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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for American International Group Inc. (AIG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -43 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -3 · Value -75 · Sentiment -1 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $48.26 vs $79.06 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
American International Group Inc.
AIG NYSEAmerican International Group Inc. is a global insurance and financial services company headquartered in New York City and founded in 1919. The company focuses on providing property and casualty insurance, life insurance, and retirement solutions to commercial, institutional, and individual clients. American International Group Inc. offers products such as commercial property, liability, financial lines, specialty risk, and personal insurance coverage, serving sectors including corporate enterprises, small and mid-sized businesses, and high-net-worth individuals. It also provides group retirement, annuities, and related financial products that support long-term savings and risk management needs. Operating across numerous countries and jurisdictions, American International Group Inc. plays a significant role in global risk transfer and insurance capacity, helping businesses and individuals manage complex exposures, meet regulatory and contractual requirements, and protect assets in both mature and emerging markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.43
Total Equity: $41.14B
Shares: 570,165,746
Total Debt: $9.19B
Cash: $1.27B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $9.19B
Cash: $1.27B
Revenue: $26.77B
Revenue: $26.77B
Revenue: $26.77B
Total Equity: $41.14B
Tax Rate: 20.2%
Equity: $41.14B
Total Debt: $9.19B
Cash: $1.27B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $9.19B
Total Debt: $9.19B
Total Equity: $41.14B
Shares: 570,165,746
Shares: 570,165,746
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 570,165,746
Stock Price: $79.06
Net Income: $3.10B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:36am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $52.0B | $54.8B | $47.3B | $27.3B | $26.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $8.1B | $8.5B | $9.0B | $5.6B | $5.1B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $10.4B | $10.2B | $3.6B | -$1.4B | $3.1B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $12.10 | $13.10 | $5.02 | $2.35 | $5.48 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $11.95 | $12.94 | $4.98 | $-2.17 | $5.43 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:06am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | — | — | — | $161.3B | $161.3B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $30.2B | $25.7B | $22.1B | $8.9B | $9.2B |
| Total Liabilities | — | — | — | $118.8B | $120.1B |
| Total Equity | $66.0B | $41.0B | $45.4B | $42.5B | $41.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $23.8B | $34.9B | $37.5B | $35.1B | $37.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:36am (27d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $6.3B | $4.2B | $6.2B | $3.3B | $3.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$343.0M | -$210.0M | -$240.0M | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | $5.9B | $4.0B | $6.0B | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$4.0B | -$478.0M | -$322.0M | $661.0M | $1.2B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.6B | -$5.2B | -$3.0B | -$6.7B | -$5.8B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$803.0M | -$211.0M | -$9.0M | -$201.0M | -$27.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 27, 2026 12:36am (27d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +5.4% | -13.7% | -42.3% | -1.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -1.4% | -64.4% | -138.5% | +320.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 25, 2026 3:17am (29d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-16 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-16 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-16 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-13 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-17 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-16 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-16 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-14 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-13 | $0.36 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-13 | $0.36 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-14 | $0.36 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-15 | $0.36 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-16 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-14 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-15 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-15 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-16 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-15 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-15 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-23 02:38Even the bull case prices 9% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 41%. Caveat: revenue-DCF fits financials poorly (reported revenue omits net interest) — treat the legs as rough.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($79.06) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | -6% | 16.5% | $72.30 | -9% |
| Base — stabilizes | -13% | 14.3% | $50.59 | -36% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | -19% | 12.2% | $34.53 | -56% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -9% | 11.1% | $46.47 | -41% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: the revenue trajectory ($51.96B → $54.77B → $47.25B → $27.27B → $26.77B) is a divestiture story, not organic decay — the Corebridge/life-and-retirement separation explains most of the step-down. What matters is the run-rate: ~$6.8B/quarter of revenue, and Q1 2025 net income of $698M on 10.3% margin. Annualize that and you get roughly $2.7-3.1B in NI, which reconciles with the $3.10B TTM figure and 14.6x P/E. The Q2 2024 -$3.88B loss is a one-time charge (likely deconsolidation/loss on sale accounting), not underwriting collapse — you can see it because Q3 and Q4 2024 immediately return to $423-457M profit. So the "-1.4B annual NI in 2024" is noise; normalized earnings power is $2.8-3.2B.
At 1.10x book on $41.14B equity and a 7.5% ROE, AIG is earning below its cost of equity (probably 9-10% for a diversified insurer). That's the real problem — not the narrative, not the divestiture optics. Travelers trades at 2.0x book because it earns ~15% ROE consistently. For AIG to justify a re-rating to 1.5x book (~$107/share on current equity), ROE needs to migrate from 7.5% toward 11-12%. Is that happening? Q1 2025's 10.3% margin vs. Q3/Q4 2024's 6-7% suggests yes, directionally — but one quarter isn't a trend, and P&C insurers are notorious for reserve-release-driven quarterly beats that don't compound. Debt/equity of 0.22 and $1.27B cash against $9.19B debt is fine for an insurer; leverage isn't the risk.
Where I diverge from the prior models: the Market Narrative layer claims a DCF anchor of $49.68 and calls $79 a "+59% premium" driven by story. That DCF is almost certainly mis-specified for an insurer — you don't DCF an insurance company off operating cash flow ($3.31B) the way you would an industrial, because float and investment income dominate. The correct anchor is book value × sustainable ROE / cost of equity. On $41.14B equity, if sustainable ROE is 8%, fair P/B is ~0.85x = $67. If it's 10%, fair P/B is ~1.1x = $87. So $79 is pricing in ~9.5% normalized ROE — modestly optimistic but not egregious. The "Disconnected from Fundamentals" verdict and "Market Headwinds" call feel overconfident given this is arithmetically a fair-value stock. Meanwhile the "massive insider selling" claim in Market Forces contradicts the raw insider table, which shows only small A-Awards (grants), not sales — that's a factual error in the model output.
The contrarian argument cuts both ways. Bear case a skeptic would press: P&C is late-cycle, 2025 cat losses (California wildfires, hurricane season) will pressure combined ratios, and reserve releases from prior soft-market years are running out. AIG's expense ratio historically lags peers by 200-400bps and Peter Zaffino's (not "Marks" — another prior-model error) cleanup is largely done, meaning the easy wins are behind. Bull case: net investment income has a multi-year tailwind as the bond portfolio rolls into 5%+ yields, buybacks at 1.1x book are accretive to per-share book value, and the simplified company deserves a re-rating simply for being legible. Both are plausible; neither is dominant. Data thinness: no combined ratio, no net investment income breakout, no premium growth by segment — for an insurer, those are the actual KPIs, and we're flying blind on all of them. The FMP feed here is inadequate for a proper insurance analysis.
My verdict: the synthesis models are directionally too bearish and rely on a mis-specified DCF. AIG at $79 is roughly fair on a book-value framework assuming ROE normalizes to 9-10%, which Q1 2025 supports but hasn't confirmed. This is not a $50 stock unless you believe ROE reverts to 6-7% permanently, and it's not a $110 stock unless Zaffino delivers sustained 12%+ ROE. The 2.3% dividend plus buyback at 1.1x book gives you a ~6-7% capital return floor while you wait. Not a screaming buy,
GPT Reading
What stands out to me in AIG’s raw data is not just that the revenue line was cut in half from $54.8B in 2022 to $26.8B in 2025, but that the post-reset company is still not obviously earning enough on its capital base to deserve a premium multiple. The business now looks like a roughly $27B-revenue insurer producing about $3.1B of net income in a clean year, against $41.1B of equity. That is only mid-single to high-single-digit economic productivity on book. The quarterly pattern reinforces that read: outside the ugly June 2024 quarter, earnings have mostly lived in a $423M-$698M range, with one unusually strong $1.60B print in March 2024. In other words, the current AIG is not a broken franchise, but it is also not yet a high-quality compounder. At $79.06 and a $41.9B market cap, investors are paying about 1.02x market cap to book equity and 14.6x annual earnings for a company with 7.5% ROE and 11.6% net margin. That is a full-enough valuation for a merely decent insurer.
I agree with Opus that the annual revenue collapse is mostly a portfolio-change story rather than pure operating erosion, and I agree that the prior model’s $49.68 DCF anchor is not a serious way to value an insurer. Book value and sustainable ROE are the right frame. I also agree with Opus that the insider-selling claim elsewhere in the packet is just wrong; the disclosed transactions are tiny A-Award grants, not open-market sales. But I disagree with Opus’s relatively forgiving interpretation of normalized earnings power at $2.8B-$3.2B as though that is enough to make $79 “roughly fair” without much discount. If I take the latest annual NI of $3.10B at face value, that is 7.5% ROE. If I generously assume normalization to 9%, that implies about $3.7B of earnings on current equity, and even then the stock is already discounting a meaningful step-up from what the reported numbers have shown. For an insurer, paying around book for sub-cost-of-equity returns is not neutral; it is mildly expensive unless there is clearer evidence of durable improvement.
Opus argues that “$79 is pricing in ~9.5% normalized ROE — modestly optimistic but not egregious.” I disagree on the practical implication. “Not egregious” is too lenient when the actual observed annual ROE is 7.5%, 2024 produced a $1.4B loss, and the quarterly earnings cadence after the restructuring has not yet demonstrated consistent double-digit returns on equity. Yes, the June 2024 loss looks non-recurring, and I agree with Opus that it was not an underwriting collapse. But removing one-time noise does not automatically upgrade the franchise. Even if I annualize the most recent quarter’s $698M, I only get about $2.8B, below the 2025 annual NI figure and still not enough to scream rerating. Opus is right that leverage is not the issue — $9.19B debt against $41.14B equity and $3.31B operating cash flow is manageable — but that actually sharpens the central problem: this is a return-on-capital story, not a balance-sheet repair story, and the return math is merely average.
I also think Opus understates how much execution still has to go right for upside. They say AIG is “not a $50 stock unless you believe ROE reverts to 6-7% permanently, and it's not a $110 stock unless Zaffino delivers sustained 12%+ ROE.” I agree with the back-end point on $110; that would require a materially better franchise than the current numbers prove. But I disagree on the floor. A stock around book can absolutely drift toward the mid-$60s without a permanent 6-7% ROE trap if investors conclude normalized returns are 8-9% and deserve a slight discount to book rather than parity. On $41.14B of equity, even 0.9x book gets you roughly $37B of equity value, which is about 10-12% below today’s market cap before adjusting for buybacks. That is why I see the shares as more vulnerable to dead-money re-rating than Opus does. The capital return point is real — the 2.34% dividend and probable buybacks help — but “6-7% capital return floor” is doing a lot of work when the underlying earnings engine is not compounding book at an impressive rate.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus’s would say we are overfitting incomplete data. They would note that insurer analysis without combined ratio, reserve development, premium retention, and net investment income is inherently handicapped. They would also point out that the annual and quarterly revenue lines are distorted enough by restructuring that our apparent precision around “normalized” earnings may be false confidence. That skeptic is right. But with the evidence actually in front of us, the stronger conclusion is not that AIG is misunderstood cheap; it is that AIG is a cleaned-up but still mediocre-return insurer being valued as though the cleanup has mostly translated into quality. The numbers do not prove that yet.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
AIG has clearly been through a major portfolio restructuring: revenue collapsed from $54.8B in 2022 to $26.8B in 2025 (largely the Corebridge deconsolidation), net income swung from $10.2B to a $1.4B loss in 2024 before recovering to $3.1B in 2025, and diluted shares fell from 867M to 570M (a -10% CAGR) - genuine per-share concentration, not optical. Liquid cash of $38.4B against a $41.9B market cap and $29.2B net cash gives the insurer meaningful financial flexibility, and FCF of roughly $3.3B is self-funding the dividend and repurchases.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Identity and 10b5-1 status of the $750M insider sale - who sold and under what plan
- Combined ratio trend in P and C segments post-Corebridge separation - is underwriting actually profitable ex-investment income
- Reserve development (favorable vs adverse) over last 3 years to gauge earnings integrity
- Reinsurance program and catastrophe exposure concentration
- Whether $38.4B cash is holdco liquidity or trapped at regulated subs
- Source of 2024 net loss - one-time divestiture charge or underwriting deterioration
- Capital return runway: remaining buyback authorization and dividend coverage
The e2e composite pins fair value at $49.68 against a $79.06 price - a ~37% overvaluation on the model. Even allowing that insurance FV models often understate franchise value on a cash-rich, buyback-heavy balance sheet, the gap is wide enough that you cannot dismiss it as method noise. The market is paying up for the turnaround thesis: disciplined underwriting, higher net investment income, and aggressive share count reduction. Most of that is already in the tape.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Underlying combined ratio ex-cat and reserve development trend in latest 10-Q
- Net investment income run-rate sensitivity to rate path
- Remaining buyback authorization and pace vs free cash generation
- Any one-time gains/losses distorting 2024 loss year
The macro tape is mildly risk-off (VIX 18.6, S&P off 2.6%, 10y at 4.71%), but AIG's 0.54 beta and defensive P&C/retirement mix mean this pressure barely lands on the name. Higher-for-longer rates are actually a subtle tailwind via net investment income, partially offsetting the market-PE headwind that weighs on higher-multiple cohorts more than on insurers. Net macro pressure on THIS ticker is close to neutral. The active story is a moderate-intensity, moderate-durability turnaround-bet narrative (CEO Marks cleaning up post-bailout AIG into a focused underwriter). Cult coefficient is low, so there is no euphoric bid, but also no fragile momentum-chasing crowd to unwind. The story is doing real work - it justifies a ~59% premium to DCF - which means sentiment is stretched relative to fundamentals and vulnerable to any execution stumble, catastrophe quarter, or softening premium cycle. News flow is quiet and benign (a dividend-angle piece), analyst tone is not showing target-revision momentum in either direction, and price action is flat-to-slightly-negative recently after a poor multi-year CAGR. Net: no strong push either way, but the risk skew is asymmetric - limited upside from narrative (already priced), meaningful downside if the turnaround thesis cracks.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Next quarter's underwriting margin and catastrophe losses - the single biggest crack point for the turnaround narrative
- Analyst target revisions - watch for a cluster of downgrades that would signal the story is losing sponsorship
- P&C premium pricing cycle indicators (soft market signs would gut the bull case)
- Any acceleration or fade in the sector rotation into defensive financials vs banks
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 27, 2026, AIG was $79.06. We expect it to be $69.50 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $55.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 27, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.