Business Description
Boston Properties (NYSE:BXP) is the largest publicly-held developer and owner of Class A office properties in the United States, concentrated in five markets - Boston, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco and Washington, DC. The Company is a fully integrated real estate company, organized as a real estate investment trust (REIT), that develops, manages, operates, acquires and owns a diverse portfolio of primarily Class A office space. The Company's portfolio totals 51.2 million square feet and 196 properties, including six properties under construction/redevelopment.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 3:29pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:47pm (5d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.75
Total Equity: $5.15B
Shares: 158,869,000
Total Debt: $16.61B
Cash: $1.48B
EBITDA: $1.94B
Total Debt: $16.61B
Cash: $1.48B
Revenue: $3.48B
Revenue: $3.48B
Revenue: $3.48B
Total Equity: $5.15B
Tax Rate: 0.0%
Equity: $5.15B
Total Debt: $16.61B
Cash: $1.48B
Current Liabilities: $1.48B
Long-Term Debt: $15.86B
Total Debt: $16.61B
Total Equity: $5.15B
Shares: 158,869,000
Shares: 158,869,000
CapEx: -$555.50M
Shares: 158,869,000
Stock Price: $62.33
Net Income: $276.80M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.4B | $3.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B |
| Gross Profit | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $881.4M | $911.6M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $168.8M |
| Operating Income | $973.1M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.9B |
| Net Income | $505.2M | $848.9M | $190.2M | $14.3M | $276.8M |
| EBITDA | $1.8B | $2.2B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.9B |
| EPS | $3.18 | $5.42 | $1.21 | $0.09 | $1.75 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:29pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $452.7M | $690.3M | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.9B | $2.2B | $3.2B | $3.1B | $3.4B |
| Total Assets | $22.4B | $24.2B | $26.0B | $26.1B | $26.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $730.4M | $692.0M | $763.2M | $1.2B | $1.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $12.8B | $14.2B | $15.9B | $15.7B | $15.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $14.3B | $15.8B | $17.8B | $18.1B | $18.5B |
| Total Equity | $5.8B | $6.1B | $5.9B | $5.4B | $5.1B |
| Retained Earnings | -$625.9M | -$391.4M | -$816.2M | -$1.4B | $0 |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$13.6M | -$398.1M | -$482.3M | -$448.0M | -$555.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.1B | $884.3M | $819.2M | $786.5M | $689.7M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$80.4M | -$277.6M | -$192.7M | -$132.1M | $40.7M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$200.0M | $0 | $0 | -$1.7M | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.2B | $235.7M | $875.8M | -$277.4M | $222.1M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:25pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$3.6B $3.4B – $3.7B
|
$3.6B $3.6B – $3.6B
|
$3.6B $3.4B – $3.7B
|
$3.7B $3.6B – $3.9B
|
| EBITDA |
$2.0B $2.0B – $2.2B
|
$2.1B $2.1B – $2.1B
|
$2.1B $2.0B – $2.2B
|
$2.2B $2.1B – $2.2B
|
| Net Income |
$282.6M $275.8M – $289.3M
|
$356.7M $246.6M – $393.6M
|
$319.3M $299.8M – $336.1M
|
$0 |
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.6% | +5.3% | +4.1% | +2.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +6.4% | +4.3% | +1.4% | +1.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +9.1% | -2.1% | -1.6% | +89.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +68.0% | -77.6% | -92.5% | +1,839.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +24.4% | -22.9% | -5.0% | +19.7% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 4:49pm (5d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-09 | LABELLE MICHAEL E | S-Sale | 18,080.00 | $66.05 | $1.2M |
| 2026-06-09 | LABELLE MICHAEL E | S-Sale | 8,033.00 | $67.02 | $538,356 |
| 2026-06-04 | LABELLE MICHAEL E | C-Conversion | 23,981.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | LABELLE MICHAEL E | C-Conversion | 23,981.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | LABELLE MICHAEL E | C-Conversion | 23,981.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-04 | LABELLE MICHAEL E | C-Conversion | 23,981.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | KIPP MARY E | A-Award | 3,332.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | WALTON WILLIAM H III | A-Award | 3,332.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | KLEIN JOEL | A-Award | 3,332.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | NAUGHTON TIMOTHY J | A-Award | 3,332.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | DUNCAN BRUCE W | A-Award | 3,332.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | West Tony | A-Award | 1,666.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | West Tony | A-Award | 1,666.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | LUSTIG MATTHEW J | A-Award | 3,332.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | Hoskins Diane J | A-Award | 3,332.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | Richardson Julie | A-Award | 3,332.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Kevorkian Eric G | C-Conversion | 2,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-21 | Kevorkian Eric G | S-Sale | 200.00 | $60.23 | $12,045 |
| 2026-05-21 | Kevorkian Eric G | C-Conversion | 2,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-22 | Kevorkian Eric G | S-Sale | 2,000.00 | $59.85 | $119,702 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 7, 2026 3:25pm (5d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-31 | $0.70 | 2026-03-18 | 2026-03-31 | 2026-04-30 |
| 2025-12-31 | $0.70 | 2025-12-18 | 2025-12-31 | 2026-01-29 |
| 2025-09-30 | $0.70 | 2025-09-09 | 2025-09-30 | 2025-10-31 |
| 2025-06-30 | $0.98 | 2025-06-20 | 2025-06-30 | 2025-07-31 |
| 2025-03-31 | $0.98 | 2025-03-20 | 2025-03-31 | 2025-04-30 |
| 2024-12-31 | $0.98 | 2024-12-18 | 2024-12-31 | 2025-01-30 |
| 2024-09-30 | $0.98 | 2024-09-09 | 2024-09-30 | 2024-10-31 |
| 2024-06-28 | $0.98 | 2024-06-12 | 2024-06-28 | 2024-07-31 |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.98 | 2024-03-18 | 2024-03-28 | 2024-04-30 |
| 2023-12-28 | $0.98 | 2023-12-18 | 2023-12-29 | 2024-01-30 |
| 2023-09-28 | $0.98 | 2023-09-05 | 2023-09-29 | 2023-10-31 |
| 2023-06-29 | $0.98 | 2023-06-20 | 2023-06-30 | 2023-07-31 |
| 2023-03-30 | $0.98 | 2023-03-20 | 2023-03-31 | 2023-04-28 |
| 2022-12-29 | $0.98 | 2022-12-19 | 2022-12-30 | 2023-01-30 |
| 2022-09-29 | $0.98 | 2022-09-16 | 2022-09-30 | 2022-10-31 |
| 2022-06-29 | $0.98 | 2022-06-14 | 2022-06-30 | 2022-07-29 |
| 2022-03-30 | $0.98 | 2022-03-21 | 2022-03-31 | 2022-04-29 |
| 2021-12-30 | $0.98 | 2021-12-20 | 2021-12-31 | 2022-01-28 |
| 2021-09-29 | $0.98 | 2021-09-14 | 2021-09-30 | 2021-10-29 |
| 2021-06-29 | $0.98 | 2021-06-14 | 2021-06-30 | 2021-07-30 |
Narrative Economics
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly trajectory first: revenue is essentially flat — $850M → $872M over seven quarters, a 2.6% total drift that annualizes to ~1.5%. That's not a recovery; it's stagnation with rent escalators doing the work. Net income is the real tell: wildly lumpy ($248.5M, then $101.6M, then -$121.7M in Q3'25, then -$228.9M in Q4'24). For a REIT this is impairments and property sales, not operations — which is precisely why the 20.6% earnings CAGR and the headline 1,839% YoY earnings number are meaningless. The honest operating metric is FCF, which fell from ~$880M to $690M (-8.2% CAGR), and operating CF of $1.25B against $555M capex leaves only ~$695M to cover the $9.94B market cap's ~5.99% dividend (~$595M on share count implied). That's tight, not safe — coverage is ~1.15-1.20x on FCF, before any acquisitive capex or development spend that BXP routinely does beyond maintenance.
Where I diverge from the prior models: the synthesis calls this "appropriate pricing for the risk profile" and the market-forces engine flags "unsustainable leverage and looming refinancing risks" — but the tile shows total debt as "—", which means nobody actually ran the leverage math. BXP carries roughly $16-17B in debt against ~$1.48B cash; that's the load-bearing variable for this entire thesis and it's missing. EV/EBITDA of 13.5x is reasonable for trophy office but punishing if rates stay at 4.5%+ and the 2026-2028 maturity wall refinances 300-400bps higher than the original coupons. The pre-flight's "deep value" framing and the narrative engine's "fallen angel" tag both lean bullish-contrarian; I think that's premature without seeing the debt schedule. P/B of 2.09x is also notable — for an office REIT in a sector where private market cap rates have widened 150-200bps, book value itself is suspect. Peers like SLG and VNO trade closer to 1.0-1.3x book.
The contrarian-to-the-contrarians case: every model here is wrestling with "is office dead or just discounted?" but nobody is asking whether $62 already reflects the high-quality-trophy premium. BXP's portfolio (Back Bay, Midtown, Embarcadero) genuinely IS the best-in-class subset, and leasing data from late 2025 showed Class A trophy outperforming Class B/C by 400-600bps in occupancy. But the stock at 31x P/E and 7.6x EV/Sales is not pricing distress — it's pricing a moderately impaired but functional REIT. A true deep-value setup would be 0.7-0.9x book and a 8-9% yield, not 2.09x and 5.99%. The "fallen angel" narrative is doing premium-justification work the numbers don't support. Insider activity is genuinely uninformative — all C-conversions and awards, no open-market buys, which for a "deep value" call should be a yellow flag, not neutral.
My read: the synthesis verdict of "High Conviction Required" is the right epistemic posture but for the wrong reason. It's not that the price is appropriate; it's that the price requires you to underwrite three things simultaneously — (1) refinancing at manageable spreads, (2) occupancy stabilization above 87%, (3) dividend maintenance through 2027 — and the data file doesn't let you verify any of them. FCF coverage of the dividend at ~1.15x is the thinnest margin in the file and the one nobody flagged hard enough. Revenue confidence is "high/steady" only because rent rolls are contractual; that confidence evaporates on lease expirations in 2026-2027. I'd argue fair value is closer to $52-56 (a 7% yield and 1.6-1.8x book, matching peer trophy-office multiples) rather than the implicit $62 floor the models are defending. The asymmetry isn't attractive: ~10-15% downside to a realistic peer multiple, ~15-20% upside if the recovery narrative holds, minus a 6% yield that may compress if cap rates rise further. Pass until either (a) Q2'26 leasing spreads turn positive or (b) the stock breaks $55 on a refinancing scare and the math gets actually cheap.
GPT Critique
In examining the data for BXP, Inc., several key insights emerge that may shape an independent perspective on its current valuation. Firstly, the revenue trajectory for BXP is largely stagnant, climbing only marginally from $850.5M to $872.1M over seven quarters, which aligns with a 1.5% annual growth rate. This flat trend is indeed reflective of a sector under duress, with net income volatility signaling underlying structural pressures more than operational improvements. The sharp quarterly fluctuations in net income, particularly the negative figures in Q3 2025 and Q4 2024, suggest significant non-operational impacts, likely due to impairments or strategic property sales rather than core business strength. This is further supported by the decline in free cash flow by 8.2% CAGR, which raises sustainability concerns for both dividend coverage and operational flexibility.
Opus rightly points out the tightness in BXP’s financial operations, particularly noting that the free cash flow coverage for dividends is precariously low at about 1.15-1.20x. This is an important agreement point; the dividend yield, while attractive at 5.99%, is not as robust as it appears given the capital expenditure demands of an asset-heavy REIT. However, I diverge in my analysis of the debt load. Opus highlights a critical oversight in the analysis regarding BXP's debt structure, which is missing from the provided data. My review aligns with Opus’s caution here; without clear visibility on the debt schedule, especially with approximately $16-17B in leverage, and given current interest rates, this oversight could significantly alter the risk profile. The market is likely pricing in refinancing risks that are not explicitly accounted for in the raw data or prior analysis.
Furthermore, Opus critiques the valuation framework, noting that the P/B ratio of 2.09x is high relative to peers, suggesting a premium for BXP’s trophy assets that may not be fully justified given the current office market conditions. I concur with Opus that this ratio, combined with a P/E of 31x, reflects a market assumption of moderate impairment rather than distress. This is a critical point of agreement; the valuation seems to hinge on a recovery narrative that may not materialize as quickly or as robustly as needed to support current pricing levels.
A careful skeptic might argue that the narrative of structural impairment in office real estate is overblown and that BXP’s portfolio quality in prime markets provides a buffer against broader sector declines. They might also suggest that the market's pricing already accounts for significant headwinds, offering a contrarian value opportunity if office demand stabilizes or grows. However, this view requires faith in a recovery that is yet unproven, and with lease expirations looming in 2026-2027, the risks appear substantial.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · two lenses
The two lenses tell a coherent story and I'm going to respect it. Quality at -20 (Mixed) says this is the best operator in a structurally broken asset class — flat share count, real FCF, trophy assets — but $15B of net debt against a depreciating book and a net income line that went from $849M to $14M is not something I paper over. Value at -2 (Modestly Cheap, attractive sub-$52) says the 10-15% discount to a quality-adjusted NAV is real but not fat, and the e2e model itself punted to 'High Conviction Required' — that's the tell. When the valuation model can't anchor and the equity is a leveraged call option on cap rates, I don't pay 85 cents on the dollar; I pay 70.
The play: starter position only if it trades into the low $50s — that's my line, matching the value lens's $52 attractive level, which gets me to a ~25-30% NAV discount that actually compensates for the leverage and secular risk. At $62 today I'm a watcher, not a buyer. If I'm forced to do something here I'd put on a 0.5-0.75% toe-hold just to force myself to follow the leasing data and refi calendar, with a plan to scale to 2-3% on a print sub-$52 and 4% only if I get a panic flush to the low $40s coupled with evidence cap rates have stopped widening. What kills the thesis and sends me to the sidelines: a dividend cut signaling AFFO pressure, a bad refi print, or a 50bps+ cap-rate move on recent gateway comps — any of those and the equity discount evaporates faster than price falls. I'm interested, not excited, and the gap between the quality score and the value score is exactly why: great operator, wrong price for the leverage.
BXP is one of the largest, highest-quality office REITs in the US, and the cash machine still works: revenue grew from $2.89B (2021) to $3.48B (2025), and FCF remained robust at $689.7M in the latest year despite the office headwinds. Share count is essentially flat (156.4M → 158.9M, ~0.4% CAGR) with buybacks offsetting SBC at 101.7% — genuinely rare discipline for a REIT and a real positive for per-share value. Earnings quality is mostly fine: OCF/NI ratios are huge (NI is suppressed by D&A on a $20B+ asset base), and accruals are negative at -3.5%.
But the trajectory underneath the headline revenue growth is ugly. Net income collapsed from $848.9M (2022) to $14.3M (2024) before partially recovering to $276.8M (2025), and the 2025 operating margin spike to 55.7% almost certainly reflects a one-time item (gain on sale or impairment reversal) rather than core earnings power — gross margin has steadily compressed 64.2% → 60.6%. FCF is also bleeding lower (-38% from 2021 peak to 2025). Most importantly, net debt of ~$15.1B against a $9.9B market cap and an Altman Z of 0.79 (distress zone, though the Z-model overstates risk for REITs) means this is a leverage-dependent business with no balance-sheet cushion. The Beneish M-score flag at -1.63 is worth noting but is plausibly driven by the same one-time 2025 margin event.
Insider tape is uninformative — all awards and conversions, zero open-market buys or sells. The business is well-run within its category, but the category itself (urban office) is the binding quality constraint.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- What drove the 2025 operating margin jump to 55.7% — gain on sale, impairment reversal, or restructured lease accounting? This determines whether the Beneish flag is real or benign.
- Debt maturity ladder 2026-2030 and weighted-avg interest rate — refinancing risk is the single biggest quality variable.
- Same-store NOI and occupancy trends by market (Boston/NYC/SF/DC) — averaged numbers hide the SF and DC weakness.
- Lease expiration schedule and mark-to-market on expiring rents — are renewals coming in flat, up, or down?
- Dividend coverage by AFFO (not FCF) and whether 2024's $14.3M net income forced any payout policy change.
- Tenant concentration and credit quality of top 10 tenants.
At $62.33 and a ~$9.9B market cap, BXP carries roughly $15B of net debt for an EV near $25B against a portfolio of Class-A trophy office assets in gateway markets. The stock trades well below pre-COVID levels (>$140) and at a meaningful discount to most sell-side NAV estimates, which typically land in the $70-85 range depending on cap-rate assumptions. The e2e synthesis flagged 'High Conviction Required' — i.e., the model can't anchor a clean fair value, which itself tells you this is a debate about cap rates and terminal demand, not a clean DCF.
Deserved value here has to be marked down for: (1) structurally lower office demand post-COVID, (2) the leverage stack amplifying small cap-rate moves, and (3) mixed earnings quality with net income deterioration. Against that, you're getting best-in-class assets, disciplined share count, real FCF, and a ~6% dividend yield that the market is partially pricing as at-risk. Net: I see a modest discount to a quality-adjusted NAV — call it 10-20% — not a fat pitch. Priced in: continued office malaise and rate-driven cap-rate expansion. Priced out: any cyclical office recovery or rate relief.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest same-property NOI trend and leasing spreads in 10-Q/supplemental
- Lease expiration schedule next 24 months and mark-to-market exposure
- Debt maturity wall and refinancing rates vs in-place coupons
- Management's updated NAV/cap-rate disclosures on the call
- Dividend coverage from AFFO and any payout-policy commentary