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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Dave Inc. Class A Common Stock (DAVE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Watch · Gem Score -7 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 42 · Value -40 · Sentiment 57 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Dave Inc. Class A Common Stock
DAVE NASDAQDave Inc. Class A Common Stock represents an ownership stake in Dave Inc., a U.S.-based financial technology company and digital banking platform. The company focuses on serving everyday consumers, particularly those managing tight cash flow, through a mobile-first app that combines small-dollar liquidity, digital banking, and financial wellness tools. Dave Inc. today offers a suite of products including ExtraCash, a short-term cash advance service designed to help members avoid punitive overdraft fees and bridge gaps between paychecks, as well as Dave Banking, a fee-transparent digital checking account provided via a partner bank. The platform also features budgeting tools, income opportunities through its Side Hustle job-finding service, and other cash-flow management capabilities. Operating primarily in the United States and headquartered in Los Angeles, California, Dave Inc. plays a role in the consumer fintech and neobank segment, sitting between traditional banks and high-cost alternative lenders by emphasizing speed, convenience, and clearer pricing on everyday financial services.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 13.53
Total Equity: $352.73M
Shares: 14,480,703
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $80.52M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $80.52M
Revenue: $554.18M
Revenue: $554.18M
Revenue: $554.18M
Total Equity: $352.73M
Tax Rate: -16.6%
Equity: $352.73M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $80.52M
Current Liabilities: $114.00M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $352.73M
Shares: 14,480,703
Shares: 14,480,703
CapEx: -$317,000
Shares: 14,480,703
Stock Price: $334.57
Net Income: $195.87M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:04am (53d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $153.0M | $204.8M | $259.1M | $347.1M | $554.2M |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $199.9M | $339.2M | $301.3M | $312.5M | $367.6M |
| Operating Income | -$6.4M | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | -$5.3M | -$128.9M | -$48.5M | $57.9M | $195.9M |
| EBITDA | -$3.3M | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $-4.69 | $-11.12 | $-4.07 | $4.62 | $14.65 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-4.69 | $-11.12 | $-4.07 | $4.19 | $13.53 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:48am (53d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $32.0M | $22.9M | $41.8M | $49.7M | $80.5M |
| Total Current Assets | $829,593 | $308.6M | $276.9M | $282.3M | $436.7M |
| Total Assets | $254.6M | $321.5M | $294.0M | $299.3M | $487.4M |
| Current Liabilities | $5.0M | $36.4M | $25.6M | $35.1M | $114.0M |
| Long-Term Debt | $35.0M | $75.0M | $75.0M | $75.0M | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $30.2M | $214.9M | $207.0M | $116.2M | $134.7M |
| Total Equity | $224.4M | $106.6M | $87.1M | $183.1M | $352.7M |
| Retained Earnings | -$29.4M | -$161.8M | -$210.3M | -$152.4M | $43.4M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:04am (53d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$2.1M | -$44.9M | $33.8M | $125.1M | $290.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | $-371,000 | $-728,000 | $-688,000 | $-262,000 | $-317,000 |
| Free Cash Flow | -$2.5M | -$45.6M | $33.1M | $124.9M | $289.7M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $-536,000 | $0 | $0 | -$43.7M |
| Net Change in Cash | $79,785 | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:04am (53d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +33.9% | +26.5% | +34.0% | +59.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -2,346.2% | +62.4% | +219.3% | +238.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:34The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
ai-findings step) when a report is run on this ticker.
GPT Reading
Dave’s numbers scream “business model inflection,” but they also scream “do not annualize the peak quarter set.” Revenue has stepped up fast: from $259.1M in 2023 to $347.1M in 2024 to $554.2M in 2025, and the quarterly run-rate has kept rising to $170.8M in June 2026. On a trailing four-quarter basis using the last four reported quarters, revenue is about $643.6M, up roughly 42% versus the prior four-quarter period of about $453.1M. That is real growth, not accounting noise. Just as important, this is no longer a debt-laden subscale fintech; the balance sheet has zero debt, $80.5M of cash, and a 3.8x current ratio. The market is right to stop valuing this like a distressed consumer-finance experiment.
What stands out to me, though, is the shape of profitability. Quarterly net margins swung from 0.5% in 3Q24 to 16.7%, then 26.7%, then 6.9%, then an absurd 61.1% in 3Q25, 40.3% in 4Q25, 36.6% in 1Q26, before crashing back to 3.9% in 2Q26. That is not the profile of a clean, mature software compounder, and it does not support paying a software-like premium without adjustment. Full-year 2025 net income of $195.9M on $554.2M of revenue implies a 35.3% margin; trailing net income from the last four quarters is about $222.6M on $643.6M of revenue, still around 34.6%. But that TTM figure is flattered by the extraordinary 2H25 and 1Q26 prints. The latest quarter is the key tell: revenue still grew nearly 30% year over year from $131.8M to $170.8M, yet net income fell from $9.0M to $6.7M and margin compressed from 6.9% to 3.9%. If the business can grow 30% while earning only mid-single-digit margins in a more normalized quarter, then the stock at $334.57 is being valued on peak economics, not normalized economics.
The cash flow deserves the most skepticism. 2025 operating cash flow was $290.0M against net income of $195.9M, and free cash flow was essentially the same because capex was only $317K. For a software business that might look pristine; for a fintech serving cash-constrained consumers, it may simply mean working capital and advance timing were unusually favorable. With no gross profit or operating expense detail here, and with quarterly earnings volatility this high, I am unwilling to treat the 2025 52% FCF margin as durable. On current valuation, the stock trades around 6.6x trailing revenue if I use the $4.27B market cap against the roughly $643.6M TTM revenue, and roughly 19x trailing earnings if I use the $222.6M TTM net income. Those multiples are not insane if Dave has genuinely become a 30% grower with sustainably 25%+ margins. My problem is the latest quarter argues the opposite: growth remains strong, but normalized margin may be closer to high single digits than mid-30s. On that earnings base, the stock is expensive.
The best counterargument is obvious and strong: even after the margin collapse in the latest quarter, the company is still profitable, still growing fast, still unlevered, and still comping against much smaller revenue levels. A bull can say the weird margin pattern reflects accounting or episodic loss provisioning noise rather than deterioration in unit economics, and that the true story is scale: quarterly revenue has risen from $92.5M to $170.8M in seven quarters, a near-doubling. If Dave can land around $700M-plus revenue over the next year and settle at even a 15%-20% net margin, then today’s market cap implies a forward P/E that could compress quickly. I also take seriously that annual net income moved from a $48.5M loss in 2023 to a $57.9M profit in 2024 to $195.9M in 2025; plenty of investors will look at that and conclude the company has solved the model. I weigh it differently because businesses that truly “solve” the model usually do not see margin swing from 36.6% to 3.9% in one quarter while revenue keeps climbing.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2Q26 was a one-off and not the start of normalization. Specifically, I would want to see the next two quarters hold revenue above $175M while net margin rebounds and stays above 15% without another outlier spike, or annual operating cash flow remain comfortably above net income without unusual working-capital benefits. If management can show that TTM revenue can approach $700M and TTM net income can stay above $150M even after the 2025-26 peaks roll off, then $334 starts to look supportable. If instead margins remain sub-10% while growth decelerates into the 20s, fair value is meaningfully lower because the market is still paying for a fintech miracle that the latest quarter did not confirm.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a genuine inflection that is already fraying at the edges. Dave scaled revenue from $153M in 2021 to $554M in 2025, flipped from a $48.5M loss in 2023 to $196M of net income, and converted almost every dollar of that into free cash flow—$290M operating cash and $290M FCF on negligible capex. Trailing twelve-month revenue now sits near $644M with TTM net income still above $220M even after the latest print, which is why a $4.27B market cap and a 25x P/E look superficially reasonable. What stands out, however, is the violent margin path: net margin peaked at 61% in Q3 2025, held in the mid-to-high 30s through Q1 2026, then collapsed to 3.9% on $170.8M of revenue in the June 2026 quarter. That is not mature-earner stability; it is either credit-loss normalization, promotional intensity, or one-time noise that the market has not yet discounted. Revenue growth itself is decelerating—from nearly 60% year-over-year in early 2025 toward the low-to-mid 30s in the most recent quarter—while the balance sheet remains pristine ($0 debt, $80M cash, 3.8 current ratio). The combination of still-elevated multiples (8.7x sales, 13.7x book, 55% trailing ROE that is already being diluted by the margin drop) and a cluster of insider sales in early June 2026 makes the current $335 price look like it is capitalizing the peak year rather than the emerging run-rate.
The quantitative labels conflict with the tape. Calling this a “mature earner” at 0.65 confidence ignores that four of the last eight quarters still show single-digit or sub-1% net margins and that earnings power is swinging by tens of millions quarter to quarter. The pre-flight description of a pre-profit platform that just escaped the fintech graveyard is closer to reality: this remains a unit-economics-at-scale cash-advance and banking story whose 35% annual net margin and 52% FCF conversion in 2025 are being treated by the market as the new baseline. At roughly 8x forward revenue and mid-20s earnings if margins re-expand, the stock embeds continued 30%+ growth and a durable mid-30s profit pool. The latest quarter directly challenges that embedding.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and quantitative. Even after the margin air-pocket, TTM earnings still support a mid-20s P/E, revenue is still compounding above 30%, the company generates nearly $300M of unlevered free cash with zero debt, and the underbanked addressable market remains large enough to justify multi-year member and ARPU expansion. A bull can fairly say one soft quarter does not invalidate the operating-leverage story, that FCF quality is excellent, and that 25x earnings for 40% historical revenue CAGR is not egregious for a scaled software-like financial platform. I weigh that evidence lower because the margin volatility is too large to dismiss as noise, insider selling is clustered and one-directional, and competitive capital continues to chase the identical customer with near-zero switching costs; the 2025 print increasingly looks like a credit-cycle high rather than a permanent reset of unit economics.
I would reverse to a constructive stance if the next two quarters restore net margins above 25% while revenue growth holds above 25% year-over-year, or if management demonstrates that the Q2 2026 collapse was purely non-recurring and loss rates have re-stabilized. Sustained margin compression below 15% or sequential revenue deceleration into the teens would confirm the overvaluation case.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The operating trajectory is remarkable: revenue compounded from $153M in 2021 to $554M in 2025 (roughly 38% CAGR), while net income swung from -$129M in 2022 to +$196M in 2025 and FCF from -$46M to +$290M. Altman Z at 21 and accruals at -19% of assets suggest reported earnings are backed by cash, and OCF/NI of 0.74x is acceptable given the balance-sheet mechanics of a consumer-credit fintech. The business is self-funding with $80.5M cash and $290M annual FCF, so survival is not a question. The blemishes are structural rather than existential. Diluted share count grew from 4.3M to 14.5M (a 35.7% CAGR), which is severe per-share dilution even accounting for the de-SPAC baseline; SBC as a share of revenue is only 1.4%, so most of the increase is legacy issuance and equity capital rather than ongoing comp burn - a distinction that materially softens the concern but doesn't erase it. Insider tape shows 32 sales and zero open-market buys over 12 months, including CEO Wilk trimming ~$2.4M in a single day, which is a behavioural yellow flag even if legally routine. On durability, gross margin isn't reported in the module (shows 0), so unit economics of the ExtraCash product need filing-level verification. The pattern of rising revenue with expanding operating leverage and cash conversion is consistent with a scaling, structurally profitable platform rather than a subsidy-fuelled growth story.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- ExtraCash loan loss provisioning methodology and charge-off trends in the 10-K
- Segment / product-level unit economics and true gross margin (module shows 0)
- Whether recent share-count growth is stabilising (13.8M to 14.5M suggests yes) or if more issuance/warrants overhang remains
- Customer concentration and regulatory exposure (CFPB, state lending laws) for the cash-advance product
- Nature of the large 2022 net loss (-$129M) - one-time SPAC/warrant marks vs operating
Without a handed-in composite fair value, I have to back into this from scratch. Dave carries a $4.27B market cap at $334.57. For a subprime-adjacent cash-advance fintech that has just flipped to genuine cash generation, a Strong (not Fortress) quality read supports a full but not heroic multiple - somewhere in the 18-25x forward earnings / 4-6x revenue zone once you haircut for dilution and credit-cycle risk. That band brackets today's price rather than sitting well below it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward revenue and EPS guidance vs the multiple embedded at $334
- Loss provision trends and 28-day delinquency by cohort
- Fully diluted share count including RSU/option overhang
- Any change in ExtraCash advance size limits or take-rate
- Insider Form 4 pace over next two quarters
The tape is calm and modestly risk-on (VIX 14, S&P near highs), which is the exact environment where a 3.86-beta, story-driven fintech like DAVE gets rewarded rather than punished. With no market-wide narrative crisis to fight, high-beta small/mid-cap software has room to run, and DAVE's tape shows it: 60% recent gains outpacing an already strong 46% long-term CAGR, and +54pp of 3-year relative strength. Momentum begets momentum in this regime. The freshest catalyst reinforces the push. Q2 print delivered 30% revenue growth with member acquisition reaccelerating and ARPU expanding - exactly the fact-pattern that keeps a growth-fintech narrative alive and gives longs something to point at. Absent visible analyst downgrades or a sector rotation, the narrative pressure is one-directional right now. The one real counterweight is macro: 10y at 4.63% and a market PE of 26 create latent duration risk for high-multiple names, and a 3.86-beta stock is the first thing sold in any risk-off flinch. So the tailwind is real but fragile - it is riding the tape, not defending against it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Analyst target revisions post-Q2 - are sell-side numbers being marked up to match the reaccelerating growth?
- Any signs of fintech/consumer-credit sector rotation or regulatory headlines that could bruise the cohort
- VIX behavior and 10y direction - a spike above 18 or yields toward 5% would flip the beta from friend to foe
- Insider selling or secondary-offering chatter after the strong run
The world is moving toward embedded, app-native liquidity for consumers the traditional overdraft system taxed. That structural shift is Dave's tailwind and it is not narrative — it shows up as a measurable share gap versus the industry. Two forces cut against it: a rate/macro backdrop that pressures the exact income cohort Dave serves, and a regulatory apparatus that periodically reprices small-dollar credit fees. Neither is currently visible in the trajectory; both are the mechanisms by which this decelerates faster than modelled. Net: business direction is clearly up, with the debate being the rate of decay, not the sign.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for DAVE — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.