Business Description
Amazon.com, Inc. operates a vast global retail enterprise, distributing consumer goods and subscription services through both its extensive online platforms and a network of physical stores across North America and internationally. Its operations are structured into three primary segments: North America, International, and Amazon Web Services (AWS). The company's product offerings encompass both merchandise and content procured for direct resale, alongside items sold by third-party merchants on its platform. Furthermore, the company develops and markets its own range of electronic devices, such as Kindle e-readers, Fire tablets and TVs, Ring, Blink, eero, and Echo products. It also invests in the development and production of original media content. Amazon provides various programs designed to enable independent sellers to offer their products, and empowers authors, musicians, filmmakers, Twitch streamers, and app developers to publish and commercialize their content. Beyond this, it delivers a comprehensive suite of cloud computing solutions, including compute, storage, database, analytics, and machine learning services through AWS. The company also offers fulfillment services, advertising solutions, and digital content subscriptions. A key offering is Amazon Prime, its exclusive membership program. Amazon caters to a wide array of clientele, including individual consumers, third-party sellers, software developers, enterprise clients, content creators, and advertisers. Incorporated in 1994, Amazon.com, Inc. maintains its headquarters in Seattle, Washington.
Business History
Generated: Jun 16, 2026 4:58pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 4:54pm (10d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.29
Total Equity: $411.07B
Shares: 10,827,000,000
Total Debt: $65.65B
Cash: $86.81B
EBITDA: $165.34B
Total Debt: $65.65B
Cash: $86.81B
Revenue: $716.92B
Revenue: $716.92B
Revenue: $716.92B
Total Equity: $411.07B
Tax Rate: 19.7%
Equity: $411.07B
Total Debt: $65.65B
Cash: $86.81B
Current Liabilities: $218.01B
Long-Term Debt: $65.65B
Total Debt: $65.65B
Total Equity: $411.07B
Shares: 10,827,000,000
Shares: 10,827,000,000
CapEx: -$131.82B
Shares: 10,827,000,000
Stock Price: $246.41
Net Income: $77.67B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Amazon's business quality has clearly inflected upward on the income statement: revenue compounded from $469.8B (2021) to $716.9B (2025), gross margin expanded from 42% to 50.3%, and operating margin tripled from 5.3% in 2021 (and 2.4% in 2022) to 11.2% in 2025. Net income scaled from a 2022 loss of $2.7B to $77.7B in 2025 — that is genuine operating leverage, almost certainly AWS + advertising carrying retail. Balance sheet is sturdy: $123B liquid cash, $57B net cash, Altman Z of 5.55 (safe zone), and mechanical earnings-quality screens are clean (Beneish -2.59, negative accruals).
The wart is FCF. After two strong years ($32.2B in 2023 and $32.9B in 2024), FCF cratered to $7.7B in 2025 despite net income hitting a record $77.7B. That gap — earnings of $77.7B vs. FCF of $7.7B — is enormous and almost certainly capex (AI/data-center buildout) absorbing the cash. It's defensible as investment, but it means today's reported profits are NOT showing up as owner cash, and the OCF/NI of -1.85x flag in the module deserves a hard look. Capital intensity has stepped up materially.
Dilution discipline is mediocre for a company this profitable: diluted shares drifted from 10.30B (2021) to 10.83B (2025), a ~1.3% CAGR, and buybacks only offset 6.1% of SBC (2.7% of revenue). For a mature earner this rich, that's a quiet tax on per-share value. Insider tape is routine option-exercise-and-sell by Jassy and Garman — no open-market buys, but nothing alarming either.
None surfaced.
None surfaced.
At $246 and a $2.65T cap, AMZN trades on roughly the consensus thesis: AWS as the high-margin cash engine, retail margins inflecting, and AI capex as both opportunity and overhang. The e2e synthesis flagged 'High Conviction Required' — code for 'the math doesn't scream cheap on conservative inputs.' On a sum-of-parts, AWS at ~10–11x forward sales plus a low-margin retail/ads stack gets you into the $230–$270 zip code; that brackets today's price rather than dwarfing it.
The quality lens is Strong, which raises deserved value — but the same lens flagged a FCF collapse from the capex surge and slow dilution leakage. Both pull the deserved price back down. Net: I see no meaningful margin of safety here. To justify $246, the market needs AWS reacceleration to hold, retail op margin to keep climbing, and the AI capex cycle to earn its cost of capital — none heroic, but none free either. That's a fair price for a fair set of expectations, not a mispricing.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- AWS forward growth guide and backlog (RPO) trend — is the reacceleration durable?
- 2025–2026 capex guide and management framing of ROIC on AI infrastructure spend
- North America retail segment op margin trajectory in next 2 quarters
- Advertising revenue disclosure and growth rate — is mix shift to high-margin ads continuing?
- Share count / SBC trend — is dilution flattening as growth matures?
The macro backdrop is neutral-to-slightly-cautious (VIX 17, S&P off highs, 10y at 4.43%), and AMZN's 1.44 beta means a real risk-off lurch would hit it harder than defensives. But the tape is not actually risk-off - it is neutral - so that beta exposure is latent, not active. The dominant non-fundamental force on this name is its narrative: a durable platform-monopoly story with AWS plus AI (Trainium, Inferentia, Claude) as the next leg, intensity strong and durability durable. That archetype is exactly what the market wants to own right now in the mega-cap complex. Analyst tone reinforces the push: 84 Buys vs 1 Sell, target $307.77 (about 31% above spot), and recent revisions averaging $321.67 - meaning the marginal analyst is raising, not cutting. That is a clear positive divergence vs the merely neutral tape. Momentum is strong-positive and leverage is falling, which keeps the story clean and removes a common sentiment attack vector (balance-sheet worry). Net: the non-fundamental pressure on AMZN leans up, with the main risk being a macro-driven de-rating of high-beta mega-caps if the tape tips risk-off.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Next AWS growth print - any deceleration revives the 'cloud maturing' bear narrative
- VIX move above 20 or S&P breaking below recent support, which would activate the latent high-beta headwind
- Whether target revisions keep trending up (positive divergence) or roll over
- Any crack in the AI-capex ROI narrative across hyperscaler peers (MSFT, GOOGL) that would spill onto AMZN
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 4:59pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $469.8B | $514.0B | $574.8B | $638.0B | $716.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $272.3B | $288.8B | $304.7B | $326.3B | $356.4B |
| Gross Profit | $197.5B | $225.2B | $270.0B | $311.7B | $360.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $172.6B | $212.9B | $233.2B | $243.1B | $280.5B |
| Operating Income | $24.9B | $12.2B | $36.9B | $68.6B | $80.0B |
| Net Income | $33.4B | -$2.7B | $30.4B | $59.2B | $77.7B |
| EBITDA | $74.4B | $38.4B | $89.4B | $123.8B | $165.3B |
| EPS | $3.30 | $-0.27 | $2.95 | $5.66 | $7.29 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 4:55pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $36.2B | $53.9B | $73.4B | $78.8B | $86.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $161.6B | $146.8B | $172.4B | $190.9B | $229.1B |
| Total Assets | $420.5B | $462.7B | $527.9B | $624.9B | $818.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $142.3B | $155.4B | $164.9B | $179.4B | $218.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $48.7B | $67.2B | $58.3B | $52.6B | $65.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $282.3B | $316.6B | $326.0B | $338.9B | $407.0B |
| Total Equity | $138.2B | $146.0B | $201.9B | $286.0B | $411.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $85.9B | $83.2B | $113.6B | $172.9B | $250.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 4:56pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $46.3B | $46.8B | $84.9B | $115.9B | $139.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$61.1B | -$63.6B | -$52.7B | -$83.0B | -$131.8B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$14.7B | -$16.9B | $32.2B | $32.9B | $7.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.0B | -$8.3B | -$5.8B | -$7.1B | -$3.8B |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$6.0B | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$5.9B | $17.8B | $19.6B | $8.4B | $7.8B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 4:55pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$933.0B $893.7B – $990.5B
|
$1.1T $1.1T – $1.1T
|
$1.2T $1.1T – $1.2T
|
$1.3T $1.3T – $1.4T
|
| EBITDA |
$151.7B $145.3B – $161.1B
|
$173.3B $172.9B – $173.6B
|
$193.6B $185.8B – $200.8B
|
$218.5B $209.7B – $226.7B
|
| Net Income |
$108.5B $92.3B – $123.3B
|
$140.2B $106.2B – $164.7B
|
$168.8B $160.0B – $177.0B
|
$210.8B $199.8B – $221.1B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 4:59pm (10d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +9.4% | +11.8% | +11.0% | +12.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +14.0% | +19.9% | +15.4% | +15.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | -50.8% | +200.9% | +86.1% | +16.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -108.2% | +1,217.7% | +94.7% | +31.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -48.4% | +133.1% | +38.5% | +33.5% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 16, 2026 4:59pm (10d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-21 | Jassy Andrew R | M-Exempt | 50,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Jassy Andrew R | S-Sale | 5,206.00 | $261.95 | $1.4M |
| 2026-05-21 | Jassy Andrew R | S-Sale | 5,227.00 | $263.10 | $1.4M |
| 2026-05-21 | Jassy Andrew R | S-Sale | 5,667.00 | $263.95 | $1.5M |
| 2026-05-21 | Jassy Andrew R | S-Sale | 3,600.00 | $264.97 | $953,908 |
| 2026-05-21 | Jassy Andrew R | S-Sale | 300.00 | $265.61 | $79,684 |
| 2026-05-21 | Jassy Andrew R | M-Exempt | 50,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | M-Exempt | 7,836.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | M-Exempt | 1,500.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | M-Exempt | 7,836.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | S-Sale | 4,257.00 | $261.93 | $1.1M |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | M-Exempt | 4,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | S-Sale | 4,554.00 | $263.18 | $1.2M |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | M-Exempt | 1,500.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | S-Sale | 3,689.00 | $264.03 | $974,010 |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | M-Exempt | 4,860.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | S-Sale | 2,534.00 | $264.95 | $671,374 |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | M-Exempt | 4,860.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | S-Sale | 433.00 | $265.64 | $115,023 |
| 2026-05-21 | Garman Matthew S | M-Exempt | 4,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue grew from $148B (Q2'24) to $213B (Q4'25), a clean ~12% YoY trajectory with margins ratcheting from 9.1% to 9.9-11.8%. The Q1'26 print is the eye-catcher — $181.5B revenue with $30.3B net income at 16.7% margin. That's a 670bp margin jump in one quarter versus year-ago, and it would represent the highest net margin Amazon has posted in any quarter I can recall outside of the Rivian mark-up windfall in 2021. Either AWS/ads operating leverage just inflected hard, or there's a one-time item (equity gain, tax benefit) baked in. The synthesis models don't interrogate this — they should. If sustainable, TTM earnings power is closer to $90B+ and the forward P/E drops below 25; if it's a one-timer, the trailing 29x is flattering.
The capex story is where I diverge most from the bullish framing. Operating cash flow of $139.5B is fine, but capex of $131.8B leaves $7.7B of FCF on a $2.65T market cap — that's an FCF yield of 0.3%. The synthesis flagging "60% implied FCF growth" as the embedded thesis is directionally right but understates the problem: at this capex run-rate, Amazon needs AWS AI revenue to deliver Azure-like growth (>30%) AND incremental margins north of 40% just to justify the spend. The bear case the narrative layer cites — "capital intensity in logistics/data centers will pressure ROIC" — is already showing up: ROIC of 9.65% is mediocre for a "platform monopoly" and barely covers WACC. Meanwhile hyperscaler capex across MSFT/GOOG/META/AMZN is approaching $400B annually; the marginal return on the next $50B is almost certainly lower than the last $50B.
I largely agree with the synthesis "High Conviction Required" verdict but think the models are too polite about the contradictions between their own signals. Market Forces calls it "Tailwinds" then describes "balanced risk/reward" — those don't reconcile. The pre-flight notes a pullback from $278 to $246 (-11.5%) signaling skepticism, yet the narrative layer calls intensity "strong" and durability "durable." The honest read: this is a high-quality compounder priced at ~3.5x sales and ~30x earnings where the bull case requires AWS to win AI infrastructure share AND ads to keep compounding 20%+ AND retail margins to structurally expand — three independent bets, each plausible, jointly demanding. Insider activity is mixed exercise-and-sell, not informative. The contrarian argument that nobody in the stack made: if AWS AI capex is partly defensive (preventing share loss to Azure's OpenAI relationship rather than expanding TAM share), then the $131B is closer to maintenance capex than growth capex, and steady-state FCF is structurally lower than 2021-2023 levels suggest.
Net: I dissent mildly from the implicit "wait" posture. At $246 with revenue compounding 12%, a credible path to $90-100B in normalized earnings within 18 months (if Q1'26 margin is even 60% sustainable), and AWS still growing high-teens, the stock is reasonably priced — not cheap, not a screaming buy. Fair value range $230-275 depending on whether you believe Q1'26 margins are signal or noise. The right action is a held position or modest add on weakness toward $220, not a fresh high-conviction entry at $246 and not a sell. The thesis pivots entirely on the next two AWS growth prints and confirmation that the Q1'26 margin wasn't a tax/equity anomaly.
GPT Critique
In reviewing Amazon's recent financial performance, the standout figure is the dramatic net income and margin expansion in Q1 2026, where margins surged to 16.7% on $181.52 billion revenue. This is a significant leap from previous quarters, where margins hovered around 9.1% to 11.8%. Such a margin jump suggests either a substantial improvement in operational efficiency, particularly in AWS and advertising, or the presence of an extraordinary item boosting this quarter's results. A deeper analysis is warranted to determine whether this is a sustainable trend or an anomaly. Additionally, Amazon's annual revenue growth has been robust at 11.7% CAGR, with net income showing a remarkable 59.8% CAGR, reflecting strong earnings growth potentially driven by high-margin sectors like AWS.
Opus argues that the Q1 2026 margin expansion could be structural, suggesting a TTM earnings power closer to $90 billion if sustainable. I agree with this observation, as the margin expansion is pivotal in recalibrating Amazon's valuation metrics. However, I disagree with Opus's view that the synthesis models should interrogate potential one-time items more skeptically. Given Amazon's history of reinvestment and long-term strategic plays, sudden margin improvements could indeed reflect strategic shifts rather than isolated anomalies. Opus also highlights the capex challenge, with $131.8 billion spending against $139.5 billion in operating cash flow, yielding a mere $7.7 billion in FCF. I concur that this indicates a constrained cash flow situation, which might pressure future returns unless AWS's growth justifies such heavy investment.
Moreover, Opus critiques the narrative layer's mixed signals, emphasizing the need for high conviction in Amazon's multi-faceted growth bets across AWS, advertising, and retail. I agree that the narrative is demanding, relying on several aggressive growth assumptions. The skepticism around AWS's capex, particularly if it's more maintenance than growth-driven, aligns with my view that Amazon's high valuation necessitates more than just maintaining current market share—it requires significant growth in high-margin segments.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I overestimate the sustainability of current margin expansions and underestimate the operational risks associated with Amazon's scale and capital intensity. They might highlight that Amazon's current valuation reflects not just optimism but speculative belief in the company's ability to innovate and dominate new sectors, which is not guaranteed.