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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for CRH plc (CRH) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -8 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 61 · Value -65 · Sentiment 31 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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CRH plc
CRH NYSECRH plc is a leading global provider of building materials essential for construction projects worldwide. The company manufactures a diverse range of products, including aggregates, asphalt, cement, ready-mixed concrete, concrete pipes, blocks, and precast concrete elements. Operating through a vertically integrated business model, CRH plc supplies materials for infrastructure, residential, commercial, and industrial developments. Its portfolio features well-known brands such as Oldcastle Materials Group, Basalite Concrete Products, Interstate Brick, and Pacific Coast Building Products. With a strong presence across developed markets and North America as its primary region, CRH plc holds significant positions in key industries like sand and gravel mining, asphalt manufacturing, and concrete production. The company supports major construction initiatives by delivering high-quality, reliable materials from thousands of locations in 28 countries. Founded in 1970 and headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, CRH plc plays a vital role in the building materials sector, enabling the built environment through its comprehensive product offerings and operational scale.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.51
Total Equity: $25.48B
Shares: 677,000,000
Total Debt: $17.65B
Cash: $4.10B
EBITDA: $7.60B
Total Debt: $17.65B
Cash: $4.10B
Revenue: $37.45B
Revenue: $37.45B
Revenue: $37.45B
Total Equity: $25.48B
Tax Rate: 21.7%
Equity: $25.48B
Total Debt: $17.65B
Cash: $4.10B
Current Liabilities: $8.75B
Long-Term Debt: $16.48B
Total Debt: $17.65B
Total Equity: $25.48B
Shares: 677,000,000
Shares: 677,000,000
CapEx: -$2.71B
Shares: 677,000,000
Stock Price: $101.31
Net Income: $3.75B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 3:04pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $29.2B | $32.7B | $34.9B | $35.6B | $37.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $19.4B | $21.9B | $23.0B | $22.9B | $23.9B |
| Gross Profit | $9.8B | $10.8B | $12.0B | $12.7B | $13.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $6.5B | $7.0B | $7.8B | $7.8B | $8.1B |
| Operating Income | $3.3B | $3.8B | $4.2B | $4.9B | $5.4B |
| Net Income | $2.6B | $3.9B | $3.2B | $3.5B | $3.8B |
| EBITDA | $4.9B | $5.4B | $5.8B | $6.7B | $7.6B |
| EPS | $3.35 | $5.15 | $4.36 | $5.06 | $5.54 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.32 | $5.11 | $4.33 | $5.02 | $5.51 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:34pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $5.8B | $5.9B | $6.3B | $3.7B | $4.1B |
| Total Current Assets | — | $14.8B | $16.9B | $14.1B | $15.3B |
| Total Assets | — | $45.3B | $47.5B | $50.6B | $58.3B |
| Current Liabilities | — | $8.0B | $10.0B | $10.3B | $8.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | $8.1B | $9.8B | $11.0B | $16.5B |
| Total Liabilities | — | $22.3B | $25.8B | $27.8B | $32.9B |
| Total Equity | $21.6B | $23.0B | $21.6B | $22.9B | $25.5B |
| Retained Earnings | — | $22.5B | $22.9B | $24.0B | $25.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 3:04pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.0B | $3.8B | $5.0B | $5.0B | $5.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.6B | -$1.5B | -$1.8B | -$2.6B | -$2.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.4B | $2.3B | $3.2B | $2.4B | $2.9B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.5B | -$3.3B | -$640.0M | -$4.9B | -$3.9B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.2B | -$326.0M | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.9B |
| Dividends Paid | -$938.0M | -$930.0M | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$896.0M | -$1.2B | -$3.1B | -$1.5B | -$1.2B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.9B | $153.0M | $454.0M | -$2.6B | $388.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 3:04pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +12.0% | +6.8% | +1.8% | +5.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +10.1% | +10.6% | +6.2% | +6.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | +14.5% | +9.9% | +17.7% | +10.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +46.8% | -17.7% | +9.9% | +7.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +10.4% | +8.0% | +15.5% | +13.0% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:34pm (12d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-15 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-06 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-23 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.37 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-22 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-23 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-23 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-14 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-19 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-16 | $1.03 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-08 | $0.24 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-16 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-09 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 2021-03-18 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2020-09-03 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2020-03-12 | $0.69 | — | — | — |
| 2019-09-05 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2019-03-14 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2018-09-06 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-11AI capex is concrete-, aggregate- and asphalt-intensive: hyperscale data centers, substations, transmission and fab sites consume enormous volumes of ready-mix and base material that must be sourced within short haul radii of the site, which is exactly CRH's vertically integrated US footprint.
AI-driven electricity and fuel demand raises the marginal cost of the most energy-intensive part of the portfolio — cement kilns, asphalt plants, ready-mix fleets — and generative structural design plus AI-optimised reinforcement can cut cubic yards of concrete per structure, quietly eroding volume intensity per dollar of construction spend.
Whether AI-related infrastructure becomes a visible share of CRH's US volumes faster than energy-cost inflation and material-intensity optimisation bite; watch data-center/power-related backlog commentary against per-ton energy cost in the Americas Materials segment.
Permitted aggregates reserves and asphalt/ready-mix plant networks inside metro haul distance, DOT-approved mix designs and prequalification, plus multi-decade zoning consents — none of which get cheaper when software does.
AI Lens thesis
CRH sells weight, proximity and compliance, not information: the monetised unit is tons and cubic yards delivered within a short haul radius, and no amount of cheap inference creates a new quarry, a new permit, or a truck that arrives before the concrete sets. AI therefore enters through four narrow channels — (1) demand, where AI-era buildout of data centers, transmission and fabs is unusually materials-heavy and lands in CRH's US core; (2) inputs, where AI-driven power demand inflates the energy bill for kilns and plants; (3) internal cost, where dispatch optimisation, predictive maintenance, autonomous haulage and kiln control can add real but slow-diffusing points of margin across thousands of decentralised locations; and (4) volume intensity, where AI structural optimisation reduces material per structure. Disruption risk to the product, the interface or the customer relationship is close to nil; the fragmented-market pricing power that has driven GM from 33.6% to 36.1% rests on geography and consolidation, not on information asymmetry AI can dissolve.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Ready-mix is a perishable, logistics-bound product with historically poor asset utilisation; AI dispatch and truck-cycle optimisation across a fleet of that scale is a rare case where software converts directly into deliveries per truck-day and fixed-cost absorption, and CRH's decentralised roll-up gives it more slack to harvest than best-in-class peers.
Downside AI code and generative design tools that trim reinforced-concrete volumes 10-20% per structure would reduce tons per dollar of construction spend — a silent decoupling of CRH volumes from headline infrastructure budgets that no cycle chart would flag as AI-caused.
Outcome range spread 31
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterlies first: CRH's business is brutally seasonal — Q1 2026 rev $7.37B with a $176M loss, Q1 2025 rev $6.76B with a $94M loss, Q1 mattering less than the Q2-Q3 build season where they printed $10.21B/$11.07B and ~13% net margins. That seasonality means the "decelerating quarterly trend" flag is mostly noise. What's real: Q1 2026 revenue grew 9.0% YoY off Q1 2025, and the Q1 loss actually widened by $82M, which is not the direction you want if you're paying 18.4x for a mature earner. TTM revenue is running ~$37.8B vs FY25 $37.45B — barely 1% sequential acceleration off a 5.3% recent YoY. This is a low-single-digit organic grower dressed up by acquisition accounting.
The synthesis's $81 fair value looks directionally right but I'd push back on how it's constructed. EV/EBITDA of 10.6x on peak-cycle EBITDA is the real tell — VMC and MLM trade at 18-22x but on aggregates-only mix with structurally higher incremental margins; CRH's blended 14.5% op margin and 10.9% ROIC don't justify pure-play multiples, and the market already knows this (hence the discount). More concerning: FCF CAGR is -4.6% while earnings CAGR is +8.7%. That gap — $2.91B FCF against $3.75B net income, a 78% conversion — signals either working capital bloat, acquisition-related capex creep, or earnings quality erosion. For a "steady compounder" thesis, FCF should be leading, not lagging. Debt at $17.65B against $4.10B cash and $5.63B OCF is manageable (net debt/EBITDA ~2.4x) but leaves little dry powder if the U.S. infrastructure cycle rolls over in 2026-27.
Where I disagree with the prior stack: the Market Forces call of "trough multiples on unsustainable peak earnings" contradicts the Narrative layer's "moderate durability" framing, and I side with Market Forces. The IIJA is 4 years into a 5-year authorization; the incremental federal dollar has already been appropriated and much of it obligated. State DOT budgets remain strong but residential (roughly 25-30% of CRH's mix depending on region) is softening, and non-res is mixed. Pricing has done the heavy lifting for two years — aggregates pricing +11-12% in 2024, likely +6-8% in 2025 — and that lever gets harder as volumes flatten. The bear case isn't a recession; it's simply normalization to mid-cycle margins of 12% instead of 14.5%, which would compress EBITDA by ~$800M-$1B and take EV/EBITDA on normalized numbers to ~13x at current price. Not a disaster, but no upside either.
Contrarian angle worth stating: CRH could deserve a rerating higher, not lower, if the U.S. business (now >75% of EBITDA post-portfolio reshuffle) gets valued separately from the European drag. A sum-of-parts where U.S. gets 15x EBITDA and Europe gets 7x lands closer to $110-115. But that requires management to formally spin or list the U.S. business, which they've shown no interest in doing — the whole point of the NYSE primary listing was to close the gap without structural surgery. Insider activity is uninformative (routine option exercises and small awards, no meaningful open-market buys or sells), and the "?" on filer identity is a data quality flag worth noting but not actionable. I agree with the synthesis's fully_priced verdict but think even $81 is generous — I'd anchor fair value at $78-82 on normalized 12-13% op margins and a 10x EV/EBITDA multiple appropriate for a diversified cyclical, meaning ~20-23% downside to intrinsic and no margin of safety at $101.
GPT Reading
CRH looks like a very good business being priced like a somewhat better one. The operating record is solid: revenue rose from $29.2B in 2021 to $37.5B in 2025, a 6%+ annualized climb, while operating income expanded from $3.33B to $5.44B and operating margin improved from 11.4% to 14.5%. That is not just a commodity volume story; it suggests real pricing discipline, mix improvement, and decent integration of acquisitions. The quarterly pattern also shows the seasonal nature of the business rather than deterioration: Q1 is loss-making both in 2025 and 2026, but the loss only widened from -$94M to -$176M while revenue grew from $6.76B to $7.37B, implying the year started with higher activity but still absorbed fixed costs before the stronger construction quarters. The more important signal is that the last four reported quarters sum to roughly $38.1B of revenue and $3.67B of net income, very close to full-year 2025 and consistent with a business holding its earnings base rather than rolling over.
What gives me pause is not quality but valuation versus cash generation. At a $66.9B market cap, investors are paying about 18.4x earnings, 1.83x sales, and 10.6x EV/EBITDA for a company whose free cash flow in 2025 was $2.91B. That is a roughly 4.3% FCF yield on market cap, or somewhat lower on enterprise value once net debt of about $13.6B is included. For a cyclical building materials company, that is not cheap. Yes, operating cash flow was a healthy $5.63B, but capex of $2.71B consumed nearly half of it, which matters because this is not a software business where cash conversion can structurally expand without reinvestment. The models calling CRH “mature earner” are directionally right on business type, but the more important contradiction is that some narrative framing treats the stock as if it is still discounted for cyclicality. On these numbers, it is not meaningfully discounted; it is valued as a high-quality compounder with cyclical risk largely forgiven.
The balance sheet is fine, not pristine. Debt of $17.65B against $4.10B of cash and $25.48B of equity is manageable, with debt/equity at 0.69 and current ratio 1.74, so I do not see financial stress. Returns are respectable rather than extraordinary: ROE 14.7%, ROIC 10.9%, ROA 6.4%. Those are good numbers in heavy materials, but again, they do not scream “must-pay premium multiple.” The earnings trend from 2023 to 2025 is also strong but not explosive: net income moved from $3.18B to $3.75B over two years, about 8.6% CAGR. That supports a fair multiple in the mid-to-high teens, not an obvious bargain if macro headwinds hit volumes or if pricing finally normalizes. Insider activity is a shrug: mostly option exercises, awards, and small sales, nothing that validates a strong internal conviction signal either way.
The best argument against my caution is straightforward: CRH has earned the right to trade above a plain-vanilla cyclical multiple because the margin structure keeps improving, revenue continues to rise, and end-market exposure is probably better than the word “construction” implies. If the market is looking through residential softness toward infrastructure, public works, and aggregates scarcity in attractive regions, then 18x earnings may be entirely reasonable. On that case, the 2025 step-up in operating profit to $5.44B from $4.93B, plus 2026 Q1 revenue growth of 9%, says demand is proving more resilient than bears expect. If management can sustain 14%+ operating margins and convert even a modestly larger share of earnings into free cash flow, today’s multiple would not be demanding. I weigh that less heavily because free cash flow has not kept up with accounting earnings, with the provided momentum data showing negative FCF CAGR, and because in this industry “resilience” can look strongest near the top of the cycle.
What would change my mind is either a better price or evidence that CRH deserves to be treated more like a secular compounder than a cyclical consolidator. At roughly $80-$85, the stock would offer a materially better margin of safety against volume or pricing slippage while still crediting the quality of the asset base. Alternatively, I would turn more constructive at the current price if the next few quarters show revenue holding above a $38B annual run rate, operating margin staying around 14.5% or better, and free cash flow moving clearly above $3.5B without leverage drifting higher. If instead Q2-Q3 margins slip back toward 12%-13% or full-year FCF stalls around $3B despite higher sales, the market’s premium framing should compress.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a high-quality cyclical compounder that has already been paid for the good news. Revenue climbed from $29.2B in 2021 to $37.5B in 2025 on a 3.5% CAGR while operating income expanded from $3.33B to $5.44B and net income to $3.75B, lifting operating margin to 14.5% and net margin to 10.0%. That is real operating leverage in aggregates and ready-mix. Yet free cash flow only reached $2.91B against $5.63B of operating cash flow after $2.71B of capex, and FCF is contracting at a 4.6% CAGR even as earnings grow 8.7%. The market is capitalizing peak-cycle earnings power at 18.4x trailing earnings, 10.6x EV/EBITDA and 1.83x sales while net debt sits at roughly $13.6B. Seasonality is intact—Q1 losses are structural—but the latest March 2026 quarter showed revenue of $7.37B against a deeper $176M loss versus a $94M loss on $6.76B a year earlier, so incremental winter volume is not flowing through cleanly.
The valuation synthesis putting composite fair value near $81 versus the $101 print is directionally correct. At current levels the stock embeds a durable multi-year U.S. infrastructure premium on top of already-elevated construction pricing. ROIC of 10.9% and ROE of 14.7% are respectable for the sector, and the balance sheet (debt-to-equity 0.69, current ratio 1.74) is not stretched, but neither metric justifies paying mid-teens-plus multiples once residential and non-residential volumes normalize. The 5.3% recent revenue growth and 7.5% earnings growth look fine until you notice the decelerating quarterly revenue trend and the fact that cash conversion is deteriorating while management continues to run a heavy bolt-on M&A and capex program. Insider activity is noise—option exercises and small sales—not a signal. The market narrative of “fortress aggregates riding CHIPS/IRA” is real but already fully reflected; once that story loses intensity the multiple compresses toward the DCF anchor.
The strongest counter-argument is that CRH still screens cheap versus pure-play U.S. aggregates peers that trade at 22–25x earnings, that $2.91B of FCF and a 1.5% dividend provide a floor, and that pricing power in fragmented regional markets plus a proven capital-allocation record have historically de-risked the cycle. A bull would also note that operating margins have expanded for four straight years and that net leverage of roughly 2.5x operating profit leaves room to keep consolidating. I weigh those points as already in the price: the peer discount exists precisely because of European exposure and acquisition integration risk, and “cheap versus VMC” is not the same as cheap on absolute cash flows. Declining FCF CAGR while earnings rise is the tell that reported profits are running ahead of economic cash generation at this point in the cycle.
I would reverse to neutral or better only on clear evidence that FCF is re-accelerating above $3.5B while organic volumes hold through a softer residential print, or on a material multiple re-rating catalyst such as sustained 2026–27 guidance that keeps operating margins above 14% even as public infrastructure spend rolls off. A drop back through the high-$80s on no fundamental break would also force a revisit of the risk/reward.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has climbed every year from 29.2B in 2021 to 37.5B in 2025 (about 6.4% CAGR), with gross margin widening from 33.6% to 36.1% and operating margin expanding from 11.4% to 14.5%. That is genuine operating leverage in a cyclical, capital-heavy industry - net income grew from 2.63B to 3.75B and FCF ran 2.4-3.2B annually. Earnings quality looks clean: OCF/NI 1.4x, accruals -2.5% of assets, no mechanical red flags. Per-share value is actively concentrated, with diluted shares falling from 786.8M to 677.0M (a 3.7% annual shrink) and buybacks running roughly 13x SBC, so dilution discipline is exemplary. The main structural mark against the business is the balance sheet: net debt of about 13.6B against 4.1B liquid cash means the balance sheet is a constraint rather than a cushion, and Altman Z at 2.92 sits in the grey zone. However, at 2.9B FCF the debt is serviceable and there is no runway question. Insider tape is neutral - a single small sale plus routine option/award/withholding flow, nothing directional.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and fixed vs floating mix behind the 13.6B net debt
- Whether recent margin expansion is price/mix or M&A-driven (aggregates vs materials segment detail)
- Acquisition cadence and goodwill/intangibles growth relative to organic growth
- Pension and lease obligations not captured in net debt figure
- Geographic mix - US vs Europe exposure given divergent construction cycles
The composite fair value of $79.65 (signal-adjusted $81.23) implies roughly 20% downside from the $101.15 print. The two conservative methods cluster tightly and low: DCF at $55.11 and EPV floor at $54.50, both saying the cash-generating base of the business, without heroic growth, is worth about half the current price. Only the anchored P/E at $153.88 argues for upside, and that method essentially extrapolates recent multiple and earnings strength - a runaway input I discount heavily given CRH's cyclicality. Splitting the difference toward the cash-based methods, deserved value sits in the low-$80s even after crediting the strong quality grade and clean earnings.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward guidance on U.S. infrastructure backlog conversion and pricing into 2025-2026
- Residential/commercial vs infrastructure revenue mix trend
- Net debt trajectory and M&A pace/multiples paid
- Any evidence of volume rollover in key state DOT markets
CRH sits inside a moderately supportive tape: risk-on regime at +47, VIX at 15.5, and the S&P near highs. With a 1.2 beta this name gets a modest lift from the risk-on read, but it is not a high-octane story stock that levers into euphoria - the pressure it feels from the tape is real but ordinary. The active narrative (steady-compounder, moderate intensity, moderate durability) is quietly on the right side of the market's favorite 2026 theme: U.S. infrastructure spend, CHIPS/IRA project pipelines, and regional aggregates pricing power. That story is coherent, defensible, and being credited by the market.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any softening in state DOT/IRA project awards that would crack the infrastructure story
- Housing starts and non-res construction prints - a sharp downshift would re-price the cyclical premium
- Analyst target revisions post next print - watch for tone diverging from the compounder narrative
- Sector rotation out of materials into defensives if VIX pushes above 20
CRH sells weight, proximity and compliance, not information: the monetised unit is tons and cubic yards delivered within a short haul radius, and no amount of cheap inference creates a new quarry, a new permit, or a truck that arrives before the concrete sets. AI therefore enters through four narrow channels — (1) demand, where AI-era buildout of data centers, transmission and fabs is unusually materials-heavy and lands in CRH's US core; (2) inputs, where AI-driven power demand inflates the energy bill for kilns and plants; (3) internal cost, where dispatch optimisation, predictive maintenance, autonomous haulage and kiln control can add real but slow-diffusing points of margin across thousands of decentralised locations; and (4) volume intensity, where AI structural optimisation reduces material per structure. Disruption risk to the product, the interface or the customer relationship is close to nil; the fragmented-market pricing power that has driven GM from 33.6% to 36.1% rests on geography and consolidation, not on information asymmetry AI can dissolve.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Reserve life and permitted tonnage disclosure
- Aggregates price per ton growth
- Greenfield permit denials in key states
- US highway and state DOT funding levels
- Data-center and power construction starts
- Residential starts in CRH metros
- Bolt-on acquisition multiples paid
- New entrant permits granted
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for CRH — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.