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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Broadcom Inc. (AVGO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -8 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 61 · Value -77 · Sentiment -75 (timing only, not weighted)
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Broadcom Inc.
AVGO NASDAQBroadcom Inc. is a global technology leader that designs, develops, and supplies semiconductors and infrastructure software solutions. It operates through two primary segments: Semiconductor Solutions and Infrastructure Software. In semiconductors, the company provides networking connectivity products like custom silicon solutions, Ethernet switching and routing, NIC controllers, physical layer devices, and fiber optic components; wireless connectivity including RF devices and custom touch controllers; server and storage solutions such as PCIe switches, SAS products, and Fibre Channel; broadband solutions for set-top boxes and access; and industrial applications. The infrastructure software segment offers private cloud platforms like VMware Cloud Foundation, vSphere, telco cloud, and private AI; mainframe software for AIOPS, database management, and cybersecurity; endpoint and network security; and enterprise software including application networking and data services. These products support enterprise data centers, artificial intelligence networking, home connectivity, telecommunications, wireless base stations, factory automation, power systems, and electronic displays. Founded in 1961 and headquartered in Palo Alto, California, Broadcom Inc. plays a vital role in powering computing, networking, and cloud infrastructure worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.77
Total Equity: $81.29B
Shares: 4,853,000,000
Total Debt: $65.14B
Cash: $16.18B
EBITDA: $26.06B
Total Debt: $65.14B
Cash: $16.18B
Revenue: $63.89B
Revenue: $63.89B
Revenue: $63.89B
Total Equity: $81.29B
Tax Rate: -1.7%
Equity: $81.29B
Total Debt: $65.14B
Cash: $16.18B
Current Liabilities: $18.51B
Long-Term Debt: $61.98B
Total Debt: $65.14B
Total Equity: $81.29B
Shares: 4,853,000,000
Shares: 4,853,000,000
CapEx: -$623.00M
Shares: 4,853,000,000
Stock Price: $380.76
Net Income: N/A
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 29, 2026 12:29am (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $27.5B | $33.2B | $35.8B | $51.6B | $63.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $10.6B | $11.1B | $11.1B | $19.1B | $20.6B |
| Gross Profit | $16.8B | $22.1B | $24.7B | $32.5B | $43.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $8.3B | $7.9B | $8.5B | $19.0B | $17.8B |
| Operating Income | $8.5B | $14.2B | $16.2B | $13.5B | $25.5B |
| Net Income | — | $11.5B | $14.1B | $5.9B | — |
| EBITDA | $9.1B | $14.8B | $16.7B | $14.1B | $26.1B |
| EPS | $15.70 | $27.44 | $33.93 | $1.27 | $4.91 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $15.00 | $26.53 | $32.98 | $1.23 | $4.77 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 23, 2026 2:55pm (31d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $12.2B | $12.4B | $14.2B | $9.3B | $16.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $16.6B | $18.5B | $20.8B | $19.6B | $31.6B |
| Total Assets | $75.6B | $73.2B | $72.9B | $165.6B | $171.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $6.3B | $7.1B | $7.4B | $16.7B | $18.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $39.4B | $39.1B | $37.6B | $66.3B | $62.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $50.6B | $50.5B | $48.9B | $98.0B | $89.8B |
| Total Equity | $25.0B | $22.7B | $24.0B | $67.7B | $81.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $748.0M | $1.6B | $2.7B | $0 | $9.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 29, 2026 12:29am (25d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $13.8B | $16.7B | $18.1B | $20.0B | $27.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$443.0M | -$424.0M | -$452.0M | -$548.0M | -$623.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $13.3B | $16.3B | $17.6B | $19.4B | $26.9B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$8.0M | -$246.0M | -$53.0M | -$26.0B | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.6B | -$426.0M | -$403.0M | $20.3B | -$2.8B |
| Dividends Paid | -$6.2B | -$7.0B | -$7.6B | -$9.8B | -$11.1B |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$7.0B | -$5.8B | -$7.2B | -$2.5B |
| Net Change in Cash | $4.5B | $253.0M | $1.8B | -$4.8B | $6.8B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 29, 2026 12:29am (25d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +21.0% | +7.9% | +44.0% | +23.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +31.2% | +11.7% | +31.7% | +33.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +67.0% | +13.9% | -16.9% | +89.3% |
| Net Income Growth | — | +22.5% | -58.1% | — |
| EBITDA Growth | +62.9% | +13.3% | -15.9% | +85.4% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 23, 2026 2:55pm (31d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-22 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-23 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-22 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-22 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-20 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-20 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-23 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-19 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-24 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-20 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-19 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-20 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-21 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-21 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-19 | $0.46 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-21 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-21 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-21 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-21 | $0.41 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-21 | $0.36 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:32Even the bull case prices 67% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 100%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($380.91) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +66% | 22.2% | $126.57 | -67% |
| Base — stabilizes | +44% | 19.3% | $63.42 | -83% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +22% | 16.4% | $29.01 | -92% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +39% | 0.0% | $0.00 | -100% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: Q2 FY26 revenue of $22.19B on 42% net margin is a genuinely remarkable print — up from $15.00B in the year-ago quarter, a 48% YoY acceleration, not deceleration as the "Revenue Confidence" tag claims. Sequential progression $15.95B → $18.02B → $19.31B → $22.19B is accelerating, not decelerating; someone's momentum module is looking at a stale window. Annual FY25 revenue of $63.89B with $25.48B operating income and $26.91B FCF is real cash, capex only $623M — this is a capital-light franchise throwing off ~42% FCF margins. Net debt of ~$49B against $27B annual FCF is <2x, trivially serviceable. The 80x PE is distorted by VMware purchase accounting hitting FY24 NI ($5.9B on $51.6B revenue — clearly non-cash amortization drag); look at operating income ($25.48B FY25 vs $13.46B FY24) and the picture is a company nearly doubling operating earnings.
On valuation: $1.81T market cap on $27B FCF is ~67x trailing FCF, ~55x forward if you annualize the Q2 run-rate (~$88B revenue and roughly $32-35B FCF). EV/revenue of ~29x and EV/EBITDA of ~71x are software-multiple territory on a business that is still ~55% semis. The reverse-DCF here demands ~20% FCF CAGR for a decade plus terminal software margins — plausible if the AI XPU thesis holds through 2027, but leaves zero margin of safety for a Google TPU/Meta MTIA insourcing air pocket or a China revenue haircut.
Where I disagree with the prior models: the "narrative_platform" archetype is a miscategorization. Broadcom is not Palantir or Tesla — it has $27B in real, audited FCF and dominant merchant silicon share in networking (Tomahawk/Jericho) plus a captive custom-ASIC book with Google and Meta. Calling profit metrics "lagging indicators" here is wrong; the correct critique is that GAAP NI is understated by VMware amortization, not that fundamentals don't matter. The synthesis "High Conviction Required" is directionally right but soft — this isn't a story stock, it's a high-quality cyclical priced as a secular monopoly. Market Forces flagging "extreme insider selling" is fair: the insider ledger shows nine sales in ~two weeks and zero opens buys, with 25K-share clip sizes suggesting programmatic 10b5-1 unloading at these prices. The "Net Insider Buying" tag in Secondary Signals directly contradicts the transaction list — that's a data error, and it's the exact opposite of the truth. Also, "Lagging Sector Peers" is questionable given AVGO's YTD outperformance versus most semis ex-NVDA.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: hyperscaler custom-silicon revenue is lumpy and concentrated — Google and Meta together likely account for the bulk of the XPU ramp, and both have every incentive to dual-source or in-house further. If AI capex growth decelerates from ~60% to ~20% in 2026-27 (still healthy), Broadcom's growth compresses from 40%+ to teens, and a 55x FCF multiple compresses to 25-30x — that's a 40-50% price reset even with no fundamental impairment. VMware is also a real integration risk: revenue was goosed by forced subscription conversions and pricing that has enterprises actively evaluating alternatives (Nutanix, Proxmox). The 68% gross margin holds only if VMware churn stays contained. And China (~20% of historical semis revenue) remains a policy overhang that no model here weights hard enough.
My verdict: I dissent partially from the synthesis. This is not "high conviction required" — it's straightforwardly overvalued on any reasonable base case, but backed by a genuinely great business. At 55x forward FCF with ~40% growth and 42% FCF margins, you're paying for perfect execution through 2027 with insiders actively taking the other side of your trade at $380. Fair value on a normalized $35B FCF and a still-generous 30x multiple is ~$1.05T, or roughly $220/share. Even granting AI-cycle premium and giving credit for the software mix shift, $280-300 is where I'd start a position. Above $350, the risk/reward is
GPT Reading
What jumps out to me is not just that Broadcom is growing fast, but that the earnings power has snapped back far more sharply than the headline annual GAAP figures suggest. The latest two quarters did $19.31B and $22.19B of revenue with net margins of 38.1% and 42%, versus $14.92B and $15.00B in the comparable 2025 quarters. That is roughly 29% and 48% year-over-year growth on an already enlarged base, and the mix is clearly getting richer as the post-VMware model settles. The oddity is 2024 annual net income of only $5.90B on $51.57B revenue, followed by quarterly net income recovering to $4.97B, $4.14B, $7.35B, and $9.31B across the last four reported quarters. That pattern screams accounting noise and integration charges rather than a structurally weak franchise. Meanwhile, free cash flow of $26.91B on $63.89B annual revenue with only $623M of capex confirms this is a cash machine, not a capital-hungry semiconductor fabricator. My read is simple: Broadcom today is a hybrid of premium infrastructure software economics and AI-networking/custom-silicon exposure, and the market is paying up because that hybrid is unusually profitable and unusually scarce.
The balance sheet does not worry me nearly as much as the valuation does. With $65.14B of debt and $16.18B of cash, net debt is about $49B, which against $27.54B of operating cash flow or $26.91B of free cash flow is manageable. Equity of $81.29B and a current ratio of 1.7 are perfectly fine for this type of business. The issue is that the stock is already capitalizing this quality at an extreme level: $1.81T market cap is about 28x FY25 revenue and about 67x trailing free cash flow. Even if I give them a generous run-rate and assume revenue around the high-$80Bs and free cash flow in the low-to-mid $30Bs, you are still around 50x-plus FCF for a company that remains meaningfully exposed to customer concentration, enterprise software integration, and semiconductor cycle risk. The business is excellent; the stock is priced as if excellence compounds uninterrupted.
I agree with Opus on several important points. Opus argues the “decelerating” label is wrong, and that is plainly correct: the sequence from $15.95B to $18.02B to $19.31B to $22.19B is acceleration, not slowdown. I also agree with Opus that the “narrative_platform” framing is a category error. Broadcom is not being valued on dream economics without proof; it already throws off nearly $27B of annual free cash flow and posted a 39.9% operating margin in FY25. I further agree that the insider data contradicts the “Net Insider Buying” signal. The actual ledger is overwhelmingly sales, including repeated 25,000-share disposals and multiple large June 24 sales. Finally, I agree with Opus that GAAP PE near 80x is not the right anchor because FY24 net income was clearly distorted relative to operating income and subsequent quarterly profitability.
Where I part company with Opus is mainly on valuation severity. Opus says fair value is around $220 per share based on a normalized $35B FCF and a 30x multiple. I think that is too punitive for a business with 67.8% gross margin, 39.9% operating margin, nearly 20% ROIC, capital-light cash conversion, and a demonstrated ability to push quarterly net margin back above 40%. A straight 30x multiple may fit a mature software company or a high-quality semiconductor name separately, but Broadcom deserves a premium because it combines both attributes and has shown it can scale them together. On the other hand, I absolutely agree with Opus’s core claim that the stock is overvalued above $350. I just would not haircut it as hard as he does. My base case is that fair value is closer to $290-320, assuming the current revenue run-rate is mostly durable but that the market eventually settles on a lower multiple than today’s roughly 67x trailing FCF and 29x sales. That still implies meaningful downside from $381 without requiring any collapse in fundamentals.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus’s would say we are still anchoring too much on trailing economics in the middle of a step-function upgrade cycle. If AI networking and custom silicon keep compounding and VMware sustains pricing power with limited churn, then annual revenue can move from $63.89B to something far above an $88B run-rate, and today’s multiple could compress naturally through growth rather than through price decline. The skeptic would also point out that annual net income data are messy enough to make any single valuation framework fragile. But the same skeptic would have to admit the reverse risk is brutal too: at $1.81T, even a shift from 40%-plus growth to mid-teens can justify a major re-rating. That asymmetry is why I land bearish on the stock, though less bearish than Opus.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Broadcom is a cash-gushing semi and infrastructure-software platform: revenue scaled from $27.5B (2021) to $63.9B (2025), FCF from $13.3B to $26.9B, and gross margin sits at 67.8% with operating margin recovering to 39.9% after the VMware-integration dip to 26.1% in 2024. OCF/NI of 2.04x, accruals of -7.1% of assets, and Altman Z of 13.14 all point to genuinely high-quality earnings - the reported profits are backed by cash. Balance-sheet posture is the main structural constraint: net debt of roughly $49B against only $16B liquid cash, a consequence of the VMware acquisition. However $26.9B/yr FCF makes this eminently serviceable, and buybacks are running at 119.9% of SBC, so per-share discipline post-deal is actually reasonable despite SBC at 11.9% of revenue. The optical red flag - diluted share count going from ~427M to ~4.85B - is the 10-for-1 stock split plus VMware stock consideration, not runaway dilution. Insider tape is heavy one-way selling (Samueli, Brazeal, Delly, Page) with essentially no open-market buys, which is normal for a mega-cap with long-tenured insiders but is not a vote of incremental conviction.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment mix and organic vs VMware-driven growth in the 10-K to confirm the software integration is accretive on an underlying basis
- Customer concentration - specifically the share of revenue tied to a single hyperscaler AI-ASIC customer
- Debt maturity ladder and covenants on the ~$49B net debt stack post-VMware
- Whether the 53 insider sales are 10b5-1 plan-driven vs discretionary
- Actual organic share-count change ex-split and ex-VMware issuance to assess ongoing dilution discipline
Broadcom trades at $380.91 for a $1.81T market cap on roughly $65B of revenue - that is ~28x sales and, on consensus forward earnings power, a mid-30s P/E for a semis-plus-software hybrid. The e2e synthesis itself flags 'High Conviction Required,' which is code for: the fair value depends entirely on which growth assumption you feed the DCF. Bull-case models that extrapolate hyperscaler ASIC and networking demand can print fair values well above spot; base-case models that normalize chip cyclicality land near or below today's price. That is not a margin-of-safety setup - it is a coin flip on narrative.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- AI/custom-silicon revenue disclosure and customer concentration in next 10-Q
- VMware ARR, churn, and margin trajectory post-integration
- Hyperscaler capex guidance from MSFT/GOOG/META/AMZN for 2025-2026
- Any commentary on ASIC design-win pipeline beyond current two anchor customers
- Gross margin durability as VMware mix stabilizes
AVGO sits at the epicenter of a narrative that is starting to crack in real time. The 72h news flow is dominated by 'Chip Stocks Extend Pullback Amid AI Bubble Fears' and 'Big Tech Credit Risk Flashes Urgent Warning Over AI Spending' - exactly the kind of headlines that de-rate a platform-monopoly AI story where the bear case explicitly flags unprecedented growth expectations on a $65B base. With beta 1.46 and a neutral-leaning-headwind tape (VIX 18.2, S&P off highs, 10y at 4.65%), macro pressure gets amplified, not muted, on this name.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the 'AI bubble fears' headlines widen into a sustained rotation or fade within a week
- Hyperscaler capex guidance from MSFT/META/GOOGL/AMZN prints - the direct sentiment pivot for AVGO
- Credit spread behavior on big tech debt - the 'credit risk' angle is a new vector
- Any VMware integration milestone or slip that reshapes the software-lock-in narrative
- Sell-side target revisions post-pullback - are they defending or trimming
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 29, 2026, AVGO was $380.91. We expect it to be $378.00 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $300.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 29, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.