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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for CoreWeave, Inc. Class A Common Stock (CRWV) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Low · Gem Score -75 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -73 · Value -77 · Sentiment 23 (timing only, not weighted)
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CoreWeave, Inc. Class A Common Stock
CRWV NASDAQCoreWeave Inc. Class A Common Stock represents ownership in CoreWeave, a cloud infrastructure technology company focused on delivering computing resources for artificial intelligence workloads. The company provides GPU-accelerated and CPU-based infrastructure, storage, networking, and managed software services through its CoreWeave Cloud platform. Its offerings are designed to support AI model training and inference, as well as adjacent workloads such as machine learning, visual effects rendering, pixel streaming, and batch processing. CoreWeave also serves organizations that need specialized high-performance computing, including enterprises and AI developers building and operating demanding applications. Headquartered in Livingston, New Jersey, and founded in 2017, CoreWeave plays a growing role in the market for purpose-built AI cloud infrastructure and related developer tools.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Jun 30, 2026
EPS (Diluted): -3.67
Total Equity: $5.02B
Shares: 525,295,333
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $5.52B
EBITDA: $3.76B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $5.52B
Revenue: $7.59B
Shares: 525,295,333
Revenue: $7.59B
Revenue: $7.59B
Revenue: $7.59B
Total Equity: $5.02B
Tax Rate: -0.2%
Equity: $5.02B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $5.52B
Current Liabilities: $20.92B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $5.02B
Shares: 525,295,333
Shares: 525,295,333
CapEx: -$20.57B
Shares: 525,295,333
Stock Price: $86.87
Net Income: -$1.93B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 23, 2026 4:44pm (14d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $229.0M | $1.9B | $5.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $69.0M | $493.0M | $1.5B |
| Gross Profit | $160.0M | $1.4B | $3.7B |
| Operating Expenses | $174.0M | $1.1B | $3.7B |
| Operating Income | -$14.0M | $324.0M | -$46.0M |
| Net Income | -$594.0M | -$863.0M | -$1.2B |
| EBITDA | $89.0M | $1.2B | $2.4B |
| EPS | $-3.09 | $-4.30 | $-2.75 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-3.09 | $-4.30 | $-2.81 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 23, 2026 4:51pm (14d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | — | $217.0M | $1.4B | $3.1B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | $1.9B | $7.5B |
| Total Assets | — | — | $17.8B | $49.3B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | $5.0B | $16.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | $5.5B | $14.9B |
| Total Liabilities | — | — | $16.5B | $46.0B |
| Total Equity | -$11.0M | -$597.0M | $1.3B | $3.3B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | -$1.5B | -$2.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 23, 2026 5:07pm (14d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.8B | $2.7B | $3.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.9B | -$8.7B | -$10.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$1.1B | -$6.0B | -$7.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | -$108.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $1.4B | $6.4B | $8.4B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $473.0M | $1.6B | $2.1B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 23, 2026 4:44pm (14d ago)| Metric | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +736.2% | +167.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +788.8% | +158.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +2,414.3% | -114.2% |
| Net Income Growth | -45.3% | -35.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +1,233.7% | +102.9% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-08 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays -169%; a −1σ run costs 100%. Ratio -1.7:1 (μ 152.7%, σ 98.5% , 6 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 3.0 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($86.87) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +150% | 11.5% | $345.08 | +297% |
| Base — stabilizes | +100% | 10.0% | $111.53 | +28% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +50% | 8.5% | $25.82 | -70% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +134% | -25.4% | $0.00 | -100% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +50% | -12.7% | $-59.70 | -169% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +50% | -25.4% | $0.00 | -100% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-23 17:36The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly cadence is the single most important thing in this file and it cuts against the "decelerating" tag in the secondary signals: revenue went $982M → $1.21B → $1.36B → $1.57B → $2.08B → $2.58B across the last six quarters — that's ~23% sequential in the most recent print and roughly 163% YoY on Q2'26. TTM revenue is now ~$7.59B, not the $5.13B annual figure the multiples are anchored to, meaning the true forward EV/S is closer to ~3.5x (EV ~$66B against $47.9B cap plus $21.6B debt less $3.1B cash) rather than the 6.0x ps_ratio printed. That's not a "priced for perfection" multiple on the tape; that's a rounding error for an infrastructure business growing triple-digits — IF the unit economics are real. Gross margin at 67% is genuinely high, but it's a lease-accounting artifact: $10.3B of capex against $3.06B operating cash flow means depreciation is going to strangle GAAP margins for years. Operating margin already flipped from +16.9% in FY24 to -0.9% in FY25 as the depreciation wave lands.
Where I part company with the synthesis: the "priced for perfection" verdict and the -13 thesis score both underweight how quickly the revenue base has re-based. Six quarters ago CRWV was a $4B run-rate company; today it's north of $10B run-rate. Even if you haircut FY27 revenue to $14B (well below the current exit trajectory) and assign a distressed 4x EV/S, you get to an EV of $56B — roughly today's EV. That's the "the story is already priced in" case, and it's plausible. But the bear case requires believing hyperscaler competition compresses pricing before CRWV's contracted backlog (widely reported OpenAI/Microsoft take-or-pay structure) rolls off. The contracts are the moat here, not the architecture, and the models barely mention them.
What the contrarian should hammer: the balance sheet is genuinely alarming and no one is quantifying it sharply enough. $21.6B debt against $3.34B equity is 6.5x leverage; current ratio 0.46 means working capital is negative; FY25 FCF was -$7.25B and 2026 capex will likely exceed that. This company must tap capital markets continuously — every quarter is a refinancing event. If AI capex sentiment cracks even modestly (a single hyperscaler capex guide-down, a Nvidia supply loosening headline), the debt spreads blow out and equity gets crushed regardless of revenue trajectory. The insider activity list is uninterpretable as printed ("E-ExpireShort" with no filer names and 2026-09-18 dates that postdate the analysis window suggests option expirations, not discretionary sells) — the "Unusual Selling Activity" tag is doing more work than the underlying data supports. I'd downgrade that signal's weight. The pre-flight AI note that CEO/insiders "are selling for good reason" is not defensible from this data.
My verdict: I dissent partially from the synthesis. This is not "priced for perfection" at ~3.5x forward EV/S with 100%+ growth and take-or-pay contracts — the multiple is defensible for the growth. But it's also not undervalued, because the leverage and refinancing risk create a fat left tail that a P/S multiple doesn't capture. Fair value is roughly where it trades, with an unusually wide distribution: I can construct a $150 bull case (FY27 rev $18B, EV/S 5x, debt refinanced smoothly) and a $25 bear case (capex guide cut, spread blowout, dilutive equity raise) with about equal ease. That's a fairly-valued-with-huge-variance setup, not a directional bet. The synthesis got the direction roughly right but for the wrong reasons (they cited multiple compression risk; the real risk is balance sheet); the momentum model overstated deceleration (revenue is accelerating sequentially); the market-forces "neutral" is the most honest single line in the deck.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is the mismatch between how fast CoreWeave is scaling and how little economic proof sits underneath that scale. TTM revenue through 2026-06-30 is about $7.59 billion, up from roughly $3.52 billion in the prior TTM window, so growth is still an extraordinary 115%. Quarterly revenue also keeps climbing sequentially from $1.36 billion to $1.57 billion to $2.08 billion to $2.58 billion. On the surface that is exactly what investors want from an AI infrastructure winner. But the income statement says this is not yet a business with demonstrated operating leverage. TTM net loss is about $1.93 billion, or a -25.4% margin, and even with a strong 67.4% gross margin, TTM operating margin is still negative at about -3.0%. The story here is not “temporary losses on the way to proven profitability”; it is “massive revenue expansion that has not yet translated into reliable earnings power.”
The cash-flow and balance-sheet combination is the real issue. Operating cash flow of $3.06 billion looks powerful until you put it next to $10.31 billion of capex and -$7.25 billion of free cash flow. This is not software-like reinvestment discretion; this is hard infrastructure spend on a scale that requires constant external funding. Against that, CoreWeave carries $21.59 billion of debt, only $3.13 billion of cash, just $3.34 billion of equity, and a current ratio of 0.46. Even allowing for project-finance dynamics and the fact that depreciation trails cash capex in fast buildouts, the financing burden is enormous for a company still losing more than $600 million a quarter. At a $47.9 billion market cap and about 6.0x TTM sales, the stock is not being valued on current free cash flow, current earnings, or balance-sheet conservatism; it is being valued on the assumption that today’s capex converts into a durable, high-utilization GPU platform before competition compresses returns.
There are encouraging operating trends, but I do not think they justify the present price. Quarterly net losses are ugly, yet they did improve from -$740 million in March to -$626 million in June despite adding $500 million of revenue, which is a sign of some incremental scaling. The TTM EV/revenue multiple of roughly 4.25x and EV/EBITDA of 8.6x are not absurd if this were a more normal infrastructure company with visible normalized margins ahead. The problem is that CoreWeave is being asked to prove three things simultaneously: that demand remains strong as supply catches up, that customers are sticky enough to support returns on this capex base, and that financing risk will not dilute equity holders or impair economics. I do not see enough evidence yet. This looks less like an underappreciated compounder and more like a richly valued, balance-sheet-stretched buildout whose best-case future is already heavily capitalized into an $86.87 stock.
The best case against my skepticism is straightforward and serious. Revenue is not merely growing; it is exploding, and not from a tiny base anymore. A business going from roughly $3.5 billion to $7.6 billion of TTM revenue in one year while sustaining gross margins near 67% can plausibly be in the early innings of absorbing fixed costs and depreciation. The annual data already showed operating income of $324 million in 2024 before slipping to essentially breakeven operating results in 2025, suggesting GAAP noise, financing costs, and non-cash items may be obscuring a business with better unit economics than net income implies. If utilization on the newly deployed asset base rises faster than capex from here, the current period could end up looking like the ugliest point in the investment cycle rather than a permanent condition. On that view, 6x sales is not expensive for a company that could plausibly grow into a $12-15 billion revenue run-rate relatively quickly.
Still, I weigh those bullish points less heavily because the downside is balance-sheet-shaped, not merely multiple-shaped. A company can grow its way out of temporary losses; it is much harder to grow your way out of weak liquidity, giant debt, and structurally negative free cash flow if pricing or utilization disappoints even modestly. What would change my mind is specific proof that the buildout is maturing: two or three consecutive quarters where revenue growth stays above 70% year over year, operating margin turns clearly positive, and capex falls enough that free cash flow improves from deeply negative toward manageable levels, ideally with debt growth slowing materially. If CoreWeave can show that the June quarter’s $2.58 billion revenue level is not just bought with capital but is converting into self-funding economics, then the stock can deserve a premium. Until then, the market is paying in advance for a margin structure and moat that have not yet been earned.
Grok Reading
CoreWeave’s numbers describe a company that has converted GPU scarcity into one of the fastest revenue ramps in public-market history and is still nowhere near a finished business. Trailing-twelve-month revenue through mid-2026 sits near $7.6B ($2.58B + $2.08B + $1.57B + $1.36B), up from $5.13B for calendar 2025 and $1.92B the year before; the latest quarter alone is a $10.3B annualized run-rate and still growing just over 110% year-on-year versus the year-ago $1.21B. Gross margin holds at a robust 67%, and operating cash flow reached $3.06B in 2025, proving the installed base throws off real cash. Yet net losses remain large and sticky—$626M and $740M in the two most recent quarters, TTM net margin –25%—while free cash flow burned $7.25B against $10.3B of capex. The balance sheet that funded this build-out is the real story: $21.6B of debt against $3.13B cash and only $3.34B of equity, a current ratio of 0.45, and an equity cushion that is already thin relative to the leverage. At $86.87 and a $48B equity value (enterprise value higher once net debt is added), the market is capitalizing a still-pre-profit, hyper-levered infrastructure build as if the scarcity window and the margin structure are both durable.
What stands out is the mismatch between the growth narrative and the financial architecture. Revenue confidence is already flagged as decelerating; absolute dollar losses have widened even as scale improved; and the entire equity story sits on top of a capital structure that leaves almost no room for a refinancing hiccup, a utilization miss, or a hyperscaler price war. EV/Revenue around 4.3x and EV/EBITDA 8.6x look deceptively tame only because the market is already embedding a multi-year path to cloud-like margins on a much larger revenue base. The 67% gross margin is the single strongest fundamental exhibit—it shows customers will pay a premium for dedicated GPU capacity today—but operating margin is still negative and the conversion of that gross profit into free cash flow has not begun. Insider prints are a wall of short-dated option expirations and sales; whether mechanical or discretionary, they do not signal confidence that the $87 price is cheap. The quantitative models that label this “priced for perfection” and score the thesis slightly negative are, on this read, correctly reading the data rather than fighting it: the growth is real, the moat and the capital structure are not yet proven.
The strongest case against this skepticism is straightforward and must be weighed. Demand is not fabricated—quarterly revenue has marched from $584M to $2.58B in eight quarters with no collapse in gross margin, operating cash flow is already multi-billion, and a purpose-built GPU cloud can retain pricing power longer than a pure commodity reseller if software, networking, and power contracts create switching costs. If CoreWeave is already locking multi-year take-or-pay capacity with creditworthy counterparties, the $21.6B debt is simply the construction loan for an asset that will throw off high-teens free-cash-flow margins once the build cycle peaks. On that view, a $10B-plus revenue run-rate at 40%+ EBITDA margins justifies far more than $48B of equity, and today’s multiple is the entry point before the profitability inflection becomes obvious in the reported numbers. I weigh that case second because the briefing supplies no backlog disclosure, no customer-concentration metrics, and no evidence that utilization or pricing is holding as supply normalizes; the same data set that shows 110% growth also shows a current ratio below 0.5 and equity that is a small fraction of debt. Until the income statement and the cash-flow statement confirm that the gross-margin advantage survives competition, the bull case remains a claim on future scarcity rather than a demonstrated franchise.
I would reverse to constructive on a clear sequence: two consecutive quarters of sequential operating-margin expansion toward breakeven while revenue growth stays above 40%, a visible peak and decline in quarterly capex that turns free cash flow less negative, and either a material debt pay-down or a successful long-dated refinancing that removes near-term maturity risk. Evidence of diversified, non-startup revenue (hyperscaler overflow alone is not enough) or gross margin holding above 60% as GPU supply eases would also move the needle. Absent those prints, the stock at $87 is a leveraged call option on continued AI capacity shortage, not a cash-flow compounder.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
CoreWeave is growing revenue explosively ($229M in 2023 to $7.59B TTM, roughly a 33x jump in three years, with GM% around 67-74%), but the business model is a capital furnace: FCF is -$13.66B TTM against just $5.54B of liquid cash, implying under 2 quarters of runway before more financing is required. Operating margin oscillated from -6.1% to +6.3% back to -3.0%, and net loss widened to -$1.93B. OCF/NI at -2.43x and Altman Z of 0.24 place the balance sheet squarely in the distress zone, consistent with an asset-heavy GPU cloud operator financing datacenters with debt and equity.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Debt structure, maturity ladder, and covenants on datacenter/GPU financings
- Customer concentration (Microsoft/Meta/OpenAI exposure) and contract duration/take-or-pay terms
- Committed but undrawn credit facilities and delivery-linked financing
- Capex schedule vs contracted revenue backlog to test whether burn is demand-matched
- Lock-up expirations and secondary offering plans given insider selling cadence
- Whether the Magnetar Form 4 entries reflect derivative expirations vs actual dispositions
The stock trades at roughly 6.3x TTM revenue of ~$7.6B for a business that just flipped operating margin negative, is bleeding $13.7B of annual cash, and is diluting shareholders at ~65% per year. Deserved value has to be discounted heavily for both earnings quality (mixed) and the Fragile quality grade (Altman Z in distress). Even generous assumptions - $20B revenue run-rate, mid-teens steady-state operating margin, and a hyperscaler-like multiple - land you near today's price, not meaningfully above it. That means the market is already paying for the bull case (platform lock-in, GPU-cloud monopoly, margin expansion with utilization) while ignoring the bear case (commodity reseller, hyperscaler price war, customer concentration, refinancing risk).
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Contracted backlog duration and take-or-pay terms with top customers (Microsoft concentration)
- Unit economics per GPU-hour and utilization trends
- Debt maturity wall and refinancing capacity given negative FCF
- Trajectory of share count and any planned raises
- Gross margin bridge - is the slippage mix or pricing
The tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 14, S&P near highs) and that matters disproportionately for CRWV: this is a high-beta, pre-profit, story-first AI-infrastructure name whose price is almost entirely narrative. A calm, risk-seeking market is exactly the environment where the platform-monopoly story gets bid. The 72-hour news slate is heavily positive - UBS initiating Buy at $120 (40% upside) as a non-consensus call, a $4.2B upsized convertible closing (a demand signal, even if dilutive), the Harell Data win, and bullish 94%-upside pieces citing the backlog. That is a lot of positive catalyst density into a name that had shed nearly half from its 52-week high, which sets up a squeeze-friendly sentiment tilt. Counterweight: Rothschild just issued a Sell on CRWV specifically (and on Nebius), Bernstein flagged the training-to-inference risk last week, and the stock has been whippy on rate/debt worries given the capex-and-convert model. Analyst tone is genuinely split, and the narrative durability is only moderate with a medium cult - meaning sentiment can flip fast on any AI-capex wobble. Net: the immediate pressure leans tailwind - fresh sell-side sponsorship, a closed financing overhang, and a risk-on tape - but it is not a dominant force, because the bear desks are visibly pushing back and macro rate sensitivity (10y ~5%) keeps a lid on the multiple.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether more sell-side desks follow UBS with upgrades or Rothschild with downgrades in the next 2-4 weeks
- Any AI-capex wobble from hyperscalers or Nvidia commentary that would break the picks-and-shovels narrative
- 10y yield direction - a move back above 5.1% would reprice this name hard regardless of news
- Post-convert share price action around the $199.70 cap and any signs of hedge unwind pressure
- Follow-through customer wins vs concentration disclosures in the next print
The world is mid-buildout on AI compute: capex commitments from model labs and enterprises are still rising, and physical constraints (power, shells, accelerators) mean demand exceeds deliverable supply today. That favors specialized operators who secured capacity early. The countervailing forces are financial rather than demand-side — a 4.96% long rate with a nearly flat curve makes debt-funded fleet expansion expensive, and the broader infrastructure-software cycle is flagged as slowing. The honest structural uncertainty is whether AI compute settles into a utility with thin, contract-driven spreads or retains scarcity pricing. CoreWeave's direction over the next year is largely pre-determined by signed contracts and delivery schedules; beyond that, it depends on renewal pricing and whether inference workloads absorb depreciating training fleets.
When we made this prediction on Sep 24, 2026, CRWV was $90.20. We expect it to be $65.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $55.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 24, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.