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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (BR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -1 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 68 · Value -57 · Sentiment 11 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $138.23 vs $158.02 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc.
BR NYSEBroadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. is a financial technology and corporate services company that provides critical infrastructure for the global financial industry. Headquartered in Lake Success, New York, it focuses on automating and streamlining operations for broker-dealers, banks, asset and wealth managers, and corporate issuers. The company’s core activities span investor communication solutions, including proxy distribution, regulatory and shareholder communications, and virtual shareholder meetings, helping clients manage corporate governance and meet compliance requirements at scale. Broadridge also delivers technology and operations platforms that support trading, post-trade processing, and portfolio and account management across multiple asset classes and markets. Its systems are embedded in front-, middle-, and back-office workflows, making the firm a key utility-like provider in capital markets and wealth management. By combining software, data, and communications capabilities, Broadridge plays a central role in enabling efficient securities processing, transparent shareholder engagement, and reliable information flows across the financial ecosystem.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.10
Total Equity: $2.66B
Shares: 118,300,000
Total Debt: $3.25B
Cash: $561.50M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $3.25B
Cash: $561.50M
Revenue: $6.89B
Revenue: $6.89B
Revenue: $6.89B
Total Equity: $2.66B
Tax Rate: 20.7%
Equity: $2.66B
Total Debt: $3.25B
Cash: $561.50M
Current Liabilities: $1.86B
Long-Term Debt: $2.75B
Total Debt: $3.25B
Total Equity: $2.66B
Shares: 118,300,000
Shares: 118,300,000
CapEx: -$43.80M
Shares: 118,300,000
Stock Price: $157.50
Net Income: $839.50M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:57pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.0B | $5.7B | $6.1B | $6.5B | $6.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.6B | $4.1B | $4.3B | $4.6B | $4.8B |
| Gross Profit | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $744.3M | $832.3M | $849.0M | $916.8M | $948.2M |
| Operating Income | $678.7M | $759.9M | $936.4M | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| Net Income | $547.5M | $539.1M | $630.6M | $698.1M | $839.5M |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $4.73 | $4.62 | $5.36 | $5.93 | $7.17 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $4.65 | $4.55 | $5.30 | $5.86 | $7.10 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:35pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $274.5M | $224.7M | $252.3M | $304.4M | $561.5M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Total Assets | $8.1B | $8.2B | $8.2B | $8.2B | $8.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.3B | $1.3B | $2.4B | $1.4B | $1.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.9B | $3.8B | $2.2B | $3.4B | $2.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $6.3B | $6.2B | $6.0B | $6.1B | $5.9B |
| Total Equity | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.4B | $3.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:57pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $640.1M | $443.5M | $823.3M | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$51.9M | -$29.0M | -$38.4M | -$57.4M | -$43.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | $588.2M | $414.5M | $784.9M | $998.8M | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.6B | -$13.3M | $0 | -$34.3M | -$193.5M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $2.1B | -$95.5M | -$385.0M | -$60.0M | -$104.4M |
| Dividends Paid | -$261.7M | -$290.7M | -$331.0M | -$368.2M | -$402.3M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$21.5M | -$22.8M | -$24.3M | -$485.4M | -$134.9M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$202.1M | -$49.9M | $27.6M | $52.1M | $257.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:57pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +14.3% | +6.2% | +7.4% | +5.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +11.9% | +12.1% | +8.3% | +10.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | +12.0% | +23.2% | +8.6% | +16.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -1.5% | +17.0% | +10.7% | +20.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:36pm (20d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-12 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-16 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-12 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-11 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-12 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-13 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-13 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-12 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-14 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-14 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-14 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-14 | $0.73 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-14 | $0.73 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-14 | $0.73 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-14 | $0.73 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-14 | $0.64 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-14 | $0.64 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-14 | $0.64 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-14 | $0.64 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Reading the raw numbers first: BR is a fiscal-year-June filer, so the "2026-03-31" quarter is FY26 Q3. Rev sequencing shows the seasonal pattern clearly — Q1 (Sep) is trough, Q4 (Jun) is peak. Comparing like-for-like: FY26 Q3 rev $1.95B vs FY25 Q3 $1.81B = +7.7% YoY; NI $276M vs $243M = +13.6%. FY26 Q2 rev +7.5% YoY, NI +100% (off a weak comp). FY26 Q1 rev +12% YoY, NI +107%. That's genuine acceleration on both lines, not deceleration — the "decelerating quarterly trend" flag in secondary signals looks like a sequential-quarter artifact (Q3 is smaller than Q4 by design). Full-year FY25 delivered $6.89B rev (+5.8%), $839M NI (+20%), $1.13B FCF. TTM NI is running ~$1.10B (sum of last 4Q: 276+285+165+374), so trailing P/E on $17.8B cap is ~16x, not the 22x annual tag — the canonical metric is stale.
Balance sheet: $3.25B debt / $2.66B equity, D/E 1.22, current ratio 0.98. Net debt ~$2.7B is ~2.4x FCF — modest for a utility-like recurring-revenue business. ROIC 17.6%, ROE 31.6% on a 7x book — the book is depressed by buybacks/goodwill, so ROE is inflated but ROIC is the honest number and it's genuinely good. Insider "activity" is just July 2026 equity grants — noise, ignore.
Where I disagree with the prior stack: the Valuation Synthesis calls this "fully_priced" at $135 fair value vs $157.5, arguing all three methods agree on overvaluation. But if TTM earnings are ~$1.10B and growing 15%+ (with FCF growing 20% CAGR over 5 years), a 16x trailing P/E on a regulatory-moated, switching-cost-heavy processor is not demanding. Pre-Flight's claim of a "42% drawdown from 52-week highs" I can't verify from this file but if true, and fundamentals are accelerating not decelerating, the synthesis DCF anchor of $120 looks too conservative — probably using 3-4% terminal growth when trailing FCF CAGR is 20% and revenue is compounding 6-7%. The Market Narrative layer flagging "~$22/share of story premium" assumes the fundamentals are worth only $135; if you re-anchor to $1.10B TTM earnings × a defensible 20x (in line with peers like FIS, FISV/FI, SEIC quality tier), you get ~$22B market cap or ~$195/share. The bear case of "3-4% earnings growth trajectory" is contradicted by the actual 15.4% earnings CAGR and 20% recent YoY.
Contrarian pushback on my own read: (1) the FY26 Q3 net margin of 14.1% is below FY25 Q3's 13.4%... wait, it's actually higher. Real concern: Q3 NI growth of 13.6% is well below Q1-Q2 pace, suggesting the easy comps are done and normalized growth is closer to high-single-digits, not 20%. (2) Current ratio under 1.0 and debt/equity 1.22 mean this is not a fortress balance sheet — a shock to proxy/event volumes (recession-linked M&A drought, corporate action slowdown) would hit both revenue and the leverage cushion. (3) Broadridge's proxy oligopoly is real but SEC rule changes on proxy delivery (universal proxy, potential e-delivery mandates) are a slow-boil regulatory risk the narrative layer ignores. (4) 2.7x EV/revenue on a 17% operating margin business is not cheap on an absolute basis; if operating margins mean-revert to the 14-15% of three years ago, the multiple compresses. (5) Customer concentration — top clients are the big US brokers (Schwab, Fidelity, Morgan Stanley); any insourcing move would be material.
Net: I dissent partially with the synthesis. The $135 signal-adjusted fair value looks 10-15% too low because it appears to underweight the accelerating earnings trajectory and the actual FCF conversion (FCF > NI most years). My fair value band is $155-175 using 18-20x trailing earnings with a mid-single-digit growth fade — which brackets the current $157.5. That makes this fairly valued to modestly undervalued, not overvalued. I'd be a buyer under $145 (clean 10%+ discount to fair) and a trimmer above $185. Market Forces call of "Market Tailwinds" at fair valuation is closer to right than the synthesis's overvaluation call. The narrative is durable and the moat is real; I just don't see the $22 premium the narrative model claims — the earnings are doing the work.
GPT Reading
Broadridge looks like exactly what the raw numbers say it is: a very high-quality, mid-single-digit grower with unusually strong cash conversion, but not a company whose valuation should be insulated from arithmetic. Revenue has climbed from $4.99B in FY2021 to $6.89B in FY2025, a 6.6% CAGR, while operating income rose from $679M to $1.19B and net income from $548M to $840M. That is the good story: margins have expanded meaningfully, with gross margin up to 31.0%, operating margin to 17.3%, and net margin to 12.2%. The last four reported quarters total about $7.18B of revenue and $1.07B of net income, versus $6.76B and $788M in the prior four-quarter period, so trailing growth is still healthy at roughly 6% on sales and 35% on earnings. This is not a business in trouble; it is compounding steadily and becoming more efficient.
What stands out most to me is the cash profile. FY2025 free cash flow was $1.13B against $839.5M of net income, and capex was only $43.8M, which tells you this is a low-capital-intensity model with real earnings quality. On the current $17.81B market cap, that is an FCF yield around 6.3%, which is respectable for a defensive financial infrastructure asset. Return metrics are also legitimately strong: 31.6% ROE is flattered by leverage and a modest equity base, but 17.6% ROIC is the more important number and supports the moat narrative. Even with $3.25B of debt and only $561.5M of cash, the balance sheet does not look stressed because operating cash flow is $1.17B and the dividend payout ratio is still under 50%. If I were looking only at business quality, I would be comfortable paying a premium multiple here.
But the stock already asks you to do that. At 22.2x earnings, 2.7x sales, and roughly 3.0x EV/revenue, the market is not pricing Broadridge as a dull processor; it is pricing it as a durable compounder with continued margin expansion. At $157.5, the earnings yield is about 4.5%, and against a business growing revenue around 6% with likely high-single-digit EPS growth absent further margin help, that is not obviously cheap. The key issue is that a lot of the recent earnings acceleration came from margin recovery and expansion rather than a step-change in top-line growth. Quarterly revenue growth has been positive but not explosive: $1.95B versus $1.81B in the March quarter, $1.71B versus $1.59B in December, $1.59B versus $1.42B in September. Nice numbers, but they do not justify pretending this is a double-digit grower. I think the market narrative is directionally right on quality but too forgiving on valuation; fair value is closer to the mid-$130s to low-$140s unless revenue can re-accelerate sustainably above 7%-8%.
The strongest argument against my caution is simple: businesses this sticky almost never screen optically cheap, and Broadridge has earned the right to trade rich. Net income margin has improved from 11.2% in FY2024 to 12.2% in FY2025, and the most recent four quarters are running above even that. If trailing earnings power is now closer to $1.0B-$1.05B rather than the FY2025 $840M figure, the effective P/E is lower than the headline 22x. Add the 2.5% dividend yield, low capex burden, and mission-critical positioning, and a premium multiple can be defended. A bull would also say the balance sheet is manageable, the current ratio under 1.0 is normal for this kind of cash-generative service company, and the consistency of quarterly profitability argues that downside should be limited compared with more cyclical tech names. I take all that seriously; this is not an overvaluation born of fantasy.
What would change my mind is evidence that growth is inflecting higher without sacrificing margins. If the next few quarters show revenue growth holding at 7%+ while net margin stays in the 14%-16% range seen in the latest December and March quarters, then the present multiple is easier to justify and $157 stops looking stretched. Likewise, if annual free cash flow moves durably above $1.25B and management uses it in a shareholder-friendly way without levering up further, fair value rises. On the other hand, if revenue slips back toward 4%-5% growth or margins retrace toward FY2024 levels, the premium multiple should compress quickly and the stock would look vulnerable into the $130 area.
Grok Reading
Broadridge’s numbers describe a classic operating-leverage compounder, not a stalled mature earner. Revenue has compounded at 6.6% while earnings and free cash flow have run at 15.4% and 19.9% respectively; the FY2025 print of $6.89B revenue and $839.5M net income already embeds a 20% earnings jump on only 5.8% top-line growth, and the most recent March quarter ($1.95B revenue, 14.1% net margin) continues the pattern of year-over-year margin expansion. Free-cash-flow conversion is exceptional—$1.13B FCF on only $44M of capex—producing a roughly 6.3% FCF yield at the $17.8B equity value and an EV/FCF multiple near 18x once the $2.7B net debt is layered in. ROE of 31.6% and ROIC of 17.6% confirm that incremental dollars are still earning well above the cost of capital. At 22x trailing earnings and a 2.5% dividend (48% payout), the market is paying a full but not punitive multiple for a sticky, low-capex financial-infrastructure franchise whose earnings power is still rising faster than revenue.
The valuation synthesis that pins fair value at $120–$135 and labels the stock 14% overvalued is the clearest quantitative contradiction. That framework appears to under-weight both the durability of the margin trajectory and the near-100% FCF conversion; a business throwing off $1.1B-plus of cash with mid-teens earnings growth and oligopoly switching costs does not deserve to be capitalized as a 3–4% perpetual grower. Seasonal volatility is real—June quarters print 16–18% margins while September can dip to single digits—but the annual progression from 10.8% net margin in FY2023 to 12.2% in FY2025 is unambiguous. Debt of $3.25B against $2.66B of equity keeps leverage moderate (~2x), and the current ratio just under 1.0 is the only balance-sheet blemish worth watching.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward: revenue growth is decelerating in the secondary signals, the long-term top line is only mid-single digits, and once margin expansion exhausts itself earnings growth will converge toward that slower revenue path. At that point a 22x multiple on a 6–7% grower looks rich, especially with macro headwinds flagged and the stock already sitting above every model fair-value estimate. Customer concentration and fintech nibbling at the edges are permanent risks that justify a discount, not a premium. Those points have merit; I simply weigh the current FCF yield, the still-expanding operating margin (17.3%), and the regulatory/switching-cost moat more heavily than a static DCF that seems to assume margin mean-reversion that the last eight quarters have not delivered.
I would flip to outright undervalued if the next two quarters show organic revenue re-accelerating through 8% while net margins hold above 13%, or if FCF clears $1.25B on the next annual print. I would flip to overvalued if revenue growth slips below 4% for two consecutive quarters or if net margin compresses back under 11% on rising client pricing pressure.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue compounded from $4.99B (2021) to $6.89B (2025), a clean ~8% CAGR with no down years, while operating margin expanded from 13.6% to 17.3% and gross margin from 28.5% to 31.0%. Net income rose from $547M to $840M and FCF from $588M to $1.13B, with OCF/NI at 1.24x and accruals at -2.1% of assets — earnings are cash-backed, not accounting-driven. Altman Z of 3.71 places it firmly in the safe zone. Diluted share count is essentially flat (117.8M to 118.3M, 0.1% CAGR) with SBC only 1.1% of revenue and buybacks running 2.5x SBC — per-share value is genuinely protected, not optically protected. The main constraint is the balance sheet: net debt of ~$2.69B against $562M cash. At $1.13B FCF this is roughly 2.4x FCF of net debt — manageable and serviceable, but it is a constraint rather than a cushion. Insider tape is neutral (routine awards and tax withholdings, one small $305K sale). Nothing in the mechanical forensics flags; the business reads as a mature, moaty transaction-processing franchise executing well.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and fixed vs floating mix on the $2.69B net debt
- Client concentration and contract renewal rates in the ICS/GTO segments
- Recurring vs event/transaction revenue mix and organic vs M&A contribution to the 8% growth
- Capitalized software and acquisition intangibles amortization schedule
- Pension and lease obligations not captured in headline net debt
Broadridge is a strong business (quality 68) but valuation is stretched. The composite FV of $120.52 and signal-adjusted FV of $135.27 both sit well below the $158.02 price, implying roughly -14% to -24% downside to deserved value. The DCF ($139.94) is the most generous method and still lands below spot; the anchored P/E ($126.65) and EPV floor ($75.55) frame a deserved band of roughly $125-140 for this cash-generative processor. Earnings quality is high, so no haircut is warranted - but that only means the deserved value is honest, not that the price is cheap. What is priced in: continued mid-single-digit revenue growth, ongoing margin expansion, and durable pricing power on proxy/post-trade services. That is plausible given the moat, but it is already in the tape. There is no discount for the meaningful net debt or for fintech nibbling at edges. This is the classic 'wonderful business, full price' setup - the exact case the lens is designed to score low.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward organic revenue guidance and Recurring Revenue growth cadence
- Event-driven proxy revenue normalization vs comps
- Margin trajectory - whether operating leverage is still expanding or plateauing
- Capital allocation - buyback pace and any deleveraging plans
- Client concentration and any signs of fintech share loss in post-trade
Broadridge sits in a quiet corner of the tape where sentiment pressure is genuinely muted. The macro regime is only mildly tilted (VIX 16, S&P barely off highs) and with a 0.9 beta and a utility-like financial-infrastructure profile, the market's ambient risk-on/off oscillations barely land on this name. The active narrative is a durable, moderate-intensity 'steady compounder' - not a story stock, no cult, no mania to unwind - which means there is neither a euphoric tailwind lifting it nor a fragile bull case at risk of cracking. That narrative stability is the dominant sentiment fact here. Against that, two mild headwinds: a stretched market PE (26.9) and 10y at 4.68% pressure quality-compounder multiples across the board, and BR earnings hit tomorrow, which introduces short-term event risk on a name whose narrative depends on 'no surprises.' News flow is neutral-to-constructive (AI investment, digital demand, recurring revenue framing) but sets a bar. Net: this is a low-amplitude sentiment tape - not much pushing it either way, with a slight lean to headwind from rates pressure on premium-multiple defensives and a binary earnings print inside 24 hours.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Aug 4 earnings print and FY guide - does the recurring-revenue growth rate hold 6-8%?
- Any analyst target revisions post-print - upgrades would reinforce the compounder narrative
- 10y yield direction - a move above 4.8% pressures premium-multiple defensives disproportionately
- Signs of the fintech-disruption bear narrative gaining traction in sell-side notes
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 5, 2026, BR was $168.41. We expect it to be $152.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $128.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.