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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Blackstone Inc. (BX) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -13 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 51 · Value -65 · Sentiment 22 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $125.03 vs $137.20 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Blackstone Inc.
BX NYSEBlackstone Inc. is a global alternative asset management firm that provides investment and fund management services across private equity, real estate, credit and insurance, and hedge fund solutions. The company manages a broad range of strategies for institutional investors and high-net-worth clients, including buyouts, growth investments, real estate opportunities, private credit, and secondary market solutions. Its business is built around allocating capital across asset classes that are less directly tied to traditional public markets, giving it a central role in alternative investing. Blackstone also offers capital markets and portfolio management capabilities to support its funds and investment platforms. With a diversified product mix and a strong presence across major financial centers, Blackstone Inc. is a significant participant in global asset management and institutional finance.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.87
Total Equity: $21.88B
Shares: 780,158,656
Total Debt: $12.58B
Cash: $2.63B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $12.58B
Cash: $2.63B
Revenue: $12.41B
Revenue: $12.41B
Revenue: $12.41B
Total Equity: $21.88B
Tax Rate: 15.7%
Equity: $21.88B
Total Debt: $12.58B
Cash: $2.63B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $12.58B
Total Debt: $12.58B
Total Equity: $21.88B
Shares: 780,158,656
Shares: 780,158,656
CapEx: -$115.70M
Shares: 780,158,656
Stock Price: $137.20
Net Income: $3.02B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 2:53pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $16.7B | $7.1B | $7.0B | $10.9B | $12.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $931.0M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $5.9B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $2.8B | $3.0B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $8.14 | $2.36 | $1.84 | $3.62 | $3.87 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $8.13 | $2.36 | $1.84 | $3.62 | $3.87 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 12:03am (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.1B | $4.3B | $3.0B | $2.0B | $2.6B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $41.2B | $42.5B | $40.3B | $43.5B | $47.7B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $7.9B | $12.5B | $11.6B | $11.5B | $12.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $19.5B | $22.8B | $22.2B | $24.0B | $25.8B |
| Total Equity | $21.7B | $19.7B | $18.1B | $19.5B | $21.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $3.6B | $1.7B | $660.7M | $808.1M | $191.6M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 2:53pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.0B | $6.3B | $4.1B | $3.5B | $4.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$64.3M | -$235.5M | -$224.2M | -$61.4M | -$115.7M |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.9B | $6.1B | $3.8B | $3.4B | $4.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | -$5.4M | $0 | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $2.2B | $3.2B | -$7.5M | $638.0M | $1.0B |
| Dividends Paid | -$4.6B | -$6.5B | -$4.3B | -$4.4B | -$6.0B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $135.3M | $2.3B | -$1.2B | -$1.1B | $678.5M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 2:53pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -57.2% | -1.8% | +56.0% | +13.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -70.2% | -20.4% | +99.6% | +8.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 12:04am (22d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-04 | $1.16 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-09 | $1.49 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-03 | $1.29 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-04 | $1.03 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-28 | $0.93 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-10 | $1.44 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-28 | $0.86 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-29 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-26 | $0.83 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-02 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-27 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-28 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-28 | $0.82 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-03 | $0.91 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-28 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-29 | $1.27 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-29 | $1.32 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-04 | $1.45 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-29 | $1.09 | — | — | — |
| 2021-07-30 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:39Even the bull case prices 16% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 88%. Caveat: revenue-DCF fits financials poorly (reported revenue omits net interest) — treat the legs as rough.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($137.20) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +45% | 28.8% | $115.25 | -16% |
| Base — stabilizes | +30% | 25.0% | $68.59 | -50% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +15% | 21.3% | $39.19 | -71% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -16% | 25.0% | $17.04 | -88% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue oscillates between $2.8B and $4.4B with no clean trend — Q1 2026 at $3.62B is actually down from Q4 2025's $4.36B, and net income margin has bounced between 16% and 23% with no directional signal. That's not "accelerating" — that's performance-fee lumpiness, which is exactly what you'd expect from a GP whose realized carry depends on exit windows. The momentum module's 33% revenue CAGR and 47% earnings CAGR are artifacts of cherry-picking the 2022-2023 trough ($7.0-7.1B rev, $1.4-1.75B NI) as the base. Look at 2021: $16.65B revenue, $5.86B NI. Current TTM revenue (~$14.8B) and NI (~$3.06B) are still well below the 2021 peak. This isn't a compounder marching upward; it's a cyclical fee/carry business that had a huge 2021, crashed 2022-2023, and is now recovering. Framing this as a "mature earner" with 33% CAGR is a category error.
The synthesis verdict of $100.88 fair value (-26.5%) directionally rhymes with my read but I'd challenge the precision. At 35x P/E on $3.02B NI, BX trades at $107B of earnings capitalization — the other $64B of market cap is AUM/franchise premium, dividend yield (3.6%), and belief in the perpetual-capital thesis. The narrative model's claim that ~$36B of market cap sits above intrinsic is roughly consistent with the synthesis gap. But payout ratio of 1.99 is a genuine red flag the models underweight: BX is distributing roughly 2x GAAP earnings, which works when distributable earnings (DE, the metric management uses) exceed GAAP NI due to unrealized carry accounting — but it also means the 3.6% yield is not covered by GAAP earnings and depends on continued realizations. If PE exit markets stay frozen (which is exactly the current concern), the dividend gets cut or the payout math breaks.
The insider data is the most suspicious element in the file. Ten identical or near-identical "P-Purchase" entries on 2026-07-23 and 2026-06-23 of 573,614 and 765,111 shares with unknown filer identity look like duplicated records or a single institutional filing being multi-counted, not organic insider conviction. At $137, 573K shares is ~$78M — plausible for a Schwarzman-scale buy but suspicious without a named filer. I'd discount "Net Insider Buying" as a signal until the CIK is identified. The market narrative layer is the most useful prior output here: it correctly identifies that BX's premium is a secular-rotation-into-alternatives story, and that story is vulnerable to (a) private credit spread compression as capital floods in, (b) LP denominator-effect reversal if public equities keep rallying, and (c) any sustained normalization in PE distribution yields, which have been running at multi-decade lows.
A careful contrarian would push back on the bear case as follows: perpetual capital vehicles (BXPE, BCRED, BREIT) genuinely do change the fee-annuity profile versus pre-2018 Blackstone, and the private credit franchise is scaling into a structural void left by regional bank retrenchment — these aren't fully in a mean-reversion DCF. Fair value probably isn't $100; it's more like $110-120 if you credit half the platform premium. But at $137 with a 35x multiple on cyclically-recovering (not peak, but not trough) earnings, a payout ratio above 100% of GAAP, PE exit markets still constipated, and the recent quarter showing sequential revenue decline, the risk/reward is unattractive. I agree with the synthesis direction but think $100.88 is too aggressive on the downside — a 15-20% overvaluation ($110-118 fair value) is my read, not 26.5%. The thesis score of -3 (essentially balanced) captures the real tension: this is a high-quality franchise trading at a demanding price, not a broken business, and the short case requires either an actual PE cycle downturn or a regime shift, not just multiple compression in a vacuum.
GPT Reading
Blackstone’s numbers read like a very good business being valued like an almost frictionless compounding machine. The raw operating picture is solid: 2025 revenue rose to $12.41B from $10.93B, up 13.5%, and net income increased to $3.02B from $2.78B, up 8.6%. The quarterly run-rate also shows resilience rather than fragility: over the last four reported quarters, revenue totals about $14.8B and net income about $3.06B, with margins mostly holding in an 18-23% band despite the lumpiness that comes with realization-driven economics. Cash generation is real too. On 2025 numbers, Blackstone produced $4.66B of operating cash flow and $4.55B of free cash flow, which is excellent conversion for a capital-light manager. The balance sheet is not stressed either: $12.58B of debt against $21.88B of equity and $2.63B of cash is manageable for this model.
What stands out, though, is the disconnect between “good” and “worth 35x earnings, 8.6x sales, and 9.5x EV/revenue.” For an asset manager, even an elite alternative manager, those are premium multiples that require either a long runway of fee-related earnings compounding or a new step-up in profitability. I don’t see enough evidence of that step-up in the reported data. Net margin was 24.3% in 2025, better than 2024’s roughly 25.4%? No — actually slightly worse, because 2024’s $2.78B on $10.93B was about 25.4%. The most recent quarter, 2026-03-31, showed revenue of $3.62B and net income of $649.7M, up from $3.29B and $614.9M a year earlier, but that is only 5.7% earnings growth on 10% revenue growth, with margin slipping from 18.7% to 18.0%. That is not the profile of a business entering a higher-gear earnings phase. It is the profile of a scaled franchise still growing, but with some operating dilution and cyclical variability.
The annual history reinforces that caution. Revenue collapsed from $16.65B in 2021 to around $7.1B in 2022-2023 before recovering to $12.41B in 2025. Net income similarly fell from $5.86B in 2021 to $1.39B in 2023 and has only partially rebuilt to $3.02B. That volatility matters because the current valuation is not being asked to capitalize trough-ish earnings; it is capitalizing a recovery that is already well advanced. At $170.8B market cap, investors are paying roughly 56x 2025 free cash flow and about 5.7x 2025 net income. Wait, not 5.7x — the stated P/E of 35.5x is the cleaner anchor, and that is still expensive given the earnings cyclicality. The payout ratio near 199% is another tell that the dividend, while attractive at 3.6%, should not be mistaken for a conventional steadily covered payout; Blackstone’s distribution policy is inherently tied to realizations and fee-related cash generation, so yield support is weaker than it looks on a screen.
The best pushback is obvious: Blackstone is not “just” another asset manager, and treating it on plain-vanilla earnings can understate franchise value. The revenue rebound from $7.01B in 2023 to $12.41B in 2025 is meaningful, free cash flow is robust, and the company’s scale likely gives it fundraising, product breadth, and distribution advantages that smaller peers cannot match. If private credit, infrastructure, and perpetual vehicles continue taking share, then reported earnings may be too low a base because carry realizations can recover materially from here. The insider purchase cluster in June and July 2026 is also hard to ignore; even if the duplicated entries are messy, the signal points positive. I weigh those arguments less heavily because the stock price already reflects them. A premium is deserved; this premium looks excessive when recent earnings growth is single-digit, margins are not expanding, and the business has a demonstrated history of sharp revenue swings.
What changes my mind is simple: I need to see that the recovery is becoming structurally higher quality rather than merely cyclical. If Blackstone can string together two or three quarters of 15%+ year-over-year revenue growth with net income growing faster than revenue and margins moving back toward or above 22-25%, I’d be more willing to underwrite the current multiple. Likewise, if annual free cash flow can move from $4.55B toward $6B+ without a leverage spike, that would support a much richer valuation. Absent that, I think the stock is pricing the brand, the scale, and the alternatives secular story too aggressively. Good company, expensive stock.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a high-quality franchise that has already done the hard work of climbing out of the 2022–23 realization drought and is now being asked to keep compounding at a rate its own recent run-rate cannot support. Annual revenue rose from $7.01B in 2023 to $10.93B in 2024 and $12.41B in 2025—solid 13–14% growth into the latest year—but the quarterly print for Q1 2026 already slipped to $3.62B from $4.36B the prior quarter, and trailing net margins have compressed from the mid-20s back toward 18%. Free cash flow of $4.55B on $3.02B of net income is genuine and high-quality, yet the FCF CAGR of only 8.9% over the measured period sits in sharp contrast to the 33% revenue and 47% earnings CAGRs that are still being extrapolated by bulls. At $137 the stock trades at 35.5× trailing earnings, 8.6× sales and nearly 9.5× EV/revenue while returning a 3.6% dividend that requires a 199% payout ratio—i.e., the distribution is already running ahead of reported earnings and will need continued realization strength or balance-sheet flexibility to remain intact. The $12.6B of debt against $2.6B of cash is manageable given the equity base, but it leaves limited dry powder if fundraising or exit markets tighten.
What the quantitative models correctly flag is that the current price embeds roughly 40% annual FCF growth for half a decade—an outcome that would require either AUM to roughly triple or performance fees to stay near cyclical highs indefinitely. Neither has precedent at Blackstone’s present scale. The 2021 peak of $16.65B in revenue and $5.86B in net income remains the high-water mark; four years later the firm is still 25% below that revenue level even after a strong recovery. The narrative premium—call it $30–35B of market cap—is therefore doing real work: investors are paying for the permanence of the alternatives rotation and for Blackstone’s platform monopoly rather than for the cash flows already visible. That premium is not imaginary, but it is fragile. Private-credit expansion and perpetual-capital vehicles are real tailwinds, yet they are already partially in the price, and the deceleration in year-over-year earnings growth to 8.7% suggests the easy catch-up phase is ending.
The strongest counter-argument is the insider tape and the franchise durability. In June and July 2026 alone, repeated open-market purchases totaling well over four million shares signal that people closest to the books see value at these levels; that is not noise. Blackstone’s brand still lets it raise multi-billion-dollar vehicles on demand, management-fee streams are stickier than the lumpy GAAP revenue implies, and ROE of 14% on a capital-light model remains attractive relative to traditional asset managers. A bull can fairly claim that normalizing carry and applying a 28–30× multiple to a mid-cycle FRE base gets you closer to $120–125, and that the model’s $102 fair-value anchor is too punitive for a firm that has structurally widened its moat since 2021. I weigh that case seriously, but the payout ratio above 190%, the still-elevated 35× earnings multiple, and the dependence on continued multiple expansion in private markets keep me from joining it. The insider buying reduces downside convexity; it does not erase the valuation gap.
I would flip to a neutral-to-constructive stance if the next two quarters show management fees growing faster than 15% year-over-year while realization income holds above $1B per quarter, or if the firm demonstrates that perpetual-capital inflows can push FRE margins sustainably above historical peaks without fee compression. Conversely, any guidance cut to distribution coverage or a visible slowdown in private-credit fundraising would confirm the overvaluation thesis quickly.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Blackstone generates $4.55B of FCF on $12.41B revenue with high earnings quality (OCF/NI ~2x, accruals -3.6% of assets, Altman Z 4.23). Revenue has recovered from the 2022-23 trough ($7.0-7.1B) to $12.41B in 2025, and net income has rebuilt from $1.39B to $3.02B, consistent with the cyclical nature of performance-fee-driven asset management rather than structural deterioration. Classification as mature_earner fits: durable fee streams, a global brand in alternatives, and clear operating leverage as fundraising and realizations normalize. The balance sheet carries net debt of ~$9.95B against only $2.63B liquid cash, which is a constraint but manageable given consistent FCF and the fee-based revenue model. SBC at 11.7% of revenue is elevated and drives ~2% annual diluted share growth (720.5M to 780.2M over five years) with zero offsetting buyback - a real per-share headwind for a firm this mature. Insider tape shows genuine Schwarzman open-market purchases ($35M across two July 2026 tranches) alongside routine LLC sales; founder buying at this scale is a meaningful positive signal on management conviction.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Fee-related vs performance-related earnings mix and AUM trajectory in latest 10-K
- Debt maturity ladder and covenants against the $9.95B net debt position
- SBC vesting schedule and whether management has any buyback authorization
- Composition of the Schwarzman July 2026 purchases - direct personal vs entity attribution
- Fund realization pipeline and dry powder disclosures supporting fee growth
The e2e composite fair value is $102.30 and the signal-adjusted FV is $100.88, implying roughly -26% downside from the $137.20 quote. The two underlying methods bracket the answer sensibly: a DCF at $89.44 (skeptical on through-cycle fee-related earnings and performance revenues) and an anchored P/E at $128.03 (which itself sits below spot). When both a cash-flow view and a multiple view land beneath the market price, the burden of proof is on the bulls, not the bears. Earnings quality is high (no haircut needed) and the business is Strong, so I lift deserved value toward the upper end of that range - call it ~$105-115 on a generous read - but not to $137.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Fee-related earnings growth trajectory and management guidance on FRE margins
- Realizations/performance revenue pipeline and DE payout ratio sustainability
- Net accrued performance fees balance and mark movements
- LP fundraising pace in flagship funds; any signs of denominator-effect slowdown
The immediate news pulse is unambiguously positive for BX: a second mega debt package to finance Anthropic's Google TPU deployment plants Blackstone squarely inside the hottest narrative in markets - private credit as the funding backbone of the AI capex boom. That is exactly the kind of story-fit a high-beta (1.58) platform-monopoly name needs, and it feeds the bull case that BX's scale advantage compounds. Financial stocks are bid, the tape is risk-on (+37), and VIX at 16.5 gives high-beta alt managers room to run.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the Anthropic debt package actually launches and gets absorbed at strong terms (validates the AI-credit narrative)
- Any crack in Q3 distributable earnings or fundraising pace that would puncture the platform-monopoly story
- 10y yield direction - a move above 5% would compress the alts-manager multiple regardless of news flow
- Sector rotation signals: sustained public-equity strength that pulls LP dollars back from private markets
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 5, 2026, BX was $137.20. We expect it to be $123.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $110.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.