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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Apollo Global Management, Inc. (APO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score +4 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 15 · Value -4 · Sentiment 54 (timing only, not weighted)
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Apollo Global Management, Inc.
APO NYSEApollo Global Management, Inc. is a global alternative asset manager focused on credit, private equity, infrastructure, secondaries, and real estate. The firm provides capital solutions to companies and institutional investors across private and public markets, with an emphasis on flexible financing, investment management, and risk-adjusted return strategies. Apollo also operates a retirement services business through Athene, offering retirement savings products and related solutions designed for long-term financial security. Its business model combines asset management with retirement services, giving it exposure to both institutional capital allocation and retirement-focused markets. Apollo Global Management, Inc. plays a significant role in alternative investing by serving corporations, sponsors, insurers, and savers through a broad range of investment products and financial services.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.54
Total Equity: $42.52B
Shares: 630,324,910
Total Debt: $13.36B
Cash: $20.59B
EBITDA: $9.68B
Total Debt: $13.36B
Cash: $20.59B
Revenue: $32.05B
Revenue: $32.05B
Revenue: $32.05B
Total Equity: $42.52B
Tax Rate: 19.1%
Equity: $42.52B
Total Debt: $13.36B
Cash: $20.59B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $13.36B
Total Debt: $13.36B
Total Equity: $42.52B
Shares: 630,324,910
Shares: 630,324,910
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 630,324,910
Stock Price: $138.09
Net Income: $3.49B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 11:55am (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.0B | $11.0B | $32.6B | $26.1B | $32.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $778.0M | $927.0M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.4B |
| Gross Profit | $5.2B | $10.0B | $31.6B | $25.0B | $30.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.2B | $14.4B | $25.5B | $16.7B | $22.3B |
| Operating Income | $2.0B | -$4.4B | $6.1B | $8.3B | $8.3B |
| Net Income | $1.8B | -$2.0B | $5.0B | $4.6B | $3.5B |
| EBITDA | $2.7B | -$3.3B | $7.3B | $9.7B | $9.7B |
| EPS | $7.32 | $-3.43 | $8.32 | $7.39 | $5.58 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $7.32 | $-3.43 | $8.28 | $7.33 | $5.54 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 11:35am (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.1B | $11.1B | $17.7B | $17.1B | $20.6B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $30.5B | $259.3B | $313.5B | $377.9B | $460.9B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.1B | $6.5B | $8.1B | $10.6B | $13.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $18.5B | $252.1B | $288.2B | $346.9B | $418.4B |
| Total Equity | $12.0B | $7.2B | $25.2B | $31.0B | $42.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.1B | -$2.3B | $3.0B | $6.0B | $7.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 11:55am (57d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.1B | $3.8B | $6.3B | $3.3B | $7.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | $0 | $0 | $99.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$634.0M | $1.7B | $1.1B | $2.7B | $2.6B |
| Dividends Paid | -$517.0M | -$962.0M | -$1.0B | -$1.1B | -$1.2B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$299.0M | -$635.0M | -$561.0M | -$890.0M | -$773.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$379.0M | $9.0B | $6.6B | -$579.0M | $3.5B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 11:55am (57d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +84.3% | +197.6% | -20.0% | +22.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +94.1% | +214.9% | -21.0% | +22.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -321.4% | +240.5% | +35.0% | -0.5% |
| Net Income Growth | -206.6% | +357.4% | -9.3% | -23.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | -224.5% | +319.4% | +33.5% | -0.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 11:35am (57d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-19 | $0.56 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-19 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-17 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-18 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-16 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-18 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-18 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-16 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-16 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-16 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-16 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-17 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-19 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-17 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-16 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-17 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-17 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-17 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-18 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-18 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly tape is genuinely alarming and I think the models are underweighting it. Q1 2026 revenue collapsed to $5.06B with a $1.91B net loss (-37.7% margin) after a $9.86B Q4 2025 and $9.82B Q3 2025. That's not seasonality — that's a mark-to-market event, almost certainly Athene's investment portfolio or Apollo's own principal investments getting hit. The five-year annual sequence — $5.95B → $10.97B (with a $1.96B loss) → $32.64B → $26.11B → $32.05B — tells you this is a business whose GAAP revenue is dominated by fair-value swings on insurance assets and carry accruals, not fee streams. The 95.5% gross margin and 25.8% operating margin are essentially fictional at the consolidated level; ROE of 8.2% and ROA of 0.76% are the honest numbers, and they don't support a 25x P/E.
The synthesis verdict of $207 fair value (+50% upside) strikes me as the weakest output in the stack. A DCF on a business where one quarter can swing from +$1.74B NI to -$1.91B NI is a category error — you cannot discount cash flows you cannot forecast within an order of magnitude. The pre-flight note correctly identifies the dual-engine problem but then the synthesis ignores it. Meanwhile the Market Forces model saying "wait for a 20-30% pullback" and the Narrative model's "fragile durability, fallen-angel" framing are much closer to what the tape shows. Recent earnings YoY is -23.7% and quarterly trend is explicitly decelerating; pairing that with a Q1 loss and the model still outputs "fair_value with +49.9% upside" is internally inconsistent.
The contrarian bull case does exist and deserves airtime: Apollo's fee-related earnings (the part that matters for valuation) have been growing double-digits, Athene's spread-related earnings benefit from higher-for-longer rates once mark-to-market noise clears, and the $20.6B cash vs $13.4B debt balance sheet is genuinely fortress-like for a financial. EV/EBITDA of 7.7x is not expensive if you believe normalized earnings are closer to the 2023 $5.05B NI print than the trailing $3.49B. Insider activity is neutral-to-benign — awards and a gift, no meaningful open-market selling that I'd hang a bear thesis on. But the bull case requires you to trust that Q1 2026 is a one-time mark and not the leading edge of credit stress in private credit, where Apollo is heavily concentrated and where denominator-effect unwinds and CRE exposure are real 2026 risks.
I dissent from the synthesis $207 fair value — that number is nonsense given the data volatility. I partially agree with Market Forces: $138 is not a screaming buy and the risk/reward asks you to underwrite a credit cycle you can't see through. My read: fair value is roughly $125-150 on normalized FRE-based sum-of-parts (fee business at ~20x on ~$3.50-4.00 FRE per share, Athene at ~1.0-1.2x book), meaning APO is roughly fairly valued to modestly rich here, not 50% undervalued. The Q1 loss needs an explanation before adding; if it's isolated Athene marks that reverse with rates, this re-rates to $160+, but if private credit marks are starting to bleed, $110 is the next stop. Data gaps matter here: no FCF/capex disclosed, "revenue" is a near-meaningless GAAP artifact for this business model, and the models are all working from consolidated numbers that mix two fundamentally different businesses. Anyone paying $138 without a segment-level FRE and SRE breakdown is buying a black box.
GPT Reading
Apollo’s numbers read less like a “mature earner” and more like a high-powered but highly mark-to-model financial hybrid whose reported revenue is a poor guide to owner economics. The first thing that jumps out is the sheer instability in quarterly profitability: revenue ran from $5.06B to $9.86B over the last five quarters, while net margin swung from -37.7% in 2026 Q1 to +17.7% in 2025 Q3. That is not normal operating cyclicality; it tells you accounting marks, investment income, and insurance/credit spread dynamics are dominating the reported P&L. The annual picture says the same thing. Revenue was $32.64B in 2023, fell to $26.11B in 2024, then rebounded to $32.05B in 2025, yet operating income barely moved between 2024 and 2025 ($8.30B to $8.26B) while net income dropped from $4.58B to $3.49B. So the business can produce sizable operating earnings, but the path from operating profit to common earnings is noisy enough that a simple 25x P/E is a dangerous anchor.
What I do like is that beneath the noise, the balance sheet and cash generation are stronger than the headline volatility suggests. Apollo ended 2025 with $20.59B of cash against $13.36B of debt, so net cash is positive by about $7.2B, and debt/equity at 0.31 is not remotely distressed for a financial business with insurance-related assets and liabilities. Operating cash flow of $7.25B versus net income of $3.49B suggests the earnings base is backed by real cash generation, at least over a full year. Valuation also doesn’t scream expensive if you avoid over-fixating on GAAP net income: about 2.3x EV/revenue and 7.7x EV/EBITDA are not demanding for a franchise producing $8B+ of operating income and benefiting from permanent capital dynamics. Price/book at 2.05x is also not excessive if the company can sustain anything close to its 18.9% ROIC and mid-20s operating margin profile. At $76B market cap, the market is paying up for quality, but not paying an absurd price for a scaled alternatives-plus-retirement platform.
The real issue is whether that quality deserves a premium today given what the most recent numbers are signaling. The latest quarter was ugly: revenue down to $5.06B from $5.55B a year earlier and a $1.91B net loss versus a $442M profit in the prior-year quarter. Even if I discount that as mark volatility rather than franchise impairment, it matters because Apollo’s premium valuation rests on the idea that its earnings are more durable than a typical cyclical asset manager. The five-year history does not fully prove that. 2022 produced a $1.96B net loss and negative $4.38B operating income, and 2025 earnings remain well below 2023 despite similar revenue. Momentum data reinforces the concern: earnings CAGR of -16.8% and recent earnings down 23.7% year over year. So my read is that Apollo is a good business but not a simple compounding machine, and at $138 the market is still capitalizing a cleaner and steadier earnings stream than the reported history warrants.
The best argument against my skepticism is straightforward: you should not value Apollo on reported net income in volatile quarters because the fee-related earnings power and spread income engine are being obscured by marks. If you focus on annual operating income, the company generated over $8.2B in both 2024 and 2025, versus only $6.15B in 2023 and $1.98B in 2021. That progression says the core platform is materially larger and stronger than it was a few years ago. On that lens, 7.7x EV/EBITDA and 2.7x sales look cheap, especially for a business with scale, permanent capital, and positive net cash. The 2026 Q1 loss could easily reverse if markets cooperate, and if investors look through it, the current multiple may prove to be a trough entry into normalized earnings well above 2025’s $3.49B. I weigh that case less heavily because Apollo has now shown multiple years where “normalization” is always one period away; when volatility is a recurring feature, you should demand a discount, not a full premium.
What would change my mind is evidence that the volatility is narrowing while earnings power is compounding. Specifically, I’d want to see the next two quarters produce positive net income with aggregate earnings above $2.0B and no repeat of the extreme margin collapse, plus annualized operating cash flow staying north of $7B. If 2026 revenue can still reach roughly $30B+ while net income recovers back toward the 2024 level of $4.5B or better, then $138 would start to look undemanding and I could justify a move toward $160-$170. Conversely, if another quarter shows losses or if full-year operating income slips materially below the $8B area, I’d view the stock as priced too richly for a business with this much earnings opacity and would look for something closer to 1.6x-1.8x book, or roughly $105-$120, before getting constructive.
Grok Reading
Apollo’s raw numbers describe a scaled dual-engine franchise whose operating engine is holding while reported earnings are deteriorating and becoming violently lumpy. Full-year 2025 revenue reached $32.05B (up from $26.11B in 2024) with operating income essentially flat at $8.26B versus $8.30B, a 25.8% operating margin that still generates $7.25B of operating cash flow against a net-cash balance sheet ($20.59B cash versus $13.36B debt, D/E 0.31). Yet net income fell from $5.05B in 2023 to $4.58B in 2024 to $3.49B in 2025, and the March 2026 quarter delivered a $1.91B loss on only $5.06B of revenue—a –37.7% margin that erased more than half of the prior year’s entire profit in a single period. Trailing P/E near 25× on a –16.8% earnings CAGR and –23.7% recent earnings YoY is not a bargain if the Athene-related marks and spread compression persist; EV/EBITDA of 7.7× and EV/revenue of 2.3× look far more reasonable and are the metrics that actually support any claim of cheapness. ROE of 8.2% is mediocre for a premier alternative platform, while ROIC of 18.9% and the 95.5% gross margin confirm the fee and spread economics remain attractive when marks cooperate. At $138 the market is paying roughly 10.5× that operating cash flow for a permanent-capital complex whose AUM and insurance float should, in a normal credit regime, produce mid-to-high teens free-cash conversion; the Q1 blow-up simply proves the regime is not normal.
The valuation synthesis’s $201–207 composite therefore over-reaches. It capitalizes a normalized earnings power that the last eight quarters have refused to deliver and ignores the fact that revenue itself is swinging between $5B and $10B quarters with no clear run-rate. I haircut that figure into the mid-$160s: still a high-teens percentage above the current print, enough to call the shares modestly undervalued once the fortress liquidity and sticky Athene float are credited, but nowhere near the 50% free lunch the model advertises. The “fallen-angel” narrative is correctly fragile; the market is not irrationally punishing a pristine compounder, it is attaching a discount for opaque private-credit marks and insurance liability duration that the March quarter just validated.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward: operating income has been rock-steady near $8.3B for two years, cash exceeds debt by $7B, and a 7.7× EV/EBITDA multiple on a business with secular private-credit and retirement tailwinds has historically been a buy signal for every large alternative manager. A bull would note that the $1.91B loss is almost certainly mark-to-market rather than realized economic destruction, that 2025 revenue still grew 23% year-on-year at the recent print, and that any stabilization in rates or credit spreads would snap the multiple back toward 12–14× EV/EBITDA and produce the $180–200 outcomes the DCF implies. I weigh that case as real but incomplete: flat operating profit alongside collapsing net income and a sudden $5B revenue quarter tells me the quality of those operating dollars is lower than the headline suggests, and the market’s 25× earnings multiple already embeds a recovery that has not yet appeared in the P&L.
What flips the view is concrete and near-term. Two consecutive quarters of net income above $1.2B with revenue stabilizing above $8B, or an explicit Athene mark recovery that restores trailing twelve-month NI above $4.5B, would force me to raise fair value toward $190 and increase conviction. Conversely, another quarter of negative NI or any disclosure of permanent credit impairments inside the insurance portfolio would push the stock into fairly-valued-to-expensive territory below $120 and invert the stance.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Apollo generates real cash: FY2025 FCF of 7.25B on 32.05B revenue, with 20.59B liquid cash and 7.23B net cash. Operating margin has swung from -39.9% (2022) to 31.8% (2024) to 25.8% (2025), reflecting the mark-to-market noise of the Athene insurance book more than the underlying fee/spread business. Net income of 3.49B in 2025 with OCF/NI at 0.54x is unremarkable but consistent with an insurance-heavy balance sheet where investment portfolio flows dominate cash conversion. The Altman Z of 0.26 is a false alarm - the model is not designed for a firm whose balance sheet is dominated by an insurance investment portfolio funded by policyholder liabilities. The real quality concern is per-share dynamics: diluted shares went from 251M (2021) to 630M (2025), a 25.9% CAGR, and buybacks recover only 74.2% of SBC. Even allowing for the 2022 Athene merger driving the biggest jump, the trend since is still upward drift, and management is not aggressively defending per-share value. SBC at 2.5% of revenue is moderate. Insider tape is neutral-to-mildly-negative: zero open-market buys in twelve months, four sales totaling 7.3M (Zito, a senior investment executive), plus routine awards and gifts. Nothing alarming, no conviction buying either. Franchise durability is strong - Apollo is a top-three alternative asset manager with sticky Athene spread-related earnings and growing private credit AUM - but this profile is not visible from the raw numbers alone.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Athene-related fair-value adjustments as a share of GAAP net income to separate underlying fee/spread earnings from mark-to-market noise
- Segment breakdown: fee-related earnings vs spread-related earnings vs principal investing income for durability assessment
- Post-2022-merger share issuance pace to distinguish one-time Athene consolidation from ongoing dilution trend
- Convertible or preferred instruments outstanding that could drive further dilution
- Insurance liability duration and asset-liability matching at Athene given Altman Z misapplication concern
- Management long-term incentive plan structure and target dilution rate
The e2e composite FV of $201.56 (signal-adj $207) implies ~45-50% upside from $140.77, but that anchor leans heavily on the anchored-PE method at $279, which is aggressive for a business whose GAAP earnings are distorted by Athene mark-to-market and whose share count keeps drifting up. The EPV floor of $124.11 sits BELOW today's price, meaning on a no-growth, cash-earnings-only view you are already paying a small premium. Splitting the difference and haircutting for the weak earnings-quality signal, a defensible deserved value lands somewhere in the $170-185 zone, roughly 20-30% above spot.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- FRE (fee-related earnings) run-rate and growth vs SRE volatility - the cleaner cash number
- Net share issuance trajectory and buyback pace - is per-share value actually compounding?
- Athene mark-to-market exposure and any credit-loss reserve build in the latest 10-Q
- Management guidance on normalized earnings power ex-insurance accounting
The tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 15.5, S&P near highs) and APO's 1.51 beta means it leverages that up rather than fights it. But the dominant force this week is stock-specific: Nvidia named Apollo as one of six financiers for a $500B AI-infrastructure funding machine, and Apollo simultaneously printed a marquee $2.6B Yankees deal and crossed $1T AUM with record origination on the Q2 call. That is a narrative pivot in real time - from 'levered-up alt manager with Athene tail risk' to 'indispensable balance sheet behind the AI capex supercycle.' The fallen-angel setup (fragile durability, moderate intensity, low cult) is exactly the kind of story that flips fast when a fresh catalyst arrives, and this one lands directly on APO's business model. Offsetting: macro backdrop still has 10y at 4.65% and market PE 26, which is the bear's ammunition (credit stress, Athene float). The bear story isn't dead - it's just been shouted down for the moment. Momentum confirms the pivot: +22.7% recent vs -0.9% long-term CAGR means sentiment is already turning, and news flow is feeding it. Net: real, present tailwind, but riding a fragile narrative that needs the AI-finance story to keep printing headlines.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the Nvidia AI-financing story keeps generating follow-on headlines or fades within 2-3 weeks
- Any crack in private credit / BDC spreads that would reactivate the Athene/credit-stress bear frame
- Analyst target revisions in the next 30 days - do they capitalize on the AI-financier reframe?
- 10y yield direction - a move above 4.8% would pressure the whole alt-manager cohort regardless of narrative
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for APO — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.