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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Credo Technology Group Holding Ltd. (CRDO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -26 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 24 · Value -76 · Sentiment 0 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Credo Technology Group Holding Ltd.
CRDO NASDAQCredo Technology Group Holding Ltd. is a semiconductor company that develops high-speed connectivity solutions for the global data infrastructure market. The company focuses on enabling efficient, reliable data transmission for applications such as optical and electrical Ethernet and PCI Express used in data centers, cloud computing, and high-performance computing environments. Credo Technology Group Holding Ltd. offers a portfolio that includes integrated circuits, HiWire active electrical cables, optical PAM4 digital signal processors, low-power line card PHY devices, serializer/deserializer (SerDes) chiplets, and SerDes intellectual property licensing. It also provides PCIe retimer solutions, predictive integrity link optimization, telemetry capabilities, and related support, engineering, and royalty services. The company serves hyperscale cloud providers, original equipment and design manufacturers, and optical module manufacturers, supplying components that support growing bandwidth and power-efficiency demands in modern networks. Founded in 2008 and headquartered in Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands, Credo Technology Group Holding Ltd. operates across key technology regions, including the United States, Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.51
Total Equity: $2.06B
Shares: 188,232,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.16B
EBITDA: $479.64M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.16B
Revenue: $1.34B
Revenue: $1.34B
Revenue: $1.34B
Total Equity: $2.06B
Tax Rate: 0.7%
Equity: $2.06B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.16B
Current Liabilities: $197.09M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $2.06B
Shares: 188,232,000
Shares: 188,232,000
CapEx: -$57.30M
Shares: 188,232,000
Stock Price: $245.97
Net Income: $472.28M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:45pm (4d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $106.5M | $184.2M | $193.0M | $436.8M | $1.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $42.5M | $78.0M | $73.5M | $153.9M | $426.8M |
| Gross Profit | $64.0M | $106.2M | $119.4M | $282.9M | $908.3M |
| Operating Expenses | $86.0M | $127.4M | $156.5M | $245.8M | $463.3M |
| Operating Income | -$22.0M | -$21.2M | -$37.1M | $37.1M | $445.0M |
| Net Income | -$22.2M | -$16.5M | -$28.4M | $52.2M | $472.3M |
| EBITDA | -$17.2M | -$11.7M | -$23.3M | $59.1M | $479.6M |
| EPS | $-0.25 | $-0.11 | $-0.18 | $0.31 | $2.65 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.25 | $-0.11 | $-0.18 | $0.29 | $2.51 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:21am (4d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $259.3M | $108.6M | $66.9M | $236.3M | $1.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $332.2M | $328.2M | $530.3M | $713.5M | $2.0B |
| Total Assets | $375.7M | $397.3M | $601.9M | $809.3M | $2.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $26.5M | $31.0M | $44.6M | $107.7M | $197.1M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $41.5M | $49.7M | $61.7M | $127.7M | $232.0M |
| Total Equity | $334.2M | $347.6M | $540.2M | $681.6M | $2.1B |
| Retained Earnings | -$90.4M | -$107.0M | -$135.3M | -$83.2M | $389.1M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:45pm (4d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$30.8M | -$24.6M | $32.7M | $65.1M | $464.3M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$17.6M | -$21.7M | -$15.7M | -$36.1M | -$57.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$48.4M | -$46.3M | $17.1M | $29.0M | $407.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | $0 | $0 | -$112.9M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $155.6M | -$150.7M | -$41.6M | $169.4M | $928.6M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:45pm (4d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +73.0% | +4.8% | +126.3% | +205.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +65.9% | +12.5% | +136.9% | +221.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +3.3% | -74.5% | +200.2% | +1,098.7% |
| Net Income Growth | +25.4% | -71.4% | +283.9% | +805.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +31.8% | -98.7% | +353.6% | +712.1% |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-19Every incremental AI cluster multiplies high-speed link count faster than it multiplies GPUs — scale-up and scale-out fabrics need retimers, AECs and optical DSPs per port, so Credo's monetized unit compounds with cluster size, not with software seats.
Its customers are among the most vertically capable buyers on earth: hyperscaler ASIC teams and merchant switch/accelerator vendors can absorb SerDes into their own die, and 224G-era link architectures (linear-drive optics, co-packaged optics) can remove the discrete DSP Credo is paid for.
Whether copper AEC attach and discrete retiming survive the 224G/scale-up transition at multiple hyperscalers — observable in product mix disclosure (AEC vs optical DSP vs IP), and in whether revenue concentration broadens beyond the top two customers.
Silicon-proven mixed-signal SerDes at leading rates, signal-integrity and cable-assembly manufacturing know-how, per-link telemetry/diagnostics software embedded in hyperscaler fleet operations, and multi-year design-in slots inside rack architectures.
AI Lens thesis
AI reaches Credo as pure volume: the scarce resources in an intelligence-abundant world are power and bandwidth between accelerators, and Credo owns a piece of the bandwidth layer at 68% gross margin with 33% operating margin already achieved on $1.34B revenue — cheap intelligence does not substitute for its product, it orders more of it. The exposure is therefore enormous and directionally positive, but the value capture is contested from both sides: buyers with in-house SerDes ambitions above, and Broadcom/Marvell/Astera plus architecture shifts beside. AI-assisted design tooling shortens digital iteration but does little for analog/packaging/qualification, so entrant compression is real but slower here than in software; the honest read is favorable economics with a genuinely wide tail driven by architecture and concentration, not by whether AI demand persists.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Power-per-bit becomes the binding constraint in AI data centers; if Credo's link power advantage becomes a specified rack-level requirement, it converts from component vendor to architectural dependency with pricing that survives volume ramps.
Downside Concentration means the AI tailwind and the customer-integration risk arrive through the same one or two counterparties — a single roadmap change at one buyer can reverse a triple-digit growth rate without any change in industry AI spend.
Outcome range spread 62 · unresolved
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-19 12:57The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw trajectory is genuinely extraordinary: quarterly revenue went from $59.7M (Aug-2024) to $437M (May-2026), a 7.3x expansion in seven quarters, with net margin flipping from -16% to +38.7%. Sequential growth Q4→Q1 was $407M→$437M, or 7.4% QoQ — that's a sharp deceleration from the prior $268M→$407M (52% QoQ) and $223M→$268M (20% QoQ). The "Revenue Confidence: decelerating" tag is understating it — this is the single most important number in the file. If Q2 FY27 prints another 5-10% sequential, annualized run-rate settles near $1.9B, not the $2.5B+ that a 34x P/S implies the market is discounting. FCF of $407M on $1.34B revenue (30% FCF margin) is real and impressive; balance sheet ($1.16B cash, zero debt, 10x current ratio) removes any solvency question. This is not a fraud, and it's not a "narrative platform" in the SaaS sense — it's a fabless semi riding an unusually steep customer concentration wave.
Where I diverge from the prior models: the classification engine tagged this "narrative_platform" with confidence 1 (which the anomaly warnings then propagate as "profit metrics are lagging") — that's just wrong for a hardware company already generating 38.7% net margins and $464M operating cash flow. Profit metrics here are not lagging; they are the point. The synthesis verdict ("High Conviction Required") and Thesis score (-8, essentially balanced) are directionally reasonable but too soft. At 34x TTM sales and ~28x forward sales assuming another year of growth, CRDO is priced for a Nvidia-adjacent monopoly outcome in SerDes/AECs. The bear case the market-forces layer flags — hyperscaler in-housing, customer concentration (Amazon and Microsoft reportedly >70% of revenue), commoditization — is the historical base rate for merchant silicon selling into 3-4 buyers with infinite engineering budgets. Marvell and Broadcom exist precisely to compress this pricing.
The contrarian bull angle worth stating: if the QoQ deceleration is a supply-driven pause (packaging/CoWoS-like constraints) rather than demand softening, and 800G→1.6T transitions extend the cycle through CY27, then $1.34B could become $2.5-3B by FY28 with margins holding. Under that scenario, 245 isn't crazy — you're paying ~18x FY28 sales for a category-defining name. But that requires believing the largest customer doesn't in-house AECs (Amazon has publicly explored this), that Astera Labs and Marvell don't take share, and that gross margin holds 68% as volumes scale — historically unprecedented for merchant SerDes at scale. The insider selling on 2026-07-31 (ten separate sales, mostly small — looks like coordinated 10b5-1 or option exercise, not panic) is background noise, not signal.
I agree with the synthesis direction but push harder: this is overvalued, not "high conviction required." Fair value on a demanding-but-defensible frame — 15x FY27 revenue of $2.0B (assuming 50% YoY off current run-rate, well above the implied QoQ trajectory) with 35% FCF margins — gets you to roughly $30B market cap, or ~$160/share. The current $246 embeds a scenario where FY28 revenue exits above $3B and margins expand further, which requires no customer in-housing, no ASIC competition winning sockets, and continued AI capex acceleration. The base rate on all three simultaneously is low. I'd wait for either the Q2 print to confirm re-acceleration (would need >15% QoQ to justify current multiple) or a drawdown to the $160-180 range where the risk/reward on the platform-monopoly narrative becomes defensible. Owning here is paying the narrative peak while the growth rate is already visibly rolling over — the worst combination.
GPT Reading
What stands out is not that Credo is “just” growing fast, but how violently its economics inflected in less than two years. Quarterly revenue went from $59.7M in August 2024 to $437.0M in May 2026, a 7.3x jump, while net margin moved from -16.0% to 38.7%. Annual revenue similarly exploded from $193.0M in FY2024 to $1.34B in FY2026, and operating income swung from a $37.1M loss to a $445.0M profit. This is not promotional software-style growth with weak unit economics; gross margin hit 67.8% in FY2026, operating margin 33.3%, free cash flow was $407.0M on $464.3M of operating cash flow, and the company sits on $1.16B of cash with no debt. The core read from the raw data is that Credo has real product-market fit in an AI-linked bottleneck and converted that into elite semiconductor profitability extremely quickly.
The problem is that the stock price is not valuing a great semiconductor company; it is valuing a future monopoly-like compounding machine. At $45.9B market cap, investors are paying roughly 34.7x trailing sales, about 98x earnings, and 89x EV/EBITDA for a business that just earned $472.3M and generated $407.0M of free cash flow. Even after backing out the $1.16B cash pile, EV/revenue is still 32.0x. Those multiples can work for a brief period if revenue is about to double again, but the quarterly sequence already hints at the first law of gravity: growth is still huge, yet maturing. Revenue rose from $170.0M to $223.1M to $268.0M to $407.0M to $437.0M over the last five quarters. The two most recent quarters added just $30M sequentially after a massive $139M jump the quarter before. That is not a collapse, but it is exactly the kind of early deceleration that makes 30x+ sales dangerous. A company can be outstanding and still be a poor stock when the market capitalizes one extraordinary year as though it is a base rate.
I also think some of the “ignore profit metrics” framing is wrong here. This is no longer a pre-profit concept stock where only top-line trajectory matters. Once a semiconductor company is producing 68% gross margins, 35% net margins, 30%+ operating margins, and 30%+ FCF margins, valuation must reconnect to earnings power. On today’s numbers, the business is excellent, but the stock still needs years of near-flawless execution. If revenue reached $2.0B with 30% net margins, net income would be roughly $600M; at the current market cap that would still be about 76x earnings. Even at $2.5B revenue and 30% net margin, you get $750M of earnings, still around 61x. That math tells you the market is not merely paying for growth through FY2027; it is paying in advance for a long runway of dominance, sustained margin superiority, and minimal competitive erosion. In semis, that is a heroic set of assumptions.
The best case against my skepticism is that the data already show unusual durability. Sequential revenue did not really “roll over” after the big ramp; it held at $407.0M and then increased again to $437.0M, while net margin stayed almost perfectly stable at 38.6% and 38.7%. That suggests the big jump was not purely one-off pull-forward or a low-quality volume dump. Annual cash generation also largely corroborates earnings: $472.3M of net income versus $464.3M of operating cash flow is not the profile of fabricated demand, and capex is light at $57.3M, so the model can scale efficiently. The balance sheet is pristine, ROIC is listed at 49.2%, and the company did move from subscale losses to elite profitability faster than most semis ever do. A smart bull would say that if Credo is becoming a critical merchant supplier into AI interconnect and retimer/optical-adjacent architectures, then traditional “semiconductor commoditization” instincts may understate the length of the window. I weigh that argument seriously; it’s why I’m not calling the business broken, only the stock overpriced.
What would change my mind is not another backward-looking beat on margins; it is evidence that the current revenue run-rate can keep compounding fast enough to justify a $46B valuation. Specifically, I would need to see revenue sustain above roughly $500M per quarter soon and then keep growing, rather than flattening in the low-$400Ms. If annual revenue power starts looking like $2.0B-plus with gross margins still above 65% and operating margins above 30%, the multiple can de-risk faster than I expect. Conversely, one quarter of revenue stalling near $430M or a margin drop from the high-30s net margin area into the 20s would expose how much perfection is embedded. Until proved otherwise, I think Credo is a great company being priced as though the hardest part of the story is over, when in reality the valuation now demands the next miracle.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a company that went from barely relevant to genuinely elite in under two years. Credo printed $1.34B in fiscal 2026 revenue after $437M the prior year — a 205% leap — and converted that scale into a 68% gross margin, 33% operating margin, and 35% net margin with $472M of net income and $407M of free cash flow on only $57M of capex. The quarterly path is the real tell: $135M → $170M → $223M → $268M → $407M → $437M, with net margins climbing from roughly 22% to nearly 39%. Zero debt, $1.16B cash, ROIC near 49%, and a current ratio above 10 confirm this is not a story stock fabricating profits. Technical differentiation in high-speed SerDes for AI clusters is real and already showing up in unit economics that most fabless peers never reach.
The market, however, has priced the inflection as if it were the base rate. At $245.97 and a $45.9B enterprise, Credo trades at roughly 34× trailing sales, 32× EV/revenue, and 98× earnings. That multiple structure only works if the 206% growth year is the opening act of a multi-year 40–60% compounder with locked-in pricing power. The most recent quarter undercuts that assumption hard: sequential growth collapsed from 52% ($268M to $407M) to just 7% ($407M to $437M). Annualized run-rate is already near $1.75B; the easy inventory-and-ramp phase is behind them. Secondary signals flag low revenue confidence and a decelerating quarterly trend, which is exactly the pattern that destroys 30×+ sales multiples in semis. Heavy same-day insider selling across multiple filings adds no comfort at these prices.
I am therefore treating Credo as an excellent business trading at a valuation that embeds the AI-capex supercycle continuing without pause and Credo retaining merchant sockets against hyperscaler vertical integration. The $46B capitalization is not supported by current cash generation when growth is already rolling over; it is supported by a narrative that SerDes is an unassailable chokepoint. That narrative is vivid and currently dominant, but fabless history and customer concentration argue it is fragile. The prior models that call this “high conviction required” and score the thesis slightly negative are directionally correct — the execution is not the dispute; the terminal multiple and duration of hypergrowth are.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and quantitative. If hyperscaler AI spend stays elevated and Credo simply grows 45–50% for two more years while holding mid-30s net margins, earnings power approaches $1B and the multiple compresses into a merely expensive rather than absurd range; the 49% ROIC and 68% gross margin already demonstrate pricing power that pure commodity SerDes vendors never achieve. Design-win stickiness and the bandwidth bottleneck story are not fiction, and the fortress balance sheet means Credo will not dilate or distress if the cycle hiccups. A smart bull would also note that FCF of $407M arrived almost immediately upon scale, so cash quality concerns are overstated relative to the growth phase. I weigh this less because the last printed quarter already shows the deceleration the bull case needs to not happen, and because 34× sales leaves almost no room for any integration, pricing, or capex-normalization surprise.
What would flip me is concrete re-acceleration: two consecutive quarters of 20%+ sequential revenue growth with margins stable above 35%, or explicit multi-year hyperscaler volume commitments that underwrite 50% growth through fiscal 2028. Conversely, another sub-10% sequential quarter or any guidance implying growth settling into the mid-20s would confirm the multiple is structurally wrong.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Credo has undergone a genuine step-function transformation. Revenue went from $193M (FY24) to $437M (FY25) to $1.34B (FY26), gross margin expanded from 61.9% to 68%, and operating margin flipped from -19.2% to +33.3%. Net income swung from a $28M loss to $472M profit, and FCF from breakeven to $407M. Altman Z of 121 and $1.44B net cash with zero debt make survival a non-issue - this is a fortress balance sheet with a clearly demonstrated AI/connectivity tailwind driving elite operating leverage. The classification as a narrative_platform is somewhat unfair given the FY26 numbers are hard cash and hard earnings, not story.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Customer concentration in FY26 10-K - what % of revenue is top 1-2 customers (likely hyperscaler)
- Receivables and inventory growth vs revenue growth to validate 0.79x OCF/NI
- Segment/product mix behind the GM expansion to 68% - is it AECs, optical DSPs, or IP licensing?
- SBC vesting schedule and 10b5-1 plan disclosures behind the July 2026 insider sales
- Backlog / bookings disclosure to gauge whether the FY26 run-rate is a spike or a new base
- Any convertible or warrant overhang beyond the reported diluted share count
The business is genuinely strong - $1.34B revenue, 33% operating margins, $407M FCF - but the price already worships those numbers. A $45.9B market cap on $1.34B revenue is roughly 34x sales and ~113x FCF; even generous scenarios (revenue doubling again to ~$2.7B at 35% FCF margins = ~$950M FCF) leave you at ~48x forward FCF. That is a price that assumes another multi-year leg of hyperscaler SerDes/AEC spend accrues to Credo specifically, without in-house integration by NVIDIA/AMD/hyperscalers eroding share. The 206% growth print is the reason the stock is here, not a reason it goes higher from here.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Customer concentration disclosure - what % from top 2 hyperscalers
- Guidance for FY27 revenue and gross margin trajectory
- Any signal of in-house SerDes programs from top customers in earnings calls
- SBC as % of revenue trend and any buyback authorization
None surfaced.
None surfaced.
AI reaches Credo as pure volume: the scarce resources in an intelligence-abundant world are power and bandwidth between accelerators, and Credo owns a piece of the bandwidth layer at 68% gross margin with 33% operating margin already achieved on $1.34B revenue — cheap intelligence does not substitute for its product, it orders more of it. The exposure is therefore enormous and directionally positive, but the value capture is contested from both sides: buyers with in-house SerDes ambitions above, and Broadcom/Marvell/Astera plus architecture shifts beside. AI-assisted design tooling shortens digital iteration but does little for analog/packaging/qualification, so entrant compression is real but slower here than in software; the honest read is favorable economics with a genuinely wide tail driven by architecture and concentration, not by whether AI demand persists.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- cluster port count per GPU deployed
- scale-up fabric bandwidth roadmaps
- hyperscaler capex on networking share
- LPO/LRO adoption at hyperscalers
- copper reach limits at 224G
- CPO design-win announcements
- AEC vs optical DSP mix
- pJ/bit specified in RFQs
AI training and inference clusters are shifting spend from compute-only toward the wiring between accelerators: scale-up and back-end networks now grow faster than server count because links scale with GPU count and with per-lane speed transitions (400G→800G→1.6T). Power per bit has become the binding constraint in the rack, which structurally favors low-power electrical solutions for short reach and DSP-based optics beyond it. Credo sits precisely on that content layer. The counterforce is vertical integration: the same scale that creates the socket makes it worth owning, so the durable question is whether Credo's per-generation SerDes lead and qualification incumbency stay ahead of hyperscaler and merchant-ASIC insourcing. Macro is a second-order input here — neutral rates with a positive curve do not gate AI capex in the next year, though they do enforce eventual ROI discipline.
When we made this prediction on Aug 19, 2026, CRDO was $234.82. We expect it to be $205.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $150.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 19, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.