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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Allison Transmission Holdings, Inc. (ALSN) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score +0 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 0 · Value 0 · Sentiment -29 (timing only, not weighted)
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Allison Transmission Holdings, Inc.
ALSN NYSEAllison Transmission Holdings, Inc. is a global manufacturer of propulsion solutions for commercial and defense vehicles. The company designs and produces fully automatic transmissions, electrified propulsion systems, and related drivetrain technologies used in medium- and heavy-duty trucks, buses, motorhomes, off-highway equipment, and military vehicles. Allison Transmission also supports its installed base through an extensive aftermarket network that provides genuine parts, service, and technical support across multiple regions. Its products are widely used by original equipment manufacturers and fleet operators that rely on durable, high-performance transmission systems for demanding applications. Headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana, Allison Transmission focuses on serving transportation, construction, energy, mining, and defense markets with specialized powertrain solutions.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Jun 30, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 6.30
Total Equity: $1.98B
Shares: 84,000,000
Total Debt: $4.15B
Cash: $399.00M
EBITDA: $1.04B
Total Debt: $4.15B
Cash: $399.00M
Revenue: $4.40B
Revenue: $4.40B
Revenue: $4.40B
Total Equity: $1.98B
Tax Rate: 23.2%
Equity: $1.98B
Total Debt: $4.15B
Cash: $399.00M
Current Liabilities: $1.32B
Long-Term Debt: $4.13B
Total Debt: $4.15B
Total Equity: $1.98B
Shares: 84,000,000
Shares: 84,000,000
CapEx: -$202.00M
Shares: 84,000,000
Stock Price: $119.72
Net Income: $529.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 11, 2026 10:53am (26d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.4B | $2.8B | $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.5B |
| Gross Profit | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $476.0M | $513.0M | $551.0M | $537.0M | $583.0M |
| Operating Income | $669.0M | $784.0M | $919.0M | $992.0M | $880.0M |
| Net Income | $442.0M | $531.0M | $673.0M | $731.0M | $623.0M |
| EBITDA | $773.0M | $893.0M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $997.0M |
| EPS | $4.13 | $5.53 | $7.48 | $8.40 | $7.42 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $4.13 | $5.53 | $7.40 | $8.31 | $7.33 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 11, 2026 10:53am (26d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $127.0M | $232.0M | $555.0M | $781.0M | $1.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $671.0M | $866.0M | $1.3B | $1.5B | $2.2B |
| Total Assets | $4.5B | $4.7B | $5.0B | $5.3B | $6.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $459.0M | $480.0M | $501.0M | $506.0M | $460.0M |
| Long-Term Debt | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.7B | $4.2B |
| Total Equity | $634.0M | $874.0M | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.9B |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.1B | -$953.0M | -$628.0M | -$239.0M | -$38.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 11, 2026 10:53am (26d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $635.0M | $657.0M | $784.0M | $801.0M | $836.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$175.0M | -$167.0M | -$125.0M | -$143.0M | -$175.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $460.0M | $490.0M | $659.0M | $658.0M | $661.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | $0 | $0 | $500.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$81.0M | -$80.0M | -$83.0M | -$87.0M | -$91.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$513.0M | -$278.0M | -$263.0M | -$254.0M | -$328.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$183.0M | $105.0M | $323.0M | $226.0M | $714.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 11, 2026 10:53am (26d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +15.3% | +9.6% | +6.3% | -6.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +13.3% | +13.3% | +4.0% | -4.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +17.2% | +17.2% | +7.9% | -11.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +20.1% | +26.7% | +8.6% | -14.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | +15.5% | +15.1% | +7.3% | -9.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 17, 2026 4:39pm (20d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-21 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-18 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-09 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-21 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-20 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-19 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-18 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-19 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-17 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-01 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-10 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-11 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-12 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-03 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-18 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-19 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-13 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-04 | $0.21 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-19 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-17 16:51The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The quarterly print is where I have to start, because the models are papering over something ugly. Q1 2026 revenue of $1.41B and Q2 2026 of $1.57B are roughly double every prior quarter shown ($693M–$824M range), while net income collapsed to 8% and 11.6% margins versus a steady 22–25% through 2024–early 2025. Either Allison closed a transformative acquisition (doubling the top line, dragging margins), the data is mis-stitched, or there's a restatement/reporting change. No standalone auto-parts business goes from $814M to $1.41B to $1.57B in two quarters organically. The "revenue_cagr 18.9%" and "recent_revenue_yoy 37.6%" figures the momentum engine is citing are almost certainly a data artifact — and the synthesis composite fair value of $254 (implying +77% upside) is being pulled higher by the same artifact via extrapolated revenue and cash flow. That number should be discarded.
Working from the clean annual data instead: 2025 revenue $3.01B (down 6.8% from $3.23B in 2024), NI $623M (down from $731M), FCF $661M. On $9.89B market cap that's a 6.7% FCF yield and 15.9x earnings on 2025 actuals — not a screaming bargain, not expensive, exactly where a mature industrial with modest secular headwinds should trade. ROE of 28% and ROIC of 11.5% are real and reflect the transmission monopoly economics. Leverage at $2.89B debt vs $1.50B cash and $836M OCF is manageable (net debt/EBITDA around 1.2x), not the "dangerous leverage" the Market Forces model dramatizes. The Market Forces "structural margin collapse" call is contradicted by 2025's 29.2% operating margin — the collapse it's pointing at is the corrupted quarterly data.
The thesis evaluation (-3, essentially a coin flip) is the most honest output here. The Narrative layer correctly identifies this as an EV-transition-timing bet with fragile durability — a single major OEM electrification delay or an eGen contract win re-rates the stock. Contrarian point the bulls should sit with: Class 8 truck electrification has repeatedly slipped, Allison's defense and motorhome mix (~25% combined) is genuinely non-cyclical and non-electrifying on any relevant timeframe, and management has been aggressively buying back stock (equity shrinking supports the 5.1x P/B and 28% ROE). Contrarian point the bears should sit with: earnings CAGR of -12% and 2025 revenue decline are real, not narrative — the melting has started, and terminal value in a DCF is doing enormous work for a business whose core product line has a defined obsolescence path. The synthesis's $212 signal-adjusted fair value implicitly assumes the terminal decline is 20+ years out; halve that assumption and fair value collapses toward $130–150.
I dissent from the synthesis "undervalued +77.6%" verdict — that number is built on contaminated quarterly data and an overly generous DCF terminal. I also reject Market Forces' "value trap / margin collapse" framing as overwrought given clean 2025 financials. My read: fair value in the $135–155 range on 12–14x normalized earnings of ~$10–11/share, with option value from electrification delay. At $119.72 that's 15–25% upside plus a 1% dividend — a modest long, not a table-pounder, and the thesis unwinds fast if 2026 clean-data earnings confirm the negative trajectory rather than the corrupted acceleration. The real action item is: verify what happened in Q1/Q2 2026 before sizing anything. If those prints are genuine (major acquisition), the whole model set needs redoing; if artifact, my $135–155 range holds.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers do not support the dramatic “melting ice cube” framing, but they also do not support the very bullish valuation composite. On a trailing-twelve-month basis through 2026-06-30, Allison did about $4.41B of revenue and $529M of net income, which means revenue exploded 44% versus the prior TTM base of roughly $3.06B while earnings fell about 25% from roughly $707M. That is the central fact here: this business has suddenly become much larger, but much less profitable. TTM net margin is 12.0%, far below the 22.6% earned in 2024 and below the 20.7% earned in 2025. Quarterly data shows why: the last four quarters include two huge revenue quarters, $1.41B and $1.57B, but only 8.0% and 11.6% net margins, versus 24%-25% margins in the comparable quarters a year earlier. That is not normal noise. Something in mix, cost structure, or acquired/adjacent business economics has changed materially.
That margin reset is why I do not buy the simple “cheap at 19x earnings” argument. At $119.72, equity value is $9.89B; using the provided 19.0x P/E implies the market is valuing current earnings as if the lower-margin run rate is sustainable but not disastrous. On sales, the stock is at 2.28x TTM revenue, and on enterprise value 13.25x EBITDA and 3.14x revenue. Those are not distressed multiples for an auto-parts name with leverage and an unclear margin baseline. Allison does have real quality: 36.4% gross margin and 19.6% operating margin are still excellent for anything tied to commercial vehicles, annual free cash flow was $661M on $836M of operating cash flow in 2025, and the balance sheet is not stretched in absolute terms with $2.89B debt against $1.50B cash. Net debt around $1.4B is manageable. But quality only matters if the earnings power is durable, and the recent print says the business mix generating the growth is structurally less profitable than the legacy franchise.
The deeper contradiction in the dataset is that the market seems to be paying for Allison as a high-quality compounder while the recent income statement looks more like a transition story with integration or mix drag. If I annualize nothing and just stay with TTM facts, ROE of 28.4% looks great, but book is only $1.87B, so that figure is heavily shaped by leverage and capital returns rather than pristine incremental economics. Likewise, the rule-based “mature earner” label is partly right—this is a cash-generative incumbent—but mature earners usually do not swing from $824M and $796M quarters into $693M and $737M, then suddenly into $1.41B and $1.57B with margins cut in half. That is a company in the middle of something, not a steady annuity. My read is that the stock is roughly fairly valued to modestly rich because the market is already giving substantial credit for the durability of the franchise while brushing past a very obvious deterioration in profitability. If normalized earnings are no longer $700M+ but instead closer to the current $500M-$550M zone, $120 is not cheap.
The best argument against my caution is straightforward: Allison may be going through a temporary mix/integration trough, not a permanent margin reset, and if so the stock is materially underpriced. Even after the compression, TTM operating income is about $862M, almost identical to the $880M reported for full-year 2025 despite the messy quarter pattern, suggesting underlying earnings power has not collapsed at the operating line. Revenue is massively higher, current ratio is a comfortable 1.81, free cash generation has historically been strong, and the company’s niche positioning can support outsized incremental margins once temporary launch, acquisition, or product-transition costs wash through. If net income recovers even partway back toward the 2024-2025 range on this bigger revenue base, then today’s 19x P/E could quickly become 14x-15x on forward earnings, which would look attractive for a business with sticky OEM and aftermarket relationships. That is the strongest bull case, and it is a good one.
What would change my mind is not a narrative about electrification either way; it is evidence in the next two or three quarters that the new scale can earn old-style margins. Specifically, if quarterly revenue stays above $1.2B while net margin climbs back into the mid-to-high teens and TTM net income re-accelerates toward $650M+, I would turn constructive and could justify $135-$150. Conversely, if revenue remains elevated but net margin stays near 8%-12%, that would confirm Allison has traded legacy-margin revenue for lower-quality sales, in which case I would see fair value more like $90-$105. At today’s $119.72, the stock sits in the uncomfortable middle: too expensive for a margin-reset story, not cheap enough for me to underwrite on faith.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers tell a story of a cash-rich franchise that just broke its own operating pattern in a way that should worry owners more than excite them. Through 2024 Allison compounded revenue from $2.40B to $3.23B and net income from $442M to $731M with net margins consistently in the low-to-mid 20s; 2025 then slipped to $3.01B revenue and $623M net income. The four quarters ending June 2026 reverse that softness on the top line—$693M, $737M, $1.41B and $1.57B—for a trailing revenue base near $4.4B, yet trailing net income is only about $529M and the two most recent quarters printed 8% and 11.6% net margins. That is not operating leverage; it is either a dilutive acquisition, a sharp mix shift into lower-margin volume, or both. Free-cash-flow generation remains the bright spot ($661M on the 2025 annual, low-teens capex intensity), ROE is still a healthy 28%, and net debt after $1.50B of cash is manageable against that FCF. But at $119.72 the stock trades at 19× trailing earnings, 13.2× EV/EBITDA and 2.3× sales while earnings are already contracting at a mid-teens CAGR and leverage sits at 2.1× equity. Those multiples would be reasonable for a stable high-ROE industrial; they are full for one whose incremental dollar of revenue is earning half the historical margin.
The prior models’ split personality is therefore not accidental. The valuation composite that spits out $213–$255 fair value is mechanically extrapolating the new revenue run-rate and the historical cash-conversion rates; the market-forces “value-trap” call is reading the same margin collapse and the structural threat that electrified commercial powertrains pose to a hydraulic-transmission monopoly. I side with the latter reading of the data. A 37% trailing revenue jump that simultaneously destroys 10–15 points of net margin is not the behavior of a compounding moat; it is the behavior of a company buying or chasing volume to offset core-product pressure. Defense and aftermarket may slow the decline, but they do not reverse the direction of travel visible in the last two quarters.
The strongest contrary case is straightforward and quantitative. Cash conversion is excellent, the installed base still throws off high-teens operating margins on the older product set, ROIC of 11.5% exceeds most auto-parts peers, and if the commercial-vehicle EV timeline slips three to five years the runoff pricing power on automatic transmissions could keep FCF above $600M for longer than the market credits. At a 6–7% FCF yield and only an 18% payout ratio the company can keep shrinking the share count while the bear narrative remains unproven. A smart opponent would also note that the absolute net-income dollars in the high-revenue quarters ($112M and $181M) are not collapsing in nominal terms, only in margin rate, so the PE of 19 is not being paid on a vanishing earnings base. I weigh that evidence less heavily because the quality of those earnings has already deteriorated, the balance sheet is not fortress-like, and every year the EV transition advances the terminal multiple compresses regardless of near-term cash.
Two concrete outcomes would flip the view: four consecutive quarters that hold the $1.4B-plus revenue run-rate while restoring net margins above 15%, or clear multi-year OEM awards for the eGen electrified portfolio that demonstrate the company can replace lost hydraulic profit dollar-for-dollar. Absent either, the $120 level already embeds more credit for durability than the recent margin trajectory supports.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The most glaring contradiction in this dataset is the divergence between the "Mature Earner" classification and the actual earnings trajectory. While the rule-based model labels this a steady compounder, the data shows a violent compression of profitability: net margins have collapsed from 25.1% in Q1 2025 to 8.0% in Q1 2026, even as revenue accelerated to $1.41B. This is not the profile of a business enjoying "monopoly pricing power" in a runoff; it is the profile of a company facing severe input cost inflation or a mix shift toward lower-margin products that is currently outpacing its ability to pass costs through. The "Valuation Synthesis" model’s claim of a 77.6% upside to a $212.63 fair value is mathematically indefensible given that earnings CAGR is -12.1% and recent earnings YoY is -30.6%. You cannot apply a growth premium to a company whose bottom line is shrinking at a double-digit rate while its balance sheet carries $2.89B in debt against only $1.50B in cash. The "Market Forces" signal correctly identifies "Headwinds," but it undersells the danger: the debt-to-equity ratio of 2.096 is not just a risk factor, it is a structural vulnerability that amplifies every margin miss.
The "Bull Story" relies heavily on the idea that electrification will arrive slowly, allowing Allison to milk the legacy transmission base. However, the quarterly data suggests the opposite dynamic is already underway. The jump in revenue to $1.57B in Q2 2026 (a 37.6% YoY increase) paired with a margin drop to 11.6% indicates that the company is likely selling more units at significantly lower effective prices or facing higher material costs. If this is a volume-driven growth strategy to offset declining unit margins, it is a classic "death spiral" for a capital-intensive manufacturer. The "Thesis Evaluation" scores the bull case at 81.6 vs. the bear case at 84.2, a near-tie that masks the fact that the bear case is supported by hard data (margin collapse, debt load) while the bull case is supported by hope (timeline delays). The "Narrative Economics" layer notes that the discount to DCF is an "uncertainty premium," but when that uncertainty is manifested in a 30% drop in earnings, it is no longer a premium—it is a correction.
The strongest case against my bearish read would be the "Strong Cash Flow Quality" signal and the $661M in free cash flow. A smart opponent would argue that despite the GAAP earnings compression, the cash conversion is robust, and the $1.50B cash pile provides a buffer. They would point to the 18.9% revenue CAGR as evidence of market share gains. I weigh this differently because FCF is lagging; the margin compression in the last two quarters is a leading indicator of future cash flow deterioration if costs remain sticky. Furthermore, the "Insider Activity" is neutral, with only trivial A-Award transactions, suggesting that insiders are not aggressively buying the dip to signal confidence. The "Sector Intelligence" note that Allison is "Above Sector Benchmarks" is misleading when the sector is in a structural transition; being above a declining benchmark is not a moat.
What would change my mind is a clear demonstration that the margin compression is a one-time event, such as a specific, quantifiable input cost spike that is already reversing. If the next quarter shows revenue growth of 10-15% with a margin recovery to 15%+, that would validate the "runoff" thesis and suggest the company is successfully managing the transition. Alternatively, a concrete, signed contract with a major OEM for electrified powertrains that includes volume commitments and pricing floors would shift the narrative from "legacy decline" to "transition leader." Until then, the data points to a company that is growing its top line by sacrificing its bottom line, a trade that is rarely sustainable for a leveraged industrial manufacturer.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Allison is a mature earner with a genuine cash engine: FCF of $737M on $4.40B revenue (~17% FCF margin), OCF/NI of 1.3x, and negative accruals (-2.7% of assets) all point to real, cash-backed earnings. Capital returns are disciplined - diluted shares fell from 100.7M (2022) to 84.0M (2026), a -4.4% CAGR, with buybacks running 1272% of SBC and SBC only 0.7% of revenue. That is genuine per-share value concentration, not the optical kind.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- What drove the 2026 revenue jump to $4.40B and the simultaneous 12pp gross margin drop - acquisition, mix, one-time charge, or accounting change?
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant structure against the $3.75B net debt position
- Whether the Beneish flag ties mechanically to the 2026 discontinuity or reflects underlying accrual behavior
- Customer concentration (Class 8 OEMs, defense) and exposure to EV/alternative powertrain substitution risk
- Segment-level margin bridge to confirm the core franchise economics are intact
The e2e composite fair value of $254.54 and signal-adjusted $212.63 are almost certainly runaway prints - the DCF at $413.88 is roughly 3.5x the price and the EPV floor is $46.48, a spread that wide means the methods disagree violently and I should not anchor on the composite. The anchored-PE of $143.91 is the most defensible number in the stack and lines up with what a mature, cash-generative transmission franchise with a leveraged balance sheet deserves. Against $119.72, that implies roughly 15-20% upside to a plausible deserved value, not the 78% headline.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Source of the 2026 gross margin compression - acquisition mix, one-time cost, or structural pricing
- Management commentary on EV/electrified propulsion product roadmap and win rates
- Aftermarket revenue trajectory and mix (higher-margin, stickier)
- Net leverage trend and buyback pace at current price
- Any large one-time items inflating TTM revenue
The dominant non-fundamental force on ALSN is narrative, not macro. The market has tagged Allison as a legacy internal-combustion transmission maker with no credible electrified-propulsion story, and that framing is the reason a steady-compounder trades at a discount. Intensity is only moderate and cult coefficient is low, so there is no fan base bidding it up on dips; durability is fragile, meaning any EV-adoption headline in trucking can re-open the de-rating. That is a persistent, ordinary-to-real headwind on this specific name. The macro tape (VIX 17.7, S&P off 3%, 10y at 5%) is a market-wide crosswind, but with beta 0.97 and a defense/motorhome/aftermarket cash profile, ALSN is not the natural victim of a risk-off day; high-multiple story stocks get mauled first. So the tape trims rather than dominates here. Analyst/news flow is quiet and mildly constructive - a Fidelity Dividend Growth Fund mention framing ALSN as capturing new markets beyond commercial vehicles is a small tailwind to the 'diversification' counter-narrative, but it is one letter, not a re-rating catalyst. Net: a modest headwind, driven by the EV-orphan narrative, partially offset by low beta and benign flow.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any EV-truck adoption or fleet-electrification headline that reignites the disruption narrative
- Management commentary on electrified-propulsion roadmap at next earnings
- Whether risk-off deepens (VIX above 20 sustained) and starts dragging low-beta industrials too
- Sell-side target revisions or new coverage that reframes ALSN as a diversified powertrain play
Macro is a headwind for a capital-goods-adjacent supplier: 10y near 5% and a nearly flat curve (0.33) raise fleet and equipment financing costs and defer replacement cycles; tariffed steel, aluminum and components pressure input cost recovery across the supplier base. Offsets are real and company-specific: rising global defense budgets fund multi-year propulsion programs, and the slippage of commercial EV mandates extends the economic life of the legacy fully automatic franchise in vocational duty cycles. Infrastructure and mining capex are the swing factor for the newly acquired off-highway exposure — currently soft, which means the acquisition was consolidated near a cyclical trough rather than a peak.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for ALSN — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.