For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Pagaya Technologies Ltd. (PGY) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-11): Designation Low · Gem Score -25 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -8 · Value -36 · Sentiment 42 (timing only, not weighted)
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Pagaya Technologies Ltd.
PGY NASDAQPagaya Technologies Ltd. is a financial technology company that develops and operates an artificial intelligence-driven network for the financial services industry. Its core purpose is to help banks, fintech lenders, auto finance providers, and residential real estate service companies evaluate and originate consumer credit and other financial assets more efficiently using proprietary machine learning, data science, and real-time decisioning technology. Pagaya’s platform connects these lending partners with institutional and other sophisticated investors through structured funding vehicles, enabling partners to extend loans and other products without relying solely on their own balance sheets. The company offers a suite of AI-powered solutions that support credit underwriting, decline monetization, dual and first-look evaluations, and customer acquisition across direct and affiliate channels, creating an integrated credit and funding infrastructure. Pagaya Technologies Ltd. was incorporated in 2016 and is headquartered in New York, with significant technology operations in Israel, and today serves financial institutions and investors across the United States, Israel, the Cayman Islands, and other international markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.93
Total Equity: $585.45M
Shares: 83,097,227
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $235.33M
EBITDA: $293.90M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $235.33M
Revenue: $1.30B
Revenue: $1.30B
Revenue: $1.30B
Total Equity: $585.45M
Tax Rate: -38.2%
Equity: $585.45M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $235.33M
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $585.45M
Shares: 83,097,227
Shares: 83,097,227
CapEx: -$13.90M
Shares: 83,097,227
Stock Price: $20.32
Net Income: $81.39M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 8:42am (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $474.6M | $748.9M | $812.1M | $1.0B | $1.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $232.3M | $451.1M | $508.9M | $597.7M | $749.2M |
| Gross Profit | $242.3M | $297.8M | $303.1M | $434.6M | $552.2M |
| Operating Expenses | $248.1M | $549.3M | $327.5M | $367.8M | $288.4M |
| Operating Income | -$5.8M | -$251.5M | -$24.4M | $66.8M | $263.8M |
| Net Income | -$91.2M | -$302.3M | -$128.4M | -$401.4M | $81.4M |
| EBITDA | -$5.0M | -$245.2M | -$5.3M | $95.6M | $293.9M |
| EPS | $-8.25 | $-0.69 | $-2.14 | $-5.66 | $0.99 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-8.25 | $-0.69 | $-2.14 | $-5.66 | $0.93 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:21am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $190.8M | $309.8M | $186.5M | $187.9M | $235.3M |
| Total Current Assets | $246.5M | $419.8M | $303.4M | $351.5M | — |
| Total Assets | $590.3M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $28.7M | $128.0M | $74.9M | $195.5M | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | $321.3M | — |
| Total Liabilities | $105.9M | $279.7M | $468.4M | $775.3M | $960.5M |
| Total Equity | $484.4M | $765.4M | $740.0M | $515.8M | $585.5M |
| Retained Earnings | -$111.9M | -$414.2M | -$542.6M | -$944.0M | -$862.7M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 8:42am (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $49.8M | -$40.0M | $9.6M | $66.5M | $238.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$6.6M | -$22.4M | -$20.2M | -$17.7M | -$13.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | $43.2M | -$62.4M | -$10.6M | $48.8M | $224.7M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | -$9.1M | $159,000 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $198.7M | $132.5M | -$114.5M | $4.0M | $61.8M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 8:42am (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +57.8% | +8.4% | +27.1% | +26.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +22.9% | +1.8% | +43.4% | +27.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -4,229.6% | +90.3% | +373.9% | +294.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -231.7% | +57.5% | -212.5% | +120.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -4,810.1% | +97.8% | +1,912.9% | +207.5% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-11 02:03A +1σ run of quarters pays +3%; a −1σ run costs 37%. Ratio 0.1:1 (μ 21.7%, σ 8.8% , 10 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.1 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($20.32) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +26% | 10.5% | $19.12 | -6% |
| Base — stabilizes | +17% | 9.1% | $13.38 | -34% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +9% | 7.8% | $9.17 | -55% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +10% | 10.0% | $11.68 | -43% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +30% | 10.0% | $20.89 | +3% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +13% | 10.0% | $12.82 | -37% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-19 11:43The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: Q2 2026 revenue of $387M is up 18.6% YoY from $326.4M, Q1 2026 at $317.9M was up 9.6% from $290M, and Q4 2025 at $334.8M was up 19.8%. So the "26% CAGR" backward-looking headline is decelerating in real time — recent quarters are running 10-20% YoY, not 26%+. Net income sequencing ($16.7M → $7.9M → $34.3M → $22.5M → $24.7M → $45.3M) is lumpy in a way that screams non-cash mark-to-model gains on retained loan interests, not recurring SaaS-like earnings. The $224.7M annual FCF on $81.4M NI looks flattering, but for a company that securitizes loans and holds risk retention pieces, FCF timing is dominated by financing cadence and net investment in retained interests — it is not the "quality" it appears. The synthesis model's accrual point is directionally right, though I'd note the FCF/NI ratio being >1 actually cuts against the pure "gain-on-sale is fake" framing; the truer issue is that both figures are dependent on securitization market conditions holding.
Where I diverge from the models: Market Forces calling this "deteriorating competitor losing massive market share" is overwrought given a sector-leader tag and 26% trailing revenue growth on a $1.5B run-rate. You can't simultaneously be losing "massive share" and compounding revenue at high-teens with expanding operating margins (op margin went from -24.4M in 2023 to +263.8M in 2025 — that's a ~$290M swing on ~$490M of incremental revenue, i.e., ~60% incremental margin). That's real operating leverage, not accounting fiction. The Thesis Evaluation's -32 score leans too heavily on the bear thesis; the bull case that AI-credit-infrastructure is a genuine category with scale advantages deserves more than 45 weight when the numbers show a business that just printed $238M operating cash flow on a $1.7B market cap (0.14x OCF yield, or ~7x price/OCF). That is not "priced for perfection."
The contrarian read the models are missing: at 1.30x P/S, 4.95x EV/EBITDA, 1.12x EV/Sales, and 7.5x price/FCF, PGY is already priced like a distressed specialty finance company, not a software platform. The 55% drawdown has done the work. The Pre-Flight note that "21.8x P/E isn't sky-high" undersells how cheap this is on cash metrics if you believe even half the FCF is real. The genuine risk is not competitive displacement (banks have been "about to build their own models" for a decade) — it's securitization market access. If ABS spreads blow out, Pagaya's whole flywheel jams: no forward flow demand, no gain-on-sale, no FCF. That's the single variable that matters, and it's a credit-cycle bet, not a moat bet. Insider activity is thin but net-selling (49k sold vs 7k awarded on 8/3/26) — noise, not signal.
Where the data is thin: two insider transactions is not a series; the balance sheet shows zero debt which is almost certainly wrong for a securitization sponsor (risk-retention notes and warehouse facilities should appear somewhere — this is a data-quality flag on the FMP feed); and we have no visibility into retained-interest fair-value marks, which is the actual quality-of-earnings question. The "decelerating quarterly trend" flag matters: if Q3 2026 prints below $360M, the deceleration story hardens and the multiple compresses. I disagree with the synthesis "Priced for Perfection" verdict — perfection at 5x EV/EBITDA and 7.5x P/FCF requires perfection to already be discounted, which it isn't. This looks more like "priced for skepticism," and the skepticism has some merit (accounting complexity, cycle exposure) but is over-baked at these multiples. Fair value on a blended 10x FCF / 15x normalized earnings frame is $25-30, not $20. I'd take a starter position, size for cycle risk, and require the Q3 print to hold above $360M to add.
GPT Reading
What stands out first is how cheap Pagaya looks if you take the reported 2025–2026 inflection at face value. Revenue went from $812.1M in 2023 to $1.03B in 2024 and $1.30B in 2025, and the quarterly run-rate has kept climbing: $290.0M in 1Q25, $326.4M in 2Q25, $350.2M in 3Q25, $334.8M in 4Q25, then $317.9M in 1Q26 and a sharp reacceleration to $387.0M in 2Q26. That latest quarter was up 18.6% sequentially and 18.6% over the prior peak quarter, with net income of $45.3M and an 11.7% margin. On the annual figures, operating income improved from -$24.4M in 2023 to +$66.8M in 2024 and +$263.8M in 2025; free cash flow hit $224.7M in 2025 against a $1.70B market cap, a low-teens FCF yield. With $235.3M of cash and no debt shown, the enterprise-value multiples around 1.1x revenue and 5.0x EBITDA are not software-like at all; they are distressed or skeptical multiples. If the business has truly become sustainably profitable, the stock is plainly inexpensive.
But the raw data also tells you why the market refuses to pay up, and I think that skepticism is directionally right even if some of the model language is overheated. The income statement is not clean. Net income was -$67.5M in 3Q24 and -$237.9M in 4Q24, then suddenly turned consistently positive through every quarter of 2025 and into 2026. That kind of swing can happen in asset-sensitive finance businesses much more easily than in genuine software platforms. The gross margin of 42.4% and operating margin of 20.3% in 2025 look impressive, but they do not line up with a classic infrastructure software economics profile, and the company’s valuation should not be benchmarked to one. The “mature earner” label is wrong to me: this is still a credit-linked, sentiment-sensitive platform whose reported earnings can be volatile. Even so, the cash flow data argues against the strongest bear claim. 2025 operating cash flow of $238.6M and FCF of $224.7M are too large to dismiss as pure accounting fiction. For me the key issue is not fake cash generation; it is durability and cyclicality. A business on roughly $1.4B–$1.5B forward revenue trading at about 1.2x sales is cheap because investors do not trust those margins through a tougher credit tape.
That leaves me modestly bullish rather than aggressively so. At $20.32, the stock is not priced for perfection; it is priced for relapse. If I annualize the last two quarters of 2026, I get a revenue run-rate of about $1.41B and net income run-rate of roughly $140M. On that rough basis the equity is around 12x earnings, and with net cash on the balance sheet the EV multiple is lower still. For a company still growing revenue near the mid-20s on the trailing commentary metrics, that is objectively low. The contradiction with the harsher prior models is that they lean too heavily on narrative concerns like commoditized AI underwriting and “catastrophic displacement” without evidence of it in the numbers presented. The actual data shows the opposite so far: revenue is still expanding, operating leverage is real, and quarterly net margins have improved from 2.7% in 1Q25 to 11.7% in 2Q26. I do not need to believe Pagaya is a defensible software monopoly to think the stock is undervalued; I only need to believe the business can hold somewhere near high-single-digit to low-double-digit net margins through the cycle.
The strongest case against my view is straightforward. First, 2024’s -$401.4M annual net loss after a profitable operating line is a giant warning that below-the-line volatility matters here, and it could come back. Second, revenue growth is not perfectly linear: 4Q25 dipped from 3Q25, 1Q26 dipped again, so one strong 2Q26 does not prove a clean acceleration. Third, insiders sold shares in August 2026, albeit in modest size, which does nothing to build confidence after a large drawdown. And finally, the market may be correctly refusing to capitalize 2025–2026 earnings because these economics depend on favorable credit conditions and capital markets receptivity, not just product strength. I weigh those points differently because the valuation already bakes in a lot of them. A business with no debt, $235M cash, positive ROE of 13.9%, FCF of $225M, and improving quarterly profitability does not deserve a disaster multiple unless the earnings are about to crack; that crack is possible, but it is not yet visible in the reported trajectory.
What would change my mind is specific evidence that 2Q26 was a head fake. If the next two quarters fall back toward the 1Q26 revenue level near $318M and net margin slips back below 5%, then the 2025–2026 earnings power should be viewed as cyclical noise and the stock probably deserves to stay around or below $20. Likewise, a sharp deterioration in operating cash flow versus net income would validate the accounting-quality concern. On the other hand, if Pagaya can string together another couple of quarters above $350M revenue with net income in the $35M–$45M range and keep annual FCF above $200M, I think the market will have to re-rate it toward at least 15x–18x sustainable earnings, which would support a share price in the high $20s to low $30s.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a clean turnaround story that the prior models are over-penalizing. Pagaya crossed into durable profitability in 2025 with $1.30B revenue, $263.8M operating income, and $81.4M net income after years of heavy losses, then kept compounding: the four most recent quarters delivered roughly $1.39B revenue and about $127M of net income, with Q2 2026 alone printing $387M revenue and an 11.7% net margin. Operating margin for full-year 2025 hit 20.3% and gross margin held at 42.4%. More important than the P&L is the cash: $238.6M operating cash flow and $224.7M free cash flow against only $13.9M of capex, on a debt-free balance sheet with $235M cash and $585M equity. At a $1.70B market cap and $20.32 share price that equates to roughly 1.1x EV/revenue, 5.0x EV/EBITDA, ~7.6x trailing FCF, and a mid-teens multiple on fresher earnings power—not a premium. Revenue CAGR of 26.6% and still-positive year-on-year prints (Q2 2026 up ~19% versus Q2 2025) sit alongside expanding sequential margins. The “accrual fiction” attack is hard to square with FCF running nearly 3x reported net income; cash is converting, not evaporating.
Growth is decelerating in plain sight, which is the real soft spot in the tape. First-half 2026 revenue of ~$705M is only ~14% above first-half 2025’s ~$616M, and the Q1 2026 year-on-year step-up was just under 10%. That is a clear downshift from the mid-20s trajectory and supports the “show me” framing. Insider activity is noise—small sales paired with awards—and does not signal conviction either way. ROE of 14% and a pristine debt-to-equity of zero are consistent with a capital-light platform that has finally scaled past its investment phase, and the 21.8x trailing P/E on the older $81M annual number compresses quickly if the recent $45M quarterly run-rate proves sticky.
The strongest opposing case is the one the bear models hammer: that reported profits and even the cash flows are artifacts of gain-on-sale securitization accounting common to specialty finance, that residual credit risk and partner concentration remain off-balance-sheet, and that banks and larger fintechs are building competing underwriting stacks that will commoditize Pagaya’s AI edge and crush pricing. A smart skeptic would also note the 55% drawdown from the 52-week high as evidence the market has already rejected the “infrastructure monopoly” narrative, and would treat the sector-leader tag and moderate narrative durability as temporary. Those risks are real—customer defection or a credit-cycle hit to origination volumes would compress both growth and the multiple overnight—but they are not what the last six quarters of rising absolute profit, rising margins, and heavy free-cash generation currently show. I weigh the verified cash conversion and zero-leverage balance sheet heavier than an unverified claim of catastrophic share loss, because the income and cash-flow statements have moved in the same positive direction for more than a year.
What flips the verdict is simple: two more quarters of sub-10% revenue growth or a material drop in FCF conversion below ~50% of net income would confirm the deceleration-and-accounting thesis and push the stock toward fairly valued or worse at these levels. Conversely, a re-acceleration above 20% growth with margins holding near the recent 10–12% net range would make $20 look like an obvious mispricing.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Pagaya's operating story in 2025 is the best it has ever looked: revenue $1.30B (up from $474.6M in 2021, roughly 28% CAGR), operating margin swinging from -33.6% in 2022 to +20.3% in 2025, first GAAP net income of $81.4M, and free cash flow of $224.7M against a $1.7B market cap. Gross margin has stabilized around 42% and SBC is a modest 4.2% of revenue - not the runaway equity comp typical of loss-making fintechs. Liquid cash of $235M with positive FCF means the business is self-funding.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Off-balance-sheet exposure to ABS conduits, risk retention, and any recourse on financed loan portfolios
- Reconciliation of the $81.4M net income vs $224.7M FCF and the -21.4% accruals figure - is FCF flattered by working capital or timing?
- Actual outstanding share count and warrant/RSU/convertible overhang beyond the 83.1M diluted figure
- Customer/partner concentration among lending network partners (top 3 originators as % of volume)
- Credit performance trends on Pagaya-underwritten vintages - delinquency and loss curves vs pricing assumptions
- Whether the 2022 spike to 459M diluted shares reflects SPAC mechanics vs a genuine dilution event, and true year-over-year per-share change
The business just printed roughly $1.3B revenue, ~20% operating margin, and ~$225M FCF — on a $1.70B market cap that is ~7.5x FCF and ~1.3x sales. On surface metrics that looks cheap, and the bull can build a fair value materially above $20 by extrapolating the inflection. But the earnings-quality haircut is real: gain-on-sale accounting inflates reported profit versus cash, share count has ballooned (diluting per-share claims on that FCF), and the balance sheet sits in the distress zone. Haircut the ~$225M FCF by the cash-vs-GAAP gap and apply a discount for dilution risk and you get a deserved value that lands close to today's price, not far above it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Cash conversion: operating cash flow ex gain-on-sale reserves versus reported net income
- Diluted share count trajectory and remaining RSU/warrant overhang
- Customer concentration disclosures - top-3 lender share of originations
- Take-rate trend on network volume - is pricing power holding or eroding
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant headroom
PGY sits at the intersection of two supportive forces: a risk-on regime (score +25, VIX 15.8, S&P near highs) and a moderately intense platform-monopoly narrative around AI-driven consumer credit. With a beta of 5.37, this name is a leveraged expression of tape direction - in a calm risk-on environment, that torque works in its favor, and momentum is already strong_positive. The news flow is friendly: management is hitting the investor-conference circuit, comparison pieces are framing PGY favorably versus UPST on valuation and capital efficiency, and the CFO just laid out a $200M net income run-rate target - a concrete profitability anchor the story can rally around. Analyst tone in the flow leans constructive (PGY framed as the cheaper, more diversified AI-credit play). The narrative durability is only moderate and the cult coefficient is low, so this is not a mania - it is a stock benefiting from a favorable tape and an intact, improving story rather than being carried by euphoria. The main non-fundamental risk is the beta itself: any risk-off flip or a wobble in the AI-credit narrative (regulatory noise, a UPST blow-up read-across, or a lender-concentration headline) would hit this name disproportionately hard.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the $200M net income run-rate is reiterated or missed at upcoming investor conferences
- Any UPST or LendingClub read-across headline that could reprice the AI-credit cohort
- VIX breaking above 20 or S&P losing the risk-on regime - would hit PGY disproportionately
- Analyst target revisions post-conference circuit
- Regulatory news flow on consumer credit / AI underwriting
Pagaya's growth is levered to two external dials it does not control: consumer credit health and securitization spread appetite. A 4.72% 10-year with a positively sloped curve (0.53) is workable — funding costs are high but stable and private-credit demand for consumer ABS remains deep, which keeps the placement engine open. The vulnerability is asymmetric: benign credit gives Pagaya mid-teens volume growth and expanding margins, while a consumer delinquency turn simultaneously shrinks partner originations, widens the spreads it must clear, and impairs its retained positions. Regulatory attention to AI-driven consumer underwriting is a slower-moving but real constraint on the fintech partner cohort. The world is currently neutral-to-supportive, not additive.
When we made this prediction on Aug 19, 2026, PGY was $20.45. We expect it to be $17.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $15.50. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 19, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
adjusted_earnings
flips up 25%
cost_of_capital
flips down 25%
shares
flips down 25%
trailing_eps
flips down 25%
adjusted_pe
flips down 25%