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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Steel Dynamics Inc. (STLD) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-04): Designation Low · Gem Score -36 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 16 · Value -70 · Sentiment 10 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $146.57 vs $228.68 at analysis
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Steel Dynamics Inc.
STLD NASDAQSteel Dynamics Inc. is a U.S.-based steel producer and metal recycler headquartered in Fort Wayne, Indiana. The company operates through four primary segments: steel operations, metals recycling operations, steel fabrication operations, and aluminum operations. Its steel operations manufacture products such as hot rolled sheet, cold rolled sheet, hot rolled plate, painted sheet, and various coated steel products for use in construction, automotive, industrial, and energy applications. The metals recycling operations focus on processing and selling recycled ferrous and nonferrous metals, supplying both internal mills and external customers. Steel fabrication operations produce steel joists, joist girders, and decking products used in nonresidential construction projects. The aluminum operations segment is developing capabilities around aluminum flat rolled products, enhancing the company’s presence across metals markets. Steel Dynamics Inc. plays a significant role in the basic materials sector by providing essential steel and metal products to a broad range of manufacturing, infrastructure, and construction end markets across North America.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.99
Total Equity: $8.93B
Shares: 148,404,000
Total Debt: $4.21B
Cash: $769.88M
EBITDA: $2.03B
Total Debt: $4.21B
Cash: $769.88M
Revenue: $18.18B
Revenue: $18.18B
Revenue: $18.18B
Total Equity: $8.93B
Tax Rate: 20.5%
Equity: $8.93B
Total Debt: $4.21B
Cash: $769.88M
Current Liabilities: $2.12B
Long-Term Debt: $4.18B
Total Debt: $4.21B
Total Equity: $8.93B
Shares: 148,404,000
Shares: 148,404,000
CapEx: -$948.03M
Shares: 148,404,000
Stock Price: $228.68
Net Income: $1.19B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 7:50am (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $18.4B | $21.5B | $18.8B | $17.5B | $18.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $13.0B | $15.4B | $14.7B | $14.7B | $15.8B |
| Gross Profit | $5.4B | $6.1B | $4.0B | $2.8B | $2.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.1B | $1.0B | $894.7M | $859.5M | $916.2M |
| Operating Income | $4.3B | $5.1B | $3.2B | $1.9B | $1.5B |
| Net Income | $3.2B | $3.9B | $2.5B | $1.5B | $1.2B |
| EBITDA | $4.6B | $5.5B | $3.6B | $2.4B | $2.0B |
| EPS | $22.42 | $21.06 | $14.72 | $9.89 | $8.02 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $22.26 | $20.92 | $14.64 | $9.84 | $7.99 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 7:30am (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $589.5M | $769.9M |
| Total Current Assets | $6.9B | $7.6B | $6.8B | $5.4B | $6.5B |
| Total Assets | $12.5B | $14.2B | $14.9B | $14.9B | $16.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $2.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.0B | $3.0B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $4.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $6.2B | $6.1B | $6.1B | $6.0B | $7.5B |
| Total Equity | $6.3B | $8.1B | $8.8B | $8.9B | $8.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $7.8B | $11.4B | $13.5B | $14.8B | $15.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 7:50am (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.2B | $4.5B | $3.5B | $1.8B | $1.4B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.0B | -$908.9M | -$1.7B | -$1.9B | -$948.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.2B | $3.6B | $1.9B | -$23.5M | $501.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$5.4M | -$42.2M | -$1.9M | $158.9M | $985.8M |
| Dividends Paid | -$213.0M | -$237.2M | -$271.3M | -$282.6M | -$291.2M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.1B | -$1.8B | -$1.5B | -$1.2B | -$900.9M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$124.8M | $384.6M | -$227.5M | -$811.5M | $180.3M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 24, 2026 7:50am (10d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +16.8% | -12.5% | -6.7% | +3.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +14.1% | -33.9% | -30.7% | -14.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +18.4% | -38.1% | -38.3% | -24.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +20.2% | -36.5% | -37.3% | -22.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | +17.8% | -34.5% | -32.5% | -16.3% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 18, 2026 12:07am (17d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-30 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-31 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-31 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-30 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-30 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-31 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-31 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-30 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-28 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-28 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-28 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-29 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-30 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-29 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-29 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-29 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-30 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-30 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-29 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-08-24 08:03Even the bull case prices 40% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 54%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($228.68) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +18% | 9.2% | $137.74 | -40% |
| Base — stabilizes | +12% | 8.0% | $102.14 | -55% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +6% | 6.8% | $74.35 | -67% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +11% | 8.6% | $105.81 | -54% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-24 08:01The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly trajectory first: STLD is actually inflecting up, not down. Q2 2026 revenue of $6.09B is a 33% YoY jump from Q2 2025's $4.57B, and net income of $534M is up 79% YoY from $299M. Margins have expanded four straight quarters from 5.0% in Q1 2025 to 8.8% in Q2 2026. This is a very different picture than the trailing annual CAGRs (-30.5% earnings, -48.1% FCF) suggest — those numbers anchor on the 2022 supernormal peak ($3.86B NI on $21.5B rev at 28.5% gross margin) and mechanically make any comparison look ugly. The synthesis and market-forces models appear to be leaning heavily on those trailing metrics and on TTM P/E of 28.6x, which is stale — annualizing the last two quarters' NI (~$1.87B) gets you to a forward P/E closer to 17.5x, not 28x. That's a materially different valuation debate.
That said, the bear case has real teeth. FCF collapsed to $501M in 2025 against $948M capex and $4.21B debt, and the balance sheet cash position ($770M) is thin relative to debt for a cyclical. ROIC of 9.5% is unremarkable for what's supposedly the low-cost EAF operator, and the 2022 peak margins (28.5% gross) versus 2025 trough (13.2%) show the amplitude of this cycle is enormous — a 15-point gross margin swing on ~$18B of revenue is $2.7B of EBIT that comes and goes. The synthesis DCF at $146 is probably using something like a $1.5-1.8B normalized NI, which is defensible mid-cycle math. The question is whether Q2 2026's run-rate is a new plateau (tariff-supported domestic pricing) or another cyclical head-fake before mean reversion. I lean toward the former being partially true but overpriced into the stock.
Where I diverge from the models: the "Market Headwinds / collapsing cash flows" framing from the market forces module is looking backward at 2025's trough and missing that Q1-Q2 2026 already show the recovery. Meanwhile, the narrative layer's characterization of this as "cyclical-late-stage" at 8.8% net margin is odd — 2022's peak was 18% net margin, so 8.8% is mid-cycle at best, not late-stage peak. The narrative model may be conflating stock price (near highs) with earnings position (mid-recovery). Insider activity is genuinely uninformative — small awards and gifts, no meaningful open-market buys or sells, so treating "no insider transactions" as a signal is noise. The contrarian argument the models under-weight: if Section 232 tariffs and reshoring are structurally sticky (bipartisan, four years running), then STLD's normalized earnings power is higher than a naive 20-year cycle-average DCF captures, and $135 fair value is too pessimistic.
Committing: I partially dissent from the synthesis "overvalued" verdict but I don't think STLD is cheap either. At $228, you're paying ~17.5x forward run-rate earnings for a cyclical whose Q2 print may itself be a peak or near-peak — auto and construction demand indicators are mixed, and steel prices historically don't hold 8-9% net margins through a full cycle without tariff support. The $146 DCF fair value looks too low because it doesn't credit the tariff regime; the $228 price looks too high because it fully credits it. Fair value in the $180-200 range feels right: a modest premium to unadjusted mid-cycle DCF, reflecting genuinely improved domestic pricing power, but not the 69% narrative premium the market is paying. I'd wait for either a pullback below $190 or a Q3 print confirming margin durability at 9%+ before adding. The high-debt/low-FCF flag is real but manageable at current cash generation — interest coverage is fine as long as EBITDA holds above $2.5B annualized, which the current run-rate supports.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say STLD is in a real earnings recovery, but the stock is already priced for much more than a normal cyclical rebound. Quarterly revenue has stepped up from $3.87B in 4Q24 to $6.09B in 2Q26, and net income has improved from $207M to $534M over the same span, with net margin recovering from 5.4% to 8.8%. That is not a broken business. In fact, the recent run-rate looks materially better than the 2025 annual average: first-half 2026 revenue is $11.29B and net income is $937.5M, which annualizes to roughly $22.6B of sales and $1.9B of earnings if conditions hold. The problem is that the equity value is not asking whether STLD can recover from a soft patch; it is asking investors to pay up as if this stronger run-rate is durable. At $32.8B market cap and about $36.2B enterprise value, the stock trades around 17x annualized first-half 2026 earnings and still roughly 14x annualized operating income on a commodity steel business whose 2021-2025 earnings ranged from $1.19B to $3.86B. For a cyclical producer, that is rich.
What stands out most is the gap between improved operating momentum and uninspiring through-cycle economics. Revenue in 2025 was $18.18B, slightly above 2024’s $17.54B, yet operating income fell from $1.94B to $1.48B and net income from $1.54B to $1.19B. Gross margin compressed from 16.0% to 13.2%, and free cash flow was only $501.5M on $1.45B of operating cash flow because capex consumed $948M. So while the business remains profitable and liquid, equity holders are not buying a cash gush machine at this point in the cycle. On 2025 numbers, the stock is at 28.6x earnings, 18.4x EV/EBITDA, 1.87x sales, and 3.8x book. Those are not distressed or even mid-cycle multiples. They are premium multiples for a company with five-year revenue CAGR of negative 1.7%, earnings CAGR of negative 30.5%, and a sub-1% dividend yield. The market is effectively capitalizing STLD on rebound expectations rather than on demonstrated cash generation.
I also think some of the bearish model language overstates the balance-sheet risk. Debt of $4.21B against $8.93B of equity and a current ratio above 3.0 does not look like a stressed steel company, especially with positive earnings throughout this downturn phase. Cash of $770M is not huge, but this is not a near-term solvency story. The more important issue is valuation discipline. A stock can be fundamentally sound and still overvalued if investors pay a price that assumes elevated spreads persist. Here, the recent quarterly ramp is genuine, but it follows a clear pattern of cyclical compression from 2022’s $3.86B net income to 2025’s $1.19B. Even if 2026 gets back near $1.9B, that is still only about half the 2022 peak, and the current market cap would still imply a high-teens earnings multiple on a recovered year. That leaves little room for steel spreads to normalize downward again.
The strongest argument against my view is that the market may be valuing STLD on forward normalized earnings power that is substantially above both 2025 and the first-half 2026 annualization. If quarterly revenue has already inflected to $6B+ and margins are climbing from 5.0% in 1Q25 to 8.8% in 2Q26, bulls can argue this is the early innings of an upcycle, not the middle. On that read, 2025 was the trough, 2026 is a transition year, and a more favorable pricing and mix environment could push earnings back toward something closer to the 2021-2023 zone. If STLD can earn, say, $14-$16 per share in a normal upswing and sustain above-peer returns because of low-cost EAF operations and vertical integration, then $228 is not absurd. I weigh that less heavily because the historical record here is still one of sharp earnings volatility, and the current valuation already grants a lot of credit for that optimistic normalization before it shows up in annual free cash flow.
What would change my mind is simple: I would need to see the recovery convert into sustained annual cash earnings, not just a couple of stronger quarters. If the next two quarters keep revenue above roughly $5.8B and net margin around 9%-10%, taking trailing annual net income decisively above $1.8B while free cash flow improves meaningfully despite capex, then the current multiple would look less demanding. Conversely, if revenue falls back toward the mid-$4B range or margins slide back toward 6%-7%, the stock’s premium rating becomes very hard to defend. For now, this is a good steel operator priced like the cycle has become structurally kinder than history suggests.
Grok Reading
The quarterly tape tells a clearer story than the trailing annuals the models are still chewing on. Steel Dynamics printed $6.09B of revenue and $534M of net income in the June 2026 quarter—net margin 8.8%—after $5.20B / $403M / 7.8% in March. That is not a trough; it is a sharp sequential re-acceleration from the $4.4–4.8B revenue and 5–6% margin band that defined late 2024 and 2025. TTM revenue is now roughly $20.5B with TTM net income near $1.61B, already well above the full-year 2025 print of $18.18B and $1.19B that underpins the advertised 28.6x P/E. Annual earnings have still collapsed from the 2022 peak of $3.86B through $2.45B (2023) and $1.54B (2024) to $1.19B (2025), so the multi-year CAGRs (earnings –30.5%, FCF –48.1%) correctly flag a cycle that has already inflicted real damage. But the forward-looking run-rate has turned. Balance sheet is serviceable rather than stressed: $4.21B debt against $8.93B equity (D/E 0.47), $770M cash, current ratio 3.06. The “high debt risk” flag in the valuation synthesis is not supported by these levels. What *is* supported is poor cash conversion—2025 operating cash flow of $1.45B produced only $502M of free cash flow after $948M of capex—so the equity is being valued on earnings quality that cash has not yet ratified.
At $228.68 and a $32.8B enterprise, the multiple stack is demanding: 28.6x depressed annual earnings, roughly 20x the fresher TTM, 18.4x EV/EBITDA, 3.8x book, and something like 65x 2025 FCF. Those are growth-stock multiples on a scrap-based EAF steelmaker whose gross margin last year was 13.2% and whose ROIC is 9.5%. The market is explicitly paying for the H1 2026 recovery to sustain and for mid-cycle earnings power in the mid-teens per share; anything short of that and 18x EBITDA has nowhere to go but down. Revenue CAGR of –1.7% over the last half-decade and a still-negative earnings YoY print (–23%) mean the multiple expansion is almost pure narrative—tariffs, reshoring, “strategic domestic capacity”—not demonstrated through-cycle cash compounding.
The strongest case against an overvalued read is the shape of the last two quarters themselves. If $6B-plus quarterly revenue and high-single-digit net margins are the new base rather than a spike, annualized earnings power is already $2.0–2.1B, or roughly $14–15 per share on ~143M shares, which puts the stock at 15–16x near-term earnings—not cheap for steel, but no longer absurd if spreads hold and the heavy capex is growth spending that rolls off into FCF. A smart opponent would also note that STLD has historically been among the better capital allocators in the group, that the 0.9% dividend is covered (payout 25%), and that scrap-based minimill cost curves plus vertical metals recycling give it a real edge when ferrous prices are volatile. They would argue the DCF anchor near $135–146 is anchoring to a mid-cycle that underweights a structurally tighter North American flat-rolled market. I weigh that less heavily because EV/EBITDA of 18x already capitalizes several years of that optimistic case, FCF has not confirmed the earnings rebound, and steel multiples compress violently on any demand hiccup—the narrative durability is explicitly tagged fragile.
I would flip toward fair value or modestly undervalued if the next two quarters hold revenue above $5.5B with net margins at or above 8% *and* free cash flow on a run-rate above $1.2B as capex normalizes, or if management guides to sustained mid-cycle EPS of $18+ with visible order books in auto and non-res construction. A break in hot-rolled coil prices or a sequential revenue drop back under $5B with margin compression toward 6% would confirm the premium is purely cyclical froth and push me more firmly short the name.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Steel Dynamics is a structurally sound mini-mill operator caught mid-cycle. The mechanical integrity checks are pristine: Altman Z of 5.69 (safe zone), Beneish M of -2.39 (no manipulation signal), OCF/NI of 1.14x, and negative accruals at -1.4% of assets. Diluted share count actually shrank from 184.6M in 2022 to 148.4M in 2025 (buyback/SBC ratio of 2045x), so per-share value is being protected aggressively. SBC is a trivial 0.4% of revenue. The concern is the earnings trajectory. Gross margin has collapsed from 29.2% (2021) to 13.2% (2025), operating margin from 23.4% to 8.1%, and net income from $3.86B peak to $1.19B. FCF went from $3.55B (2022) to negative $23.5M (2024) before recovering to $501.5M in 2025 - this is classic cyclical steel behavior compounded by heavy capex (new Sinton mill, aluminum rolling mill build-out). Net debt of $3.44B against only $770M cash means the balance sheet is a working constraint rather than a cushion, though a 5.69 Z-score says solvency is not at issue. Management behavior is clean - no insider selling in the tape, only awards and one small gift by CEO Millett (300 sh). The company remains profitable through the trough, self-funds, and is disciplined on share count. This is a cyclical business executing well through cycle bottom, not a broken franchise.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the margin compression reflects steel price cycle only or includes structural cost/mix issues at Sinton or the new aluminum operations
- Capex schedule and timing for aluminum rolling mill completion - when does the heavy capex phase end and FCF normalize
- Debt maturity schedule and covenants on the $3.44B net debt position
- Segment performance detail - is steel fabrication (highest-margin segment historically) holding up
- Customer concentration in fabrication and any exposure to non-residential construction cycle
The composite fair value of $146.57 (signal-adjusted $135.60) sits roughly 36-41% below the $228.68 price. The DCF at $69.49 and EPV floor at $94.52 both scream that current earnings power, if normalized for cycle, does not remotely support today's quote; the anchored-PE at $352.79 is the runaway outlier, effectively extrapolating peak margins forward, and deserves to be down-weighted. Operating margins have already compressed from 23.7% to 8.1%, confirming this is a cyclical business trading well above its through-cycle earning power. Company quality is genuinely Solid - clean forensics, disciplined 20% share shrink, low SBC - which raises deserved value versus a typical commodity mill. Fair to push above pure EPV given that quality and the reshoring tailwind, but even a generous mid-teens multiple on normalized EPS lands well south of $228. The market is paying a premium for a cyclical late in its cycle just as margins are already rolling over - that is the definition of priced-for-perfection in commodities. No obvious margin of safety; a re-rate lower on any demand softness is the base case risk.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Management's normalized EBITDA/ton guidance and through-cycle margin assumptions
- Segment mix shift (Aluminum ramp) and whether it structurally raises through-cycle ROIC
- Order book and pricing trend in flat-rolled versus long products for next 2 quarters
- Capex trajectory and FCF conversion as Aluminum project spend winds down
The near-term tape is doing STLD favors. A risk-on regime with VIX at 15 removes the macro overhang that usually punishes a 1.53-beta cyclical, and the very recent collapse of US-Canada trade talks is a direct, story-confirming catalyst that sent domestic steel names higher on Monday. The active narrative here (reshoring, tariffs, domestic capacity as premium infrastructure) is exactly what this news feeds, and news flow of this type tends to compound over days as follow-on tariff headlines print. Analyst tone in the cohort has been constructive on domestic mills post-tariff. That said, the narrative is flagged as fragile and late-cycle, and momentum over three years is negative (-6.5pp), meaning the market has been quietly de-rating the group even while the story sounds loud. The tailwind is real but event-driven, not structural: a single trade-talk reversal or a soft ISM print flips the tape fast on a name this cyclical. Net: a live tailwind from the tariff news landing on a receptive risk-on tape, but of the fragile, headline-dependent kind rather than a durable re-rating force.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether US-Canada trade talks resume or escalate further in coming weeks
- Section 232 or new tariff announcements on steel imports
- ISM Manufacturing and auto/construction demand prints that could break the peak-margin story
- Sell-side target revisions on STLD and NUE post trade-talk collapse
- Any crack in the reshoring narrative from a major customer (auto OEM) guiding down
Two forces the company can actually monetize: trade policy that has walled off a meaningful share of imported flat-rolled steel, and a domestic capex cycle (data centers, grid, reshored plants) that consumes plate and fabricated structures. STLD's own answer to a flat category was to buy growth with capital — a new aluminum flat-rolled platform — which converts a commodity-price story into a volume story for two to three years. The counterweight is the same policy: protected spreads are financing competing capacity across US sheet and aluminum, so the advantage is time-limited rather than permanent. Macro is a headwind at the margin, with long rates near 4.7% pressing on the construction end-markets. Net: a favorable 12-24 month operating environment sitting inside a structurally no-growth category.
When we made this prediction on Aug 24, 2026, STLD was $230.16. We expect it to be $209.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $150.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 24, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.