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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Ross Stores, Inc. (ROST) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-04): Designation Watch · Gem Score -13 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 74 · Value -71 · Sentiment 6 (timing only, not weighted)
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Ross Stores, Inc.
ROST NASDAQRoss Stores, Inc. is a U.S.-based off-price apparel and home fashion retailer focused on delivering branded merchandise at discounted prices to value-conscious consumers. The company operates retail chains under the Ross Dress for Less and dd’s Discounts banners, offering a broad assortment of in-season clothing, footwear, accessories, and home décor items for the family and household. Its stores emphasize everyday savings, typically positioning prices below those of traditional department and specialty retailers, supported by an opportunistic and flexible merchandising model that sources deals across the supply chain. Ross Stores, Inc. serves a wide demographic across urban, suburban, and smaller markets in the United States, with a footprint spanning multiple states and territories. The business plays a significant role in the off-price retail segment, providing an alternative to full-price retail for consumers seeking recognized brands and fashion-oriented products at lower cost. Headquartered in the United States, Ross Stores, Inc. is considered a major participant in the consumer cyclical sector, particularly within the discount and off-price retail industry.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.61
Total Equity: $6.19B
Shares: 324,416,000
Total Debt: $1.52B
Cash: $4.59B
EBITDA: $3.22B
Total Debt: $1.52B
Cash: $4.59B
Revenue: $22.75B
Revenue: $22.75B
Revenue: $22.75B
Total Equity: $6.19B
Tax Rate: 24.5%
Equity: $6.19B
Total Debt: $1.52B
Cash: $4.59B
Current Liabilities: $4.83B
Long-Term Debt: $1.02B
Total Debt: $1.52B
Total Equity: $6.19B
Shares: 324,416,000
Shares: 324,416,000
CapEx: -$819.28M
Shares: 324,416,000
Stock Price: $251.94
Net Income: $2.15B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:41am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $18.9B | $18.7B | $20.4B | $21.1B | $22.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $13.7B | $13.9B | $14.8B | $15.3B | $16.4B |
| Gross Profit | $5.2B | $4.7B | $5.6B | $5.9B | $6.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.9B | $2.8B | $3.3B | $3.3B | $3.6B |
| Operating Income | $2.3B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.7B |
| Net Income | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.1B |
| EBITDA | $2.6B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $3.0B | $3.2B |
| EPS | $4.90 | $4.40 | $5.59 | $6.36 | $6.66 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $4.87 | $4.38 | $5.56 | $6.32 | $6.61 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:21am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.9B | $4.6B | $4.9B | $4.7B | $4.6B |
| Total Current Assets | $7.5B | $6.9B | $7.4B | $7.5B | $7.6B |
| Total Assets | $13.6B | $13.4B | $14.3B | $14.9B | $15.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $4.2B | $3.6B | $4.2B | $4.7B | $4.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.2B | $1.5B | $1.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $9.6B | $9.1B | $9.4B | $9.4B | $9.4B |
| Total Equity | $4.1B | $4.3B | $4.9B | $5.5B | $6.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.9B | $3.0B | $3.5B | $4.1B | $4.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:41am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.7B | $1.7B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $3.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$557.8M | -$654.1M | -$762.8M | -$720.1M | -$819.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $2.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$65.0M | $0 | $0 | -$250.0M | -$700.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$405.1M | -$431.3M | -$454.8M | -$488.7M | -$528.1M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$650.0M | -$950.0M | -$950.0M | -$1.0B | -$1.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | $28.6M | -$370.1M | $323.2M | -$139.0M | -$134.5M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:41am (23d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -1.2% | +9.0% | +3.7% | +7.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -8.8% | +17.4% | +5.3% | +7.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | -11.9% | +15.9% | +12.0% | +4.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -12.2% | +24.0% | +11.5% | +2.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | -8.9% | +14.3% | +11.2% | +6.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:21am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-09 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-13 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-09 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-09 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-10 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-18 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-10 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-10 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-11 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-04 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-01 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-05 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-13 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-05 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-02 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-06 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-14 | $0.31 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-06 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-03 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: Ross is running $22.75B TTM revenue with a clean 9.4% net margin, $2.15B in net income, $2.21B in FCF, and a fortress balance sheet ($4.59B cash vs $1.52B debt). ROIC of 65.7% is genuinely elite — this is a real business, not a story stock. But the growth is pedestrian: 5.7% revenue CAGR, 7% earnings CAGR, and recent earnings YoY of just 2.6% despite 7.7% revenue growth suggests margin pressure is already showing up. The most recent quarter (May 2026) shows $6.01B revenue and 10.8% margin — the margin pop is encouraging, but one quarter doesn't reset a trend. Meanwhile the market is paying 38x earnings, 24x EBITDA, and 13x book for what is fundamentally a mid-single-digit grower.
The synthesis verdict of $125-134 fair value looks directionally right but probably too harsh. A reverse-DCF at $252 implies the market expects roughly 10-11% FCF growth for a decade with a terminal multiple around 20x — aggressive but not insane given Ross's execution history and the fact that FCF actually did compound at 12.3%. That said, TJX trades at similar multiples with arguably better international optionality, so ROST isn't uniquely mispriced within its peer set — it's the whole off-price cohort that's been re-rated. I'd peg fair value closer to $170-185 (roughly 26-28x earnings, still a premium multiple appropriate for the ROIC), not $134. The synthesis DCF is likely under-weighting the durability of returns on incremental capital, which is the actual bull case.
The contrarian pushback on the bear thesis: off-price has genuinely benefited from department store decay, and the 10.8% margin in the latest quarter suggests Ross isn't obviously losing pricing power despite "macro headwinds." The store expansion runway to ~2,900 units from ~2,200 is real and high-return. But the contrarian pushback on the bull thesis is stronger: earnings YoY of 2.6% is a warning shot, not a rounding error, and mature retailers trading at 38x P/E historically have not ended well when growth decelerates — see Starbucks 2019, Home Depot 2022. The narrative layer nailed it: this is a "compounder masquerading as a discount retailer" story, and those unwind quickly when the compounding rate visibly slows. The 88.6% premium to DCF is doing enormous narrative work for a company growing earnings 2-7%. The Market Forces module being unavailable is a real gap — I'd want to see tariff exposure analysis given ROST's import-heavy inventory sourcing, which is not trivial in 2026.
Net: I partially dissent from the synthesis on magnitude but agree on direction. $134 fair value implies a 47% drawdown, which requires either a recession-driven earnings cut or multiple compression to 20x — plausible but not base case. My fair value is $175-185, implying 25-30% downside, which is a "trim/avoid new positions" verdict rather than a "short it" verdict. The stock is overvalued but the business is high-quality enough that patient holders won't get destroyed — they'll just underperform. The asymmetric risk is that any comp-sales miss or gross margin compression (currently 27.7%, historically 28-29%) triggers a re-rating to peer multiples fast. I'd want to see the stock in the $180s before adding, and I'd note the insider activity section is missing from this file entirely, which is a real analytical gap for a name where management execution is the entire thesis.
GPT Reading
Ross is an excellent business and a difficult stock. The operating record is undeniably strong: annual revenue has climbed from $18.70B in FY2023 to $22.75B in FY2026, while net income rose from $1.51B to $2.15B. That is not financial engineering masquerading as growth; the company converts scale into real cash, with $3.03B of operating cash flow and $2.21B of free cash flow last year against only $819M of capex. The balance sheet is similarly clean, with $4.59B of cash versus $1.52B of debt, so there is no leverage story propping up returns. What stands out to me, though, is that the quality is already obvious in the numbers and the market is paying a massive price for it: at $251.94, investors are capitalizing a retailer growing revenue at roughly 6% and earnings at roughly 7% over several years at 38x earnings, 3.6x sales, and 24.5x EV/EBITDA. Those are software-like valuation tolerances being assigned to a discount apparel chain.
The recent numbers actually reinforce the mismatch. Quarterly revenue is still healthy, with the latest quarter at $6.01B versus $4.98B a year earlier, but that comparison is seasonally awkward because the more important signal is margin and earnings progression across a full cycle. Over the last five reported quarters, net margin has sat in a narrow 9.1% to 10.8% band; good stability, but not evidence of a business entering a new profitability regime. The latest annual operating margin was 11.9%, up from 11.0% the year before and 10.6% two years before, which is admirable execution, yet still consistent with a mature retailer optimizing at the margin rather than unlocking a second leg of economics. If the business can sustainably earn about $2.1B-$2.3B today and grow high single digits, paying nearly $82B of equity value requires believing that this level of consistency persists for a very long time with little macro interruption. That is a heroic assumption in consumer discretionary.
What I think the market is doing is extrapolating Ross’s “defensive cyclical” status into a compounder multiple. Off-price retail does deserve a premium to ordinary apparel retail because the model is hard to replicate at scale, inventory flexibility is a real advantage, and value positioning can hold up well in a pressured consumer environment. But the premium has become excessive relative to the actual cadence of growth. A 9.4% net margin and 27.7% gross margin are very good for retail, yet they also imply less room for upside surprises than the valuation suggests. Even using the latest annual net income of $2.15B, the earnings yield is barely above 2.5%. For that to make sense, Ross would need either a much longer unit-growth runway than mature big-box peers usually get, or a step-change in earnings growth that the current quarterly data does not show. Recent earnings growth of just 2.6% despite revenue growth near 7.7% is especially important: it hints that even small cost pressures can keep EPS from matching the market’s implied trajectory.
The best case against my view is straightforward and not trivial. Ross has earned the right to trade rich because it keeps delivering through environments that hurt weaker retailers. Revenue has compounded despite a messy post-COVID retail backdrop, annual net income has recovered from $1.72B in FY2022 to $2.15B in FY2026, returns on capital are elite, and the company has net cash. A smart bull would argue that 38x trailing earnings overstates the real valuation if operating momentum continues, buybacks reduce share count, and the store base still has years of white-space expansion. They would also point out that quarter-to-quarter margin stability around 9%-10% net in a promotional retail landscape is itself evidence of moat-like execution. I agree with all of that; I just think those are reasons Ross should trade at a premium, not at a valuation that leaves almost no room for an ordinary slowdown. This is a wonderful business priced like an even better one.
What would change my mind is not another “solid quarter,” but evidence that Ross is genuinely outgrowing its mature profile. If annual revenue growth can stay above 8%-10% for several years while operating margin holds around 12% or expands, taking net income toward $2.6B-$2.8B faster than expected, then today’s multiple would look less stretched. Likewise, if upcoming quarters show earnings growth re-accelerating clearly above revenue growth rather than lagging it, that would support a compounder case. Absent that, I would need the stock price to come down materially—something closer to the high-$100s or below $200 before the risk/reward starts to compensate for the cyclical and execution risks embedded in a retailer, no matter how good.
Grok Reading
Ross is a pristine operator trapped inside a bubble multiple. Annual revenue has compounded from $18.7B in fiscal 2023 to $22.75B in the year ended January 2026—a 5.7% CAGR—while net income climbed from $1.51B to $2.15B at a 7% earnings CAGR and free cash flow grew faster still at 12.3% to $2.21B. The latest quarter printed $6.01B revenue and a 10.8% net margin, the best in the recent series, and trailing gross and operating margins sit at 27.7% and 11.9%. Returns are elite: ROIC of 65.7%, ROE of 34.7%, net cash of roughly $3.1B against only $1.52B of debt. None of that is in dispute. What the numbers refuse to support is a 38.1x P/E, 24.5x EV/EBITDA, and 3.6x sales on a business whose recent earnings growth slowed to 2.6% year-over-year. At $251.94 the market is capitalizing Ross as if mid-teens earnings growth is locked in for a decade; the actual trajectory is mid-single-digit revenue with high-single-digit earnings at best.
The valuation synthesis fair value near $134 is directionally correct even if the precise DCF is arguable. A mature off-price retailer with 5–8% top-line growth, stable 9–10% net margins, and modest unit expansion does not clear a 38x earnings multiple under any disciplined framework once you stop extrapolating the post-COVID recovery forever. The balance sheet and FCF quality justify a premium to ordinary apparel retail—perhaps mid-20s earnings multiple in a benign rate environment—but not nearly double that. The narrative layer correctly flags that an 88% premium to DCF is being carried by the “decades of runway / structural moat” story; that story is real enough to keep the stock from collapsing on ordinary quarters, yet it is already fully, even aggressively, discounted into the price.
The strongest counter-case is straightforward and must be taken seriously. Off-price thrives when consumers trade down and brands dump inventory; Ross’s model has structural cost advantages that pure e-commerce and full-price mall retail cannot easily replicate. ROIC above 65% and FCF conversion north of 100% of net income are rare, and the recent revenue acceleration to 7.7% year-over-year plus the 10.8% margin print suggest the engine is not stalling. If management can open stores into underpenetrated Sun Belt and secondary markets for another decade while holding square-footage productivity, the earnings power in 2032 could be materially higher than a static 6% growth model implies. Bulls will also note that TJX often trades in the low-30s; a relative premium for Ross is not automatically absurd if execution remains cleaner. I weigh this less heavily because even granting superior unit economics, the absolute multiple still embeds growth and durability assumptions that leave almost no margin of safety at $252. A high-quality 7% grower at 38x is still a poor expected-return asset once rates and consumer cyclicality reassert themselves.
I would reverse to neutral or constructive only on clear evidence that sustainable earnings growth has re-accelerated into the low double digits—specifically, two consecutive quarters of mid-single-digit comps plus net margin holding above 10.5%, or a forward guide that implies FY EPS growth above 12% without one-time items—or on a drawdown that brings the stock below roughly $180 (mid-20s forward P/E on current run-rate earnings). Absent one of those, the risk-reward is skewed to the downside.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Ross is a mature, self-funding off-price apparel retailer producing $2.21B of FCF on $22.75B revenue, with a fortress-lite balance sheet (net cash $3.08B) and no need for external capital. Margins have marched back from a 2023 trough (GM 25.4%, OpM 10.6%) to 2026 levels above pre-2023 (GM 27.7%, OpM 11.9%), and net income has grown from $1.51B to $2.15B over that span. Revenue has compounded steadily from $18.92B to $22.75B.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Inventory turns and markdown risk in latest 10-K to confirm the 2023 issue was fully digested
- Lease obligation trajectory and store footprint expansion pace
- Customer/vendor concentration and any exposure to specific supplier categories
- Any share repurchase authorization changes or dividend policy shifts
- Same-store sales trend by quarter to confirm underlying traffic vs. price
The e2e composite fair value of $124.81 and signal-adjusted $133.79 imply roughly 47% downside from the $252.34 price. Even the most generous of the three methods, the anchored P/E at $218.10, sits ~14% below spot; the DCF ($102.28) and EPV floor ($76.56) are far below. That spread tells me deserved value likely lives somewhere in the $170-$220 zone once I give the quality lens (score 74, clean earnings, net cash, real buybacks) full credit and push back on the DCF/EPV as probably too punitive for a compounder with this cash-conversion profile. Even at the top of that generous range, $252 is a full-to-rich price. What is priced in: continued mid-single-digit comps, sustained margin recovery beyond pre-COVID peaks, and buyback-driven EPS compounding for years. That is the base case, not an upside case, so the risk/reward is asymmetric to the downside on any comp slowdown or margin wobble. High earnings quality means I do not haircut the numbers further, but it also does not manufacture a discount that is not there. This is a great business trading at a price that already reflects greatness.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Comp sales trajectory and guidance in the next print
- Operating margin vs pre-COVID peak - is expansion still on track
- Pace and price of buybacks vs current share price
- Inventory availability commentary from vendors/closeouts
- Any signs of consumer trade-down helping or trade-out hurting
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (regime +47, VIX 15.5, S&P near highs), which is a modest tailwind for consumer cyclicals broadly. But ROST's low beta of 0.88 means it neither fully rides risk-on euphoria nor gets crushed in a wobble - the tape barely moves the needle here. The steady-compounder narrative is intact but only moderate in intensity and durability, with a low cult coefficient, so there is no mania bidding this name and no story collapse threatening it either.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Next same-store sales / comp print - the single biggest sentiment catalyst that could break the compounder story
- Any shift in analyst target revisions or downgrades citing consumer weakness
- 10y yield trajectory - a move toward 5% would pressure premium-multiple retailers
- Sector rotation signals in off-price peers (TJX, BURL) as a tell for narrative health
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 21, 2026, ROST was $235.78. We expect it to be $215.00 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $175.00. This is an early model (v0.4.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 21, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.