For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Adobe Inc. (ADBE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +17 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 90 · Value -43 · Sentiment -49 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $268.44 vs $247.91 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Adobe Inc.
ADBE NASDAQAdobe Inc. is a global technology company that provides digital marketing, media solutions, and content creation software. It operates through three primary segments: Digital Media, Digital Experience, and Publishing and Advertising. The Digital Media segment delivers products and services empowering individuals, teams, businesses, and enterprises to create, publish, promote, and collaborate on creative content, documents, and media across various platforms. This includes tools for photographers, video editors, graphic designers, game developers, and content creators to enhance productivity and transform how content is viewed, shared, and engaged with. The Digital Experience segment offers an integrated platform for businesses to manage, execute, measure, optimize, and monetize customer experiences, spanning analytics, commerce, and personalized interactions. The Publishing and Advertising segment covers legacy solutions like eLearning, document publishing, web conferencing, forms platforms, web app development, high-end printing, and advertising services. Adobe Inc. distributes its offerings through distributors, retailers, software developers, mobile app stores, systems integrators, and hardware manufacturers, serving creative professionals, marketers, businesses, and consumers worldwide. Founded in 1982 and headquartered in San Jose, California, Adobe Inc. plays a pivotal role in the software industry, setting standards in content creation and digital experience management.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 16.70
Total Equity: $11.62B
Shares: 427,000,000
Total Debt: $6.21B
Cash: $5.43B
EBITDA: $9.52B
Total Debt: $6.21B
Cash: $5.43B
Revenue: $23.77B
Revenue: $23.77B
Revenue: $23.77B
Total Equity: $11.62B
Tax Rate: 18.4%
Equity: $11.62B
Total Debt: $6.21B
Cash: $5.43B
Current Liabilities: $10.20B
Long-Term Debt: $6.21B
Total Debt: $6.21B
Total Equity: $11.62B
Shares: 427,000,000
Shares: 427,000,000
CapEx: -$179.00M
Shares: 427,000,000
Stock Price: $247.90
Net Income: $7.13B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:46pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $15.8B | $17.6B | $19.4B | $21.5B | $23.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.6B |
| Gross Profit | $13.9B | $15.4B | $17.1B | $19.1B | $21.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $8.1B | $9.3B | $10.4B | $12.4B | $12.5B |
| Operating Income | $5.8B | $6.1B | $6.7B | $6.7B | $8.7B |
| Net Income | $4.8B | $4.8B | $5.4B | $5.6B | $7.1B |
| EBITDA | $6.6B | $7.0B | $7.5B | $7.6B | $9.5B |
| EPS | $10.10 | $10.13 | $11.87 | $12.43 | $16.73 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $10.02 | $10.10 | $11.82 | $12.36 | $16.70 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:26pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.8B | $4.2B | $7.1B | $7.6B | $5.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $8.7B | $9.0B | $11.1B | $11.2B | $10.2B |
| Total Assets | $27.2B | $27.2B | $29.8B | $30.2B | $29.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $6.9B | $8.1B | $8.3B | $10.5B | $10.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.1B | $3.6B | $3.6B | $4.1B | $6.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $12.4B | $13.1B | $13.3B | $16.1B | $17.9B |
| Total Equity | $14.8B | $14.1B | $16.5B | $14.1B | $11.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $23.9B | $28.3B | $33.3B | $38.5B | $45.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:46pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $7.2B | $7.8B | $7.3B | $8.1B | $10.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$348.0M | -$442.0M | -$360.0M | -$183.0M | -$179.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $6.9B | $7.4B | $6.9B | $7.9B | $9.9B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.7B | -$126.0M | $0 | $0 | -$17.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $0 | -$500.0M | $2.0B | $497.0M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$4.0B | -$6.6B | -$4.4B | -$9.5B | -$11.3B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$634.0M | $392.0M | $2.9B | $472.0M | -$2.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:46pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +11.5% | +10.2% | +10.8% | +10.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +10.9% | +10.5% | +12.3% | +10.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +5.1% | +9.1% | +1.4% | +29.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -1.4% | +14.1% | +2.4% | +28.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +5.5% | +8.2% | +1.0% | +25.3% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:26pm (24d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005-03-24 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2004-12-23 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2004-09-24 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2004-06-25 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2004-03-26 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2004-01-07 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2003-09-19 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2003-06-19 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 2003-03-20 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2003-01-07 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2002-09-20 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2002-06-21 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2002-03-21 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2001-12-31 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2001-09-21 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2001-06-22 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2001-03-22 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2001-01-02 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2000-09-28 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 2000-06-30 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:27Even the bull case prices 10% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 36%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($247.91) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +17% | 33.0% | $223.17 | -10% |
| Base — stabilizes | +12% | 28.7% | $166.30 | -33% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +6% | 24.4% | $121.62 | -51% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +11% | 28.3% | $159.65 | -36% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw tape: revenue has walked from $5.41B (Aug '24) to $6.62B (May '26) — roughly 22% over seven quarters, a clean ~11% annualized clip with zero sequential misses. That's not a decelerating franchise; that's a metronome. But net income tells a subtler story: NI peaked at $1.89B in Feb '26 and dropped to $1.71B in May '26 despite record revenue, compressing net margin from 31.7% (Feb '25) to 25.9% (May '26) — a 580bp erosion in five quarters. That's the AI capex/Firefly compute bill showing up, or it's aggressive R&D reinvestment, or it's discounting to defend against Canva/Midjourney. Nobody flagged this cleanly. FCF of $9.85B against a $98.5B market cap is a 10% FCF yield on a business still growing double-digits with 89% gross margins and 57% ROIC. Those are extraordinary numbers hiding inside a "utility" multiple.
Where I break with the prior stack: the Market Forces model calling this "Market Headwinds / avoid at current levels" is inconsistent with every other signal in the file — synthesis says fair value, narrative says durable platform monopoly at only 4% premium, insider activity is net buying, sector benchmarks are above, and the growth rates (rev CAGR 10.7%, earnings CAGR 14.6%, FCF CAGR 19.1%) are objectively strong. Market Forces appears to be pattern-matching on the ~33% drawdown from highs and importing a bearish narrative that the numbers don't support. Meanwhile the Synthesis "fair value at $237.73 vs $247.91" is doing exactly what a DCF anchor should do on a mature compounder and I largely trust it — but it's likely under-weighting the buyback optionality (Adobe historically retires 2-3% of shares annually, which the FCF easily funds alongside the $6.2B debt load that's trivially covered).
The contrarian case worth taking seriously isn't the moat-erosion story (open-source alternatives have existed for 20 years and Adobe's ARPU keeps rising) — it's the margin compression I flagged above. If May '26's 25.9% net margin is the new normal rather than a one-quarter blip, then forward earnings power is closer to $6.8B than the $7.5-8B run-rate implied by trailing, and the P/E is really 14.5-15x on normalized numbers rather than the headline 14.8x. That still isn't expensive, but it eliminates the "cheap" thesis. The second contrarian angle: current ratio of 0.996 with $6.2B debt against $5.4B cash is thinner liquidity than people assume for a "fortress balance sheet" software name — not dangerous, but not the Microsoft-style cash mountain the narrative implies. The insider data is nearly useless — all option exercises and in-kind tax withholdings on the same day (July 15, 2026), which is routine vesting, not conviction buying. The "Net Insider Buying" tag is misleading.
Committing: I dissent partially with the synthesis "fair value" verdict — I think this is modestly undervalued, not fairly valued, but only modestly. A business compounding revenue at 10-11%, earnings at 14%+, generating $10B FCF with 57% ROIC, trading at 10x FCF and 14.8x earnings deserves at least a 17-18x multiple absent proof that AI is structurally impairing the franchise. That gets you to $285-300 fair value versus $247.90, a ~15-20% upside plus the FCF yield while you wait. The key risk that would kill this thesis is if the Q3/Q4 '26 prints show net margin staying at 25-26% rather than reverting toward 29-30% — that would confirm structural cost creep and justify the current multiple. I'd size this as a starter position now and add on any print that shows margin recovery, or trim if two more quarters below 27% net margin confirm the compression is permanent. Market Forces is wrong; Synthesis is directionally right but slightly too cautious; Narrative layer nailed it.
GPT Reading
Adobe looks mispriced on the cheap side to me, and the biggest reason is that the raw financials do not match the market’s apparent fear of a broken moat. Revenue has climbed from $15.79B in 2021 to $23.77B in 2025, a 10.7% CAGR, while net income rose from $4.82B to $7.13B and free cash flow to $9.85B. That is not a business in decline; it is a software franchise still compounding at a very respectable clip with extraordinary unit economics. Gross margin is 89.3%, operating margin 36.6%, net margin 30.0%, and operating cash flow of $10.03B exceeds reported earnings comfortably. Even on the quarterly cadence, the trend is solid: the latest quarter at $6.62B was up 10.5% year over year from $5.99B, and net income of $1.71B was up from $1.77B against a seasonally different comparison but still well above the $1.68B-$1.69B range seen a year earlier. At $98.5B market cap, investors are paying roughly 10x trailing FCF and 4.5x sales for a dominant software platform with recurring revenue and high retention. That is closer to a mediocre enterprise software asset than to one earning 57% ROIC.
What stands out most is the tension between absolute quality and compressed valuation. A trailing P/E of 14.8x and EV/EBITDA of 11.2x for a business still growing double digits is unusually low unless the market expects growth to stall or margins to crack. But the recent numbers show neither. Quarterly revenue has risen sequentially from $5.41B in Aug-2024 to $6.62B in May-2026 without interruption. Yes, net margin dipped to 25.9% in the latest quarter from 29%-31% in prior quarters, but that looks more like spending or mix than structural impairment when the annual operating margin in 2025 still reached 36.6%, up from 31.3% in 2024. In other words, Adobe is simultaneously accelerating operating profit at the annual level and being valued like a no-growth incumbent. The balance sheet is also fine: $5.43B cash against $6.21B debt leaves net debt de minimis relative to a near-$10B FCF base.
The strongest bear case is not hard to articulate: the market may be correctly discounting an earnings peak before generative AI commoditizes parts of creative software. If Adobe’s product advantage narrows while creator pricing gets challenged, then today’s 30% net margin and 90% gross margin could be the high-water mark. There is also evidence to support caution in the latest quarter: net income fell from $1.89B in Feb-2026 to $1.71B in May-2026 even as revenue increased, which implies incremental margins softened materially. The current ratio at 1.0 is not a problem for software, but it does reinforce that this is no fortress cash pile story. And if you distrust the reported P/E because buybacks or accounting effects flatter per-share economics, then 4.5x sales is not absurdly cheap for a mature application software vendor facing open-source and AI-native alternatives. A smart skeptic would say the market is not calling Adobe broken; it is pricing in erosion from “great” to merely “good.”
I weigh that bear case less heavily because the actual income statement still shows a company converting disruption into monetization rather than surrendering to it. From 2023 to 2025, revenue added $4.36B while operating income added $2.06B, a very healthy drop-through for a supposedly weakening moat. Free cash flow at $9.85B versus net income at $7.13B suggests the economics are not low-quality or propped up by accruals. The market narrative seems to be stuck on the possibility that AI attacks Adobe’s core, while the observed data say Adobe remains the one collecting the toll on professional creative workflows. If that remains true, then a multiple closer to 18x earnings or 13x-14x EBITDA would still be conservative and would imply a stock comfortably above current levels, more in the $300 range than $250.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If revenue growth slips from roughly 10%-11% to mid-single digits for two or three quarters while net margin stays sub-27%, then the “cheap quality” thesis is wrong and the market is correctly anticipating structural pressure. I would also turn cautious if annual FCF falls materially below $9B despite revenue growth, because that would indicate Adobe is having to spend much more aggressively just to defend the base. Conversely, if the next few quarters sustain revenue above $6.7B, restore net margin toward 29%-30%, and keep annualized FCF near or above $10B, then the stock is plainly too cheap here.
Grok Reading
The numbers on Adobe tell a story the market refuses to hear. Revenue has compounded at 10.7% annually to $23.77B, with the latest quarter still printing $6.62B — up from $5.87B a year earlier — and free cash flow of $9.85B on a $98.5B market cap delivers a roughly 10% FCF yield. Net margins sit at 30%, gross margins at 89%, ROE at 61%, and ROIC at 57%. A software franchise converting nearly every incremental dollar of revenue into cash, growing double-digits, and trading at 14.8x earnings and 4.5x sales is not priced like a platform monopoly; it is priced like a utility in secular decline. The 14.6% earnings CAGR and the jump from $5.56B to $7.13B in annual net income last year make the multiple look even more disconnected. The AI panic — Firefly supposedly cannibalized by Midjourney, Gen-Z abandoning Creative Cloud — has not shown up in the P&L. Subscription lock-in across Creative Cloud, Document Cloud, and Experience Cloud continues to compound, and the balance sheet (net debt under $1B, $10B operating cash flow) gives management every tool to defend the franchise.
What stands out most is the gap between cash generation quality and the multiple the market assigns it. EV/EBITDA of 11.2x and EV/revenue of 4.5x for 37% operating margins and decelerating-but-still-solid 10.5% revenue growth is the kind of setup that appears when a narrative overruns the fundamentals. The pre-flight intelligence correctly flags the three fears — AI substitution, Digital Media saturation, Experience Cloud budget cuts — yet none of those fears have cracked the recurring revenue engine. Quarterly revenue has risen every single period in the dataset, from $5.41B to $6.62B without a stutter. The valuation synthesis composite at $261 and signal-adjusted $238 brackets the current $248 almost perfectly, which the engine reads as fair value; I read it as the market anchoring too hard to disruption optionality that remains theoretical while underweighting a $10B FCF run-rate that is already real.
The strongest case against this read is straightforward and worth taking seriously. Revenue confidence is flagged as decelerating, the most recent quarter saw net margin compress to 25.9% from the 29–30% range that had been durable, and the Market Forces layer explicitly calls out structural disruption and an eroding moat. If open-source and generative tools continue closing the gap, and if Adobe’s price increases breed the resentment the bear narrative describes, then 10% growth becomes 5% and the 15x multiple is no bargain — it is a value trap. The composite fair-value exercise already haircuts to $238 after signal adjustment, implying limited upside even on bullish math, and a current ratio of 0.996 leaves little working-capital cushion. A smart opponent would also note that insider activity is pure option exercise and tax withholding, not conviction buying, and that the entire software cohort has re-rated lower for a reason. I weigh these differently because the margin dip is one quarter against years of 30% net margins, FCF conversion remains pristine at nearly 100% of operating cash flow, and the competitive moat in professional creative workflows has historically proven far stickier than retail-creator chatter suggests. The deceleration is real but from a high base; it has not yet invalidated the cash machine.
I would flip to neutral or bearish if two consecutive quarters show revenue growth below 6%, if net margins settle sustainably under 25%, or if Digital Media subscriber net adds turn negative on a trailing twelve-month basis. A sustained break below $210 without a corresponding collapse in FCF would also force a reassessment that the multiple compression has further to run.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Adobe grew revenue from 15.79B in 2021 to 23.77B in 2025 (roughly 11% CAGR) while gross margin expanded from 88.2% to 89.3% and operating margin re-accelerated to 36.6% in 2025 after dipping to 31.3% in 2024. Net income jumped 28% to 7.13B and free cash flow hit 9.85B (41% FCF margin), with OCF/NI at 1.47x confirming that reported earnings convert cleanly to cash. Accruals at -8.9% of assets, Beneish M of -2.84, and Altman Z of 7.24 all point to clean, high-integrity earnings with no manipulation flags. Balance sheet is self-funding: 6.6B liquid cash, net cash positive, no dependence on capital markets. Capital return is disciplined - diluted shares fell from 481M to 427M (-2.9% CAGR) with buybacks running 446% of SBC, so the 8.2% SBC/revenue is more than offset and per-share value is concentrating. The insider tape is mostly option exercises and tax withholdings (M/F codes), not directional selling; the net-buying flag is minor in dollar terms and not a strong signal either way. The one soft spot worth flagging is the 2024 operating margin dip to 31.3% before rebounding, which suggests some investment/integration friction (the Figma deal era) but was clearly transitory given the 2025 snap-back. Durability is implied by the sustained 87%-plus gross margins, a subscription franchise across Creative Cloud, Document Cloud and Experience Cloud, and the ability to grow revenue 50% over four years without margin erosion.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment-level growth: is Digital Media (Creative + Document) still growing double digits or is Experience Cloud carrying the mix?
- AI/Firefly monetization traction and any disclosed impact on ARR/net-new subscriptions
- Customer concentration and any change in retention/NRR disclosure
- Cause of the 2024 operating margin dip - was it Figma-related, restructuring, or ongoing R&D step-up?
- Guidance/commentary on competitive pressure from Figma, Canva, and open-source generative tools
The composite fair value of $261.03 and the signal-adjusted $237.73 bracket today's $247.91 price within a few percent in either direction - the definition of fairly valued. The DCF ($272.90) implies ~10% upside, the anchored P/E ($373.11) looks like a runaway multiple output that assumes historical premium multiples persist and should be discounted heavily, and the EPV floor at $125.19 is a reminder that if growth optionality evaporates, downside is real. Averaging the credible methods (DCF and signal-adjusted composite) lands squarely around the current price.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Net new Digital Media ARR trajectory vs guidance (Figma/AI substitution test)
- Any pricing action or bundling changes signaling defense vs offense
- Gen-AI monetization contribution disclosed in segment detail
- Buyback pace vs guidance - dilution or acceleration would move deserved value
- One-time restructuring or Figma-termination-fee tail impacts on FCF
The tape is hostile: VIX 20.7 in the top 3% of the year, Nasdaq in correction, and a Fed-day risk-off shock. With beta 1.43, ADBE takes more than its share of that pressure - high-beta large-cap software is exactly the cohort getting sold when the macro turns. That is the dominant force on the stock this week, not anything company-specific. Narratively, Adobe is stuck in an awkward middle: still a platform-monopoly story but with only moderate intensity and thin narrative premium (about 4% over DCF). There is no euphoria to defend it, no cult to buy the dip, and the AI-disruption bear case (open source, Gen-Z piracy, Figma-style encroachment) is the quieter but more dangerous background hum in creative-software sentiment. Analyst tone tilted negative recently: Morgan Stanley's Underweight on July 21 explicitly flagged execution risk through transitions and pointed capital elsewhere in software - a real, cited driver of a prior down move. Offsetting that mildly: the FTC's early clearance of the Topaz Labs deal gave a one-day AI-flavored pop, and the stock trades at a discount to the market on earnings, which the press is starting to notice. Net: a modest but real headwind - macro pressure amplified by beta, narrative on the back foot, sell-side turning cooler, with small AI-deal tailwinds not enough to offset.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether other sell-side desks follow Morgan Stanley to Underweight or defend the name - a second downgrade would harden the narrative
- VIX cooling back below 18 and Nasdaq exiting correction - would relieve the beta-driven pressure fastest
- Firefly / AI monetization data points in the next print - the story needs a proof to reclaim intensity
- Any Figma or open-source competitive headline that would harden the disruption bear thread
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 1, 2026, ADBE was $250.41. We expect it to be $265.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $205.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 1, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.