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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Booking Holdings Inc. (BKNG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +8 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 82 · Value -52 · Sentiment 44 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $3,251.25 vs $207.02 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
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Booking Holdings Inc.
BKNG NASDAQBooking Holdings Inc. is a leading provider of online travel and related services to consumers and partners in over 220 countries and territories. Operating through prominent brands such as Booking.com, Priceline, Agoda, KAYAK, OpenTable, Rentalcars.com, and Momondo, the company facilitates a wide array of travel bookings including accommodations, flights, rental cars, vacation packages, cruises, activities, and restaurant reservations. Booking.com serves as the flagship platform for hotel and alternative lodging reservations, while Priceline offers discounted travel options and affiliate services. Agoda focuses on accommodations and transportation in Asia and beyond, KAYAK provides meta-search for comparing itineraries and prices, and OpenTable specializes in restaurant bookings and management tools. Additional offerings include travel insurance and advertising services. Founded in 1997 and headquartered in Norwalk, Connecticut, Booking Holdings Inc. plays a central role in the global travel technology sector, connecting travelers with service providers through innovative digital marketplaces.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 165.57
Total Equity: -$5.58B
Shares: 32,639,000
Total Debt: $18.74B
Cash: $17.20B
EBITDA: $9.45B
Total Debt: $18.74B
Cash: $17.20B
Revenue: $26.92B
Revenue: $26.92B
Revenue: $26.92B
Total Equity: -$5.58B
Tax Rate: 20.9%
Equity: -$5.58B
Total Debt: $18.74B
Cash: $17.20B
Current Liabilities: $16.70B
Long-Term Debt: $16.86B
Total Debt: $18.74B
Total Equity: -$5.58B
Shares: 32,639,000
Shares: 32,639,000
CapEx: -$322.00M
Shares: 32,639,000
Stock Price: $210.25
Net Income: N/A
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 5:00am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $11.0B | $17.1B | $21.4B | $23.7B | $26.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $8.5B | $12.0B | $15.5B | $16.2B | $18.1B |
| Operating Income | $2.5B | $5.1B | $5.8B | $7.6B | $8.8B |
| Net Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| EBITDA | $2.9B | $5.6B | $6.3B | $8.1B | $9.4B |
| EPS | $28.39 | $76.70 | $118.67 | $174.96 | $166.52 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $28.17 | $76.35 | $117.40 | $172.69 | $165.57 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:33am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $11.1B | $12.2B | $12.1B | $16.2B | $17.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $13.1B | $15.8B | $17.0B | $20.5B | $22.3B |
| Total Assets | $23.6B | $25.4B | $24.3B | $27.7B | $29.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $6.2B | $8.5B | $13.3B | $15.6B | $16.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $8.9B | $12.0B | $12.2B | $14.9B | $16.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $17.5B | $22.6B | $27.1B | $31.7B | $34.8B |
| Total Equity | $6.2B | $2.8B | -$2.7B | -$4.0B | -$5.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $24.5B | $27.5B | $31.8B | $36.5B | $40.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 5:00am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.8B | $6.6B | $7.3B | $8.3B | $9.4B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$304.0M | -$368.0M | -$345.0M | -$429.0M | -$322.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.5B | $6.2B | $7.0B | $7.9B | $9.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.2B | $0 | $0 | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.1B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $3.5B | -$1.3B |
| Dividends Paid | — | $0 | $0 | -$1.2B | -$1.2B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$163.0M | -$6.6B | -$10.4B | -$6.5B | -$6.4B |
| Net Change in Cash | $570.0M | $1.1B | -$116.0M | $4.1B | $1.1B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 5:00am (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +56.0% | +25.0% | +11.1% | +13.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +104.4% | +14.4% | +29.5% | +16.8% |
| Net Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| EBITDA Growth | +90.4% | +14.2% | +28.5% | +16.0% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:33am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-05 | $0.42 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-06 | $10.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-05 | $9.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-05 | $9.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-06 | $9.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-07 | $9.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-06 | $8.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-06 | $8.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-07 | $8.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-07 | $8.75 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:36Recovery pays +480%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 100%. Ratio 4.8:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($207.02) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +18% | 10.6% | $1,201.63 | +480% |
| Base — stabilizes | +12% | 9.3% | $866.78 | +319% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +6% | 7.9% | $606.70 | +193% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +11% | 0.0% | $0.00 | -100% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers here are a mess and the models are almost certainly hallucinating around them. BKNG at $210 with a $150B market cap cannot possibly have a P/E of 1.27, EV/EBITDA of 0.88, or EV/revenue of 0.31 on $26.9B of 2025 revenue — that would imply an EV of ~$8B against a company generating $9.1B of free cash flow. The real BKNG trades around $4,000-5,000/share, not $210. Either this is post-split adjusted price data spliced onto unadjusted fundamentals, or someone divided by a factor of ~20. The synthesis model's "fair value $3,487 vs price $207" verdict swallowed this error whole and produced a comically wrong 1,584% upside call. The narrative layer at least caught the smell ("catastrophic DCF error") but still framed it as a market repricing question rather than a data integrity failure. That's the first thing a careful reader should flag: the entire quantitative stack downstream of the price/multiples feed is unreliable.
Setting the price artifact aside and looking at the underlying business, the trajectory is genuinely strong. Revenue compounded from $10.96B (2021) to $26.92B (2025) — a 25% CAGR off the COVID trough, decelerating to a still-healthy 13.4% YoY in the most recent print. Operating income scaled from $2.50B to $8.83B, with 2025 operating margin at 32.8% — that's expansion, not compression. FCF of $9.09B on $322M capex is a 34% FCF margin, extraordinary for consumer cyclical. Negative book equity (-$5.58B) is a buyback artifact, not distress — cash of $17.2B exceeds debt of $18.7B, and OCF covers debt in two years. The insider tape is benign: routine May awards and small July sales, nothing informative. Quarterly seasonality (Q3 always the summer travel peak at $9.01B, Q1 the trough at $4.76B) is intact and normal. This is a high-quality compounder, not a dividend-income name — the rule-based classifier is wrong, and the pre-flight "traditional mature cash cow" framing understates the 13% top-line growth.
The contrarian case, which the models under-weight, is real: Booking's take rate is under structural pressure from Google's expanding travel surfaces, from Airbnb's direct-supply model, and from AI-native trip planners that could disintermediate the search/compare layer where Booking earns its rent. The 13% growth is partly a post-COVID travel supercycle mean-reverting toward normal — European travel volumes have normalized, and 2026 Q1 revenue of $5.53B vs 2025 Q1 of $4.76B is +16%, still fine, but the "revenue confidence: decelerating" flag matters as we lap tougher comps. Marketing spend as a share of revenue is the tell nobody in the model stack examined; if Booking is paying Google more per incremental booking, that 32.8% operating margin is the peak, not the floor. Macro headwinds flagged in secondary signals are legitimate — travel is discretionary, and any consumer rollover hits Booking's high-margin agency model faster than the merchant-model peers.
My verdict: I dissent from the synthesis "undervalued +1,584%" call because that number is a data error, not an insight — but I partially agree with the underlying direction. Booking is a genuinely undervalued high-quality compounder if the actual share price is in the $4,000-5,000 range with a real P/E in the high teens against 13% revenue growth, 34% FCF margins, and $9B annual FCF supporting aggressive buybacks (the negative equity is evidence of shareholder-friendly capital return). At a normalized 20-22x FCF on $9B FCF, fair value EV sits around $180-200B, which against ~$1.5B net debt and ~34M shares (approximate) suggests fair value per real share in the $5,200-5,800 range — meaningful upside from the ~$4,700 actual level, but nowhere near the fake $3,487 target. The bear risks (Google, AI disintermediation, take-rate compression) are the correct things to watch, and I'd size accordingly rather than back the truck up. Conviction is moderate because the data integrity issue in this file prevents me from anchoring precisely, and the deceleration in revenue confidence is a legitimate yellow flag heading into 2026 comps.
GPT Reading
The first thing to fix is the price. A $150.5B market cap against a quoted stock price of $210 is impossible for Booking’s share count; the canonical multiples are also obviously broken. A business that did $26.9B of 2025 revenue, $8.83B of operating income, and $9.09B of free cash flow is not trading at 0.25x sales, 0.9x EV/EBITDA, or 1.3x earnings unless the price feed is wrong by an order of magnitude. So the model output calling this “deeply undervalued” is not insight; it is garbage-in-garbage-out. The raw operating data tell a much more ordinary story: a very high-quality, mature internet platform compounding revenue at a respectable but slowing rate, with elite margins and cash conversion. Revenue rose from $23.74B in 2024 to $26.92B in 2025, up 13.4%, while operating income increased from $7.56B to $8.83B, taking operating margin from 31.8% to 32.8%. Free cash flow at $9.09B on $26.92B of revenue is a 33.8% FCF margin, which is excellent for any travel business.
The quarterly pattern reinforces both the strength and the maturity. 2025 quarterly revenue grew 13% in Q1, 16% in Q2, 13% in Q3, and 16% in Q4 versus 2024 comps, then 2026 Q1 slowed back to 16%? No—using the provided numbers, 2026 Q1 at $5.53B versus 2025 Q1 at $4.76B is also about 16%, so growth is holding in the low-to-mid teens, but against a heavily seasonal base and after a sharp post-Covid normalization already occurred. This is not an early-stage compounding machine; it is a scaled marketplace still taking share and monetizing well. The balance sheet is also better than the negative equity line suggests. Cash of $17.2B nearly offsets $18.74B of debt, so net debt is only about $1.5B, trivial relative to $9.4B of operating cash flow. Negative equity here is far more likely the byproduct of aggressive buybacks than financial distress. That combination—modest net leverage, tiny capex of $322M, and huge cash generation—means the business has significant resilience even if travel demand softens.
My read, then, is favorable on the company but skeptical on the “undervalued” claim because the valuation data are corrupted. On actual fundamentals, Booking deserves a premium multiple to most consumer cyclicals: 30%+ operating margins, low capital intensity, and a dominant global accommodation demand funnel are not normal. But it is still exposed to macro travel demand, Google/disintermediation pressure, and the reality that a lot of its growth from 2021 to 2025 was recovery plus pricing/mix. Revenue has gone from $10.96B in 2021 to $26.92B in 2025, a 25%+ annualized rebound, while operating income has more than tripled from $2.50B to $8.83B; that pace is not durable indefinitely. If the real stock price is around ten times the quoted figure—as the market cap implies—then the market is probably already valuing BKNG as a premium compounder, and that feels roughly right rather than obviously cheap.
The best bear case against my caution is straightforward: even stripped of the bad multiples, the business quality is so high that paying up can still work. A company growing revenue 13%-16%, expanding operating profit faster than sales, and converting over one-third of revenue into free cash flow can sustain a premium for years. Net debt is negligible, the platform has network effects, and the seasonality of travel hasn’t prevented a steady annual climb in revenue from $17.09B in 2022 to $21.37B in 2023 to $23.74B in 2024 to $26.92B in 2025. If management can keep delivering mid-teens revenue growth with 32%-plus operating margins, then concerns about maturity are too conservative and the right answer is simply “great business, own it.” I weigh that argument less heavily because travel is one of the most cyclical categories in consumer internet, and when a mature platform is already this efficient, future upside depends more on sustaining volume growth than on finding much more margin.
What would change my mind is clean evidence on either valuation integrity or operating inflection. If the quoted price is indeed wrong and the real trading level implies a materially lower-than-peer FCF multiple despite $9B of annual free cash flow, I would turn bullish quickly. Operationally, I’d get more positive if the next two quarters show revenue still compounding at 14%-16% while operating margin stays at or above 33%, because that would indicate Booking is sustaining premium growth without sacrificing profitability. I’d get more negative if quarterly growth drops into high single digits, especially if that coincides with margin compression toward 30% or a material rise in net debt, because that would suggest the post-recovery engine is finally normalizing into a slower, less special business.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a cash-compounding machine, not the broken-multiple bargain the models claim. Booking just printed $26.92B of 2025 revenue at a 32.8% operating margin ($8.83B op income) and converted nearly all of it into $9.09B of free cash flow on a trivial $322M capex base. Revenue has compounded at 12.2% and FCF at 13.9%, with the latest four quarters still running +13–16% year-on-year ($5.53B in Q1 2026 vs $4.76B a year earlier; $9.01B peak summer quarter). Against a $150.5B market cap and ~$152B enterprise value, that is a 6.0% FCF yield and roughly 16.5–17× forward cash earnings for a business still growing low-double digits. The reported 1.27× P/E, 0.25× P/S and 14% dividend yield are simply garbage—unit or share-count errors that also produced the absurd $3,507 “fair value.” Ignore them. Negative equity of –$5.58B is the accounting residue of years of aggressive buybacks, not leverage stress; net debt is only ~$1.5B against $17.2B cash. The story the clean data tell is a mature, asset-light global OTA still taking share and expanding margins while returning essentially all free cash.
What stands out is the persistence of growth and margin after the post-COVID snap-back. Operating margin climbed from the mid-20s in 2021–23 into the low-30s and is still edging higher; FCF conversion sits near 100% of operating profit. That profile does not match the “slow-growth cash cow priced for mid-single-digit earnings” thesis embedded in some of the pre-flight commentary. At 16–17× FCF with 12% top-line momentum, the stock is inexpensive relative to quality, but it is not a 15× mispricing. A disciplined DCF that fades growth to high-single digits and applies a mid-teens exit multiple lands in the mid-$240s to low-$270s on the current share-price scale—call it 15–30% upside, not 1,500%.
The strongest counter-argument is that you are already paying a full multiple for a cyclical consumer name facing real structural threats, and several secondary signals are flashing yellow. Revenue confidence is tagged “decelerating,” the macro overlay is headwinds, and the stock sits below sector benchmarks. Google’s travel ambitions, Airbnb’s continued share gains in alternative accommodations, and hotel chains’ direct-booking incentives are not theoretical; any sustained take-rate pressure or AI-driven disintermediation would compress both growth and the 33% margin that underpins the entire thesis. Travel remains economically sensitive—another demand air-pocket like 2020 would hit the multiple hard before the cash-flow engine is impaired. Insiders are net neutral-to-light sellers, and the complete absence of reported net income figures in the briefing leaves a residual question mark on below-the-line items and true owner earnings. A skeptic would also note that 33% operating margins leave limited room for further expansion, so the bull case rests almost entirely on volume and capital returns rather than operating leverage. Those points are real; I simply weigh the demonstrated FCF durability and still-double-digit growth more heavily than the narrative risks that have been well-telegraphed for years.
I would flip to outright bearish if trailing twelve-month revenue growth falls below 6–7% or if operating margin compresses below 28% on a sustained basis—evidence that take-rate or mix pressure has become structural. Conversely, two more quarters of ≥12% growth with stable-to-rising margins and continued $8B+ buybacks/dividends would justify a re-rating toward 20× FCF and push me to high conviction. Until then the stock looks modestly cheap on cash generation, not the deep-value hallucination the broken models are selling.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue compounded from $10.96B (2021) to $26.92B (2025) - roughly 2.5x in four years - while operating margin expanded from 22.8% to 32.8%. That is a rare combination: scale AND widening operating leverage in a mature category. Free cash flow scaled in lockstep from $2.52B to $9.09B, implying FCF margin around 34%, which is a hallmark of a capital-light, network-driven platform. Altman Z of 6.68 sits deep in the safe zone and no mechanical earnings-quality red flags surfaced. Diluted share count fell from 41.4M to 32.6M (roughly -5.8% CAGR), so per-share economics have compounded faster than the headline growth. Balance sheet carries net debt of about $1.53B against $17.2B liquid cash and $9B+ annual FCF, so leverage is a capital-structure choice, not a constraint. Insider tape shows only routine sales and equity grants - nothing directional or alarming. Overall this reads as one of the highest-quality consumer-internet businesses in the market: durable demand, dominant global OTA position (inferred), improving profitability, and disciplined capital return.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Take-rate and merchant-vs-agency mix trend in the 10-K - is margin expansion structural or mix-driven?
- Marketing spend as % of revenue and dependence on Google/paid channels for traffic acquisition
- Debt maturity ladder and any convertible notes that could reintroduce dilution
- Geographic concentration (Europe historically dominant) and FX sensitivity
- Whether the insider sales are 10b5-1 pre-planned vs discretionary
- Regulatory posture in EU (DMA gatekeeper status) and any pending fines/remedies
The e2e composite fair value of $3,507 (and DCF of $4,798) versus a $207 price implies a 15x-plus mispricing on a $150B mega-cap that sell-side covers exhaustively. That is not credible. Either the model is quoting a pre-split figure, using absolute dollar FCF against per-share price, or extrapolating 8% perpetual growth on a business already capturing ~80% of online hotel bookings in developed markets. I discount the composite heavily and lean on the EPV floor of $2,217 as similarly suspect. Working from fundamentals instead: BKNG generates roughly $9B of annual FCF against a $150B cap, a ~6% FCF yield on a Fortress-quality compounder that has shrunk share count ~20% and grown revenue 2.5x in four years. For a business of this quality with mid-single-digit to low-double-digit durable growth, that yield is reasonable but not a gift - peer travel/platform names trade in a similar band. The bear case (terminal saturation, regulatory fee pressure, AI-agent disintermediation) is real but not imminent, and the bull case (metaplatform lock-in, buyback flywheel) is largely already in the price. Net: this is a great business at a full-to-fair price. The margin of safety is thin. I would need a meaningful pullback before the risk-reward tilts clearly in the buyer's favor.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest quarterly room-night growth and take-rate trend vs guidance
- Buyback pace and remaining authorization
- Any AI/agent partnership disclosures or defensive moves in the last transcript
- Segment mix shift into flights/experiences and its margin drag
- Any regulatory updates in EU on OTA fees
The pressure on BKNG right now is net positive and news-driven. Q2 printed a beat on both lines, the stock jumped roughly 6% on the day, and management framed AI plans and a 'connected trip' strategy as forward narrative fuel. Coverage tone across Zacks, Investing.com and Barron's is uniformly constructive, emphasizing that demand held up even against Middle East conflict volatility. For a platform name with a durable (if low-intensity) monopoly narrative, this is the kind of clean earnings-day tailwind that tends to linger for days to weeks. The macro tape amplifies this modestly: risk-on regime, VIX 15.8, S&P near highs, and BKNG's beta of 1.07 means it participates in up-tape rather than fights it. The offset is real but secondary: 10y at 4.63% and market PE 27.7 are a slow-drip headwind on any long-duration cash-flow story, and the narrative itself is characterized as minimal intensity - there is no cult bid or momentum-chaser crowd defending this name if the tape rolls. Consumer cyclical exposure also leaves it vulnerable to any growth-scare rotation. Net: the immediate news pulse and tape both lean tailwind, but it is an earnings-reaction tailwind, not a narrative mania, so it fades unless follow-through news sustains it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether sell-side target revisions post-Q2 skew upward and by how much
- Follow-through price action 3-5 days after the beat - fade or hold
- Any escalation in Middle East conflict that would re-price travel demand
- Rotation signals out of consumer cyclicals if the risk-on tape wobbles
- Signs the AI-native competitor bear thesis gains traction in analyst notes
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 6, 2026, BKNG was $207.02. We expect it to be $226.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $170.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 6, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.