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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Venture Global Inc. (VG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Low · Gem Score -64 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -75 · Value -57 · Sentiment 31 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $-0.28 vs $14.07 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Venture Global Inc.
VG NYSEVenture Global Inc. is an energy infrastructure company focused on the production and export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States. The company sources natural gas from resource-rich North American basins and processes it into LNG for global customers, supporting power generation, industrial use, and energy security needs worldwide. Venture Global Inc. operates through four primary segments: the Calcasieu project, Plaquemines project, CP2 project, and a sales and shipping segment that manages commercial offtake and logistics. These projects are designed to provide long-term LNG supply to utilities, energy companies, and large industrial buyers. Headquartered in Arlington, Virginia and founded in 2023, Venture Global Inc. plays a significant role in the global natural gas value chain by linking U.S. natural gas production with international demand through large-scale liquefaction and export capabilities.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.86
Total Equity: $12.00B
Shares: 2,635,000,000
Total Debt: $34.21B
Cash: $2.36B
EBITDA: $6.10B
Total Debt: $34.21B
Cash: $2.36B
Revenue: $13.77B
Revenue: $13.77B
Revenue: $13.77B
Total Equity: $12.00B
Tax Rate: 18.7%
Equity: $12.00B
Total Debt: $34.21B
Cash: $2.36B
Current Liabilities: $4.34B
Long-Term Debt: $33.39B
Total Debt: $34.21B
Total Equity: $12.00B
Shares: 2,635,000,000
Shares: 2,635,000,000
CapEx: -$13.37B
Shares: 2,635,000,000
Stock Price: $14.39
Net Income: $2.73B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 12:17am (43d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $7.9B | $5.0B | $13.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.7B | $1.4B | $5.9B |
| Gross Profit | $6.2B | $3.6B | $7.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.4B | $1.9B | $2.7B |
| Operating Income | $4.9B | $1.8B | $5.2B |
| Net Income | $3.6B | $1.7B | $2.7B |
| EBITDA | $5.1B | $2.1B | $6.1B |
| EPS | $1.30 | $0.63 | $0.93 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.25 | $0.57 | $0.86 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 12:00am (43d ago)| Metric | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.6B | $2.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $4.6B | $4.0B |
| Total Assets | $43.5B | $53.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.5B | $4.3B |
| Long-Term Debt | $29.1B | $33.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $35.6B | $41.5B |
| Total Equity | $7.9B | $12.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.6B | $4.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 12:17am (43d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.6B | $2.1B | $6.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$8.1B | -$13.7B | -$13.4B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$3.5B | -$11.6B | -$6.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$5.9B | -$905.0M | -$11.1B |
| Dividends Paid | -$164.0M | -$139.0M | -$465.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $3.5B | -$1.3B | -$1.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 12:17am (43d ago)| Metric | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -37.0% | +176.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -41.7% | +116.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -63.6% | +192.5% |
| Net Income Growth | -51.7% | +56.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | -59.3% | +192.4% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 23, 2026 8:28am (45d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-16 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-15 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-19 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-10 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-10 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-18 02:45| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($14.07) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +58% | 31.3% | $75.77 | +439% |
| Base — stabilizes | +39% | 27.2% | $40.78 | +190% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +19% | 23.1% | $20.59 | +46% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +59% | 15.0% | $39.21 | +179% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +50% | 24.6% | $49.70 | +253% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +37% | 17.2% | $25.55 | +82% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-26 00:26The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly trajectory is far more constructive than the synthesis lets on. Revenue has stepped from $926M (Q3'24) to $4.58B (Q2'26) — a near-5x expansion in seven quarters, with the last four quarters printing $3.10B → $3.33B → $4.45B → $4.60B → $4.58B. That's Plaquemines commissioning, not "collapsing margins." Net margin has bounced between 13.6% and 31% depending on cargo timing and mark-to-market on gas purchases; the Q1'26 dip to 13.6% is not deterioration, it's the well-known commodity spread compression quarter. TTM revenue is roughly $17.0B and TTM net income roughly $3.8B — against a $36B market cap, that's ~9.5x trailing earnings on an asset base still ramping. The synthesis DCF spitting out -$0.04 fair value is a model failure, not a signal; it's almost certainly extrapolating the -$6.8B 2025 FCF without normalizing for the $13.4B growth capex that terminates as projects commission. Discard that number.
Where I partially agree with the bears: the $34.2B debt stack against $12.0B equity (D/E 2.85x) and 0.93 current ratio is genuinely tight, and ROIC of 9.6% is thin relative to the leverage. If SPA-contracted volumes underperform, or if the Henry Hub–JKM/TTF arb compresses structurally (which is a real risk as Qatar's North Field expansion and US Gulf Coast peers add ~150 mtpa through 2028), the equity gets squeezed hard because interest expense doesn't flex. The insider activity is worse than the market-forces note implies in one sense and better in another: these are all option-exercise-and-sell pairs at 1:1 ratios, which is mechanical comp monetization, not panic selling — but the concentration in mid-August 2026 (~2.9M shares across four days) at these depressed prices suggests insiders don't see a near-term catalyst worth waiting for. That's a soft negative, not the "insider exodus" framing.
The prior models contradict each other in ways worth flagging. Rule-based says "mature earner" (wrong — this is mid-ramp infrastructure), pre-flight correctly says "high-growth capital-intensive," narrative layer calls it "turnaround-bet" (also wrong — nothing to turn around, it's a greenfield ramp), and thesis-eval frames it as "steady midstream." These are four different companies. The correct frame is: a partially-commissioned LNG export platform with ~2 years of capex-heavy ramp remaining, contracted offtake on a majority of nameplate, and equity that behaves like a levered call on TTF-HH spreads and CP2 FID. The market-forces "avoid" call leans on "collapsing margins" that aren't actually collapsing when you look at the sequence — 26.8% in Q4'25 and 31% in Q2'26 bracket the 13.6% Q1'26 dip. Cherry-picking one quarter to build a bear case is sloppy.
Contrarian case against my own read: LNG is cyclical, and 2026-2028 sees ~120+ mtpa of new global supply against maybe 60-70 mtpa of demand growth in a base case. If spot spreads normalize to $2-3/MMBtu from current elevated levels, VG's uncontracted volumes (which have been the earnings surprise driver) evaporate, and you're left with contracted margins of maybe $1.5-2B/year against $2B+ of interest expense — the equity math gets ugly fast. The stock at $14.39 is down materially from IPO highs near $25, so the market has already partially discounted this. My fair value on a normalized 2027 basis — $18-20B revenue at 20% sustainable net margin = $3.6-4B earnings, 10-12x multiple given leverage = $36-48B equity, or $14-19/share — brackets the current price. So the synthesis "overvalued" verdict is wrong in magnitude but not necessarily direction; I'd call this fairly valued with skewed upside if CP2 gets FID'd and Plaquemines Phase 2 ramps on schedule, and 40% downside if spreads normalize hard. I dissent from the synthesis's implied "sell" and from market-forces' "avoid" — this is a hold/small-position bet, not a short.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is that the “broken DCF / avoid” framing overstates the problem because it treats Venture Global like a normal corporate free-cash-flow equity when the business is plainly in a buildout trough. The raw operating numbers are too strong to dismiss. Revenue has gone from $4.97B in 2024 to $13.77B in 2025, and the last four quarters annualize to roughly $16.9B. Net income in those same last four quarters totals about $3.56B, which means the stock at a $35.98B market cap is trading around 10x trailing-quarter annualized earnings power, not some absurd speculative multiple. Even using the reported annual PE of 16.7x on 2025 earnings, that is not a heroic valuation for an LNG exporter with revenue still scaling sharply. Operating cash flow of $6.57B in 2025 also matters more than the headline -$6.80B free cash flow, because the negative FCF is explained by $13.37B of capex rather than by a business failing to convert earnings into cash.
The business is not “unprofitable growth”; it is profitable growth with ugly capital intensity. Quarterly results show some lumpiness, but the broad trend is favorable. Revenue stepped from $926M in 3Q24 to $1.52B in 4Q24, then to $2.89B, $3.10B, $3.33B, $4.45B, $4.60B, and $4.58B through 2Q26. That is a huge capacity ramp, and despite margin volatility the company is still earning real money: net margins were 17.9%, 15.3%, 16.5%, 26.8%, 13.6%, and 31.0% over the last six quarters after a messy 2024 transition. The right read is that this is not a mature toll-road midstream name and not a cash-incinerating concept stock either; it is a commissioning story. If capex normalizes as projects move from construction to operations, the equity can look cheap very quickly because the enterprise is already demonstrating multi-billion-dollar EBITDA and cash generation. EV/EBITDA around 10.9x is not obviously expensive for scarce LNG export infrastructure if the current earnings base proves durable and still has volume upside.
The balance sheet is the real issue, but even there I think the bears are directionally right and quantitatively too extreme. Debt of $34.21B against $12.00B of equity and just $2.36B of cash is aggressive, and a current ratio of 0.93 leaves little room for execution slippage. But this is exactly what project-heavy LNG developers look like before the assets fully season. I care more that annual operating income was $5.16B in 2025 and that earnings have remained positive through the ramp than I do about simplistic leverage screens. At $14.39, the market cap is only about 2.1x 2025 revenue and roughly 13x 2025 net income; neither suggests euphoria. The better way to frame the stock is that investors are paying a fair-to-modest price for a highly levered, hard-asset platform whose value will swing massively based on whether current revenue and margins represent a floor for a larger export base or a temporary peak.
The smartest bear case is that the recent income statement may flatter economics that are not stable enough to deserve even 10-13x earnings. Annual revenue actually fell from $7.90B in 2023 to $4.97B in 2024 before exploding to $13.77B in 2025, so this is not a clean compounding story. The 2024 net margin of 35% and 4Q24 margin of 65% also look too high for a normalized midstream-like business, while 1Q26 dropped back to 13.6% before rebounding to 31% in 2Q26. That volatility supports the criticism that reported earnings may be a noisy mix of commissioning effects, contract timing, and possibly unusually favorable spot-linked realizations rather than a stable run-rate. Add in the steady option-exercise-and-sale insider pattern, and a skeptic can reasonably argue that management is monetizing into a valuation that already assumes Plaquemines ramps smoothly and future projects avoid cost, timing, or regulatory trouble. If margins settle in the mid-teens while capex stays elevated, the equity could be worth materially less because the debt load leaves little cushion.
What would flip me bearish is evidence that the current revenue scale does not translate into sustained cash earnings once the ramp matures. Specifically, if quarterly revenue stalls around $4.5B but net margin stays stuck near low teens, or if operating cash flow fails to keep pace with income while capex remains above $10B annually into 2027, then today’s valuation is too high because deleveraging gets pushed out. I’d also change my mind if net debt rises further without a clear path to commissioning-driven FCF inflection. Conversely, if the next few quarters show revenue holding above $4.5B, annualized net income staying above $3.5B, and capex stepping down enough to move free cash flow toward breakeven, the stock should trade above here because the market will stop valuing it like a perpetual construction site.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers show a company that has already crossed from project developer into commercial LNG exporter at scale. Annual revenue jumped from $4.97B in 2024 to $13.77B in 2025, with the last three reported quarters locked in a $4.45–4.60B run-rate—implying a $18B annualized pace if sustained. Operating cash flow of $6.57B against $5.16B of operating income confirms the core facilities are throwing off real cash once online; gross margin held at 57% and operating margin at 37.5% for the full year. That is not a pre-revenue story. The contradiction with several model outputs is stark: a composite fair value near zero or negative simply cannot reconcile with $2.73B of 2025 net income, 23% ROE, and an EV/EBITDA of 10.9x on assets that are already producing. Those models appear to treat mid-cycle construction capex as a permanent earnings destroyer rather than a finite build-out.
What the same data also make unavoidable is the balance-sheet and cash-conversion cost of that ramp. Free cash flow was –$6.80B on $13.37B of capex; net debt sits at roughly $32B against $12B of equity (D/E 2.85); the current ratio is 0.93. Quarterly net margins have swung from 65% to –32% to the mid-teens and back to 31% in the most recent period—evidence that realized LNG spreads, commissioning costs, and perhaps hedging or one-time items still dominate reported earnings quality. Insider activity over the last two months is almost entirely option exercise followed by immediate sale of the resulting shares (more than 3 million shares in the disclosed prints), which is consistent with liquidity-taking rather than incremental ownership. Revenue growth is decelerating at the quarterly level even while the absolute dollars remain large, and the 32% revenue CAGR is paired with a –13% earnings CAGR, underscoring that scale has not yet translated into cleaner bottom-line compounding.
The strongest case against a constructive read is precisely the leverage-plus-execution stack that the bear models emphasize. At $34B of total debt and still-negative FCF, any multi-quarter delay at Plaquemines or further regulatory slippage on CP2 forces either expensive refinancing or equity issuance into a stock that already trades at 3.2x book. Global LNG capacity additions are well-telegraphed; if spot and contract spreads compress another 20–30% while VG is still burning $10B+ of annual capex, the 16.7x trailing P/E becomes an optically cheap multiple on earnings that prove temporary. The market-narrative layer correctly flags that a large fraction of the $36B equity value is an option on successful project delivery and sustained energy-security demand rather than a discounted claim on today’s free cash flow. Those risks are real and explain why peer midstream names with simpler balance sheets trade at tighter spreads.
I still weigh the operating evidence more heavily than the incomplete DCF snapshots: Calcasieu is already a cash-generating proof point, the contracted offtake structure limits pure commodity beta relative to upstream E&P, and EV/EBITDA near 11x is not extreme for infrastructure that is 60–70% through its major growth spend. The stock at $14.39 is therefore not a deep bargain, but neither is it the zero-equity-value disaster some quant composites imply.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Venture Global is mid-cycle in a massive LNG capex program: revenue swung from $7.90B (2023) to $4.97B (2024) to $13.77B (2025), with gross margin compressing from 78.7% to 57.0% as more capacity comes online at lower unit economics. Reported net income of $2.73B on 2025 revenue sounds healthy, but FCF was -$6.80B, and cumulative three-year FCF is roughly -$21.9B. Net debt of ~$31.85B against $2.36B liquid cash and a runway of ~1.4 quarters on current burn puts survival math squarely in refinancing-dependent territory - Altman Z of 1.21 sits in the classical distress zone. Earnings quality is mixed at best. OCF/NI of 1.82x looks reassuring, but the Beneish M of -1.32 flags statistical manipulation indicators, and the gap between GAAP profits and the $6.8B cash bleed is enormous. Diluted shares grew from 2.14B to 2.64B (10.9% CAGR), so per-share value is being materially eroded even as headline profits print. SBC is only 0.3% of revenue - the dilution is coming from primary equity/structural share issuance tied to financing the build, not comp. Governance signal is poor: 8 insider sells for $42.6M and zero open-market buys over the last 12 months, with a repeated option-exercise-and-immediate-sale pattern from multiple named officers (Larson, Thayer, Blake, Staton, Granat). That is a monetization posture, not a conviction posture, at a company still burning multi-billions annually.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and covenants - how much refinancing is required in the next 24 months and at what rates
- Contracted vs merchant LNG mix and remaining capex to complete Plaquemines/CP2 - determines when FCF turns positive
- Customer concentration and any arbitration/dispute exposure with foundation offtakers (public reports suggest ongoing disputes)
- Nature of the 10.9% share growth - primary issuance, converts, warrants, earn-outs - and whether more is contractually required
- Beneish inputs: check DSO trend, gross margin index, and accruals composition against project-accounting revenue recognition
The e2e composite spits out a negative fair value ($-0.04) driven by an EPV-floor that treats today's negative free cash flow as steady-state. That's mechanically broken for a mid-build LNG developer whose value lives in Plaquemines and CP2 coming online, so I won't take -$0.04 literally. But the direction is right: on current cash generation the equity is worth roughly zero, and the entire $36B market cap is an option on flawless project execution against $31B+ net debt and ~11% annual dilution. Against a Shaky quality grade, deserved value has to be haircut, not extended. Peer LNG midstream (CQP, LNG) trade on run-rate EBITDA from operating trains; VG is being priced as if its trains are already contracted, ramped, and de-risked. To justify $14 you need Plaquemines Phase 1+2 at nameplate, CP2 sanctioned and on-time, spot-heavy spreads holding, and no further equity raises - that's a stacked bet, not a base case. Fair, in my view, sits closer to $9-11 once you demand a real margin of safety for construction, permitting, and dilution risk. Not a screaming short given the growth optionality, but not cheap.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Plaquemines Phase 1 and 2 commissioning cadence and realized spreads vs spot
- CP2 FID status, financing structure, and expected equity funding need
- SPA contract mix - what % of future volumes are contracted vs merchant
- Any further equity or convertible issuance guidance
- Litigation/arbitration exposure with foundation SPA customers over commissioning cargoes
VG is riding a strong turnaround-bet narrative as the pure-play US LNG export growth story, with Plaquemines, Calcasieu and CP2 giving the market a clean vehicle for the post-Ukraine energy-security thesis. Momentum confirms it - 176.9% recent vs 32% long-term CAGR - and hedge fund crowding (51 holders per the news flow) tells you this is a favored expression, not a forgotten one. The narrative intensity is strong with moderate durability and medium cult coefficient, which is exactly the profile that keeps bid on dips in a risk-on tape.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any Plaquemines or CP2 construction/commissioning delay headline
- Global LNG spot spreads (TTF-HH) and whether utilization/realized prices are holding
- LNG export permitting posture from DOE/FERC
- Sell-side target revisions and whether consensus starts calling the rally stretched
- Hedge fund positioning changes in next 13F cycle - crowding is a two-way risk
Post-2022 energy security repricing made US Gulf Coast LNG the marginal supplier to both Europe and Asia, and VG is one of the few operators actually adding trains into that gap. The offsetting world fact is that everyone else noticed: a large global liquefaction supply wave lands 2026-2028 (Qatari expansion plus multiple US projects), which should compress spot spreads even as absolute demand grows. That combination favors owners of contracted, low-cost capacity and punishes anyone whose earnings depend on spot arbitrage. VG sits on both sides of it — its volume growth is insulated, its price realization is not. Macro (10y at 4.7%, flat-ish curve) is a real cost-of-capital tax on a company still spending heavily on construction.
When we made this prediction on Aug 26, 2026, VG was $14.26. We expect it to be $12.20 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $9.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 26, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.