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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Carpenter Technology Corporation (CRS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-22): Designation Low · Gem Score -21 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 71 · Value -83 · Sentiment 34 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $73.21 vs $467.48 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Carpenter Technology Corporation
CRS NYSECarpenter Technology Corporation is a specialty metals manufacturer that produces and distributes high-performance alloys and engineered metal products. The company serves critical end markets including aerospace, defense, medical, energy, transportation, industrial, and consumer electronics. Its product portfolio includes titanium alloys, stainless steels, alloy steels, tool steels, powder metals, and metal powders used in demanding applications that require strength, precision, and reliability. Carpenter Technology operates through two main business segments, Specialty Alloys Operations and Performance Engineered Products, supporting customers with materials used in components, parts, and advanced manufacturing processes. Headquartered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the company is a significant supplier in the specialty materials market, where it plays a key role in providing advanced metal solutions for performance-driven industries.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 10.52
Total Equity: $2.23B
Shares: 50,400,000
Total Debt: $690.70M
Cash: $393.30M
EBITDA: $849.10M
Total Debt: $690.70M
Cash: $393.30M
Revenue: $3.12B
Revenue: $3.12B
Revenue: $3.12B
Total Equity: $2.23B
Tax Rate: 19.3%
Equity: $2.23B
Total Debt: $690.70M
Cash: $393.30M
Current Liabilities: $520.00M
Long-Term Debt: $690.70M
Total Debt: $690.70M
Total Equity: $2.23B
Shares: 50,400,000
Shares: 50,400,000
CapEx: -$242.70M
Shares: 50,400,000
Stock Price: $467.48
Net Income: $529.80M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 12:13am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.8B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.9B | $3.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.2B |
| Gross Profit | $149.8M | $337.3M | $584.3M | $768.6M | $955.5M |
| Operating Expenses | $174.7M | $204.2M | $261.2M | $246.8M | $253.5M |
| Operating Income | -$24.9M | $133.1M | $323.1M | $521.8M | $702.0M |
| Net Income | -$49.1M | $56.4M | $186.5M | $376.0M | $529.8M |
| EBITDA | $106.5M | $264.1M | $457.7M | $661.0M | $849.1M |
| EPS | $-1.01 | $1.15 | $3.75 | $7.50 | $10.59 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-1.01 | $1.14 | $3.70 | $7.42 | $10.52 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 12:00am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $154.2M | $44.5M | $199.1M | $315.5M | $393.3M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.0B |
| Total Assets | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $375.6M | $459.4M | $466.3M | $483.7M | $520.0M |
| Long-Term Debt | $691.8M | $693.0M | $694.2M | $695.4M | $690.7M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.6B |
| Total Equity | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 12:56am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $6.0M | $14.7M | $274.9M | $440.4M | $605.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$91.3M | -$82.3M | -$96.6M | -$154.3M | -$242.7M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$85.3M | -$67.6M | $178.3M | $286.1M | $362.3M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$300.0M | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$700.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$39.2M | -$39.4M | -$40.0M | -$40.3M | -$40.3M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | $0 | $0 | -$101.9M | -$179.1M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$133.2M | -$109.7M | $154.6M | $116.4M | $77.8M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 4, 2026 12:13am (18d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +38.9% | +8.2% | +4.3% | +8.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +125.2% | +73.2% | +31.5% | +24.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +634.5% | +142.7% | +61.5% | +34.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +214.9% | +230.7% | +101.6% | +40.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | +148.0% | +73.3% | +44.4% | +28.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 11:31am (22d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-25 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-28 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-27 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-21 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-26 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-22 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-28 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-22 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-27 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-22 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-29 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-23 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-21 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-01 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-30 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-24 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-22 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-02 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-31 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-25 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-22 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays -68%; a −1σ run costs 82%. Ratio -0.8:1 (μ 9.0%, σ 9.1% , 16 pairs).
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($467.48) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +13% | 19.5% | $130.81 | -72% |
| Base — stabilizes | +8% | 17.0% | $101.73 | -78% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +4% | 14.4% | $77.74 | -83% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +18% | 18.7% | $147.32 | -68% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -0% | 18.7% | $84.30 | -82% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-04 01:07The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: CRS has executed a genuine transformation. FY22 operating income was -$25M on $1.84B revenue; FY26 it's $702M on $3.12B. Gross margin went from 8.1% to 30.6%; net margin from -2.7% to 17.0%. The quarterly cadence is not decelerating — Q4 FY26 hit $851M revenue and 19.1% net margin, the best print in the series, up from $717M/11.8% eight quarters prior. ROIC of 22.5% and FCF of $362M ($7.30/share) are real. This is not a fake beat; the operating leverage is throwing off cash and the balance sheet is clean ($690M debt vs $393M cash, 3.8x current ratio).
That said, the valuation math the synthesis presents is directionally right but the $81 fair value is comically low and undermines the case. At $467, market cap $23.2B, TTM earnings ~$530M puts the P/E at 43.7x, EV/EBITDA ~28x, EV/Sales ~7.6x. For a specialty metals manufacturer — even a best-in-class one — that's aerospace-multiple territory (HEI, TDG) applied to a business with capex intensity ($243M capex vs $605M OCF, i.e., 40% reinvestment) and cyclical end markets. A defensible fair value on a mature-earner framework using 20-25x forward earnings on ~$600M NI is $12-15B, or $240-300/share. That's a 35-50% overvaluation, not 82%. The synthesis DCF is anchored on normalized/mid-cycle assumptions that ignore the current earnings power entirely.
Where I'd push back on the bear consensus: the "mix normalizes" thesis has been the bear call since margins were 12%, and margins have continued climbing to 19%. Carpenter's SAO segment genuinely benefits from a structural qualification moat in aerospace alloys — requalifying a supplier for turbine disks takes years. Boeing 737/787 rate ramps and F-35 sustainment are multi-year committed backlogs, not order-book vapor. The bull case for durability at these margins isn't insane; it's the magnitude of the premium that's insane. The August 25 cluster of insider sales — 10 sales same day, ~50K shares — is not a smoking gun (likely 10b5-1 or option-exercise related given uniform date) but it's certainly not confidence-signaling near $467 either. A contrarian would note: nobody is buying.
The models contradict themselves in a useful way. Rule-based says mature_earner; pre-flight says cyclical industrial with margin transformation; narrative engine calls it a fragile bubble at 82% premium; thesis evaluator scores -10 (nearly balanced). The honest read is between these: it's a high-quality cyclical caught at peak margins with a legitimate structural story, priced as if the peak is permanent. Revenue CAGR of 6.4% doesn't support the multiple; earnings CAGR of 68.6% does, but off a near-zero base — mean reversion in that growth rate is mechanical, not a bear thesis. If margins hold at 17% and revenue grows 8%, FY28 EPS is roughly $13-14; at a generous 25x that's $325-350. To justify $467 you need either margin expansion to continue (20%+ net) or a re-rating to 30x+ mature-industrial multiples that has no historical precedent absent a bubble.
I agree with the synthesis direction (overvalued) but strongly dissent on the magnitude. Fair value is $275-325, not $81. The $81 print makes the analysis dismissible to anyone who's watched the operational execution. At $467, the stock is pricing in aerospace supercycle continuation through 2028+ with no margin give-back — a bet, not an investment. I would not short (quality is real, momentum is intact, no earnings deceleration visible) but I would not initiate long here. Wait for either a $325 handle on a cyclical scare or a Q1 FY27 print that confirms 20%+ net margins are sticky.
GPT Reading
The numbers show a real operating transformation, not a mirage. Carpenter has gone from a loss in FY2022 on $1.84B of revenue to $529.8M of net income on $3.12B in FY2026, with operating income up from negative $24.9M to $702.0M. That is not just end-market recovery; it is a profound margin reset. Gross margin expanded from 8.1% in FY2022 to 30.6% in FY2026, operating margin to 22.5%, and net margin to 17.0%. The quarterly progression is even more striking: net margin moved from 11.8% in Sep-2024 to 19.1% in Jun-2026 while revenue climbed from $717.6M to $851.0M. Over the last four quarters, revenue ran about $3.12B annualized and net income about $529.8M, but the exit rate is higher still: the last two quarters alone produced $302.0M of net income on $1.66B of revenue, an 18.2% net margin. Cash generation supports the quality of earnings. FY2026 operating cash flow was $605.0M versus $529.8M of net income, and even after heavy $242.7M capex, free cash flow was $362.3M. The balance sheet is not what you see in a strained late-cycle steel name either: $393.3M cash, $690.7M debt, current ratio 3.81, debt/equity 0.31.
What stands out to me is that the market is paying not for today's earnings, but for the belief that this new earnings power keeps compounding from here. At $23.17B market cap, the stock trades at 7.5x sales, 44.4x trailing earnings, 27.9x EV/EBITDA, and 10.6x book. Those are software-like multiples on a specialty metals producer. Even if I reject the absurdity of the model-derived $70-$80 fair values, the core objection remains: a company growing revenue 8.6% YoY and likely benefitting from unusually strong aerospace/defense mix should not need to be valued on heroic assumptions. On FY2026 free cash flow, the stock is around a 1.6% FCF yield. To justify that, you need either sustained 20%+ earnings growth for years or confidence that margins still have room to move materially higher from already exceptional levels. The raw data does not prove that. Revenue growth has been good, but not explosive: $2.76B to $2.88B to $3.12B over the last three years. The earnings surge has come far more from margin than volume. That is exactly the part of the story I am least willing to underwrite at 44x earnings.
The strongest pushback is that this is not a commodity steel rerating but a scarcity-value franchise in high-spec alloys, and the numbers do support a structural quality argument. ROIC of 22.5% and ROE of 23.8% are elite for an industrial manufacturer. Quarterly revenue did not just recover; it re-accelerated from $728.0M in Dec-2025 to $811.5M and then $851.0M, while margins also rose, which suggests pricing power and mix are still improving rather than rolling over. If the business has moved into a new regime where aerospace engines, defense systems, and additive/powder metallurgy command persistently higher margins, then a simple reversion-to-midcycle framework will badly understate value. A bull can also point to disciplined capital deployment: the company is funding nearly $243M of capex while still producing $362M of free cash flow and carrying manageable net debt of roughly $297M. If FY2027 earnings were to reach, say, $650M-$700M with similar cash conversion, today’s multiple would compress quickly.
I still weigh the bear case more heavily because the valuation already assumes that favorable scenario and then some. This is a $23B equity value on a business that generated $3.12B of sales and $362M of free cash flow last year. Even if I capitalize earnings rather than cash and grant that FY2026 is not the peak, there is no room for a normal industrial wobble. The insider tape does not help: the latest ten reported insider transactions are all sales on the same date, and while that can reflect options or planned dispositions, it is not the signal you want when the stock is priced for perfection. The contradiction I see in the prior outputs is not that the stock is expensive — it clearly is — but that some model outputs overstate the case by pretending a cyclical industrial deserves a low-teens multiple on current earnings. Carpenter deserves a premium because the operating improvement is real. It just does not deserve this premium. I would not anchor fair value at $80; I would anchor it much higher, but still far below $467. A 22x-28x earnings range on $530M-$600M of sustainable earnings implies something more like $235-$335 per share, depending on share count and how much of the current margin profile you treat as structural.
What would change my mind is straightforward: if the next 2-3 quarters show revenue above $850M consistently and net margins holding in the 18%-20% range without a working-capital unwind masking deterioration, then I would accept that FY2026 was not peak-ish but merely an intermediate step. Likewise, if FY2027 free cash flow can move from $362M to well north of $500M after capex, the valuation debate changes because the equity would no longer be trading at a sub-2% cash yield on peak conditions. On the other hand, if quarterly revenue slips back toward $730M-$760M or net margin retraces to the low teens, the stock should de-rate hard because too much of the current price is attached to permanence of unusually high profitability.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a genuine industrial transformation, not a statistical fluke. Carpenter went from a $49M loss and negative operating income in FY2022 to $530M of net income on $3.12B of revenue in FY2026, with gross margin expanding from high-single digits to 30.6% and operating margin landing at 22.5%. The latest quarter is the strongest yet: $851M revenue and a 19.1% net margin, up from $756M and 14.8% a year earlier. Free cash flow of $362M against only $691M of debt and a 3.8 current ratio means the balance sheet is clean and the earnings are cash-backed. ROIC at 22.5% and ROE at 24% confirm that the mix shift into aerospace and medical alloys is earning an economic return, not just a temporary price spike. That part of the story is real.
What the same numbers refuse to support is the $23B equity value. Revenue has compounded at only 6.4% over the multi-year recovery; the 68% earnings CAGR is almost entirely margin catch-up from a depressed base. At 44× trailing earnings, 7.5× sales and 28× EV/EBITDA, the market is capitalizing today’s peak margins as if they are the new floor and still layering on multi-year volume growth that the top line has not yet delivered. FCF yield is roughly 1.6%—a bond-like return for a cyclical metals fabricator. Even granting the aerospace qualification moat and another 25–30% earnings advance, a 22–25× multiple on forward net income still points closer to the mid-$200s than to $467. The valuation synthesis fair value near $81 is mechanically harsh, but the direction is unambiguous: price has outrun the cash-flow reality by a wide margin. Clustered insider sales on a single August day add a second, independent caution signal.
The strongest counter-argument is that specialty-alloy capacity and OEM qualifications are genuinely scarce, commercial-aerospace build rates still have years of catch-up, and defense budgets are politically sticky. If powder-metallurgy and additive products scale from a small base while gross margins hold above 28–30%, the earnings power could reach $700–800M within a couple of years and the franchise might deserve a mid-20s multiple rather than a classic industrial 15×. Under that math the stock is expensive rather than absurd, and the pullback from $626 already reflects some skepticism. I weigh this less heavily because the bulk of the margin expansion is already in the rear-view mirror, revenue growth remains mid-single-digit, and 44× leaves almost no room for any normalization in mix or pricing—the exact risk the bear case flags.
I would reverse the overvalued call if the next two quarters show revenue accelerating through the mid-teens while gross margin stays at or above 30%, or if management guides FY2027 net income toward $700M+ with visible powder/AM contribution. A sustained drop in aerospace OEM schedules or a gross-margin print back below 26% would confirm the downside case even more forcefully.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The trajectory is striking: revenue grew from $1.84B (2022) to $3.12B (2026), gross margin expanded from 8.2% to 30.6%, operating margin from -1.4% to 22.5%, and net income swung from a $49M loss to $530M profit. FCF flipped from -$85M to +$362M over the same window. Earnings quality supports the reported numbers: accruals -1.4% of assets, Beneish M -2.44 (no manipulation flag), and Altman Z of 11.31 puts the balance sheet firmly in the safe zone. Share count is essentially flat (48.5M to 50.4M, ~1% CAGR) with SBC only 0.9% of revenue and buybacks running 2.9x SBC, so per-share value is protected. The business carries net debt of $297M against $362M annual FCF, which is a modest constraint rather than a threat - roughly 0.8x FCF, easily serviceable. OCF/NI of 0.79x is the one soft spot in an otherwise pristine picture, suggesting working capital absorption during growth but not distortion. The CEO's concentrated single-day sale of ~68K shares (~$32M) on 2026-08-25, with zero insider buys over 12 months, is a behavioral yellow flag on an otherwise excellent operational tape.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- End-market mix (aerospace/defense vs industrial/medical) and customer concentration to gauge cyclicality of the 30.6% GM
- Whether CEO's 2026-08-25 sales were 10b5-1 scheduled or discretionary, and remaining insider ownership post-sale
- Order book/backlog disclosures to test durability of the margin ramp
- Working capital composition - specifically inventory days - to explain OCF/NI of 0.79x
- Debt maturity schedule and covenants against the $297M net debt position
- Pension/OPEB obligations typical for legacy specialty steel producers
The e2e composite pins fair value at $72.26 with a signal-adjusted $81.13, and both the DCF ($74.55) and EPV floor ($67.68) cluster in the same $68-$75 zone. Price is $467.48 - roughly 6x the deserved value implied by cash-flow and earnings-power methods. Even granting that a Strong quality grade and a genuine margin inflection (gross margin 8% to 30%) deserve a premium multiple on today's earnings power, a 6x gap to EPV cannot be closed by quality alone; it requires the current aerospace super-cycle margin to be treated as permanent and growing. That said, a 6x gap this wide against a specialty-metals name with sole-source aerospace positions raises the possibility the DCF/EPV inputs are stale or under-capturing the earnings run-rate - so I hedge the confidence. Even doubling deserved value to ~$160 to give full credit for the turnaround still leaves the stock ~3x rich. The market is pricing perpetual super-cycle economics; the margin of safety is deeply negative.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Latest quarterly aerospace segment margins and backlog duration - is 30% gross margin sustainable or peak?
- Management guidance on FY normalized EBITDA / FCF run-rate vs the DCF inputs
- Order book visibility from Boeing/Airbus/defense primes beyond 2026
- Whether the DCF used stale (pre-turnaround) margin assumptions - would materially raise deserved value if so
The active story on CRS is a strong aerospace/defense supply-scarcity narrative with medium cult following - Sands Capital just publicly championed the name, and analyst-flavored coverage is framing FY27 free cash flow of $400-430M as a continuation, not a peak. That is a real tailwind for a high-beta (1.28) industrial that has already tripled the tape over three years: momentum begets flows, and peer coverage (ATI getting the same bullish aerospace/defense treatment) reinforces the cohort bid. The risk-on tape (VIX 14, near highs) amplifies this - beta 1.28 catches the updraft cleanly.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Boeing/Airbus production-rate updates or order pushouts
- Any sell-side downgrade citing valuation - would crack the fragile narrative
- VIX break above 18 or sector rotation out of aerospace/defense cohort
- Peer (ATI, HAYN) guidance revisions - cohort tell
The world is re-arming and re-fleeting at the same time: commercial aviation is working through a decade-long delivery backlog while defense budgets across NATO and Asia step up, and both consume the same narrow set of qualified high-temperature and titanium alloys. Qualification barriers mean supply cannot flex to meet that demand for years, so value accrues to the few incumbent mills. Against this, higher-for-longer rates (10y 4.79) and industrial macro headwinds pressure the transportation, energy and consumer-electronics slices of the portfolio — a mix drag, not a thesis break. The structural read is that Carpenter's business direction is upward and supply-advantaged, while the cyclical read warns this is the good part of the cycle, not the start of one.
When we made this prediction on Sep 4, 2026, CRS was $476.29. We expect it to be $425.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $160.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.