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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Collegium Pharmaceutical Inc. (COLL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Gem · Gem Score +53 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 51 · Value 55 · Sentiment -45 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $103.04 vs $28.10 at analysis
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Collegium Pharmaceutical Inc.
COLL NASDAQCollegium Pharmaceutical is a specialty biopharmaceutical company focused on developing and commercializing medicines for pain management and neuropsychiatric conditions. The company's primary portfolio includes Jornay PM, a central nervous system stimulant for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; Belbuca, a buccal film containing buprenorphine for chronic pain; and Xtampza ER, an abuse-deterrent extended-release oral formulation of oxycodone. Collegium also offers Nucynta products in extended-release and immediate-release formulations, along with Symproic for opioid-induced constipation. The company employs proprietary DETERx platform technology designed to maintain safety profiles while deterring abuse through various manipulation methods. Headquartered in Stoughton, Massachusetts, and founded in 2002, Collegium serves healthcare providers and patients across the United States, positioning itself as a leader in responsible pain management and ADHD treatment.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.73
Total Equity: $301.68M
Shares: 39,701,693
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $231.25M
EBITDA: $183.82M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $231.25M
Revenue: $780.57M
Revenue: $780.57M
Revenue: $780.57M
Total Equity: $301.68M
Tax Rate: 32.1%
Equity: $301.68M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $231.25M
Current Liabilities: $440.03M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $301.68M
Shares: 39,701,693
Shares: 39,701,693
CapEx: -$1.74M
Shares: 39,701,693
Stock Price: $28.23
Net Income: $62.87M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 10:10am (51d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $276.9M | $463.9M | $566.8M | $631.4M | $780.6M |
| Cost of Revenue | $126.3M | $254.4M | $240.6M | $254.1M | $317.3M |
| Gross Profit | $150.6M | $209.5M | $326.2M | $377.3M | $463.3M |
| Operating Expenses | $133.0M | $176.2M | $159.2M | $207.4M | $283.6M |
| Operating Income | $17.6M | $33.3M | $167.0M | $169.9M | $179.6M |
| Net Income | $71.5M | -$25.0M | $48.2M | $69.2M | $62.9M |
| EBITDA | $19.4M | $36.0M | $170.5M | $173.8M | $183.8M |
| EPS | $2.05 | $-0.74 | $1.43 | $2.14 | $1.98 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.86 | $-0.74 | $1.29 | $1.86 | $1.73 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 14, 2026 10:44am (54d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $186.4M | $173.7M | $238.9M | $70.6M | $231.3M |
| Total Current Assets | $315.5M | $420.0M | $537.6M | $482.3M | $691.4M |
| Total Assets | $692.1M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.7B | $1.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $279.6M | $433.7M | $457.9M | $509.5M | $440.0M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $489.1M | $979.3M | $947.9M | $1.4B | $1.4B |
| Total Equity | $202.9M | $194.8M | $195.4M | $228.8M | $301.7M |
| Retained Earnings | -$256.3M | -$281.3M | -$233.2M | -$164.0M | -$101.1M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 10:10am (51d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $103.6M | $124.2M | $274.7M | $205.0M | $329.3M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.9M | -$1.6M | $-461,000 | -$1.7M | -$1.7M |
| Free Cash Flow | $101.6M | $122.6M | $274.3M | $203.3M | $327.6M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | -$572.1M | $0 | -$267.5M | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$47.9M | -$14.1M | -$75.0M | -$60.0M | -$25.1M |
| Net Change in Cash | — | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 17, 2026 10:10am (51d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +67.6% | +22.2% | +11.4% | +23.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +39.1% | +55.7% | +15.7% | +22.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +89.0% | +401.1% | +1.8% | +5.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -135.0% | +292.6% | +43.7% | -9.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +85.9% | +373.5% | +1.9% | +5.8% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-10-03 02:02A +1σ run of quarters pays +124%; a −1σ run costs 89%. Ratio 1.4:1 (μ 19.2%, σ 45.1% floored by longrun, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): 1.3 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($28.10) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +11% | 17.3% | $52.49 | +87% |
| Base — stabilizes | +7% | 15.0% | $40.65 | +45% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +4% | 12.8% | $30.76 | +10% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +6% | 3.0% | $9.04 | -68% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +50% | 6.5% | $62.85 | +124% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -26% | 3.1% | $3.17 | -89% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:19The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Independent read on the raw numbers first: TTM revenue is $807.8M (Q3'25 through Q2'26) with net income of $47.9M, but the trajectory is uglier than the annuals suggest. Quarterly revenue peaked at $209.4M in Q3'25 and has stepped down two quarters running to $199.9M in Q2'26 — call it a 4.5% top-line slide off the peak. Worse, Q2'26 swung to a $15.1M net loss despite $199.9M of revenue, versus $12.0M profit on $188.0M a year earlier. That's not decelerating growth; that's operating deleverage or a one-time charge that management, notably, isn't in this file to explain. Gross margin held at 59% annually, but the Q2'26 loss on solid revenue implies opex, impairment, or litigation reserves ate the quarter. Free cash flow of $327.6M against a $920M market cap is a 36% FCF yield with zero debt and $231M cash — that's a distressed multiple on a business that, until two quarters ago, was compounding revenue at 17%.
The prior models are internally inconsistent in a way worth flagging. Synthesis says "fair value $95.89" implying +240% upside, yet labels the verdict "fair_value" — that's incoherent; a 240% gap is not fair value, it's either a screaming buy or a broken model. Market Forces calls it a "melting ice cube" while Pre-Flight calls the pricing "distressed-level" for a stable earner. Both can't be right. Thesis Evaluation splits the difference at -12 ("priced for perfection") which contradicts the 3.6x EV/EBITDA — nothing at 3.6x EBITDA is priced for perfection. The narrative layer's framing is the most honest: this is a fundamental repricing of terminal value on the opioid franchise (Belbuca, Xtampza ER, Nucynta), not a sentiment discount. Jornay PM (acquired via Ironshore in 2024) is the growth engine driving that 23.6% YoY, and the 62/100 fragility weight on Jornay formulary exclusion is the right thing to fixate on.
The contrarian case against the bull thesis: at $807M TTM revenue and ~$300M annual FCF, if the opioid book is in 8-10% annual volume decline (which is roughly the real-world de-prescribing trend) and Jornay stalls at $250-300M peak due to ADHD stimulant competition and payer pushback, terminal FCF settles closer to $180-200M within four years. Apply a 6x multiple for a declining specialty pharma and you get $1.1-1.2B EV, roughly the current EV of ~$690M plus some — so today's price isn't obviously wrong, it's pricing exactly that scenario. The insider activity confirms nothing bullish: awards dominate, sales are small and look programmatic (4,127 shares, 20 shares), and there are zero open-market insider buys despite the "70% discount to DCF." If insiders believed the DCF, they'd be buying. They're not. That's the tell.
Where I land: I dissent from synthesis's implied +240% upside but also from Market Forces' "melting ice cube" framing. The truth is in between and closer to undervalued than fair. A 36% FCF yield with no debt gives you enormous margin of safety even under aggressive decline scenarios — you only need FCF to average $110M/year for a decade to justify today's price at a 10% discount rate with zero terminal value. That's a low bar. The Q2'26 loss is the single most important data point in this file and it's unexplained; that alone caps conviction. Fair value on my math is $42-50 (roughly 6-7x sustainable FCF of $220-250M, haircut for opioid tail risk and Jornay concentration), implying 50-75% upside, not 240%. Signal-adjusted composite of $95.89 is fantasy — it's extrapolating growth that the last two quarters just contradicted.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not a melting-ice-cube income statement but a business whose accounting earnings understate the cash engine, and whose valuation looks far too low for the observed operating profile. Revenue has scaled from $463.9M in 2022 to $780.6M in 2025, a 68% increase in three years, while gross margin expanded from 45.2% to 59.4% and operating income rose from $33.3M to $179.6M. Even with some quarterly lumpiness, the recent run-rate is holding near $800M: the last four quarters sum to about $796M of revenue ($177.8M, $188.0M, $209.4M, $205.4M before the first half of 2026 prints), and the latest two quarters at $193.5M and $199.9M do not suggest collapse. Against that, the stock at a $0.92B market cap trades at just 1.2x trailing revenue and, using the provided multiples, roughly 3.6x EV/EBITDA and 0.85x EV/revenue. For a company with 23.0% operating margin in 2025, no reported debt, and $231.3M of cash, that is distressed pricing.
The cash flow is the key fact the bear case has to overcome. 2025 operating cash flow was $329.3M and free cash flow was $327.6M on just $1.7M of capex. That is an extraordinary 42% FCF margin on $780.6M of sales. Even if that level is helped by working-capital timing or non-cash amortization typical in specialty pharma, the gap between $62.9M of net income and $327.6M of FCF is so large that simple P/E-based skepticism misses the real earnings power of the asset base. At the current market cap, that is roughly a 35% FCF yield. You do not need perfection here; you need cash flow to fall a lot less than the market seems to fear. The quarter-to-quarter net income volatility also looks more like P&L noise than franchise deterioration: from $31.5M in 2025 Q3 to $17.0M in Q4 to $14.5M in 2026 Q1 to -$15.1M in 2026 Q2, while revenue over the same span stayed in a relatively tight $193.5M-$209.4M band. Stable sales with swinging earnings usually points me to non-operating or accounting items before I infer a demand cliff.
The contradiction I see in the model outputs is that some of them simultaneously frame this as “priced for perfection,” “fair value,” and a “fallen angel” with distressed EV multiples. The numbers support only one of those. A 16.3x P/E on depressed accounting earnings and a 3.6x EV/EBITDA on strong cash generation is not a stock the market is treating as safe growth; it is a stock the market is haircutting heavily on durability. That haircut may be rational in part, but the discount has already gone well beyond what current financials show. If 2026 simply lands around $780M-$800M of revenue with operating margins still around the high teens to low 20s and free cash flow even half of 2025’s level, the equity is cheap. On modest assumptions, this looks more like a $35-$40 stock than a $28 stock, and if investors regain confidence that cash conversion is structurally real rather than a one-year artifact, the upside could be higher.
The strongest case against this bullish read is straightforward: specialty pharma cash flows can vanish faster than historical statements imply, especially when product concentration, payer access, litigation overhang, and category stigma are in play. The recent quarterly sequence does show some warning signs. Revenue peaked at $209.4M in 2025 Q3 and has drifted to $199.9M by 2026 Q2; on a year-over-year basis, 2026 Q2 grew only 6.3% versus 2025 Q2, a sharp deceleration from the annual growth profile. Net income in the latest quarter was negative 7.5% margin, and recent earnings growth is already negative year over year. If 2025 free cash flow was flattered by working-capital releases, legal timing, or favorable rebate accruals, then the 35% implied FCF yield is a mirage. And if the market is correctly looking through current sales to future erosion from payer exclusions or opioid-related pressure, then low EV/revenue is not opportunity but recognition that terminal value is poor. The insider tape is not helpful either; while the sales disclosed are small and mixed with option exercises and awards, there is no obvious confidence signal from buying.
What would change my mind is not another theoretical debate about stigma; it is evidence of economic decay in the reported numbers. If the next two quarters show revenue dropping below $185M with no offset in margins, or if trailing operating cash flow falls toward ordinary GAAP earnings instead of remaining far above it, then the cash-yield thesis weakens materially. Likewise, if 2026 full-year revenue slips back toward $720M-$740M and operating income compresses meaningfully below 20% of sales, I would conclude the market was right to distrust the franchise. Conversely, if management can print another year near $800M of revenue, positive full-year net income despite quarterly noise, and over $200M of free cash flow, the current valuation will look plainly too cheap.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a specialty pharma that throws off cash far in excess of what a sub-$1B equity value implies. 2025 delivered $780.6M of revenue, up from $631.4M the prior year and $463.9M two years earlier, with operating income of $179.6M and free cash flow of $327.6M on a negligible $1.7M of capex. Against a $0.92B market cap and roughly $0.69B of enterprise value (after $231.3M net cash and zero reported debt), that is an EV/FCF multiple near 2x and an EV/EBITDA of 3.6x—distressed pricing for a business still posting a 59% gross margin, 23% operating margin, and 21% ROE. Quarterly revenue has stabilized in a $190–210M band rather than collapsed, and the trailing P/E of ~16x sits on net income that is depressed by what looks like heavy non-cash amortization typical of acquired product portfolios; cash earnings are the cleaner lens and they are excellent. The story the ledger tells is not a company in free-fall—it is a mature cash engine the market has marked as if the engine is about to seize.
What stands out against the bullish arithmetic is the most recent print: Q2 2026 revenue of $199.9M produced a $15.1M net loss and a −7.5% margin, breaking a multi-quarter stretch of profitability and confirming the secondary signal that revenue momentum is decelerating. Annual net income already slipped from $69.2M in 2024 to $62.9M in 2025 even as sales rose nearly $150M, so incremental revenue is not dropping cleanly to the bottom line. That pattern, plus the opioid-heavy heritage and the named Jornay PM formulary risk, is exactly why the 3.6x EV/EBITDA multiple exists. The valuation models that spit out $95–114 composites are mechanically correct on trailing cash flow and then largely ignore terminal-value decay; I discount those fair-value figures heavily and still find the stock cheap, but I am not anchoring on a triple.
The strongest case against this read is the melting-ice-cube thesis: if pain-product volumes keep grinding lower under payer and regulatory pressure, and if Jornay PM loses formulary access, the $328M FCF run-rate is a one- or two-year artifact rather than a durable base. A smart opponent would also note the insider activity cluster—option exercises paired with open-market sales—and the fact that net margin is only 8% while ROIC looks artificially sky-high on a thin capital base, classic signs of a depleting acquired-asset business that has not replenished its pipeline. I weigh those points seriously; they are why conviction is not a five. I still come out undervalued because even a 50% haircut to FCF would leave a double-digit free-cash-flow yield at $28, and the fortress balance sheet (zero debt, $231M cash) buys time that pure ice-cube names usually lack.
I would flip to neutral or bearish on two consecutive quarters of revenue below $180M, a sustained collapse in operating cash flow below $150M annualized, or a concrete major-PBM exclusion of Jornay PM without an offsetting new product contribution. Confirmation that 2026 full-year FCF holds above $250M with stable ADHD scripts would push me the other way, toward higher conviction.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that decides this case is the free cash flow: $327.6M on $780.6M of 2025 revenue, a 42% FCF margin, with capex of just $1.7M. Against a market cap of $920M and $231.3M of cash with zero debt, enterprise value is roughly $689M, which puts EV/FCF at 2.1x and EV/EBITDA at 3.6x. For a specialty pharma company still growing revenue at 6–13% year-over-year (Q2'26 $199.9M vs Q2'25 $188.0M; Q4'25 $205.4M vs Q4'24 $181.9M), those multiples are at the bottom of the range for the sector, not the top. The zero-debt line is credible here — this is not a telecom or LBO with a missing debt line; it is a cash-generative product company with $231M in the bank and $302M in equity. The ROIC of 173% in the canonical metrics is a units error and I am setting it aside; the ROE of 20.8% and operating margin of 23% are the numbers that matter, and both are consistent with a healthy, capital-light franchise.
The prior models split into two camps that the raw data does not fully support. The valuation synthesis lands at $114.41, a 4x gap over the current price, which is not a defensible read of this data — it implies a DCF terminal value that assumes sustained 20%+ growth for a decade, and the revenue trend does not support that: the year-over-year growth rate has compressed from 31% (Q3'25 vs Q3'24) to 13% (Q4) to 9% (Q1'26) to 6% (Q2'26). That deceleration is real and the "Adequate Revenue Confidence (decelerating)" tag is correct. On the other hand, Market Forces calls this a "melting ice cube value trap" where "insiders are correctly fleeing." The insider data does not support that. The last ten transactions are five A-Awards (grants), two M-OptionExercises of 8,700 shares each, one S-Sale of 20 shares, and one S-Sale of 4,127 shares on the same day as an 8,700-share option exercise — that is tax withholding, not open-market selling. There is no P-Purchase, but there is no meaningful discretionary selling either. The "Unusual Selling Activity" tag is an artifact of the transaction codes, not a signal.
The Q2 2026 net loss of $15.1M on $199.9M of revenue is the single most important data point to interpret correctly. Revenue is in line with the prior four quarters ($188–209M range), so this is not a demand problem. It is a cost or one-time charge problem — litigation, a restructuring, or a tax item. TTM net income is $47.9M, dragged down by that quarter; the median of the three clean annual figures (2023: $48.2M, 2024: $69.2M, 2025: $62.9M) is $62.9M, and on that basis the P/E is 14.6x, not the 19x the TTM figure implies. Operating income has been stable at $167–180M across 2023–2025, which tells me the core business is not deteriorating even as the bottom line wobbles.
The strongest case against my read is the growth deceleration combined with the structural headwinds the narrative layer identifies: opioid de-prescribing, payer pushback, and the finite life of Jornay PM and the rest of the portfolio. A smart bear would point out that 6% revenue growth in the most recent quarter, on a base that already includes the full year of Jornay PM, means the marginal growth is coming from smaller products or price, not volume. They would also note that the 42% FCF margin is propped up by minimal capex ($1.7M) and that eventually the company must fund new product development to replace aging franchises, which will compress that margin. The 44% drawdown from highs is the market telling you it sees a patent cliff or formulary risk that is not yet visible in the quarterly revenue line. I weigh this concern seriously — it is the real risk, not the phantom insider selling — but it does not change the fact that the company is generating $327M of cash a year with no debt, and the market is paying less than 3x that for the entire enterprise.
What would change my mind: a second consecutive quarter of net losses (confirming the Q2'26 charge was structural, not one-time), a revenue print below $185M in Q3'26 (breaking the floor of the last eight quarters and confirming the deceleration is accelerating), or a formulary exclusion or litigation judgment that hits the P&L directly. Any of those would push fair value below $25 and flip this to overvalued. Conversely, a Q3'26 revenue print above $210M with a return to positive net income would confirm the Q2 loss was a one-time item and support the higher end of my range.
On a normalized earnings base of $63M and a 12–15x multiple appropriate for a decelerating but still-growing specialty pharma with a clean balance sheet, equity value is $756M–$945M, or $23–$29 per share — roughly where the stock trades. But that P/E framework ignores the cash flow. On an FCF basis, even at a distressed 6x multiple (pricing in meaningful patent risk), EV is $1.97B, equity is $1.74B, or $53 per share. At a more reasonable 8x, it is $71. The truth is probably between the two: the FCF is real but will compress as the company reinvests, and the earnings are stable but growing slowly. A fair value of $38–$48 captures both the cash-flow support and the growth-deceleration discount, implying 35–70% upside from $28.23. That is undervalued, but the decelerating growth and the opioid-market overhang keep my conviction moderate rather than high.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Collegium is a mature specialty pharma that has scaled revenue from $277M (2021) to $781M (2025), with gross margins expanding into the high-50s and operating margins settling in the low-to-mid 20s after a step-change in 2023 (likely reflecting the Nucynta/BDSI integration). FCF is the standout: $327.6M in 2025 on $63M of GAAP net income, with OCF/NI of 2.08x and accruals at -12.3% of assets - earnings are conservatively stated and cash conversion is elite. Liquidity is a fortress at face value: $386.7M cash equals 42% of market cap and the business self-funds. Capital allocation is shareholder-friendly - diluted shares have drifted down at a -0.8% CAGR with buybacks running 149% of SBC (SBC itself a modest 5.4% of revenue). Beneish M at -3.34 shows no manipulation flags. The one real caution in the modules is Altman Z at 1.33 - which for an asset-light pharma almost certainly reflects debt from prior acquisitions rather than genuine distress, given $327M FCF and $387M cash. Insider tape is all option-exercise-and-sell plus routine awards with zero open-market buys; that is normal for specialty pharma comp structures but not a positive signal.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Total debt balance, maturity schedule, and covenants - to confirm the Altman Z reading is leverage rather than distress
- Xtampza ER, Nucynta, Belbuca, Jornay PM patent/exclusivity expirations and generic entry timelines
- Customer/PBM concentration in the 10-K risk factors
- Any pending opioid litigation exposure or settlement reserves
- Whether the 2025 revenue jump to $781M includes a new acquisition or is organic (Jornay PM contribution)
- 10b5-1 plan disclosures behind the insider sales pattern
Price is $28.10 against a composite FV of $114 and signal-adjusted FV of $96 - those numbers are runaway artifacts of a DCF ($193) that extrapolates current FCF with no franchise decay, so I discount them heavily. The credible anchors are the EPV floor at $49 and the anchored-PE at $21. Split the difference and deserved value sits roughly $35-50, meaning the $28 price embeds a meaningful but not catastrophic decline in the pain/ADHD franchise. On the trailing numbers ($327M FCF against a $916M market cap = ~35% FCF yield, net cash balance sheet, shrinking share count) this is priced like a run-off, not a going concern. The gap to a sober deserved value is roughly 25-60% upside - real margin of safety, but not the 240% the composite claims. Earnings quality is clean so no haircut, and the Strong quality grade supports using EPV rather than anchored-PE as the floor. The bear case (terminal opioid decline) is legitimate and is why the multiple is a 3x FCF stub; the bull case doesn't need heroics, it just needs the franchise not to collapse in 3 years. That asymmetry is what makes this cheap rather than fair.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Latest quarterly Rx trends for Xtampza, Belbuca, Jornay - are scripts stable, declining slowly, or accelerating down
- Debt maturity schedule and refinance terms - the Altman flag needs to be confirmed as acquisition leverage serviced by FCF
- Management capital allocation - continued buybacks at this price vs new deals that dilute the cash-return thesis
- Guidance on franchise life and any pipeline/BD to offset opioid decay
The macro tape is mildly supportive (risk-on, VIX 14, S&P near highs), but COLL's low beta of 0.76 mutes any lift from the broader bid. What actually moves this name is its narrative bucket - a fallen-angel opioid story with fragile durability and minimal cult support - and that bucket is under quiet, persistent pressure from structural opioid de-prescribing, payer deprioritization, and skepticism toward the DETERx moat. There is no story here for buyers to rally around.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether analyst target revisions post-Q2 skew down (would confirm headwind) or stabilize
- Jornay PM script trends - the only credible bull thread
- Any sector rotation into small-cap specialty pharma
- Buyback execution pace as a sentiment support
The world is moving against branded opioids and toward CNS/ADHD therapeutics; COLL has already made that pivot with one asset but has not yet completed it at the portfolio level. Payer consolidation and opioid stewardship keep pressing the legacy base, while ADHD demand and adherence-friendly formulations remain a genuine growth channel. Higher-for-longer rates raise the price of the M&A that COLL's growth model requires, and sector-wide earnings contraction narrows the field of affordable targets. Net: the addressable direction of travel is favourable for the new franchise, unfavourable for the old, and the outcome depends on the speed of the handoff.
When we made this prediction on Jul 31, 2026, COLL was $35.98. We expect it to be $45.00 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $32.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 31, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence UNSETTLED
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
adjusted_earnings
flips down 25%