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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Dave Inc. Class A Common Stock (DAVE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -3 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 42 · Value -40 · Sentiment 57 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Dave Inc. Class A Common Stock
DAVE NASDAQDave Inc. Class A Common Stock represents an ownership stake in Dave Inc., a U.S.-based financial technology company and digital banking platform. The company focuses on serving everyday consumers, particularly those managing tight cash flow, through a mobile-first app that combines small-dollar liquidity, digital banking, and financial wellness tools. Dave Inc. today offers a suite of products including ExtraCash, a short-term cash advance service designed to help members avoid punitive overdraft fees and bridge gaps between paychecks, as well as Dave Banking, a fee-transparent digital checking account provided via a partner bank. The platform also features budgeting tools, income opportunities through its Side Hustle job-finding service, and other cash-flow management capabilities. Operating primarily in the United States and headquartered in Los Angeles, California, Dave Inc. plays a role in the consumer fintech and neobank segment, sitting between traditional banks and high-cost alternative lenders by emphasizing speed, convenience, and clearer pricing on everyday financial services.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 13.53
Total Equity: $352.73M
Shares: 14,480,703
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $80.52M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $80.52M
Revenue: $554.18M
Revenue: $554.18M
Revenue: $554.18M
Total Equity: $352.73M
Tax Rate: -16.6%
Equity: $352.73M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $80.52M
Current Liabilities: $114.00M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $352.73M
Shares: 14,480,703
Shares: 14,480,703
CapEx: -$317,000
Shares: 14,480,703
Stock Price: $334.57
Net Income: $195.87M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:04am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $153.0M | $204.8M | $259.1M | $347.1M | $554.2M |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $199.9M | $339.2M | $301.3M | $312.5M | $367.6M |
| Operating Income | -$6.4M | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | -$5.3M | -$128.9M | -$48.5M | $57.9M | $195.9M |
| EBITDA | -$3.3M | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $-4.69 | $-11.12 | $-4.07 | $4.62 | $14.65 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-4.69 | $-11.12 | $-4.07 | $4.19 | $13.53 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:48am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $32.0M | $22.9M | $41.8M | $49.7M | $80.5M |
| Total Current Assets | $829,593 | $308.6M | $276.9M | $282.3M | $436.7M |
| Total Assets | $254.6M | $321.5M | $294.0M | $299.3M | $487.4M |
| Current Liabilities | $5.0M | $36.4M | $25.6M | $35.1M | $114.0M |
| Long-Term Debt | $35.0M | $75.0M | $75.0M | $75.0M | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $30.2M | $214.9M | $207.0M | $116.2M | $134.7M |
| Total Equity | $224.4M | $106.6M | $87.1M | $183.1M | $352.7M |
| Retained Earnings | -$29.4M | -$161.8M | -$210.3M | -$152.4M | $43.4M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:04am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$2.1M | -$44.9M | $33.8M | $125.1M | $290.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | $-371,000 | $-728,000 | $-688,000 | $-262,000 | $-317,000 |
| Free Cash Flow | -$2.5M | -$45.6M | $33.1M | $124.9M | $289.7M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $-536,000 | $0 | $0 | -$43.7M |
| Net Change in Cash | $79,785 | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:04am (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +33.9% | +26.5% | +34.0% | +59.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -2,346.2% | +62.4% | +219.3% | +238.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-15ExtraCash profitability is essentially a loss-rate and approval-rate problem on bank-transaction data; each increment of underwriting accuracy raises advance size and approvals while cutting charge-offs, and that flows to variable profit almost dollar-for-dollar. Support, collections and fraud triage — historically headcount-heavy at consumer fintech scale — are also textbook LLM automation targets.
Cheap AI makes a competent small-dollar advance product buildable in months, so the scarce asset shifts entirely to distribution and cost of acquisition — where Cash App Borrow, Chime MyPay and neobank incumbents already sit on tens of millions of primary-deposit relationships Dave must pay to reach.
Whether Dave's realized loss rate on ExtraCash keeps falling faster than rivals' while CAC per funded member stays flat; watch the disclosed provision/charge-off ratio against monthly transacting members and marketing spend per new member.
Years of labeled repayment outcomes tied to observed cash-flow patterns for a population invisible to bureau scores, plus bank sponsorship, licensing posture and regulatory scar tissue — an AI-native can copy the interface but not the outcome labels or the compliance stack.
AI Lens thesis
Dave is not a software vendor whose seats can shrink; it is a balance-sheet-light lender whose unit economics are a prediction problem. Cheap intelligence attacks the cost side of that prediction — better feature extraction from transaction streams, cheaper fraud and collections handling, automated support — while the underlying need (paycheck-gap liquidity for consumers who overdraft) is macro-driven and essentially AI-proof. The monetized unit, a percentage fee on advances plus interchange, survives cheap software; nothing about an LLM makes a consumer need $200 less. The exposure is therefore asymmetric on the competitive axis rather than the demand axis: the same tooling that improves Dave's model lowers the build cost for every neobank and payroll platform, so the defensible layer becomes proprietary repayment labels, sponsor-bank access, regulatory tolerance and paid-acquisition efficiency — not the app itself. Net: AI is more likely to widen Dave's margin than to remove its reason for existing, with the tail risk sitting in distribution, not technology.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Support, collections and fraud costs at consumer-fintech scale are the largest automatable opex block, and Dave's already-inflected FCF ($289.7M in 2025 on $554.2M revenue) means each point of automated servicing cost converts to cash rather than funding growth losses.
Downside Consumer-facing AI assistants and bank-embedded copilots could route liquidity requests to the cheapest available option, turning a habitual-app relationship into a shoppable, price-transparent transaction and compressing the effective fee take rate.
Outcome range spread 52 · unresolved
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:34The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
ai-findings step) when a report is run on this ticker.
GPT Reading
Dave’s numbers scream “business model inflection,” but they also scream “do not annualize the peak quarter set.” Revenue has stepped up fast: from $259.1M in 2023 to $347.1M in 2024 to $554.2M in 2025, and the quarterly run-rate has kept rising to $170.8M in June 2026. On a trailing four-quarter basis using the last four reported quarters, revenue is about $643.6M, up roughly 42% versus the prior four-quarter period of about $453.1M. That is real growth, not accounting noise. Just as important, this is no longer a debt-laden subscale fintech; the balance sheet has zero debt, $80.5M of cash, and a 3.8x current ratio. The market is right to stop valuing this like a distressed consumer-finance experiment.
What stands out to me, though, is the shape of profitability. Quarterly net margins swung from 0.5% in 3Q24 to 16.7%, then 26.7%, then 6.9%, then an absurd 61.1% in 3Q25, 40.3% in 4Q25, 36.6% in 1Q26, before crashing back to 3.9% in 2Q26. That is not the profile of a clean, mature software compounder, and it does not support paying a software-like premium without adjustment. Full-year 2025 net income of $195.9M on $554.2M of revenue implies a 35.3% margin; trailing net income from the last four quarters is about $222.6M on $643.6M of revenue, still around 34.6%. But that TTM figure is flattered by the extraordinary 2H25 and 1Q26 prints. The latest quarter is the key tell: revenue still grew nearly 30% year over year from $131.8M to $170.8M, yet net income fell from $9.0M to $6.7M and margin compressed from 6.9% to 3.9%. If the business can grow 30% while earning only mid-single-digit margins in a more normalized quarter, then the stock at $334.57 is being valued on peak economics, not normalized economics.
The cash flow deserves the most skepticism. 2025 operating cash flow was $290.0M against net income of $195.9M, and free cash flow was essentially the same because capex was only $317K. For a software business that might look pristine; for a fintech serving cash-constrained consumers, it may simply mean working capital and advance timing were unusually favorable. With no gross profit or operating expense detail here, and with quarterly earnings volatility this high, I am unwilling to treat the 2025 52% FCF margin as durable. On current valuation, the stock trades around 6.6x trailing revenue if I use the $4.27B market cap against the roughly $643.6M TTM revenue, and roughly 19x trailing earnings if I use the $222.6M TTM net income. Those multiples are not insane if Dave has genuinely become a 30% grower with sustainably 25%+ margins. My problem is the latest quarter argues the opposite: growth remains strong, but normalized margin may be closer to high single digits than mid-30s. On that earnings base, the stock is expensive.
The best counterargument is obvious and strong: even after the margin collapse in the latest quarter, the company is still profitable, still growing fast, still unlevered, and still comping against much smaller revenue levels. A bull can say the weird margin pattern reflects accounting or episodic loss provisioning noise rather than deterioration in unit economics, and that the true story is scale: quarterly revenue has risen from $92.5M to $170.8M in seven quarters, a near-doubling. If Dave can land around $700M-plus revenue over the next year and settle at even a 15%-20% net margin, then today’s market cap implies a forward P/E that could compress quickly. I also take seriously that annual net income moved from a $48.5M loss in 2023 to a $57.9M profit in 2024 to $195.9M in 2025; plenty of investors will look at that and conclude the company has solved the model. I weigh it differently because businesses that truly “solve” the model usually do not see margin swing from 36.6% to 3.9% in one quarter while revenue keeps climbing.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2Q26 was a one-off and not the start of normalization. Specifically, I would want to see the next two quarters hold revenue above $175M while net margin rebounds and stays above 15% without another outlier spike, or annual operating cash flow remain comfortably above net income without unusual working-capital benefits. If management can show that TTM revenue can approach $700M and TTM net income can stay above $150M even after the 2025-26 peaks roll off, then $334 starts to look supportable. If instead margins remain sub-10% while growth decelerates into the 20s, fair value is meaningfully lower because the market is still paying for a fintech miracle that the latest quarter did not confirm.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a genuine inflection that is already fraying at the edges. Dave scaled revenue from $153M in 2021 to $554M in 2025, flipped from a $48.5M loss in 2023 to $196M of net income, and converted almost every dollar of that into free cash flow—$290M operating cash and $290M FCF on negligible capex. Trailing twelve-month revenue now sits near $644M with TTM net income still above $220M even after the latest print, which is why a $4.27B market cap and a 25x P/E look superficially reasonable. What stands out, however, is the violent margin path: net margin peaked at 61% in Q3 2025, held in the mid-to-high 30s through Q1 2026, then collapsed to 3.9% on $170.8M of revenue in the June 2026 quarter. That is not mature-earner stability; it is either credit-loss normalization, promotional intensity, or one-time noise that the market has not yet discounted. Revenue growth itself is decelerating—from nearly 60% year-over-year in early 2025 toward the low-to-mid 30s in the most recent quarter—while the balance sheet remains pristine ($0 debt, $80M cash, 3.8 current ratio). The combination of still-elevated multiples (8.7x sales, 13.7x book, 55% trailing ROE that is already being diluted by the margin drop) and a cluster of insider sales in early June 2026 makes the current $335 price look like it is capitalizing the peak year rather than the emerging run-rate.
The quantitative labels conflict with the tape. Calling this a “mature earner” at 0.65 confidence ignores that four of the last eight quarters still show single-digit or sub-1% net margins and that earnings power is swinging by tens of millions quarter to quarter. The pre-flight description of a pre-profit platform that just escaped the fintech graveyard is closer to reality: this remains a unit-economics-at-scale cash-advance and banking story whose 35% annual net margin and 52% FCF conversion in 2025 are being treated by the market as the new baseline. At roughly 8x forward revenue and mid-20s earnings if margins re-expand, the stock embeds continued 30%+ growth and a durable mid-30s profit pool. The latest quarter directly challenges that embedding.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and quantitative. Even after the margin air-pocket, TTM earnings still support a mid-20s P/E, revenue is still compounding above 30%, the company generates nearly $300M of unlevered free cash with zero debt, and the underbanked addressable market remains large enough to justify multi-year member and ARPU expansion. A bull can fairly say one soft quarter does not invalidate the operating-leverage story, that FCF quality is excellent, and that 25x earnings for 40% historical revenue CAGR is not egregious for a scaled software-like financial platform. I weigh that evidence lower because the margin volatility is too large to dismiss as noise, insider selling is clustered and one-directional, and competitive capital continues to chase the identical customer with near-zero switching costs; the 2025 print increasingly looks like a credit-cycle high rather than a permanent reset of unit economics.
I would reverse to a constructive stance if the next two quarters restore net margins above 25% while revenue growth holds above 25% year-over-year, or if management demonstrates that the Q2 2026 collapse was purely non-recurring and loss rates have re-stabilized. Sustained margin compression below 15% or sequential revenue deceleration into the teens would confirm the overvaluation case.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The operating trajectory is remarkable: revenue compounded from $153M in 2021 to $554M in 2025 (roughly 38% CAGR), while net income swung from -$129M in 2022 to +$196M in 2025 and FCF from -$46M to +$290M. Altman Z at 21 and accruals at -19% of assets suggest reported earnings are backed by cash, and OCF/NI of 0.74x is acceptable given the balance-sheet mechanics of a consumer-credit fintech. The business is self-funding with $80.5M cash and $290M annual FCF, so survival is not a question. The blemishes are structural rather than existential. Diluted share count grew from 4.3M to 14.5M (a 35.7% CAGR), which is severe per-share dilution even accounting for the de-SPAC baseline; SBC as a share of revenue is only 1.4%, so most of the increase is legacy issuance and equity capital rather than ongoing comp burn - a distinction that materially softens the concern but doesn't erase it. Insider tape shows 32 sales and zero open-market buys over 12 months, including CEO Wilk trimming ~$2.4M in a single day, which is a behavioural yellow flag even if legally routine. On durability, gross margin isn't reported in the module (shows 0), so unit economics of the ExtraCash product need filing-level verification. The pattern of rising revenue with expanding operating leverage and cash conversion is consistent with a scaling, structurally profitable platform rather than a subsidy-fuelled growth story.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- ExtraCash loan loss provisioning methodology and charge-off trends in the 10-K
- Segment / product-level unit economics and true gross margin (module shows 0)
- Whether recent share-count growth is stabilising (13.8M to 14.5M suggests yes) or if more issuance/warrants overhang remains
- Customer concentration and regulatory exposure (CFPB, state lending laws) for the cash-advance product
- Nature of the large 2022 net loss (-$129M) - one-time SPAC/warrant marks vs operating
Without a handed-in composite fair value, I have to back into this from scratch. Dave carries a $4.27B market cap at $334.57. For a subprime-adjacent cash-advance fintech that has just flipped to genuine cash generation, a Strong (not Fortress) quality read supports a full but not heroic multiple - somewhere in the 18-25x forward earnings / 4-6x revenue zone once you haircut for dilution and credit-cycle risk. That band brackets today's price rather than sitting well below it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward revenue and EPS guidance vs the multiple embedded at $334
- Loss provision trends and 28-day delinquency by cohort
- Fully diluted share count including RSU/option overhang
- Any change in ExtraCash advance size limits or take-rate
- Insider Form 4 pace over next two quarters
The tape is calm and modestly risk-on (VIX 14, S&P near highs), which is the exact environment where a 3.86-beta, story-driven fintech like DAVE gets rewarded rather than punished. With no market-wide narrative crisis to fight, high-beta small/mid-cap software has room to run, and DAVE's tape shows it: 60% recent gains outpacing an already strong 46% long-term CAGR, and +54pp of 3-year relative strength. Momentum begets momentum in this regime. The freshest catalyst reinforces the push. Q2 print delivered 30% revenue growth with member acquisition reaccelerating and ARPU expanding - exactly the fact-pattern that keeps a growth-fintech narrative alive and gives longs something to point at. Absent visible analyst downgrades or a sector rotation, the narrative pressure is one-directional right now. The one real counterweight is macro: 10y at 4.63% and a market PE of 26 create latent duration risk for high-multiple names, and a 3.86-beta stock is the first thing sold in any risk-off flinch. So the tailwind is real but fragile - it is riding the tape, not defending against it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Analyst target revisions post-Q2 - are sell-side numbers being marked up to match the reaccelerating growth?
- Any signs of fintech/consumer-credit sector rotation or regulatory headlines that could bruise the cohort
- VIX behavior and 10y direction - a spike above 18 or yields toward 5% would flip the beta from friend to foe
- Insider selling or secondary-offering chatter after the strong run
Dave is not a software vendor whose seats can shrink; it is a balance-sheet-light lender whose unit economics are a prediction problem. Cheap intelligence attacks the cost side of that prediction — better feature extraction from transaction streams, cheaper fraud and collections handling, automated support — while the underlying need (paycheck-gap liquidity for consumers who overdraft) is macro-driven and essentially AI-proof. The monetized unit, a percentage fee on advances plus interchange, survives cheap software; nothing about an LLM makes a consumer need $200 less. The exposure is therefore asymmetric on the competitive axis rather than the demand axis: the same tooling that improves Dave's model lowers the build cost for every neobank and payroll platform, so the defensible layer becomes proprietary repayment labels, sponsor-bank access, regulatory tolerance and paid-acquisition efficiency — not the app itself. Net: AI is more likely to widen Dave's margin than to remove its reason for existing, with the tail risk sitting in distribution, not technology.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Overdraft fee revenue at banks
- Household liquid savings trends
- Monthly transacting member growth
- Cash App/Chime advance product scaling
- Member growth deceleration
- Marketing spend per funded member
- Charge-off rate per advance cohort
- Approval rate versus loss rate
The world is moving toward embedded, app-native liquidity for consumers the traditional overdraft system taxed. That structural shift is Dave's tailwind and it is not narrative — it shows up as a measurable share gap versus the industry. Two forces cut against it: a rate/macro backdrop that pressures the exact income cohort Dave serves, and a regulatory apparatus that periodically reprices small-dollar credit fees. Neither is currently visible in the trajectory; both are the mechanisms by which this decelerates faster than modelled. Net: business direction is clearly up, with the debate being the rate of decay, not the sign.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for DAVE — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.