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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Ford Motor Company (F) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-11): Designation Low · Gem Score -38 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -19 · Value -50 · Sentiment -5 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $13.10 vs $14.05 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Ford Motor Company
F NYSEFord Motor Company is a global automaker that designs, manufactures, and sells Ford and Lincoln vehicles, including cars, SUVs, pickup trucks, commercial vans, and luxury models. The company serves individual drivers, businesses, and fleet customers through its Ford Blue, Ford Model e, Ford Pro, and Ford Credit segments. Ford Blue focuses on conventional and hybrid vehicles, Ford Model e centers on electric vehicles and related technologies, Ford Pro provides commercial products, software, charging, and services for business customers, and Ford Credit supports vehicle financing and leasing. The company also offers connected services and driver-assistance features across parts of its lineup. Headquartered in Dearborn, Michigan, Ford Motor Company plays a significant role in the automotive market through its broad product portfolio and strong presence in both consumer and commercial transportation.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -2.06
Total Equity: $35.98B
Shares: 3,979,000,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $23.36B
EBITDA: $6.81B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $23.36B
Revenue: $187.27B
Revenue: $187.27B
Revenue: $187.27B
Total Equity: $35.98B
Tax Rate: 31.0%
Equity: $35.98B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $23.36B
Current Liabilities: $114.89B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $35.98B
Shares: 3,979,000,000
Shares: 3,979,000,000
CapEx: -$8.82B
Shares: 3,979,000,000
Stock Price: $14.17
Net Income: N/A
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 18, 2026 12:39am (50d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $136.3B | $158.1B | $176.2B | $185.0B | $187.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $114.7B | $134.4B | $150.6B | $158.4B | $174.5B |
| Gross Profit | $21.7B | $23.7B | $25.6B | $26.6B | $12.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $17.2B | $17.4B | $20.2B | $21.3B | $22.0B |
| Operating Income | $4.5B | $6.3B | $5.5B | $5.2B | -$9.2B |
| Net Income | $17.9B | -$2.0B | $4.3B | $5.9B | — |
| EBITDA | $11.8B | $14.0B | $13.1B | $12.8B | $6.8B |
| EPS | $4.49 | $-0.49 | $1.09 | $1.48 | $-2.06 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $4.45 | $-0.49 | $1.08 | $1.46 | $-2.06 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 18, 2026 12:18am (50d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $20.5B | $25.1B | $24.9B | $22.9B | $23.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $109.0B | $116.5B | $121.5B | $124.5B | $123.5B |
| Total Assets | $257.0B | $255.9B | $273.3B | $285.2B | $289.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $90.7B | $96.9B | $101.5B | $106.9B | $114.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $208.4B | $212.7B | $230.5B | $240.3B | $253.2B |
| Total Equity | $48.6B | $43.2B | $42.8B | $44.9B | $36.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $35.8B | $31.8B | $31.0B | $33.7B | $22.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 18, 2026 12:39am (50d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $15.8B | $6.9B | $14.9B | $15.4B | $21.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$6.2B | -$6.9B | -$8.2B | -$8.7B | -$8.8B |
| Free Cash Flow | $9.6B | -$13.0M | $6.7B | $6.7B | $12.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$23.0B | $5.3B | $8.2B | $11.4B | $39.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$403.0M | -$2.0B | -$5.0B | -$3.1B | -$3.0B |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$484.0M | -$335.0M | -$426.0M | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$5.2B | $4.6B | -$230.0M | -$1.9B | $560.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 18, 2026 12:39am (50d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +15.9% | +11.5% | +5.0% | +1.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +9.1% | +8.4% | +3.6% | -51.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +38.8% | -13.0% | -4.4% | -275.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -111.0% | +319.4% | +35.2% | — |
| EBITDA Growth | +17.8% | -5.7% | -2.8% | -46.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:51pm (57d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-12 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-13 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-07 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-11 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-12 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-18 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-07 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-07 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-07 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-15 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-31 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-24 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-25 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-10 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-14 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-10 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-25 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-28 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-18 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2020-01-29 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-06 19:09A +1σ run of quarters pays -26%; a −1σ run costs 73%. Ratio -0.4:1 (μ 4.4%, σ 7.4% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 1.1 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($14.05) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +6% | 9.2% | $25.05 | +78% |
| Base — stabilizes | +4% | 8.0% | $20.66 | +47% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 6.8% | $16.70 | +19% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -5% | 1.3% | $3.58 | -75% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +12% | 2.8% | $10.37 | -26% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -3% | 1.3% | $3.77 | -73% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-18 00:47The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly cadence first: Q1 2026 revenue of $43.25B is down 14% sequentially from Q3 2025's $50.53B but that's normal Ford seasonality — the more telling comp is Q1'26 NI of $2.55B vs Q1'25 NI of $473M, a 5x jump on essentially flat revenue ($43.25B vs $40.66B). Q1'26 net margin of 5.9% is the best print in the visible series. Meanwhile 2025 full-year op income swung to -$9.17B from +$5.22B in 2024 with revenue essentially flat at $187B vs $185B — that's a ~$14B operating swing on 1% revenue growth, which screams one-time charges (recall/warranty, EV writedowns, or restructuring) rather than structural collapse. Gross margin at the annual line collapsed to 6.8% from 14.4%, but Q1'26 producing $2.55B NI suggests the run-rate has already normalized. FCF of $12.47B against a $57B market cap is a 22% FCF yield — that is not a melting-ice-cube multiple, that's distressed-pricing on a company that just posted its best quarterly margin in two years.
The synthesis verdict of "$12.63 signal-adjusted vs $14.05" — implying 10% overvalued — reads to me as too anchored on the 2025 annual GAAP wreckage and not weighting the Q1'26 inflection. If I annualize Q1'26 NI naively ($2.55B × 4 = $10.2B), F trades at 5.6x forward earnings on that math; even haircutting for Q1 seasonality upside and assuming $6-7B normalized annual NI, you're at 8-9x with a 4.2% dividend covered ~3x by FCF. Market Forces' "value trap burning $9B annually in a failed EV transition" is directionally the bear case but the $9B op loss is a 2025 annual number that Q1'26 has already contradicted at the consolidated level. The narrative layer's "11% premium to DCF" framing feels backwards to me — the DCF anchor itself is probably too low if you normalize away 2025's charge-heavy year.
The contrarian pushback: this is still a cyclical auto in a late cycle with tariff exposure, UAW cost step-ups baked in, and Model e economics that genuinely don't work at current EV pricing. The "significant insider buying" flag is a single 10,600 share purchase — that's ~$150K, essentially noise, and the rest is option exercises and awards. Debt-to-equity showing 0 is almost certainly a data error given Ford Credit's massive finance receivables book — Ford's actual automotive + financial services debt is well over $100B, and the reported $23B cash figure is meaningless without the debt context. The current ratio of 1.07 is thin. Revenue CAGR of 3.1% is barely inflation, and the "decelerating quarterly trend" is real — Q1'26 revenue is only +6.4% YoY vs Q1'25, well below the 3-year trend. If Q1'26 profitability was aided by inventory drawdown, warranty reserve releases, or FX, the run-rate collapses.
Net: I dissent modestly from the fair_value synthesis and lean undervalued, but with lower conviction than the FCF yield alone would suggest. The bear case (EV cash burn, UAW, tariffs, cyclical peak) is real but the market is already pricing a permanent impairment that Q1'26 numbers refute. At $14.16 with a covered 4.2% dividend and 22% FCF yield, downside to $11-12 is bounded by the yield floor, while a single clean earnings year re-rates this to $18-20 easily. I'd disagree with Market Forces' "avoid" framing — this is a starter-position value setup, not a value trap, provided the Q2'26 print confirms Q1's margin recovery isn't a one-off. The prior models are over-weighting the 2025 annual GAAP disaster and under-weighting the sequential recovery already visible.
GPT Reading
At $14.17, Ford is being valued like a business whose cash generation is suspect, and the raw numbers mostly justify that skepticism rather than refute it. The headline cheapness is obvious: $57.3B market cap on $187.3B of 2025 revenue, 0.30x sales, roughly 4.2% dividend yield, and reported 2025 free cash flow of $12.47B, which would imply a FCF yield above 20%. But the income statement and cash flow statement are telling very different stories. In 2025, revenue rose to $187.27B from $184.99B, yet gross profit collapsed to $12.80B from $26.56B and operating income swung to a staggering -$9.17B from +$5.22B. That is not a normal cyclical wobble; it is a severe earnings impairment somewhere in the mix. When a company can post $21.28B of operating cash flow in the same year it reports -$9.17B of operating income, I do not assume hidden strength first — I assume working-capital swings, financing-related effects, or accounting noise are inflating cash generation relative to sustainable earnings power.
The quarterly progression reinforces that this is not a clean recovery story yet. Q1 2026 was good on its face: $43.25B of revenue and $2.55B of net income, a 5.9% margin, much better than the 1.2% margin in Q1 2025. But the path there was erratic: Q2 2025 lost money, Q3 recovered to a 4.8% net margin, and Q4 2024 was only 3.8%. On a trailing run-rate basis, Ford looks capable of decent profitability, but not stable profitability. Even more importantly, 2025 annual operating margins of -4.9% and gross margins of 6.8% are extraordinarily thin for a capital-intensive manufacturer trying to fund product cycles, software investment, and electrification. If I normalize Ford off the better quarterly prints rather than the disastrous annual operating line, I can get to “not expensive”; I cannot get to “obviously mispriced.” At 1.57x book on $35.98B of equity and with $23.36B of cash, the stock is not demanding, but for autos book value and liquidity only matter if margins stop lurching around.
The market narrative that Ford is a structurally impaired incumbent feels closer to correct than the more optimistic “cash machine in transition” framing. Revenue has grown from $136.3B in 2021 to $187.3B in 2025, but that top-line growth has not translated into a durable improvement in operating economics. 2023 operating income was $5.46B; 2024 was $5.22B; then 2025 fell off a cliff to -$9.17B despite slightly higher revenue. That kind of deterioration tells me the business remains highly exposed to pricing pressure, product mix, and restructuring burdens, and those risks deserve a discount multiple. The tiny insider open-market purchase of 10,600 shares in June is not enough to alter that read. If Ford were consistently earning something like the Q1 2026 margin on a $180B-$190B revenue base, this stock would be cheap. The problem is that the recent record does not prove that level of earnings is durable.
The best counterargument is strong and specific: if the 2025 annual operating result is unusually distorted, then the valuation is plainly too low. On the quarterly data, Ford earned roughly $5.44B across the last four reported quarters with net income disclosed — Q2 2025 through Q1 2026 excluding the missing Q4 2025 NI — and the latest quarter’s 5.9% net margin suggests the company may already be through the worst of the pressure. Pair that with $12.47B of free cash flow and the stock could look materially undervalued, especially if Ford Credit and working capital are recurring support rather than temporary cushions. A bull would also point out that 2024 net income was $5.88B and 2026 started much stronger than 2025, so anchoring on the ugly 2025 operating line may be overly punitive. I weigh that less heavily because autos are judged on repeatability, not snapshots; one good quarter does not erase a year in which gross profit halved and operating profitability imploded.
What would change my mind is not another abstract “strategic progress” claim but evidence that 2025 was genuinely aberrational. If the next two to three quarters sustain at least 4% net margins on roughly $45B-$50B of quarterly revenue, and if full-year operating income returns solidly positive — ideally above $5B, back in line with 2023-2024 — then the current $14 stock would start to look too cheap, with fair value moving into the high teens. Conversely, if free cash flow falls sharply while margins slip back toward breakeven, that would confirm that the 2025 cash figure overstated true earnings power and that even $14 is generous. Right now, Ford looks more like a statistically cheap stock with unreliable economics than a clear bargain.
Grok Reading
Ford’s 2025 income statement is the number that refuses to be ignored: revenue held at $187.3B (barely above 2024’s $185.0B), yet gross profit collapsed from $26.6B to $12.8B and operating income swung from +$5.2B to –$9.2B. That is not cyclical softness; it is a near-halving of the gross margin to 6.8 percent and a business that, on an accrual basis, destroyed value at scale. Against that wreckage sits $21.3B of operating cash flow and $12.5B of free cash flow after only $8.8B of capex—an FCF yield north of 21 percent on the $57B equity value. The market is therefore pricing the cash as temporary: EV/revenue of 0.18x, EV/EBITDA under 5x, and a negative P/E all scream “melting ice cube.” Q1 2026 offers the first counter-evidence—$43.3B revenue, $2.55B net income, 5.9 percent margin—suggesting the worst of the non-cash charges or Model e drag may be cresting, but one clean quarter does not reverse a structural gross-profit air pocket.
The cash-flow quality and the balance-sheet liquidity ($23.4B cash, current ratio still above 1.0) keep the equity from being a pure short. At 0.30x sales and a 4.2 percent dividend, the stock already embeds a multi-year earnings drought. If even half of the $12.5B FCF proves durable once EV restructuring charges normalize, the shares are cheap; the 3.1 percent revenue CAGR and Ford Pro’s commercial mix provide a plausible bridge. Insider activity is noise—one modest open-market buy amid option exercises—so it does not tip the scale. The contradiction the models under-weight is simple: a company that just printed double-digit billions of FCF while the P&L went negative is either about to see cash collapse or is being valued as if the cash never existed.
The strongest opposing case is that 2025’s gross-margin freefall is the new run-rate, not a one-time hit. If Blue’s truck and hybrid profits continue to be siphoned into Model e unit losses and warranty reserves, the $12.5B FCF becomes a residual of deferred capex and working-capital release rather than earnings power; ROIC of –50 percent already says capital is being destroyed. Under that reading the 4.9x EV/EBITDA is not a bargain but a trap, and the valuation composite near $13 is still too generous once FCF mean-reverts lower. I weigh this less heavily only because the absolute cash generation remains large enough to fund the dividend and the transition for several years, and because Q1 2026’s 5.9 percent net margin is inconsistent with permanent 6–7 percent gross margins. Still, if the next two quarters re-print sub-8 percent gross margins and FCF drops below $6–7B annualized, the bear case wins cleanly.
I would flip to a clear overvalued stance if trailing-twelve-month FCF falls under $7B or if gross margin stays below 9 percent through year-end 2026; conversely, two more quarters of >5 percent net margins and stable $10B+ FCF would justify a re-rating toward the mid-teens and force a higher conviction long.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Ford sits on $38.49B of liquid cash against a market cap of $57.3B, generates $12.47B of free cash flow, and has held diluted shares essentially flat (-0.3% CAGR) with SBC a trivial 0.3% of revenue. That combination means survival risk is effectively nil and per-share value is not being eroded by issuance. OCF/NI of 0.87x and accruals of -2.5% of assets suggest reported earnings are broadly cash-backed, and the FCF module flags cash quality as strong. Revenue has grown steadily from $136B in 2021 to $187B in 2025. However, the business itself is thin and cyclical. Gross margin has drifted down every year (15.9 to 15.0 to 14.6 to 14.4) and then apparently collapsed to 6.8% in 2025 with operating margin swinging to -4.9%, a decisive deterioration if the figure is complete (may reflect a partial period, EV losses, or a one-off charge - worth verifying). Even in good years, operating margin peaked at 4.0%, which is structurally weak and offers minimal cushion against input, warranty, or demand shocks. Altman Z of 0.82 lands in the distress zone; for an asset-heavy, finance-arm-carrying OEM this is partly a model artifact but still reflects thin equity cushion relative to leverage. Buybacks recover only 58.7% of SBC, so capital return is real but modest. Insider activity is neutral-to-mildly-positive: one open-market purchase by Thornton for $149K against routine awards and tax-withholding, no directional sells. Net read: a durable, well-capitalized but low-return cyclical whose 2025 margin print raises a real question mark on operating execution.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Whether the 2025 GM 6.8% / OpM -4.9% is full-year or partial, and how much is tariffs, EV losses, warranty/recall charges, or restructuring
- Ford Credit leverage and how much of consolidated debt is finance-arm versus industrial
- Segment-level margins: ICE trucks/SUVs (Pro/Blue) versus Model e EV losses
- Warranty and recall reserve trends over 2023-2025
- Pension and OPEB obligations and their funded status
- Dividend coverage from industrial (not finance) FCF specifically
- Customer/geographic concentration and China exposure
The composite fair value of $13.35 and signal-adjusted FV of $12.63 both sit below the current $14.05, implying roughly -5% to -10% downside to deserved value. The DCF of $20.04 looks generous given the 2025 margin collapse and 3-4% normalized operating margins - it is likely extrapolating a cash-flow profile the business is not currently earning - while the EPV floor of $6.65 is a sobering reminder of what a thin-margin cyclical is worth on trough earnings power. Splitting those, deserved value clusters in the low-to-mid $12s, essentially where the composite lands. The Mixed quality grade (score -19) argues for the lower end of that range, not the higher. What is priced in at $14 is a successful turnaround: Ford Pro sustaining premium margins, Model e losses narrowing, and Blue holding its truck cash flows. That is the bull case, not a base case, and paying for it leaves no cushion. The 5.4% forward dividend is real support, but it does not create a mispricing - it is what you get paid to hold a fairly-to-richly valued cyclical while the turnaround is unproven.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 2026 guidance on Model e losses and whether they narrow as promised
- Ford Pro segment margin sustainability and software attach rates
- Blue segment ICE truck cash flow trajectory as EV mix shifts
- Warranty and recall provisions - any one-offs distorting 2025 margins
- Capex trajectory and whether EV spend is being rationalized
The macro backdrop is modestly supportive - risk-on tape, VIX 15, calm regime - and Ford's 1.85 beta means it should catch a bid when animal spirits run. But the pressure landing on this specific name is muddled: the news flow this week is dominated by tariff-driven reshoring stories (Lincoln production moving from China to the US, Lutnick explicitly saying 'Ford is going to rock'), which is a clean political tailwind for a US-legacy automaker archetype. Working against that, the tape has already picked a winner between the Detroit twins post-Q2 - GM up 14%, F down 3% - so Ford wears the relative-loser label into a sector that is otherwise being talked up. The active narrative is a turnaround-bet with only moderate intensity and durability and low cult - not the kind of story that generates its own lift or defends against a wobble. Analyst tone is quiet rather than upgrading, and the bull case still hinges on Ford Pro's unearned TAM, which is easy to challenge on any soft print. Net: no dominant force in either direction. The macro and political narrative gently push up, the relative-performance and lukewarm-story pull down. Balanced, with a slight tailwind bias from the tape and tariff rhetoric.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the GM/F post-Q2 divergence widens or mean-reverts over the next two weeks - a sign flows are rotating back into F
- Any concrete tariff rule or EV credit change that puts hard numbers behind the Lutnick rhetoric
- Ford Pro commentary or fleet-win press releases that would harden the turnaround narrative from moderate to high intensity
- Sell-side target revisions after the recent divergence - are analysts cutting F or defending it
The auto world is normalizing after the post-shortage pricing windfall: units are the constraint again, incentives are rebuilding, and affordability at a 4.68% 10y caps the mix upgrade that drove 2021-23 profits. EV adoption is real but slower and less profitable than planned, which favors hybrid-heavy, truck-heavy, commercially-weighted lineups — Ford's structural strength. Against that, tariffs and content inflation raise the cost floor for everyone, and Chinese and Korean competition plus Tesla price discipline keep global pricing capped. Ford's outcome hinges less on macro than on two internal variables: warranty cost normalization and whether Ford Pro's software/service annuity can grow fast enough to offset Blue's share erosion.
When we made this prediction on Aug 18, 2026, F was $14.05. We expect it to be $13.40 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $11.50. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 18, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.