Business Description
First Solar, Inc. provides photovoltaic (PV) solar energy solutions in the United State, Japan, France, Canada, India, Australia, and internationally. The company designs, manufactures, and sells cadmium telluride solar modules that converts sunlight into electricity. It serves developers and operators of systems, utilities, independent power producers, commercial and industrial companies, and other system owners. The company was formerly known as First Solar Holdings, Inc. and changed its name to First Solar, Inc. in 2006. First Solar, Inc. was founded in 1999 and is headquartered in Tempe, Arizona.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 5:17pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:14pm (19d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 14.25
Total Equity: $9.54B
Shares: 107,537,000
Total Debt: $498.57M
Cash: $2.80B
EBITDA: $2.21B
Total Debt: $498.57M
Cash: $2.80B
Revenue: $5.22B
Revenue: $5.22B
Revenue: $5.22B
Total Equity: $9.54B
Tax Rate: 3.3%
Equity: $9.54B
Total Debt: $498.57M
Cash: $2.80B
Current Liabilities: $2.25B
Long-Term Debt: $282.59M
Total Debt: $498.57M
Total Equity: $9.54B
Shares: 107,537,000
Shares: 107,537,000
CapEx: -$869.88M
Shares: 107,537,000
Stock Price: $279.01
Net Income: $1.53B
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:20pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.9B | $2.6B | $3.3B | $4.2B | $5.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $3.1B |
| Gross Profit | $730.0M | $69.9M | $1.3B | $1.9B | $2.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $143.2M | $97.1M | $443.4M | $463.4M | $437.2M |
| Operating Income | $586.8M | -$27.2M | $857.3M | $1.4B | $1.7B |
| Net Income | $468.7M | -$44.2M | $830.8M | $1.3B | $1.5B |
| EBITDA | $845.2M | $290.5M | $1.2B | $1.9B | $2.2B |
| EPS | $4.41 | $-0.41 | $7.78 | $12.07 | $14.25 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:17pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $1.6B | $2.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $3.2B | $3.8B | $4.6B | $5.1B | $6.0B |
| Total Assets | $7.4B | $8.3B | $10.4B | $12.1B | $13.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $726.9M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $2.1B | $2.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | $236.0M | $184.3M | $464.1M | $373.4M | $282.6M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.5B | $2.4B | $3.7B | $4.1B | $3.8B |
| Total Equity | $6.0B | $5.8B | $6.7B | $8.0B | $9.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $3.2B | $3.1B | $4.0B | $5.3B | $0 |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:20pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $237.6M | $873.4M | $602.3M | $1.2B | $2.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$540.3M | -$903.6M | -$1.4B | -$1.5B | -$869.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$302.7M | -$30.2M | -$784.5M | -$308.1M | $1.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $300.5M | $442.3M | -$28.1M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$16.0M | -$12.1M | -$31.1M | -$20.2M | -$15.5M |
| Net Change in Cash | $182.2M | $37.6M | $471.6M | -$326.8M | $1.2B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:14pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$6.0B $5.6B – $6.3B
|
$6.5B $6.5B – $6.5B
|
$7.2B $6.9B – $7.6B
|
$7.1B $6.7B – $7.4B
|
| EBITDA |
$2.0B $1.8B – $2.0B
|
$2.1B $2.1B – $2.1B
|
$2.4B $2.2B – $2.5B
|
$2.3B $2.2B – $2.4B
|
| Net Income |
$2.5B $2.0B – $3.2B
|
$3.0B $2.4B – $4.3B
|
$3.6B $3.4B – $3.8B
|
$2.9B $2.7B – $3.1B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:20pm (19d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -10.4% | +26.7% | +26.7% | +24.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -90.4% | +1,761.9% | +42.8% | +14.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -104.6% | +3,247.5% | +62.7% | +20.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -109.4% | +1,981.0% | +55.5% | +18.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -65.6% | +317.2% | +54.2% | +18.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 5:20pm (19d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-28 | Stockdale Caroline | S-Sale | 10,628.00 | $275.60 | $2.9M |
| 2026-05-22 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 239.00 | $250.02 | $59,755 |
| 2026-05-22 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 172.00 | $251.53 | $43,263 |
| 2026-05-22 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 97.00 | $252.87 | $24,528 |
| 2026-05-22 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 218.00 | $253.63 | $55,291 |
| 2026-05-22 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 916.00 | $254.93 | $233,516 |
| 2026-05-22 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 64.00 | $255.59 | $16,358 |
| 2026-05-22 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 75.00 | $256.32 | $19,224 |
| 2026-05-22 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 149.00 | $257.55 | $38,375 |
| 2026-05-22 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 47.00 | $258.48 | $12,149 |
| 2026-05-26 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 364.00 | $265.15 | $96,515 |
| 2026-05-26 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 1,237.00 | $266.60 | $329,784 |
| 2026-05-26 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 628.00 | $267.72 | $168,128 |
| 2026-05-26 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 1,009.00 | $268.89 | $271,310 |
| 2026-05-26 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 632.00 | $270.05 | $170,672 |
| 2026-05-26 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 726.00 | $271.23 | $196,913 |
| 2026-05-26 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 473.00 | $273.17 | $129,209 |
| 2026-05-26 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 126.00 | $276.29 | $34,813 |
| 2026-05-21 | Verma Kuntal Kumar | S-Sale | 582.00 | $250.00 | $145,500 |
| 2026-05-21 | Widmar Mark R | S-Sale | 672.00 | $240.10 | $161,347 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a cleaner story than the models give them credit for, but with a sharp wrinkle. Revenue scaled from $2.62B (2022) to $5.22B (2025) — a doubling in three years — while net income went from -$44M to $1.53B. Gross margin expanded from 2.7% (2022) to 40.6% (2025). That's not a "mature earner" trajectory; the rule-based classifier is wrong. This is a policy-juiced cyclical manufacturer in the middle of a margin step-function, and the step-function has a name: §45X advanced manufacturing tax credits, which flow through COGS and are the single biggest reason gross margin tripled. Strip them out and the underlying panel economics are far less impressive — this is the central fact the bull narrative tends to elide.
The quarterly trajectory is where I diverge from the "decelerating" framing. Q1 2026 revenue of $1.04B is *down* from Q4 2025's $1.68B and barely above Q1 2025's $844M — only +23% YoY, decelerating from the 35%+ prints earlier in 2025. More importantly, Q1 2026 net income of $347M on $1.04B revenue (33.2% margin) is healthy in isolation but the absolute dollar deceleration from Q4 ($521M NI) is meaningful in a business with this much operating leverage and lumpy module shipment timing. The "Poor Cash Flow Quality" flag deserves attention: $1.53B NI vs $1.19B FCF is fine, but capex of $870M against $2.06B OCF means roughly 42% of operating cash is being plowed back into capacity — capacity that only pays off if IRA persists and module ASPs hold. Either assumption can break.
A careful contrarian would press three points the synthesis underweights. First, the §45X credit is statutorily scheduled to phase down starting 2030 and the Trump administration has openly targeted IRA manufacturing credits — even partial rollback compresses gross margin from 40% toward the high-teens to low-20s structural level, which at current 5.2B revenue implies ~$700M of EBIT evaporation. Second, Chinese crystalline silicon module pricing has collapsed to $0.10/W and CdTe's cost advantage is largely a regulatory artifact in the US market, not a global moat — the "platform-monopoly" narrative archetype is generous; this is a tariff-protected duopolist-ish player, not a network business. Third, the insider selling is small in share count but it's *all* selling, no buying, against a stock that's compounded hard — modest tell, not a smoking gun. The market-forces "Neutral" and synthesis "High Conviction Required" verdicts capture the right tension but bury the asymmetry: the downside if IRA is touched is 40%+, the upside if everything goes right is maybe 30%.
On valuation: 17.9x TTM P/E, 11.9x EV/EBITDA, 5.4x P/S, and 2.9x P/B for a business earning 18% ROE and 15.4% ROIC is *not* expensive on reported numbers — that's the bull's strongest card. But the right way to think about it is normalized: assume §45X credits halve by 2028 and net margin compresses from 29% to ~18% on $7B revenue (assuming continued unit growth), you get ~$1.26B normalized earnings, and a fair multiple for a cyclical manufacturer with policy overhang is 14-16x, giving $17-20B equity value vs $30B today. That's roughly $165-190 per share fair value, suggesting current $279 embeds a 40-50% policy-continuity premium. The synthesis is too soft — "high conviction required" is analyst-speak for "we don't want to call it." I'll call it: this is priced for the IRA to remain fully intact through 2030, and that's a coin flip at best given political reality. Quality business, real earnings, real moat in its protected niche — but the price assumes the protection is permanent. I dissent from the neutral framing and lean negative.
GPT Critique
First Solar, Inc. is currently priced at $279.01, with a market cap of $29.98 billion. My independent review of the data reveals a compelling growth story driven by significant revenue increases from $2.62 billion in 2022 to $5.22 billion in 2025, marking a 79% CAGR over the period. This growth is accompanied by a remarkable expansion in net income from a loss of $44.2 million in 2022 to $1.53 billion in 2025. The gross margin improvement from a paltry 2.7% in 2022 to 40.6% in 2025 highlights effective cost management and potentially strategic pricing advantages. However, the reliance on tax credits, specifically the §45X advanced manufacturing tax credits, underscores the vulnerability of First Solar's margins to policy changes. The company's operating cash flow of $2.06 billion and free cash flow of $1.19 billion indicate robust cash generation, although the substantial capex of $870 million suggests heavy reinvestment in growth, which could be risky if external conditions shift unfavorably.
I find myself largely in agreement with Claude Opus's analysis. Opus rightly highlights the heavy reliance on policy-driven incentives like the §45X credits, which critically underpin First Solar's impressive margin expansion. I concur with Opus's point about the potential downside risks associated with a rollback of these credits, which could lead to a significant reduction in margins and earnings. The deceleration in quarterly revenues and net income from Q4 2025 to Q1 2026 further supports Opus's cautious stance. I also share Opus's view that the insider selling activity, although not overwhelmingly large, could serve as a potential red flag in the context of current high valuations.
Where I diverge slightly from Opus is regarding the degree of the downside risk. While Opus suggests a 40-50% policy-continuity premium, I estimate it to be slightly lower, given the company's current market positioning and technological differentiation with CdTe panels, which still offer some competitive edge despite the global pricing pressure from crystalline silicon modules. Moreover, the company's ability to maintain a solid balance sheet with $2.80 billion in cash without significant debt provides a solid buffer against potential headwinds.
A skeptic might argue that both of our analyses overly focus on the risks associated with policy changes, potentially underestimating First Solar's ability to adapt and innovate technologically to maintain competitive advantages. They might also point out the potential for global policy shifts towards renewable energy that could benefit First Solar beyond the US market, mitigating some of the domestic policy risks.