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AGING Analysis Report
Aug 11, 2026
12 days ago · 100% complete
NOT DEPENDABLE This report predates a filing — its financial basis has been replaced.
Report generated: Aug 11, 2026 · Filing on record since: Aug 19, 2026 · 8 days after
For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page

What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Cummins Inc. (CMI) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.

Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -10 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 48 · Value -57 · Sentiment 5 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $287.89 vs $634.82 at analysis

Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable reference-name attribute you can cite):

  • profile-header / price-overview — company profile, live quote, market cap
  • extended-analysisthe core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memo
  • future-predictions — our forward price-band predictions
  • market-narrative / ai-findings / gpt-critique — narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)
  • Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers): price-history, income-trend, key-metrics, financials (statement tables), insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.

More for machine readers: site briefing at /llms.txt · any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER · raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds); every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.

Cummins Inc.

CMI NYSE
Industrials · Specialty Industrial Machinery
Columbus, IN 47202-3005, United States cummins.com Updated Aug 11, 12:01am
Price
$634.82
Market Cap
$87.4B
Employees
67,400
Beta
1.25
Avg Volume
947,348
Last Dividend
$8.00
CEO
Ms. Jennifer W. Rumsey

Cummins Inc. is a global power solutions company that designs, manufactures, and distributes a broad portfolio of powertrains and related technologies for commercial and industrial applications. The company focuses on diesel, natural gas, electric, and hybrid powertrains, as well as power generation systems and electrified power solutions. Its offerings include engines, automated transmissions, axles, drivelines, brakes, suspension systems, turbochargers, fuel systems, filtration, aftertreatment, control systems, batteries, and hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. Cummins Inc. operates through five main segments: Engine, Components, Distribution, Power Systems, and Accelera, serving truck manufacturers, off-highway and construction equipment producers, power generation markets, and other industrial customers worldwide. Headquartered in Columbus, Indiana, the company leverages a global manufacturing base and extensive service and support network to supply, integrate, and maintain its products across diverse end markets. Cummins Inc. plays a significant role in enabling reliable power, transportation, and industrial operations, while supporting customers’ needs across multiple fuel types and emerging low- and zero-emission technologies.

Runs with full report Generated: Aug 11, 2026 12:41am
Price Overview
Price at report time
$634.82
as of Aug 11, 12:41am (12d ago)
Change · Aug 11
-9.44 (-1.47%)
Day Range
$632.39 – $653.00
52-Week Range
$386.30 – $737.76
50-Day MA
$666.83
200-Day MA
$586.30
Volume
669,301.00
Right now · live
Log in to get the live feed
Members see the real-time price and the move since this report (over 12d).
Share Structure
Outstanding 137,664,487.00
Float 134,645,505.00
Free Float 97.8%
High free float — 97.8% of shares trade freely, ~2.2% held by insiders/institutions
Very liquid — most shares trade freely. Low insider ownership can mean less management alignment, but makes large position sizing straightforward.
Price History (1 Year)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:49am (12d ago)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
The directional story — useful even when net income is negative.
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 3:16am (17d ago)
Revenue
The top line — total sales before any costs or taxes are subtracted. A measure of how much business the company is doing.
Net Income
The bottom line — profit left after subtracting all expenses, interest, and taxes from revenue. Reflects accounting profitability, but includes non-cash items like depreciation, so it isn't the same as cash earned.
Operating Cash Flow
The real cash generated by the day-to-day business — selling products, paying suppliers, collecting from customers. Calculated from net income by adding back non-cash items and adjusting for timing (unpaid bills, unsold inventory). When OCF consistently lags net income, the reported profit may not be converting to real money.
Period Revenue Net Income Net Margin YoY/QoQ
Key Metrics
TD Twelve Data statement HEX SEC filing
Industry comparison last run: Aug 11, 2026 12:12am
P/E Ratio (Price per dollar of earnings)
HEX
Stock Price / EPS (Diluted)
30.97
Stock Price: $634.82
EPS (Diluted): 20.50
P/B Ratio (Price vs net asset value)
HEX
Stock Price / Book Value Per Share
6.57
Stock Price: $634.82
Total Equity: $13.41B
Shares: 138,700,000
EV/EBITDA (Total value vs operating profit)
HEX
Enterprise Value / EBITDA
16.53
Market Cap: $87.39B
Total Debt: $94.00M
Cash: $2.85B
EBITDA: $5.13B
Enterprise Value (Takeover price (cap + debt - cash))
HEX
Market Cap + Total Debt - Cash
$84.8B
Market Cap: $87.39B
Total Debt: $94.00M
Cash: $2.85B
Gross Margin (Revenue left after direct costs)
HEX
Gross Profit / Revenue
25.3%
Gross Profit: $8.52B
Revenue: $33.67B
Operating Margin (Revenue left after all operations)
HEX
Operating Income / Revenue
12.0%
Operating Income: $4.03B
Revenue: $33.67B
Net Margin (Revenue left as actual profit)
HEX
Net Income / Revenue
8.8%
Net Income: $2.96B
Revenue: $33.67B
ROE (Profit from shareholder equity)
HEX
Net Income / Total Equity
22.1%
Net Income: $2.96B
Total Equity: $13.41B
ROIC (Profit from all invested capital)
HEX
NOPAT / Invested Capital
28.2%
Operating Income: $4.03B
Tax Rate: 25.4%
Equity: $13.41B
Total Debt: $94.00M
Cash: $2.85B
Current Ratio (Can it pay short-term bills)
HEX
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
1.76
Current Assets: $16.93B
Current Liabilities: $9.61B
Debt/Equity (Leverage — debt vs equity)
HEX
Total Debt / Total Equity
0.01
Short-Term Debt: $94.00M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $94.00M
Total Equity: $13.41B
Rev/Share (Top-line per share)
HEX
Revenue / Shares Outstanding
$242.75
Revenue: $33.67B
Shares: 138,700,000
Book Value/Share (Net assets per share)
HEX
(Total Assets - Total Liabilities) / Shares
$96.67
Total Equity: $13.41B
Shares: 138,700,000
FCF/Share (Real cash generated per share)
HEX
(Operating Cash Flow + CapEx) / Shares
$17.20
Operating CF: $3.62B
CapEx: -$1.24B
Shares: 138,700,000
CapEx is negative (outflow) — added to OCF to get FCF
Div Yield (Annual income from holding)
TD
Last Annual Dividend / Stock Price
1.3%
Last Dividend: $8.00
Stock Price: $634.82
Payout Ratio (Earnings paid out as dividends)
HEX
Dividends Paid / Net Income
35.7%
Dividends Paid: -$1.06B
Net Income: $2.96B
Industry Benchmarks
Last run: Aug 11, 2026 12:12am
Compares CMI against LLM-researched typical ranges for its industry. One research call per industry, cached indefinitely — every stock in the same industry reuses the same baseline.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 3:16am (17d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue $24.0B $28.1B $34.1B $34.1B $33.7B
Cost of Revenue $18.3B $21.4B $25.8B $25.7B $25.2B
Gross Profit $5.7B $6.7B $8.2B $8.4B $8.5B
Operating Expenses $3.0B $3.8B $6.5B $4.7B $4.5B
Operating Income $2.7B $2.9B $1.8B $3.8B $4.0B
Net Income $2.2B $2.2B $840.0M $4.1B $3.0B
EBITDA $3.4B $3.7B $2.8B $4.8B $5.1B
EPS $14.74 $15.20 $5.19 $28.55 $20.62
EPS (Diluted) $14.61 $15.12 $5.15 $28.37 $20.50
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:42am (17d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Cash & Equivalents $2.6B $2.1B $2.2B $1.7B $2.8B
Total Current Assets $12.3B $14.5B $15.2B $14.8B $16.9B
Total Assets $23.7B $30.3B $32.0B $31.5B $34.0B
Current Liabilities $7.1B $11.4B $12.9B $11.2B $9.6B
Long-Term Debt
Total Liabilities $14.3B $20.1B $22.1B $20.2B $20.6B
Total Equity $9.4B $10.2B $9.9B $11.3B $13.4B
Retained Earnings $16.7B $18.0B $17.9B $20.8B $22.6B
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 3:16am (17d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Operating Cash Flow $2.3B $2.0B $4.0B $1.5B $3.6B
Capital Expenditure -$734.0M -$916.0M -$1.2B -$1.2B -$1.2B
Free Cash Flow $1.5B $1.0B $2.8B $279.0M $2.4B
Acquisitions (net) $0 -$3.2B -$292.0M -$58.0M -$12.0M
Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) $6.0M $553.0M -$275.0M $1.2B $1.4B
Dividends Paid -$809.0M -$855.0M -$921.0M -$969.0M -$1.1B
Stock Buybacks -$1.4B -$374.0M $0 $0
Net Change in Cash -$809.0M -$491.0M $78.0M -$508.0M $1.2B
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 3:16am (17d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue Growth +16.9% +21.3% +0.1% -1.3%
Gross Profit Growth +18.0% +22.8% +2.3% +0.9%
Operating Income Growth +8.2% -39.9% +112.9% +7.3%
Net Income Growth +0.9% -61.5% +384.3% -27.3%
EBITDA Growth +10.2% -25.0% +72.9% +6.5%
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:42am (17d ago)
Date Dividend Declaration Record Payment
2026-05-22 $2.00
2026-02-20 $2.00
2025-11-21 $2.00
2025-08-22 $2.00
2025-05-23 $1.82
2025-02-21 $1.82
2024-11-22 $1.82
2024-08-23 $1.82
2024-05-23 $1.68
2024-02-22 $1.68
2023-11-22 $1.68
2023-08-24 $1.68
2023-05-18 $1.57
2023-02-23 $1.57
2022-11-17 $1.57
2022-08-18 $1.57
2022-05-19 $1.45
2022-02-17 $1.45
2021-11-18 $1.45
2021-08-19 $1.45
0Company Classification 1Industry Landscape 2Company Momentum 3Forward Projection 4aDCF Valuation 4bEarnings Power Value 4cAnchored PE 4dReverse DCF 4eRevenue-Based DCF 4fAnchored P/S 4gScenario Analysis 4hDividend Discount Model 4iBook Value Analysis 4jInsider Activity 4fCash Flow Quality 4gDebt Maturity Risk 4hMacro Environment 4iSector Intelligence 4jRevenue Confidence 4kSensitivity Analysis 4lSector Demand Cycle 5AI Investigation 5bThesis Evaluation 6Valuation Synthesis
computed not applicable 18 computed · 6 not applicable
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:43
-0.8 : 1 recovery upside vs repeat-quarter downside
Even the bull case prices 60% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 78%.
CaseGrowthMarginFair valuevs price ($634.82)
Bull — recovery +5% 12.4% $257.01 -60%
Base — stabilizes +3% 10.8% $215.76 -66%
Bear — keeps slipping +2% 9.1% $177.99 -72%
Stress — last quarter repeats +3% 6.6% $141.00 -78%
The next quarters keep the trajectory of the worst recent matched quarter (ending 2026-03-31) — growth stays at 2.7% and margins bend by the same profit-vs-revenue ratio (×0.81). Stress is a trajectory, not a prediction — it answers "what if the ship's current heading simply continues," which history says is the case to respect.
Why this is appearing: this company files quarterly, so its recent trajectory could be measured rather than assumed — the engine matched Jun 2026, Mar 2026 against the same quarters one year earlier and found revenue +6.2% · operating income -5.6% · net income -7.3% year-over-year. That measured heading is what the stress case extends forward. Of those, the stress case extends the worst matched quarter — the one ending Mar 31, 2026 (revenue +2.7%, operating income -16.3% YoY) — not the average. Data measured through Jun 30, 2026 — this card recalculates automatically when the next quarterly filing is ingested. Companies without quarterly filings (many foreign listings) never show this card: with no measured trajectory, there is nothing honest to repeat.
Narrative Economics
The story the market is telling about this stock — the intangible X-factor (founder mythology, cult dynamics, TAM-of-imagination) that moves price beyond what cash flows alone explain. After Shiller, Narrative Economics.
No narrative profile yet for CMI — it's generated by the pipeline (market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-11
The creme is there an opportunity here? Conditional opportunity
The AI trade in Cummins is the genset, not the algorithm - own it for megawatts, not for machine learning.
Exposure is only 54 because most of the $33.7B base is insulated physical product, but the exposed slice is the best one: Power Systems selling onsite generation into an AI buildout that cannot wait for grid interconnects, with scarcity_migration at 78 and gross margin already grinding from 23.7 to 25.3 on flat revenue. What unlocks the bull case at 81 is evidence this is a mix shift rather than a spike - disclosed datacenter backlog and growth in prime/gas power, not just standby units. What kills it is the entrant_compression flank at 71: the -8.6% share gap plus any OEM launching a credible in-house heavy-duty engine on an AI-shortened development cycle means cheap engineering is dissolving the certification moat, and the diesel annuity funding Accelera erodes faster than the power story compounds.
64
AI Position
Favorable but narrow - AI reaches Cummins through power demand, not software
AI cannot substitute a diesel or gas engine, but the AI buildout is bidding directly for Cummins' highest-margin product - onsite mission-critical power - while cheap engineering intelligence quietly erodes the emissions-certification scale advantage that keeps truck OEMs from insourcing powertrains.
Exposure 54 Confidence 66 50 = neutral
Primary Tailwind

Data center construction needs standby and increasingly prime onsite generation faster than utilities can deliver interconnects, and Power Systems reciprocating gensets and gas engines are one of the few deliverable answers - this is AI capex converting into Cummins backlog at above-corporate margins.

Primary Pressure

Emissions calibration, durability simulation and certification are enormous fixed engineering costs that Cummins amortizes across volume no single OEM can match; if AI-assisted simulation collapses that cost, Paccar-, Daimler- and Traton-style in-house powertrains get cheaper to sustain and Cummins' installed-base share keeps leaking - consistent with the -8.6% share gap already visible.

Critical Hinge

Whether data center power demand is a multi-year structural mix shift or a two-year order spike. Watch Power Systems revenue and segment EBITDA share of total, plus disclosure of data-center-specific backlog and whether gas/prime power (not just standby) orders grow.

Hard to Reproduce

Global certified distribution and service network with parts availability at truck-stop density, emissions aftertreatment and certification portfolios per jurisdiction, and the installed base of millions of engines that pulls decades of aftermarket parts revenue.

Forensic fingerprint same 11 factors for every stock · 0 unfavorable · 50 neutral · 100 favorable
Underlying Need Persistence do people still need this at all? 88
Freight movement and reliable electrical power are needs cheap intelligence intensifies rather than removes.
AI increases electricity demand and does not reduce the need to move goods; the underlying need behind both engines and gensets is physical and growing.
Class 8 freight ton-miles trend · US datacenter power demand forecasts · Onsite generation permitting activity
relevance 58 · confidence 87
Solution Persistence will they still solve it this way? 62
Combustion remains the deliverable answer near term, but the powertrain form factor is genuinely contested - mostly for non-AI reasons.
AI-driven power urgency actually favors gas and diesel recip solutions over grid-dependent options in the next five years, while the long-run electrification question is driven by regulation and battery cost, not intelligence cost.
Gas vs diesel genset order mix · EPA 2027 rule implementation status · Accelera revenue and loss trajectory
relevance 62 · confidence 58
Intelligence Commoditization does cheap AI power them or copy them? 64
Cheap AI is mostly an input to Cummins engineering, but the same tooling narrows its development-scale moat.
Virtual calibration and generative design cut Cummins' own R&D cost per program; they also cut it for every rival, which matters because Cummins' advantage over OEM in-house engines is largely amortized certification engineering.
R&D as percent of revenue · Program development cycle-time claims · New entrant heavy-duty engine certifications
relevance 56 · confidence 60
Responsibility Transfer are they paid to take the blame? 74
Customers pay Cummins to own emissions compliance, uptime and warranty risk on a legally exposed asset.
An engine that fails certification or breaks a fleet contract creates liability no fleet wants to internalize, and AI does not transfer that accountability - it makes managing it cheaper for whoever already holds it.
Warranty expense as percent of sales · Emissions settlement or recall disclosures · Uptime guarantee contract adoption
relevance 56 · confidence 64
Scarcity Migration do their assets get rarer or more common? 78
AI makes deliverable megawatts and skilled service capacity scarcer while making software abundant.
The binding constraint on AI datacenters is power and the equipment plus field service to install and maintain it; Cummins owns manufacturing capacity, aftertreatment IP and a global service network that abundant intelligence cannot conjure.
Power Systems capacity expansion capex · Genset lead times and pricing · Distribution/service technician headcount
relevance 76 · confidence 68
Customer DIY Preference will customers just build it themselves? 70
Fleets and hyperscalers will not build engines, but truck OEMs increasingly build their own.
The DIY threat is not the end customer, it is vertical integration by Paccar, Daimler and Traton - a slow, capital-heavy decision that cheap engineering nudges rather than triggers.
OEM in-house engine share of builds · Cummins share of OEM truck platforms · Long-term supply agreement renewals
relevance 48 · confidence 60
AI Intermediation Position do AI agents go through them or around them? 55
Agents do not intermediate heavy-duty powertrain procurement in any material way.
Purchases are negotiated OEM platform decisions and fleet specs, not discoverable transactions an AI layer can reroute; parts e-commerce is the only marginal channel effect.
Digital parts ordering mix · Fleet procurement platform partnerships
relevance 20 · confidence 55
Data Leverage does their data make AI better? 68
Millions of connected engines generate duty-cycle and failure data that improves service capture and warranty prediction.
Telematics on the installed base lets Cummins predict failures, pull parts and service demand into its own network rather than will-fit competitors, and price warranty risk better than any outsider can model.
Connected engine count disclosures · Aftermarket parts share of revenue · Warranty accrual accuracy revisions
relevance 52 · confidence 54
AI Margin Conversion do the AI savings become profit? 65
Engineering and warranty are the two credible AI cost levers, and both drop to gross margin.
Gross margin has risen from 23.7 to 25.3 percent on flat revenue, showing management can hold pricing while cost falls; AI-assisted validation and predictive warranty extend that path, though heavy-industry cost structure limits the ceiling.
Gross margin trend on flat revenue · Warranty and product-coverage expense · Restructuring and headcount actions
relevance 62 · confidence 54
Revenue Unit Durability does the thing they charge for survive? 72
The monetized units - engines, aftertreatment content, parts and kilowatts of generation - all survive cheap intelligence.
No unit here is a seat or a task; AI shifts the mix toward higher-margin power generation and content-per-truck rather than dissolving the unit, though truck unit volumes remain cyclical and share is leaking.
Power Systems revenue mix shift · Content per truck and aftertreatment attach · Engine segment unit shipments
relevance 66 · confidence 65
Entrant Compression how easily can newcomers copy them? 71
Cheap software does not build a foundry, a certification portfolio or a global service network.
Barriers here are capital, regulatory homologation and physical service density, so AI-native entrants are irrelevant; the credible new competition is Chinese engine makers and alternative power vendors chasing datacenter loads.
Chinese OEM export share in engines · Fuel cell/turbine wins at datacenters · New competitor genset capacity announcements
relevance 52 · confidence 62

AI Lens thesis

AI touches Cummins in three separable channels and only one is large: first, as a customer - AI datacenters buy gensets, gas engines and eventually fuel cells, pushing revenue mix toward Power Systems where margins and pricing power exceed the truck engine business; second, as an internal cost lever - generative design, virtual calibration and telematics-driven warranty prediction attack engineering spend and the warranty line, which is exactly where an incumbent with GM% climbing 23.7 to 25.3 can convert savings into margin; third, as a competitive equalizer - the same simulation tooling lowers the barrier for OEM insourcing and Chinese engine makers, which is the one channel that structurally harms Cummins. Nothing in AI substitutes the physical artifact, the aftertreatment certification, or the parts-and-service network, so exposure is real but bounded and the direction is net positive.

Thesis breaker Power Systems growth stalling while truck engine share keeps sliding would kill the favorable read; conversely a truck OEM publicly launching a competitive in-house heavy-duty engine on an AI-compressed development cycle would confirm the bear mechanism.
What the market may be underestimating

Upside Autonomous and higher-utilization freight raises miles per truck, and aftermarket parts consumption scales with duty cycle, not with truck count - Cummins' annuity could grow even if unit sales are flat or the industry ships fewer trucks.

Downside Datacenter power is the segment now carrying the margin story, and it is a capex-cycle customer: a pause in AI buildout, a shift to grid-scale gas turbines, or fuel-cell alternatives for prime power removes the one AI-driven growth vector while legacy diesel remains structurally flat.

Outcome range spread 39

42Bear case
63Central case
81Bull case
Three headline numbers, deliberately never blended: Position (which way), Exposure (how much it matters at all), Confidence (how sure). The fingerprint asks every stock the same 11 questions so companies a sector label would lump together get told apart. Not an input to GEM/Coal or the Q/V/S lenses.
Claude Reading
Independent analyst synthesis · claude-opus-4-7 · generated 2026-08-11 00:48:21
Verdict I partially dissent from synthesis. The $286 fair value is too punitive — it ignores the Q2 reacceleration and normalizes on the wrong base year. But $635 is still full: you're paying ~19x forward on the assumption that 2026's run-rate holds through a truck cycle downturn, which historically it does not (2019-2020 saw revenue drop 15%+). Fair value in the $450-500 range on mid-cycle earnings; current price embeds too much data-center optimism plus residual electrification narrative premium. Not a short — quality is real, ROIC (even adjusted) is strong, FCF conversion is fine — but not a buy here either. Wait for the next Class 8 order downturn or a genset demand hiccup; either takes the stock to the low $500s where the setup becomes attractive.

Looking at the raw quarterly cadence first: Q2 2026 revenue of $9.46B with $968M NI (10.2% margin) is a genuine acceleration versus Q2 2025's $8.64B — that's +9.5% YoY, not the -1.3% "recent yoy" the momentum module reports (which appears to be comparing stale annual data). Q1 2026 at $8.40B vs Q1 2025 $8.17B is +2.8%. So the trajectory is inflecting, not decaying. First half 2026 run-rate is ~$17.9B, implying ~$36B+ for the year vs $33.67B in 2025 — call it +7% top-line reacceleration with margins holding double-digits. That materially undermines the synthesis's "mature/declining" DCF anchoring at $286.

The balance sheet number is suspicious: $94M total debt against $13.4B equity for a capital-intensive engine manufacturer with $2.39B FCF is almost certainly a data feed artifact (likely current-portion-only or a mislabel — CMI historically carries ~$4-6B of long-term debt from the Meritor acquisition). Debt/equity of 0.007 is not real; ROIC of 28% is likely overstated as a result. Adjusting for a realistic ~$5B net debt, EV/EBITDA in the high-teens is still full but not egregious for a sector leader printing 10%+ margins with data-center backup power (a real, non-narrative tailwind — HPE, Vertiv, generator peers all confirming genset demand) driving the Power Systems segment.

Where I dissent from the synthesis: the $286 fair value is anchored on 2023's collapsed $840M NI year (Accelera + emissions charges) and treats normalized earnings as ~$2.5-3B. But 2024 printed $4.07B NI and 2026 is annualizing toward $3.3B+ with the Q2 acceleration. On $3B normalized NI, 30x is rich but not $286-rich; a defensible 18-22x on cyclically-normalized $13-14/share EPS (~$1.9-2.1B trough) to $28-30 (peak) puts fair value in the $400-500 range, not $286. The synthesis and market-forces layers are essentially double-counting the electrification bear case — market-forces says CMI is "losing the platform race" while the narrative layer admits Accelera is immaterial to GAAP, which means the diesel/genset franchise IS the earnings story and it's performing. Where I agree with synthesis: at $635 and 31x trailing, you're paying peak-cycle multiple on peak-cycle earnings for a cyclical, and the risk/reward from here is asymmetric to the downside on any freight/truck cycle rollover (Class 8 orders are the tell).

Contrarian read a bull would push: data center backup power is a structural, not cyclical, demand pool — CMI's Power Systems segment grew ~20% in recent quarters and carries higher margins than engine. If that segment scales from ~15% to 25% of revenue over three years, mix shift alone justifies a re-rated multiple. Insider activity is genuinely neutral — the sales are trivial (90-480 share lots) against awards; this is not the "management sees structural decline" signal market-forces claims. The narrative layer's "turnaround-bet, fragile" framing is wrong archetype — this isn't a turnaround, it's a cyclical printing near-peak with an optional call on Accelera. Fragility comes from the cycle, not the story.

GPT Reading
Independent reading · gpt-5.4 · generated 2026-08-11 00:48:36
Verdict Overvalued at $635 — Cummins is an excellent business, but the current price implies a durable growth and margin regime the reported revenue, cash flow, and cycle-adjusted earnings do not yet support; fair value looks closer to $450-$500.

At $634.82, Cummins is being valued like a secular compounder, but the financials still look like a very good cyclical industrial. Revenue has gone essentially nowhere over the last three full years: $34.07B in 2023, $34.10B in 2024, then down to $33.67B in 2025. Even if I give credit for the latest two quarters, the run-rate is only modestly better, with 1H26 revenue of $17.86B versus $16.81B in 1H25, up about 6%. That is solid, but not the stuff that normally supports 31x earnings, 2.6x sales, and 16.5x EV/EBITDA for a heavy-equipment name. The key issue is that the stock multiple has expanded while the top line has not. When a mature manufacturer gets this expensive, I need to see either a clear structural margin step-up or a new growth engine that is already material in the numbers. I do not see either proven yet.

The earnings story is also less clean than the headline quality metrics suggest. Net income swung from just $840M in 2023 to $4.07B in 2024, then back down to $2.96B in 2025. Operating income is a better guide to the business than net income here, and that picture is respectable but not transformative: $2.93B in 2022, $1.76B in 2023, $3.75B in 2024, $4.03B in 2025. That says Cummins has recovered strongly and is operating well, not that it has become a different kind of company. The recent quarterly margins reinforce that. Q1 and Q2 2026 net margins were 8.1% and 10.2%, versus 10.4% and 10.7% in the comparable 2025 quarters; so revenue improved, but profitability did not expand. Free cash flow of $2.39B on $33.67B of sales is healthy, yet against an $87.4B market cap that is only about a 2.7% FCF yield. For a capital-intensive industrial with cyclical exposure, pristine balance sheet or not, that is thin.

The balance sheet is undeniably excellent and is the best argument for why the stock deserves a premium to old-cycle Cummins. With only $94M of debt against $2.85B of cash and $13.41B of equity, there is virtually no balance-sheet risk. ROIC at 28.2% and ROE at 22.1% are high-quality numbers, and the current ratio of 1.76 shows no stress. This is not a broken industrial story; it is an elite operator. But elite operators can still be overpriced. The market appears to be capitalizing Cummins as if superior capital allocation, resilience, and transition optionality justify a permanent re-rating from the historical industrial band toward something closer to infrastructure-tech. That is a big leap when the actual evidence still shows flattish multi-year revenue, volatile earnings, and only moderate cash conversion after capex.

The best case against my skepticism is straightforward: the business may be in the middle of a durable earnings reset higher, and the annual data could be understating it because 2024-2026 reflect a cleaner, more profitable operating model. Q2 2026 revenue of $9.46B was up 9.5% from $8.64B a year earlier, and net income of $968M was still above the already-strong $928M posted in Q2 2025. Operating income rose from $3.75B in 2024 to $4.03B in 2025 despite slightly lower revenue, suggesting better mix and execution. If Cummins can hold operating margins around 12% through a normal cycle, its old valuation anchors are too low. And the fortress balance sheet matters: many industrials at premium valuations carry leverage; Cummins does not. If investors are paying up for a scarce combination of cyclical exposure, capital discipline, and strategic optionality, the premium is not irrational. I still weigh that less heavily because the current price already discounts a lot of that success, while the earnings base remains too volatile to underwrite a 30x multiple with confidence.

What would change my mind is simple. I would get less bearish if Cummins can show that the latest growth is not just a favorable part of the cycle but a new baseline: specifically, full-year revenue back above $36B, operating income sustainably above $4.5B, and free cash flow above $3.0B without balance-sheet stretch. If quarterly net margins start holding above 10% consistently while revenue grows high single digits, the case for a structurally higher multiple strengthens. On the other side, if 2H26 margins soften, full-year earnings fail to clearly exceed 2025, or cash flow remains stuck around the current 2%-3% yield, the market will have to confront that it paid a growth-stock multiple for a best-in-class but still mature engine maker.

Grok Reading
Independent reading · grok-4.5 · generated 2026-08-11 00:49:02
Verdict Overvalued at $635; cash-flow fair value nearer $280–$350, 31x PE and 2.7% FCF yield too rich for flat revenue

The numbers describe a high-quality franchise that has already been paid for twice. Cummins generated $33.67B of revenue in 2025, essentially flat to down versus $34.10B in 2024 and $34.07B in 2023, yet the equity is capitalized at $87B—2.6x sales and 31x trailing earnings. Net income fell from $4.07B to $2.96B year-over-year, compressing the net margin from roughly 12% back toward a more normal 8.8%. Free cash flow of $2.39B against a $87B enterprise implies a 2.7% FCF yield; add the 1.3% dividend and the cash return is thin for a cyclical industrial whose revenue CAGR is negative 0.6% and whose FCF CAGR is negative 6.9%. The recent two quarters ($8.40B then $9.46B) show sequential momentum and mid-to-high single-digit operating margins, but they do not rewrite the multi-year stagnation in the top line.

What the market is clearly buying is the electrification/Accelera/hydrogen optionality layered on top of an almost debt-free balance sheet ($94M debt, $2.85B cash, 0.007 debt-to-equity) and elite capital returns (28% ROIC, 22% ROE). That fortress quality is real and explains why the stock can sustain a premium to ordinary machinery names. It does not justify a 31x multiple or a 16.5x EV/EBITDA when the core diesel franchise is mature, volumes are not compounding, and the new-power contribution remains immaterial to GAAP results. The 2024 earnings spike looks like a peak-cycle print that 2025 already partially gave back; paying 31x on the residual run-rate is an expensive wager that the transition story will both arrive on time and earn returns comparable to the legacy engine business.

The strongest contrary case is straightforward: Q2 2026 revenue of $9.46B and $968M of net income re-accelerated hard, the balance sheet can fund any pivot without dilution, and sector leadership plus good FCF quality mean Cummins can keep harvesting cash while competitors struggle. A smart bull argues that data-center backup power and Accelera create a second profit pool the DCF at ~$286 simply ignores, and that 31x is tolerable if earnings re-rate toward a structurally higher margin base. I weigh that less heavily because the multi-year revenue line is still flat-to-down, earnings CAGR is inflated by the 2023 trough, and the narrative layer itself flags durability as fragile—one hydrogen miss or margin compression episode collapses the premium. Insider activity is noise (small gifts, awards, and sales), not a confirming signal either way.

I would flip if two consecutive quarters deliver mid-teens revenue growth with operating margins holding above 12%, or if Accelera/new power discloses a multi-billion run-rate with positive contribution margins that the Street can underwrite. Until then the stock is priced for a successful multi-year technology migration that the cash-flow statement has not yet begun to evidence.

Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Each AI above independently stated a direction (undervalued, fairly valued, or overvalued) and how strongly it believes it (conviction, 0–5). We combine those into a Bull-Bear Index on a 0–10 scale: 5 is neutral, 10 is maximum bullish (undervalued at full conviction), 0 is maximum bearish. We compute the score ourselves with the same arithmetic for every seat — the models never grade their own bullishness — so the three are directly comparable. Δ shows how far each seat sits from the panel average of 1.3; a large Δ marks the dissenting voice, usually the one worth reading.
Claude claude-opus-4-7 2.0
overvalued · conviction 3/5 · Δ +0.7 vs panel · self: 4.0
GPT gpt-5.4 1.0
overvalued · conviction 4/5 · Δ -0.3 vs panel · self: 3.0
Grok grok-4.5 1.0
overvalued · conviction 4/5 · Δ -0.3 vs panel · self: 3.0
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Separate reads — Company Quality (is it a great business?), Valuation (is it mispriced?), and General Sentiment (how macro + narrative are pushing it), plus AI Impact (how the AI wave reshapes it), kept deliberately apart · 2026-08-11 01:17:29
Delvantic - Cairn AI
Quality - wait for a dip 7/10
Cummins is a genuinely good industrial trading well above what its cash flows justify, so I want it badly - just not here.
The cruxWhether the AI-driven Power Systems mix shift is durable enough to re-rate the whole company, or just a cyclical spike layered on flat $34B revenue.
Forensic checks Derived mechanically from CMI's filed financials — not from the AI lenses
Liquidity & RunwaySelf-Funding
DilutionShare Count Shrinking
Earnings QualityHigh Earnings Quality
The four lensesswitch a tab for its full read — score + evidence
Company Quality
+48
Solid
edge √Σ 121 · risk √Σ 69 · conf 7/10

Cummins prints the profile of a mature industrial franchise: revenue scaled from $24.0B (2021) to $33.7B (2025), gross margin expanded steadily from 23.7% to 25.3%, and 2025 operating margin recovered to 12.0%. Earnings quality is clean - accruals -0.6% of assets, OCF/NI 1.65x, and Altman Z of 5.12 sits firmly in the safe zone. Balance sheet is healthy with $3.61B cash, $3.52B net cash, and self-funding $2.39B FCF in 2025. Diluted share count shrank from 145.9M to 138.7M (-1.3% CAGR) with SBC only 0.2% of revenue and buyback/SBC ratio of 4800x - genuine per-share value concentration, not optical.

The blemishes are cyclical/one-time in character rather than structural. 2023 operating margin collapsed to 5.2% (net income $840M) - likely the Accelera/emissions-related charge era - before snapping back to 11-12%. 2024 FCF cratered to $279M against $4.07B net income (working capital or one-timers) before normalizing to $2.39B in 2025; that swing tells you FCF is lumpy even if the multi-year average is solid. Insider tape is neutral-to-mildly-negative: 38 sells, zero opens, but volumes are trivial (Jackson's ~$519K total) and dominated by routine award/gift/tax activity - no red flag.

Net read: a well-run, disciplined capital allocator with real earnings, real cash, and shrinking share count, but with the cyclicality and margin variability that keep it from a fortress rating.

Strengths 4
m70
Clean earnings quality
OCF/NI of 1.65x, accruals -0.6% of assets, Altman Z 5.12. Reported profits are backed by cash across the cycle.
m65
Per-share value concentration
Diluted shares fell 145.9M to 138.7M (-1.3% CAGR); SBC at 0.2% of revenue is negligible; buyback/SBC 4800x means shareholders keep the compounding.
m55
Gross margin expansion through the cycle
GM% climbed each year: 23.7 to 23.9 to 24.2 to 24.7 to 25.3. Pricing and mix are working even as revenue plateaus around $34B.
m50
Self-funding with net cash
$3.52B net cash and $2.39B 2025 FCF against an industrial capex base - no reliance on capital markets.
Concerns 4
m45
Lumpy FCF conversion
FCF swung $1.52B to $1.05B to $2.75B to $279M to $2.39B while net income was steadier. 2024's $279M FCF against $4.07B NI is a large working-capital or one-time gap worth understanding.
m40
2023 margin collapse still on the tape
Operating margin fell to 5.2% and net income to $840M in 2023 - likely emissions/settlement or Accelera-related charges. Shows the P&L can take material one-time hits.
m30
Revenue plateau
Top line flat at ~$34B across 2023-2025 after rapid 2021-2023 growth; forward growth engine (Accelera, electrification) is unproven at scale.
m15
One-way insider tape
38 sells and zero open-market buys in TTM, but dollar amounts are small and mostly routine post-award dispositions - weak signal at best.
This is a genuinely well-run industrial - clean books, real cash, shrinking share count, expanding gross margins. It is not a fortress because it is cyclical and the P&L has already shown it can take a $1B+ one-time hit (2023) and that FCF can miss badly in a single year (2024). Management appears disciplined with capital: modest SBC, meaningful buybacks, net cash maintained through a capex-heavy transition to electrification. I would call this a high-quality mature earner - not elite, but the kind of business that survives cycles and quietly compounds per-share value. Solid, leaning toward the upper end of that band.
Verify before trusting this (6)
  • What drove 2023 operating margin collapse to 5.2% - was it the emissions settlement, Accelera losses, or Meritor integration charges?
  • Working capital and one-time items behind 2024 FCF of $279M vs $4.07B net income
  • Accelera (new power/electrification) segment profitability and cash burn trajectory
  • Customer concentration in engine and components segments (OEM truck cyclicality exposure)
  • Any remaining EPA/emissions-related legal or regulatory liabilities post-2023 settlement
  • Pension and OPEB obligations relative to net cash position
Valuation / Mispricing
-57
Rich
edge √Σ 30 · risk √Σ 95 · conf 6/10
Price $634.82 vs deserved roughly $450-550; the stock is trading 15-30% above what the cash flows justify, not the -55% the composite screams. attractive below $475.00

Price is $634.82 vs a composite fair value of $276.39 and signal-adjusted $286.55 - implying roughly -55% downside per the e2e synthesis. I do not take that gap at face value: the DCF ($136) and EPV floor ($167) look punitive for a durable, cash-generative franchise with a Solid quality grade and net cash, and the anchored-PE at $666 is closer to where the market actually clears cyclical industrials. Splitting the difference and giving Cummins credit for high earnings quality and clean books, a defensible deserved value sits somewhere in the $450-550 zone - meaningfully below spot but not the two-thirds haircut the composite implies.

Cheap signals 1
m30
High earnings quality and net cash
Clean books, buybacks, expanding gross margins and net cash support a higher deserved value than the DCF/EPV floors suggest - the composite $276 is almost certainly too low.
Rich / priced-in 4
m62
Price above every method except anchored-PE
DCF $136, EPV $167, composite $276 all sit far below $634.82; only the anchored-PE at $666 supports current price, and that method just extrapolates the current multiple.
m55
Electrification optionality already in the price
Accelera, hydrogen and battery bets are not yet cash-generative; paying a premium multiple on cyclical diesel earnings while also crediting a $2T TAM narrative is double-counting.
m40
Cyclical earnings on a peak-ish multiple
Company-quality lens flags cyclical margin wobble, lumpy FCF and a $1B+ one-time hit in 2023 - not the risk profile that deserves a full-cycle premium.
m25
Composite FV likely too punitive but still well below spot
Even generously marking deserved value up to $500 for quality, the stock is ~25% above that - a fair-to-rich zone, not a bargain.
I do not buy the -55% downside headline - the DCF and EPV inputs look too harsh for a net-cash, high-earnings-quality industrial. But I also cannot get to $634 without leaning on either a peak multiple or the electrification story, and I am not willing to underwrite either at full price. This is a Rich, not Overvalued, stock. I want it in the mid-$400s before it is interesting; anywhere near spot I am paying for optionality I have not been shown yet.
Verify before trusting this (5)
  • North America heavy-duty truck orderbook and 2025 guidance
  • Accelera segment losses and cash burn trajectory
  • Normalized FCF conversion after the 2024 miss
  • Any further one-time / legal charges in the run-rate
  • Capital return pace vs electrification capex
General Sentiment
+5
Tailwind
tail √Σ 79 · head √Σ 74 · conf 6/10

The active narrative on CMI is a turnaround/electrification bet — strong intensity but explicitly fragile — and it is doing the heavy lifting here. The market is pricing a $635 stock against a DCF anchor near $286, meaning almost the entire tape on this name is sentiment, not cash flow. That story is currently winning: momentum is positive, the risk-on regime (score +47, VIX 15.5, S&P near highs) rewards exactly this kind of high-beta (1.25) industrial-with-a-growth-story profile, and Accelera/hydrogen headlines keep the bull frame alive. That is a real tailwind on the tape right now. The counter-pressure is macro: 10y at 4.65% and a market PE of 26 are hostile to long-duration 'story premium' embedded in a mature industrial, and CMI's 1.25 beta means any risk-off flip lands harder here than on a defensive peer. Analyst tone and news flow appear supportive rather than euphoric, so this is a tailwind, not a mania. Net: the wind is at CMI's back, but it is blowing on a fragile narrative structure — the same wind can reverse quickly if the electrification story cracks or rates jolt higher.

Tailwinds 3
m55
Electrification narrative doing the pricing
A strong turnaround/electrification story (Accelera, hydrogen, batteries) is what supports a price more than 2x DCF fair value. While the narrative holds, it is the dominant upward force on the tape for this name.
m45
Risk-on tape favors high-beta industrials with a story
Regime is risk-on (+47), VIX 15.5, indices near highs, and CMI's 1.25 beta amplifies that. High-beta industrials with a growth angle get bid in this kind of tape.
m35
Positive price momentum reinforces the story
Strong_positive momentum with low volatility feeds a self-reinforcing narrative loop — trend followers and story buyers keep pressing while the tape cooperates.
Headwinds 3
m55
Fragile narrative on a huge premium is unstable
The story is flagged fragile with low cult coefficient, and the stock trades at a 121% premium to DCF. Any crack (missed Accelera milestone, hydrogen setback) removes the only thing holding the price up — latent, sizable downside pressure.
m40
Rates and market PE punish story premium
10y 4.65% and market PE 26 are hostile to long-duration 'future powertrain' optionality embedded in a mature diesel base. Rate scares hit this specific setup harder than a pure cash-flow industrial.
m30
High beta cuts both ways
Beta 1.25 means the risk-on tailwind is real now, but a regime flip to risk-off would land disproportionately on CMI versus defensive industrial peers.
Net tailwind, but a nervous one. Right now the tape, the risk-on regime, and a strong electrification narrative are all pushing CMI up, and momentum confirms it — that is a genuine, if moderate, tailwind on this specific name. What keeps me from calling it strong is the setup underneath: the narrative is explicitly fragile, the price is more than double DCF, and a 1.25 beta into a 4.65% 10y and PE-26 market means any wobble in either the story or the macro lands harder here than on almost any peer. So: leaning tailwind today, but the pressure is asymmetric — small upside push, large latent downside if the story cracks.
Verify before trusting this (5)
  • Any Accelera/hydrogen milestone news — hits or misses will move the narrative more than earnings
  • Analyst target revisions: are they chasing the price up or quietly trimming while the tape holds
  • 10y yield behavior — a break above 4.75-5.00% would compress story-premium names first
  • VIX regime change or S&P rolling off highs — CMI's 1.25 beta makes it an early casualty
  • Sector rotation out of electrification/clean-energy adjacent names
The market-wide tape + this name's exposure to it (beta / sector / narrative durability). Context on the non-fundamental pressure — not a call on the business or the price. processId: detail-general-sentiment
AI Impact
+42
Favorable but narrow - AI reaches Cummins through power demand, not software
opp √Σ 86 · thr √Σ 0 · conf 7/10

AI touches Cummins in three separable channels and only one is large: first, as a customer - AI datacenters buy gensets, gas engines and eventually fuel cells, pushing revenue mix toward Power Systems where margins and pricing power exceed the truck engine business; second, as an internal cost lever - generative design, virtual calibration and telematics-driven warranty prediction attack engineering spend and the warranty line, which is exactly where an incumbent with GM% climbing 23.7 to 25.3 can convert savings into margin; third, as a competitive equalizer - the same simulation tooling lowers the barrier for OEM insourcing and Chinese engine makers, which is the one channel that structurally harms Cummins. Nothing in AI substitutes the physical artifact, the aftertreatment certification, or the parts-and-service network, so exposure is real but bounded and the direction is net positive.

AI opportunities 10
m44
Underlying Need Persistence
Freight movement and reliable electrical power are needs cheap intelligence intensifies rather than removes.
m15
Solution Persistence
Combustion remains the deliverable answer near term, but the powertrain form factor is genuinely contested - mostly for non-AI reasons.
m16
Intelligence Commoditization
Cheap AI is mostly an input to Cummins engineering, but the same tooling narrows its development-scale moat.
m27
Responsibility Transfer
Customers pay Cummins to own emissions compliance, uptime and warranty risk on a legally exposed asset.
m43
Scarcity Migration
AI makes deliverable megawatts and skilled service capacity scarcer while making software abundant.
m19
Customer DIY Preference
Fleets and hyperscalers will not build engines, but truck OEMs increasingly build their own.
m19
Data Leverage
Millions of connected engines generate duty-cycle and failure data that improves service capture and warranty prediction.
m19
AI Margin Conversion
Engineering and warranty are the two credible AI cost levers, and both drop to gross margin.
m29
Revenue Unit Durability
The monetized units - engines, aftertreatment content, parts and kilowatts of generation - all survive cheap intelligence.
m22
Entrant Compression
Cheap software does not build a foundry, a certification portfolio or a global service network.
AI threats 0

None surfaced.

The AI trade in Cummins is the genset, not the algorithm - own it for megawatts, not for machine learning. Exposure is only 54 because most of the $33.7B base is insulated physical product, but the exposed slice is the best one: Power Systems selling onsite generation into an AI buildout that cannot wait for grid interconnects, with scarcity_migration at 78 and gross margin already grinding from 23.7 to 25.3 on flat revenue. What unlocks the bull case at 81 is evidence this is a mix shift rather than a spike - disclosed datacenter backlog and growth in prime/gas power, not just standby units. What kills it is the entrant_compression flank at 71: the -8.6% share gap plus any OEM launching a credible in-house heavy-duty engine on an AI-shortened development cycle means cheap engineering is dissolving the certification moat, and the diesel annuity funding Accelera erodes faster than the power story compounds.
Verify before trusting this (8)
  • Power Systems capacity expansion capex
  • Genset lead times and pricing
  • Distribution/service technician headcount
  • Power Systems revenue mix shift
  • Content per truck and aftertreatment attach
  • Engine segment unit shipments
  • Gas vs diesel genset order mix
  • EPA 2027 rule implementation status
The structural effect of the AI wave on this specific business over the next ~5 years — demand, cost leverage, moat, barriers to entry, position in the AI stack. The reality beneath the AI story, not the story's market pressure (General Sentiment owns that) — and not a call on the business today or the price.
Growth Outlook
not run

This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.

The forward growth verdict — is the business itself likely to grow (next 2 quarters / year 1 / years 2–3), judged against its category and against printed expectations. The full horizon ladder + creme renders on the Growth Outlook card above. Not a call on the price (Valuation owns that) or the tape (Sentiment owns that).
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Lenses kept deliberately separate — Company Quality (price-agnostic), Valuation (price-conditional), General Sentiment (non-fundamental macro/narrative pressure), AI Impact (structural ~5yr AI exposure), and Growth Outlook (the forward growth verdict). The scores are not blended. Filing-level items (convertibles, lock-ups, customer concentration) are v2 — see each lens's "verify."
Price Prediction
Lower -12.6% v0.6.0 View full prediction →

When we made this prediction on Aug 11, 2026, CMI was $634.82. We expect it to be $555.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $475.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 11, 2026.

Price when predicted$634.82
Our estimate for Feb 2027$555.00-12.6%
Great value below$475.00
Price history shown (6 Months)

Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.

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My Notes personal — only you see this
v1.1.562 · 9b2927c4 · 2026-08-22 16:52:06