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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for TransUnion (TRU) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
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TransUnion
TRU NYSETransUnion is a global information and insights company that helps businesses and consumers make informed decisions through credit reporting, identity verification, fraud prevention, and data analytics. TransUnion provides consumer and commercial credit reports, risk scores, authentication tools, marketing solutions, and portfolio management services to financial institutions, lenders, insurers, landlords, retailers, and public-sector organizations. Its products also support identity protection, debt recovery, tenant screening, and customer engagement workflows across both U.S. and international markets. The company’s OneTru platform helps centralize data management, identity resolution, and analytics across its product suite. Headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, TransUnion plays a central role in the credit information and risk management ecosystem by enabling trusted transactions and decision-making across multiple industries.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Mar 31, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 3.59
Total Equity: $4.91B
Shares: 196,300,000
Total Debt: $5.61B
Cash: $732.50M
EBITDA: $1.44B
Total Debt: $5.61B
Cash: $732.50M
Revenue: $4.73B
Revenue: $4.73B
Revenue: $4.73B
Total Equity: $4.91B
Tax Rate: 18.2%
Equity: $4.91B
Total Debt: $5.61B
Cash: $732.50M
Current Liabilities: $1.05B
Long-Term Debt: $5.40B
Total Debt: $5.61B
Total Equity: $4.91B
Shares: 196,300,000
Shares: 196,300,000
CapEx: -$322.80M
Shares: 196,300,000
Stock Price: $79.88
Net Income: $704.40M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 5:10pm (30d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.0B | $3.7B | $3.8B | $4.2B | $4.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.0B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.9B |
| Gross Profit | $1.9B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.7B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B |
| Operating Income | $651.9M | $626.4M | $617.9M | $733.4M | $864.6M |
| Net Income | $1.4B | $266.3M | -$206.2M | $284.3M | $455.4M |
| EBITDA | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B |
| EPS | $7.25 | $1.40 | $-1.07 | $1.46 | $2.34 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $7.19 | $1.40 | $-1.07 | $1.45 | $2.32 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 5:10pm (30d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.8B | $585.3M | $476.2M | $679.5M | $853.6M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.6B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.0B |
| Total Assets | $12.6B | $11.7B | $11.1B | $11.0B | $11.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.4B | $905.5M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $6.3B | $5.6B | $5.3B | $5.1B | $4.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $8.6B | $7.4B | $7.0B | $6.7B | $6.6B |
| Total Equity | $4.0B | $4.3B | $4.1B | $4.3B | $4.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 5:10pm (30d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $808.3M | $297.2M | $645.4M | $832.5M | $987.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$224.2M | -$298.2M | -$310.7M | -$315.8M | -$326.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $584.1M | -$1.0M | $334.7M | $516.7M | $661.6M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | $0 | $0 | -$302.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.3B | -$1.3B | -$109.1M | $203.3M | $174.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 5:10pm (30d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +25.3% | +3.3% | +9.2% | +9.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +20.0% | -0.5% | +8.5% | +7.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | -3.9% | -1.4% | +18.7% | +17.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -80.8% | -177.4% | +237.9% | +60.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +10.9% | +0.7% | +10.1% | +16.3% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 1:20pm (30d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-20 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-27 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-26 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-21 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-22 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-22 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-27 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-22 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-23 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-16 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-06 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-16 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-22 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-18 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-08 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-16 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-24 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-26 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-09 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-23 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The single most important number in this file is not the 22.3x P/E or the 14.1x EV/EBITDA — it is the Q1 2026 net margin of 31.9% ($397.1M on $1.25B revenue) sitting directly above three consecutive quarters at 8.3–9.6%. That is not a margin inflection; it is a one-time item — a tax benefit, a gain on divestiture, or a reversal of a prior charge — that inflates TTM net income to $704M and makes the headline P/E look like a value stock. Strip that quarter back to the 9% run-rate the other three quarters establish, and normalized TTM earnings are closer to $420M, putting the true P/E at roughly 36x. The Valuation Synthesis correctly calls the stock overvalued, but its $37–40 fair-value anchor is built on a DCF that almost certainly assumes 5% FCF growth and a 10% discount rate, which undershoots what a 10%-revenue-growth, 60%-gross-margin, 14.5%-FCF-margin business can sustain. At 8% FCF growth over ten years with a 3% terminal rate, the DCF lands closer to $50–55 per share before net debt, or $55–65 after. The synthesis is right on direction, wrong on magnitude by roughly 30%.
The deeper problem the models underweight is ROIC. At 7.1%, TransUnion is generating a below-average return on the capital it deploys, yet the market is paying 23x trailing FCF ($15.31B on $661.6M) and 14.1x EBITDA for it. Compare that to the 2021 annual net income of $1.39B — clearly a one-time windfall year — versus the 2023 loss of $206M and the 2024–2025 recovery to $284M and $455M. The earnings trajectory is volatile and lumpy, not the smooth compounding curve a 35x multiple demands. Revenue CAGR of 9.9% over five years is respectable, and the recent 11% YoY print is encouraging, but the quarterly revenue path — $1.04B, $1.09B, $1.04B, $1.10B, $1.14B, $1.17B, $1.17B, $1.25B — shows deceleration within the year (Q2-to-Q3 flat at $1.17B) and no acceleration. The "Revenue Confidence: Good" tag with a "decelerating" trend qualifier is the honest read, and it contradicts the Pre-Flight's "sustained ~10% revenue growth" thesis, which is a forecast, not a fact.
The contrarian case is not nothing. The regulatory oligopoly (three bureaus, FCRA, CFPB oversight) is a genuine structural moat that no fintech or open-banking initiative has cracked in two decades. Operating margin has expanded from 17.5% in 2024 to 17.9% TTM, and the 59.1% gross margin is sticky. The OneTru identity-resolution platform and the "trust infrastructure" rebrand are not pure vaporware — they represent real product differentiation within the credit-check transaction. Insider activity is unremarkable (small 1,000-share sales, routine A-Awards and F-InKind tax withholdings), which is neither a red flag nor a vote of confidence. The balance sheet is serviceable: $5.10B debt against $853.6M cash, 1.14x D/E, 1.93x current ratio. None of this is broken. But "not broken" does not justify a 36x normalized earnings multiple. The Market Narrative layer correctly identifies that roughly half the market price is the "identity-infrastructure / AI-data-platform" story layered on top of steady-state cash flows, and that the narrative is load-bearing. The question is whether a 10% grower with 7% ROIC deserves a 30x+ multiple because its customers happen to be banks. I don't think it does.
The Thesis Evaluation's top bear — "implied growth is 3x the realistic trajectory" — is the single most important sentence in the entire file. The reverse-DCF math showing 42.6% implied FCF growth is not a modeling artifact; it is the arithmetic consequence of paying $15.3B for $662M of FCF in a business growing revenue at 10%. Even if margins expand another 100 basis points over three years (optimistic), FCF growth tops out at 12–14%, not 42%. The stock is a quality tollbooth priced as a tech platform. I agree with the overvalued verdict but dissent on the fair-value level: $37 is too punitive, $80 is too generous. The honest range is $55–65, which implies a 20–30% drawdown from here. The Rule-Based "mature_earner" classification at 0.9 confidence is correct and should anchor the multiple, not the "platform-monopoly" narrative.
GPT Reading
Grok Reading
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
TransUnion grew revenue from $3.18B in 2022 to $4.73B in 2026, an 8.3% CAGR with no down year, underpinned by its position as one of three major credit bureaus. Operating margin ran 17-19% in 2022, 2025, and 2026, but collapsed to 3.6% in 2024 alongside a net loss of -$193.7M, indicating a significant one-time charge (likely litigation or restructuring). FCF recovered from a near-zero $57.3M in 2023 to $696.5M in 2026, and the company is self-funding. Share count is essentially flat at 196.3M diluted, with buybacks covering 58% of SBC, so per-share value is roughly protected but not being actively returned to holders.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Identify the specific 2024 charge that drove operating margin to 3.6% and net income to -$193.7M (litigation settlement, goodwill impairment, or restructuring) in the 10-K MD&A and notes.
- Break down the OCF-to-NI gap: quantify D&A, stock-comp amortization, and working-capital swings in the cash-flow statement to determine whether 0.47x is structural or a one-time artifact.
- Confirm the composition of the $4.87B net debt (term loans vs. bonds, maturities, covenants) and whether any convertible or hybrid instruments exist that could dilute or add leverage.
- Review customer concentration: what share of revenue comes from the top 5-10 lenders or fintech partners, and whether any single relationship exceeds 10%.
- Check whether the 2026 net income of $704.4M includes any non-recurring gains (tax benefits, asset sales) that would flatter the recovery narrative.
The price of $79.88 sits at 2.2x the signal-adjusted fair value of $36.63 and 116 percent above the DCF output of $36.98. The composite fair value of $39.90 implies the stock is overvalued by roughly 54 percent, and the earnings-quality haircut (0.47x OCF-to-NI, a 2024 net loss, and a 3.6 percent operating-margin disruption) pushes the quality-adjusted number even lower. The one method that lands above the price is the anchored-PE at $92.61, but that method is the most optimistic in the set and is built on an earnings base that the company itself disrupted in 2024. The EPV floor of negative $6.96 is a broken output and I discount it entirely, but it is a reminder that the cash-flow math is fragile when OCF barely covers half of reported net income.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 2025-2026 segment revenue split: is subscription data still growing 8 percent or has it decelerated post-2024 disruption?
- OCF-to-NI ratio trend: has the 0.47x ratio recovered toward 1.0x in the last two quarters, or is it still depressed?
- Management guidance on 2026 operating margin: is the 3.6 percent 2024 trough behind them or is it the new normal?
- Any open-banking or fintech disintermediation disclosures in the 10-K risk factors that quantify revenue at risk
- Share count trajectory: any buyback acceleration that would change the per-share math
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.