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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for CorMedix Inc. (CRMD) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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CorMedix Inc.
CRMD NASDAQCorMedix Inc. is a biopharmaceutical company focused on developing and commercializing therapeutic products for life-threatening conditions, particularly in anti-infective therapies and hospital-based treatments in the United States. Its lead product, DefenCath, is an FDA-approved antimicrobial catheter lock solution containing taurolidine and heparin, designed to reduce catheter-related bloodstream infections in adult patients with kidney failure undergoing chronic hemodialysis via central venous catheters. This product serves outpatient dialysis organizations and holds a unique position as the first such approved solution in its indication. Following the acquisition of Melinta Therapeutics in August 2025, CorMedix Inc. expanded its commercial portfolio to include seven innovative anti-infective drugs: MINOCIN for injection, REZZAYO for candidemia and invasive candidiasis, VABOMERE, ORBACTIV, BAXDELA, KIMYRSA, and TOPROL-XL. These therapies strengthen its presence in acute care settings, infectious disease management, and hospital markets, diversifying beyond dialysis applications. Incorporated in 2006 and headquartered in Berkeley Heights, New Jersey, CorMedix Inc. operates as a single drug product segment emphasizing commercial sales and strategic investments in specialty pharmaceuticals.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.04
Total Equity: $405.31M
Shares: 80,308
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $144.84M
EBITDA: $150.82M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $144.84M
Revenue: $311.71M
Revenue: $311.71M
Revenue: $311.71M
Total Equity: $405.31M
Tax Rate: -8.7%
Equity: $405.31M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $144.84M
Current Liabilities: $174.27M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $405.31M
Shares: 80,308
Shares: 80,308
CapEx: -$2.26M
Shares: 80,308
Stock Price: $7.49
Net Income: $163.06M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:40pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $190,936 | $65,408 | — | $43.5M | $311.7M |
| Cost of Revenue | $148,938 | $3,734 | — | $3.2M | $22.1M |
| Gross Profit | $41,998 | $61,674 | — | $40.3M | $275.7M |
| Operating Expenses | $29.5M | $30.7M | $49.0M | $62.6M | $125.6M |
| Operating Income | -$29.4M | -$30.6M | -$49.0M | -$22.4M | $150.1M |
| Net Income | -$28.2M | -$29.7M | -$46.3M | -$17.9M | $163.1M |
| EBITDA | -$29.4M | -$30.5M | -$48.9M | -$22.2M | $150.8M |
| EPS | $-0.75 | $-0.74 | $-0.91 | $-0.30 | $2.25 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.75 | $-0.74 | $-0.91 | $-0.30 | $2.04 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:17pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $53.3M | $43.1M | $43.6M | $40.7M | $144.8M |
| Total Current Assets | $66.5M | $59.6M | $79.5M | $114.6M | $367.1M |
| Total Assets | $68.9M | $62.0M | $82.1M | $118.8M | $826.1M |
| Current Liabilities | $5.3M | $6.3M | $11.4M | $33.8M | $174.3M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $6.1M | $7.0M | $11.9M | $34.2M | $420.8M |
| Total Equity | $62.8M | $55.1M | $70.1M | $84.7M | $405.3M |
| Retained Earnings | -$245.7M | -$275.4M | -$321.7M | -$339.6M | -$176.6M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:40pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$21.2M | -$24.4M | -$38.4M | -$50.6M | $175.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.4M | $-219,360 | $-327,300 | $-115,730 | -$2.3M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$22.6M | -$24.6M | -$38.7M | -$50.7M | $172.8M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | -$308.5M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $11.5M | -$10.2M | $448,447 | -$3.1M | $105.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:40pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -65.7% | — | — | +617.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +46.8% | — | — | +584.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -4.0% | -59.9% | +54.3% | +771.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -5.3% | -56.0% | +61.3% | +1,009.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -4.0% | -60.1% | +54.6% | +779.3% |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a genuinely striking story that most of the models are underweighting. DefenCath went from essentially zero to $311.7M in FY2025 revenue with 88.5% gross margins and $175M in operating cash flow on a $590M market cap. Q1 2026 alone printed $127.4M in revenue at 30.3% net margin — annualizing that gives ~$510M, meaning the ramp is still accelerating, not plateauing. At $7.49, you're paying 3.7x trailing earnings and roughly 1.2x forward revenue for a company that generated $172.8M in FCF last year against a $590M cap — a ~29% trailing FCF yield. That is not a normal valuation for a profitable specialty pharma with monopoly-like gross margins, and the burden of proof shifts to explaining why it's cheap, not why it's a buy.
The synthesis composite fair value of "$64,195" is obviously broken — some DCF blew up on a division-by-tiny-number and the "signal-adjusted $20,480" is nonsense too. Ignore both. The narrative layer's implicit ~$20 anchor (63% of value contingent on future execution) is more defensible but still hand-wavy. A more grounded frame: if you haircut Q1'26 run-rate to $450M annual revenue and apply a 25% sustainable net margin (below current, accounting for Melinta integration drag), that's $112M in earnings. At even 8-10x — a deep discount for 88% gross margin healthcare — you get $900M-$1.1B market cap, or $11-14/share. That's a 50-85% upside range without heroic assumptions. The market forces model calling this "neutral" and the sector signal flagging "below sector benchmarks" both feel like they're anchoring on stale pre-2024 data when CRMD was a chronic burner.
The contrarian case, which the models gesture at but don't stress-test hard enough, is real and specific: DefenCath is a single product with concentrated customer risk (US Renal Care, DaVita, Fresenius essentially are the market), and dialysis reimbursement via TDAPA is time-limited — the transitional add-on payment window closes and pricing renegotiation is a genuine cliff. The Q3 2025 net income of $108.6M looks like it may contain a one-time tax benefit or milestone (given Q2 was $19.8M and Q4 was $14.0M) — the quarterly NI series is lumpy in a way that suggests non-operating items are inflating the annual $163M figure. The insider activity is *all* awards, zero open-market buying — management is being granted stock, not paying for it, which is neutral-to-slightly-negative signal. And Melinta integration is a legitimate wildcard the bull case glosses over. The "weak cash flow quality" flag deserves attention: $175M OCF vs $163M NI is fine on the surface, but with revenue accelerating this fast, working capital swings and channel-stuffing risk warrant scrutiny of receivables.
I partially agree with the synthesis "undervalued" verdict but reject its magnitude entirely. The composite numbers are garbage; the directional call is right. My read: fair value is $12-15 based on a reasonable haircut to run-rate economics with a mid-single-digit multiple for reimbursement risk. That's 60-100% upside, not 273,000%. The bear case is not a permanent zero — it's a $4-5 stock if TDAPA rolls off badly and Melinta disappoints, which caps downside at ~40%. Risk/reward is asymmetric in favor of longs at $7.49. This is a starter-position situation, not a table-pound, because (a) I can't verify the Q3'25 NI spike isn't a one-timer from this data, (b) reimbursement cliff timing matters enormously and isn't disclosed here, and (c) the "priced for perfection" thesis label is exactly backward — it's priced for skepticism, which is why it's interesting. I dissent from the models that call this fragile or fairly valued and from the synthesis's absurd fair value math, but agree with its directional undervalued call.
GPT Reading
What stands out first is that the stock looks statistically absurdly cheap, but the raw operating history says you should not take the screening multiples at face value. CorMedix went from effectively no business to $43.5M of revenue in 2024 and then to $311.7M in 2025, with gross profit of $275.7M, operating income of $150.1M, net income of $163.1M, and $172.8M of free cash flow. Against a $0.59B market cap and $144.8M of cash with no debt, that is optically a bargain. Even backing out the cash, the enterprise value is only roughly $445M, or about 1.4x 2025 revenue and under 3x EBITDA. The latest quarter also did not collapse: Q1 2026 revenue was $127.4M versus $39.1M in Q1 2025, up about 226%, and net income was still a healthy $38.6M. So the market is not pricing this as if the 2025 step-up is fully durable; it is pricing in a meaningful fade.
The reason I think the market is skeptical is also visible in the numbers. The business model appears almost too profitable for an early commercial biotech: 88.5% gross margin, 48.2% operating margin, 52.3% net margin in 2025. Q1 2025 net margin was an even more extreme 52.8%, then Q1 2026 dropped to 30.3% despite revenue more than tripling. That combination usually means mix shifted, launch economics changed, or some 2025 profitability benefited from accounting or one-time factors. The annual and quarterly net income path also has a strange shape: 2025 net income of $163.1M included one quarter with $108.6M of earnings, far larger than the surrounding periods. When I see a company that lost $17.9M in 2024 and then earned $163.1M the next year, I do not anchor to the 3.7x P/E; I ask how much of the jump is recurring product demand versus milestone, stocking, channel fill, acquisition accounting, or some other non-steady-state item. The latest quarter’s revenue acceleration is encouraging, but the margin compression is the clue that normalized earnings power may be well below trailing earnings.
My read is still modestly bullish because even with heavy skepticism, the valuation already discounts a lot of disappointment. If 2025 was a peak-ish year and normalized revenue ends up more like $350M-$450M with net margins settling in the 15%-25% range instead of 50%+, this is still not expensive at a $590M equity value. A 20% net margin on $400M would be $80M of earnings; put 10x-12x on that and you get $800M-$960M equity value before giving much credit for the $144.8M cash pile. That is roughly $10-$12 per share territory versus $7.49 today. The balance sheet matters here: zero debt and over $140M of cash sharply reduce financing risk, which is often the killer in commercial-stage biotech turnarounds. So while I do not buy the “screaming deep value” interpretation implied by the raw P/E, I do think the stock is priced below a conservative commercialization outcome.
The best case against that view is that 2025 may simply not be a clean baseline at all. If the huge revenue ramp included substantial nonrecurring economics, then the 1.4x EV/revenue multiple is less attractive than it looks because the “R” itself may be inflated. The weak cash flow quality warning and high accrual concerns matter more here than they would for a mature medtech name. A smart bear would also point to the strategic ambiguity: this was a years-long cash-burning story with negligible revenue until very recently, and the market narrative around adoption, reimbursement, and portfolio diversification exists precisely because standalone proof of durable demand is still thin. Q1 2026’s 30.3% net margin, down from 52.8% a year earlier, could be the first sign that scaling this business is less lucrative than headline annual numbers suggest. If normalized earnings are closer to $30M-$40M than $80M+, then $7.49 is not cheap at all; it is fair for a single-product, execution-sensitive biotech with a credibility gap.
What would change my mind is straightforward. Two more quarters of real revenue, not just earnings, matter most. If CorMedix can sustain quarterly revenue above $90M-$100M while holding net margin above 20% and convert that into operating cash flow, I would move materially more bullish because that would validate that 2025 was not mostly noise. On the other hand, if 2026 revenue stalls well below the Q1 run rate, or if margins slide into low teens while cash generation weakens despite the accounting profits, I would conclude the trailing valuation metrics are a trap and fair value is below the current price.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe one of the sharpest commercial inflections in small-cap biotech: CorMedix went from $43.5M revenue and a $17.9M loss in 2024 to $311.7M revenue, $150.1M operating income, and $163.1M net income in 2025, converting almost all of that into $172.8M of free cash flow on negligible capex. Gross margin held at 88.5 percent and operating margin reached 48 percent—pharma-like economics once the product cleared the hospital gate. Q1 2026 did not fade; it printed $127.4M revenue and $38.6M net income, more than triple the year-earlier $39.1M quarter. The balance sheet is clean—$144.8M cash, zero debt, $405.3M equity—and trailing EV/EBITDA of 2.9x and a 3.7x P/E at a $7.49 share price imply the market is treating nearly all of 2025’s earnings power as non-recurring. That is the central tension: either DefenCath plus the Melinta anti-infective portfolio has produced a durable, high-margin cash engine that is being given away, or the income statement is still contaminated by milestones and purchase-accounting artifacts that will reverse.
I read the cash flow statement as more credible than the skepticism layered on top of it. Operating cash flow of $175M against $163M of net income is not the signature of pure accrual fiction; the company is collecting. Even if one haircuts 2025 earnings by half to scrub out the $108.6M Q3 spike and any Melinta-related gains, the residual still supports a mid-teens multiple that would put the equity well above $12. Q1 2026’s $127M top line already annualizes above $500M; if even 60 percent of that run-rate is recurring product, the current $0.59B enterprise is pricing in outright failure of commercial adoption. ROIC above 60 percent and a current ratio of 2.1 further reduce the binary risk that historically crushed pre-revenue biotech names. The fallen-angel narrative and “show-me” label are real, but they are being applied to a company that has already shown two consecutive periods of nine-figure revenue and triple-digit millions of FCF.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and quantitative. Several 2025 quarters report blank revenue alongside large positive net income, the accrual ratio is flagged at 1.57x, and secondary signals explicitly call cash-flow quality weak—classic markers that a material slice of the $311.7M was milestone, inventory step-up, or acquisition-related rather than sustainable DefenCath vial sales. Margin compression from 52.8 percent net in Q1 2025 to 30.3 percent in Q1 2026 is consistent with a mix shift away from high-margin one-time items toward lower-margin or higher-cost commercial product. Dialysis-center adoption has historically been glacial, reimbursement remains a negotiation, and the Melinta deal could just as easily be an integration tax as a de-risking catalyst. At 3.7x trailing earnings the market is not asleep; it is assigning a high probability that 2026–27 earnings collapse toward the old cash-burn baseline. Insider activity is pure award dilution, offering no open-market endorsement. If the true recurring revenue run-rate is closer to the $40–80M range than the $300M+ print, then $7.49 is fair-to-expensive, not cheap.
Two clean data points would reverse the view: either Q2 and Q3 2026 revenue each clearing $100M with free-cash-flow conversion above 40 percent (confirming durability), or a transparent revenue bridge showing that less than 25 percent of 2025’s $311.7M was non-recurring. Conversely, two sequential quarters below $60M revenue or a guidance cut that implies sub-$200M full-year 2026 sales would validate the market’s skepticism and push the stock toward cash value.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for CRMD — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.