez Luciano | F-InKind | 22,132.00 | $14.38 | $318,258 |
| 2026-05-15 | Galvin Carmel | F-InKind | 30,541.00 | $14.38 | $439,180 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw trajectory here is genuinely impressive and the prior models are underweighting it. Quarterly revenue went $222M → $235M → $270M → $280M → $293M → $311M → $350M → $358M — that's not deceleration, that's a clean step-function with Q4'25 ($350M) and Q1'26 ($358M) showing the company punching through to durable GAAP profitability ($7M and $9M net income). Margins flipped from -10% (Q4'24) to +2.5% (Q1'26) in five quarters while revenue grew 32% YoY. Full-year FCF of $189.5M on $1.23B revenue is a 15.4% FCF margin — that is not "adequate," that is excellent for a company still compounding north of 30%. Cash of $1.06B against no meaningful debt means the EV is roughly $4.44B, putting EV/Revenue closer to 3.6x on trailing and ~2.8x on forward — materially cheaper than the 4.5x the synthesis cites.
Where I disagree with the prior models: the Market Forces verdict of "Market Headwinds — insiders heading for the exits" is sloppy. The insider "sales" listed are all paired with same-day C-Conversions of identical share counts (212,529 convert / 212,529 sell; 200,000 / 200,000) — these are programmatic 10b5-1 option exercises and immediate sales, not discretionary dumps. Calling that bearish signal is a misread, and the Secondary Signals block actually labels it "Net Insider Buying," which directly contradicts Market Forces. The synthesis verdict of "Reasonable Premium" is defensible but timid given what the numbers show. The Narrative layer's claim that "the market is pricing in 28.6% perpetual revenue growth" is the reverse-DCF output, not reality — at $5.5B market cap with $190M FCF growing 30%+, you need maybe 15-18% revenue CAGR fading to terminal to justify today's price, not 28.6% perpetual.
The contrarian case is real and worth stating sharply. Klaviyo's growth is heavily tethered to Shopify's GMV — roughly 75-80% of customers run on Shopify — and Shopify has every incentive to build or acquire a competing retention layer (they already own Shopify Email and have flirted with deeper CRM). If Shopify de-prioritizes the partnership or launches a bundled offering, Klaviyo's CAC and NRR both deteriorate fast. Second, the SMB/mid-market e-commerce TAM is genuinely cyclical — if D2C ad efficiency degrades further or Temu/Shein-style pressure compresses merchant economics, Klaviyo's net adds and seat expansion suffer with a lag. Third, gross margin at 74.7% is good but not best-in-class for infrastructure SaaS (peers run 78-82%); the SMS pass-through costs cap structural margin upside. Fourth, GAAP profitability at 2% margin is fragile — one quarter of SBC normalization or a sales hiring push reverses it.
Where the data is thin: there's no debt or equity line in the balance sheet block, no NRR disclosure, no breakdown of Shopify concentration, and the insider transactions lack named filers so we can't distinguish CEO selling from rank-and-file vesting. The "2026-Q1" revenue print labeled 2026-03-31 is either a data tag error or the file is stamped forward — either way the recency claim deserves a sanity check. The ev_to_ebitda of -209 is noise; ignore. ROE/ROIC are lagging and irrelevant for a company that just crossed breakeven. Treat operating_margin of -5.5% as stale — the quarterly trend says the TTM is closer to flat-to-slightly-positive now.
My verdict: I dissent from "Reasonable Premium" toward modestly undervalued. At $18.37 with $1.06B net cash, EV is ~$4.44B against $189M FCF growing 30%+ and revenue tracking to ~$1.55-1.6B in 2026 — that's ~2.8x forward EV/Sales and ~22x EV/FCF for a 30%-grower with positive GAAP earnings. Rule of 40 math: 32% growth + 15% FCF margin = 47, comfortably above threshold. Comparable best-in-class SaaS at this growth/FCF profile trade 5-7x forward sales. Fair value is $24-28 assuming the Shopify relationship hol
GPT Critique
In examining Klaviyo's recent performance, a few key factors stand out to me. The company has notably transitioned from a phase of significant losses to achieving positive net income, as evidenced by the $9 million net income reported in Q1 2026, alongside a margin improvement from -10% in Q4 2024 to +2.5% in Q1 2026. This suggests operational efficiencies and a disciplined approach to scaling. Despite the past losses, the 31% year-on-year revenue growth from 2025 is a testament to robust market demand and execution capability. Moreover, Klaviyo’s substantial free cash flow of $189.5 million on $1.23 billion in revenue (15.4% FCF margin) underscores a solid financial footing, especially with a cash reserve of $1.06 billion and no debt. This positions the company well, providing a buffer and flexibility for strategic maneuvers in a competitive market.
I find myself in agreement with Opus's assessment that the insider transactions are not indicative of negative sentiment but rather are programmatic in nature. The evidence presented, where insider sales are directly correlated with conversions, suggests routine financial planning rather than a lack of faith in the company's future. This aligns with Opus's critique of the "Market Headwinds" label, which appears to misinterpret these transactions. Moreover, I concur with Opus's dispute of the market narrative that claims a need for a perpetual 28.6% revenue growth rate. Given Klaviyo's current financial metrics and market stance, a more modest growth rate can sustain its current valuation, making the company's pricing appear more attractive than the synthesis suggests.
Where I diverge from Opus is in the interpretation of the overall market thesis. While Opus leans towards the stock being modestly undervalued, I am more cautious. The heavy reliance on Shopify for customer acquisition, which Opus rightly identifies as a risk, cannot be understated. The potential for Shopify to disrupt through vertical integration is a significant threat. Additionally, Klaviyo's margins, while improving, are not yet at the level of its best-in-class peers, which could limit its ability to leverage operational scale in the long term. Furthermore, while the company's current cash position is strong, the cyclical nature of the SMB/mid-market e-commerce space could pose unforeseen challenges if economic conditions tighten or competitive pressures increase.
A skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are underestimating the potential impact of competitive pressures and macroeconomic headwinds on Klaviyo's growth trajectory. They might also point out that despite positive cash flow and improving margins, the operational risks tied to its concentrated customer base and the broader e-commerce ecosystem could lead to a more volatile performance than anticipated. Furthermore, the lack of detailed data on customer retention (NRR) and the specific dynamics of its relationship with Shopify could mask underlying vulnerabilities.