For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Cirrus Logic, Inc. (CRUS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score +31 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 63 · Value 10 · Sentiment 42 (timing only, not weighted)
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Cirrus Logic, Inc.
CRUS NASDAQCirrus Logic, Inc. is a fabless semiconductor company that develops mixed-signal processing solutions and audio products for markets in China, the United States, and internationally. Its primary offerings include audio products such as amplifiers, codecs that integrate analog-to-digital converters (ADCs) and digital-to-analog converters (DACs), smart codecs with embedded digital signal processing, standalone digital signal processors, and SoundClear technology. These solutions power devices like smartphones, tablets, laptops, AR/VR headsets, home theater systems, automotive entertainment systems, and professional audio equipment. Cirrus Logic also provides high-performance mixed-signal products, including camera controllers, haptic and sensing solutions, and battery and power ICs tailored for smartphones, alongside applications in automotive, industrial, and imaging sectors. The company emphasizes diversification across consumer electronics, PCs, automotive, and industrial segments, leveraging expertise in audio and mixed-signal technologies to deliver integrated components that enhance device performance and user experience. Founded in 1984 and headquartered in Austin, Texas, Cirrus Logic plays a key role in enabling advanced audio and signal processing in modern electronics.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.85
Total Equity: $2.13B
Shares: 52,822,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $800.93M
EBITDA: $512.68M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $800.93M
Revenue: $2.00B
Revenue: $2.00B
Revenue: $2.00B
Total Equity: $2.13B
Tax Rate: 16.6%
Equity: $2.13B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $800.93M
Current Liabilities: $194.66M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $2.13B
Shares: 52,822,000
Shares: 52,822,000
CapEx: -$13.99M
Shares: 52,822,000
Stock Price: $121.09
Net Income: $414.41M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 1:06pm (53d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $857.8M | $940.6M | $872.8M | $900.0M | $943.2M |
| Gross Profit | $923.6M | $957.0M | $916.1M | $996.0M | $1.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $557.3M | $707.9M | $572.6M | $585.7M | $593.8M |
| Operating Income | $366.3M | $249.0M | $343.5M | $410.4M | $460.4M |
| Net Income | $326.4M | $176.7M | $274.6M | $331.5M | $414.4M |
| EBITDA | $428.4M | $320.2M | $391.8M | $461.3M | $512.7M |
| EPS | $5.70 | $3.18 | $5.06 | $6.24 | $8.10 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.52 | $3.09 | $4.90 | $6.00 | $7.85 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:29am (53d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $369.8M | $445.8M | $502.8M | $539.6M | $800.9M |
| Total Current Assets | $840.0M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B |
| Total Assets | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $264.8M | $216.3M | $186.4M | $195.2M | $194.7M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $523.6M | $405.7M | $414.6M | $377.6M | $361.4M |
| Total Equity | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $23.4M | -$9.3M | $58.9M | $90.4M | $184.9M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 1:06pm (53d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $124.8M | $339.6M | $421.7M | $444.4M | $650.6M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$26.1M | -$35.1M | -$37.7M | -$22.8M | -$14.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $98.6M | $304.5M | $384.0M | $421.6M | $636.6M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$276.9M | $0 | $0 | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$167.5M | -$191.4M | -$186.0M | -$261.0M | -$280.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$72.4M | $76.0M | $57.0M | $36.9M | $261.3M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 1:06pm (53d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +6.5% | -5.7% | +6.0% | +5.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +3.6% | -4.3% | +8.7% | +5.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -32.0% | +37.9% | +19.5% | +12.2% |
| Net Income Growth | -45.9% | +55.4% | +20.7% | +25.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | -25.2% | +22.3% | +17.8% | +11.1% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:32The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a seasonal Apple-supplier story with a worrying kink. Fiscal Q1 2026 (June 2025 quarter, $407M rev, 14.9% NM) and the just-reported June 2026 quarter ($459.7M, 16.7% NM) show the trough quarters, but stacking them YoY: revenue +12.9% and net income +26.7% — genuinely healthy. However, the December-quarter peaks tell a different story: Dec 2025 rev $580.6M vs Dec 2024 $555.7M is only +4.5%, and Sep 2025 vs Sep 2024 is +3.5%. So the recent acceleration is off a soft comp, not evidence of structural reacceleration. Annual FY26 revenue of $2.00B on $1.90B is +5.3% — the "steady compounder" label fits, but only barely, and the 22.9% earnings CAGR is margin-mix flattery on a modest top line. FCF of $636M on a $6.07B market cap is a ~10.5% FCF yield with net cash of $801M and zero debt — that is the actual anchor here, not the growth story.
Where I break from the synthesis: the composite $153–159 fair value implying +31% upside is too generous, and the -25 thesis-evaluation score is too bearish. Both are overreacting to the same fact — Apple concentration ~80-90%. The DCF that spits out $159 is almost certainly extrapolating the FY26 margin print (20.7% net, 23% operating) as a run-rate. But look at what happened in FY23: revenue $1.90B, net income collapsed to $176.7M (9.3% margin). This business has demonstrated it can lose half its earnings power in a single cycle without losing the Apple socket. Any DCF that doesn't cycle-adjust margins to a ~15-16% blended net is overstating intrinsic value by 20-25%. Cycle-normalized FCF is probably closer to $475-500M, which on a 13-15x multiple gets you $95-110/share plus $16/sh net cash = $110-125 fair value. That's roughly where the stock trades. The market is not being stupid.
The contrarian read the models are underweighting: insider behavior is uniformly programmatic option-exercise-and-sell — no open-market buys anywhere on this list. In a stock supposedly 24% below DCF fair value with a fortress balance sheet, insiders with the best information are not stepping up. The "Neutral Insider" tag understates this; when the CFO/execs believe the stock is cheap, you see at least token 10b5-1 amendment or opportunistic buys. You see none. Second, the pre-flight notes a 33% drawdown from 52-week highs — that context is missing from the synthesis. The stock has already re-rated from what was likely ~$180, meaning the "market pessimism" the narrative layer describes has already been substantially priced. Third, the decelerating quarterly trend flagged in Secondary Signals is real: peak quarters going from +4-5% YoY is not a growth stock trajectory, it's a plateau, and plateaus in Apple-supplier land tend to precede content-share losses on next-gen designs (see Skyworks, Qorvo).
GPT Reading
Cirrus looks cheaper than the market is giving it credit for, but only if you underwrite it as a cash-rich, low-growth compounder rather than a durable growth semiconductor name. The core fact pattern is stronger than the stock’s multiple implies: annual revenue has moved from $1.79B in FY24 to $1.90B in FY25 to $2.00B in FY26, while net income climbed much faster from $274.6M to $331.5M to $414.4M. That is not financial engineering alone; operating margin expanded from 19.2% in FY24 to 21.6% in FY25 to 23.1% in FY26, and free cash flow reached $636.6M against just $14.0M of capex. On a $6.07B market cap, that is roughly a 10.5% FCF yield, and with $800.9M of cash and no debt, the enterprise value is closer to $5.27B, making the EV/revenue of 2.7x and EV/EBITDA of 10.5x look more like industrial-quality pricing than high-return analog/mixed-signal pricing. A business producing 19.5% ROE and 28.9% ROIC with no leverage should not automatically trade at 15.4x earnings unless the earnings base is viewed as fragile.
The quarterly data says the business is not rolling over. The latest quarter at $459.7M of revenue and $76.9M of net income was up from $407.3M and $60.7M in the comparable quarter a year earlier, so revenue grew about 12.9% and earnings about 26.7%. The quarter before that was $448.5M and $81.8M versus $424.5M and $71.3M, again positive growth. Yes, the seasonal December and September quarters remain the profit peak at $580.6M/$140.3M and $561.0M/$131.6M, but that seasonality is normal for a consumer-exposed chip supplier; what matters is that each corresponding quarter has stepped up year over year and margins have held at levels well above the 2024 run-rate. In other words, the market seems to be acting as if FY26 margins near 21% net are temporary, yet the most recent four quarters still add to about $2.05B of revenue and about $430.6M of net income, actually ahead of reported FY26. That does not prove structural growth, but it does argue the earnings power has at least stabilized at a higher level.
What stands out most is the disconnect between the “mature earner” label and the quality of the cash economics. This is a fabless semiconductor company with gross margin of 52.8%, operating cash flow of $650.6M, and essentially all of that turning into free cash flow. Companies with those traits often deserve a discount if they are shrinking or balance-sheet stressed; Cirrus is neither. Book value is $2.13B, so at 3.0x book the stock is not optically deep value, but that misses the point because this is an IP business, not an asset-heavy manufacturer. If I haircut earnings meaningfully and assume normalized net income closer to $350M rather than the latest $414M, the stock is still around 17x depressed earnings for a debt-free company with nearly 32% of its market cap backed by cash. That leaves room for a fair value in the mid-$130s to low-$140s even without assigning much credit to new product vectors.
The strongest argument against this bullish read is simple and serious: the market may be right that these are peak economics on customer concentration, and the multiple is low because one design-loss event can permanently impair earnings. The quarterly progression also shows some softening sequentially from the December quarter’s 24.2% net margin to 18.2% in March and 16.7% in June; if the business is seasonal and heavily dependent on one customer cycle, trailing annual numbers can flatter sustainability. Annual revenue in FY23 was also $1.90B, essentially the same as FY25, so the top line is not compounding cleanly; the real story has been margin recovery, not durable demand expansion. If those margins are being supported by a favorable product mix that has now peaked, then 15x earnings is not cheap at all. A skeptic would also note that repeated insider option exercises and immediate sales, while not a strong red flag, certainly do not signal aggressive insider conviction at these levels.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of decent profitability; it is evidence that the current earnings base is less durable than it looks. If revenue falls back below roughly $1.9B annualized and net margin slips toward the mid-teens again, or if quarterly revenue in the seasonally weaker periods starts posting negative year-over-year comparisons after this recent strength, I would view the stock as fairly valued at best around $120. Conversely, if Cirrus can hold annual revenue above $2.0B while sustaining operating margin above 22% and free cash flow above $550M, the market should stop treating it like a structurally ex-growth supplier. In that case, a rerating toward 18x earnings or about 12x-13x EV/EBITDA would support something like $140-$150.
Grok Reading
Cirrus Logic’s numbers describe a high-return fabless franchise that is compounding cash faster than the top line, not a growth story the market has already paid for. Fiscal 2026 delivered $2.00B revenue, $460M operating income, and $414M net income on a 52.8% gross margin and 20.8% net margin; free cash flow hit $637M against only $14M of capex, producing an FCF yield north of 10% at the $6.07B enterprise. That cash conversion sits on a pristine balance sheet—$801M cash, zero debt, current ratio 7.4—and ROIC of 28.9%. Revenue CAGR of 5.7% is modest and lumpy with Apple’s seasonal cadence, but earnings and FCF have compounded at 23% and 29% respectively because operating leverage and mix have steadily lifted margins from the mid-teens net toward 20%+. The June quarter’s $460M and 16.7% net margin already clear the year-ago $407M and 14.9%, so the expansion is still visible in the soft half of the year. At 15.4x trailing earnings, 10.5x EV/EBITDA, and 2.7x EV/sales, the multiple is pricing a mature, low-growth supplier, not a business that just printed a 10%+ FCF yield with expanding returns on capital.
The contradiction with the more bearish model layers is valuation, not operations. The composite fair-value work pointing near $153–$159 is directionally consistent with capitalizing mid-teens earnings power and a clean balance sheet; the current $121 embeds a roughly 25–30% discount that only makes sense if Apple concentration is treated as an imminent binary. Quarterly revenue still tracks the classic smartphone content cycle—$560–580M in the September/December windows, $410–460M in the March/June troughs—without evidence of content loss or share erosion inside that pattern. Insider prints are mechanical option exercise-and-sell pairs, not discretionary distribution. Against that backdrop, the “steady compounder priced for perfection” bear narrative does not match the tape: 15x earnings and a double-digit FCF yield is the opposite of perfection pricing.
The strongest opposing case is the one the thesis engine already weights heavily: customer concentration is unhedgeable. If Apple redesigns audio/haptics in-house, dual-sources aggressively, or simply cuts units, revenue and the entire margin stack re-rate overnight; nothing on the balance sheet or in the product roadmap fully offsets a multi-hundred-million-dollar content hit. Skeptics can also argue that 20%+ net margins and peak content-per-device are coincident, so the earnings CAGR of 23% is a trailing artifact that will fade to the 5–6% revenue growth rate, leaving a 15x multiple looking ordinary rather than cheap once growth normalizes. Smartphone saturation and China demand softness reinforce that path. Those risks are real and justify a conglomerate discount; they do not justify a 10%+ FCF yield on a zero-debt business whose latest full year still grew revenue 5% and net income 25%. The market is paid to worry about Apple; it is already collecting that premium in the price.
What flips the view is concrete evidence on either side of the concentration and margin debates. A sustained drop in content dollars per Apple device, a design-win loss disclosed in a 10-K or supplier note, or two consecutive non-seasonal revenue declines would invalidate the undervaluation case and push the stock toward a mid-teens multiple on lower earnings. Conversely, a material non-Apple design win that shows up as sequential mix shift, or another year of net margins holding above 20% with FCF above $600M, would confirm the compounder multiple belongs higher and close the gap toward the mid-$150s.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that decides this case is the free cash flow yield: $636.6M of FCF on a $6.07B market cap is a 10.5% yield, and the EV bridge confirms it. With $800.9M in cash and no meaningful debt (plausible for a fabless design house, not an artifact), enterprise value is roughly $5.27B, which puts EV/FCF at 8.3x and EV/EBITDA at about 10.5x. For a fabless mixed-signal semiconductor company generating 32% FCF margins, 29% ROIC, and expanding operating margins, that is cheap by the sector's own standards, where fabless analog and audio-IC peers typically clear 15–20x earnings. The 14.6x P/E on FY2026 net income of $414.4M sits at the bottom of that range, and the 33% drawdown from 52-week highs has already priced in a meaningful chunk of the bear narrative.
The margin story is the real engine here, and it is not a one-quarter blip. Operating margin has climbed from 13.1% in FY2023 to 23.0% in FY2026, a 990-basis-point expansion over three fiscal years, while gross margin has held steady in the low-50s. Net margin followed from 9.3% to 20.7%. Revenue, by contrast, has grown only 5.7% CAGR over the same period ($1.78B to $2.00B), so the earnings growth is almost entirely operating leverage on a fabless cost structure, not top-line acceleration. That distinction matters: it means the margin expansion is structural to the business model (design IP, outsourced manufacturing, minimal capex of just $14M annually) rather than a cyclical upswing that will reverse. The most recent quarter, Q1 FY27 (June 2026), showed revenue of $459.7M, up 12.9% year-over-year from $407.3M, with net margin of 16.7% versus 14.9% a year earlier. The "decelerating revenue" tag in the secondary signals is misleading; the sequential dip from the $580.6M holiday quarter to $448.5M and then $459.7M is the normal Apple product-cycle seasonality, not a demand collapse.
The prior models' composite fair value of $153–159 is directionally right but I would trim it. The Valuation Synthesis layer acknowledges "methods disagree" and "treat the composite with caution," which is fair. The $159 figure implies roughly 19x trailing earnings or 12.5x FCF, a multiple that is defensible only if the margin expansion continues for another two to three years and Apple content-per-device keeps rising. I would anchor closer to 16–17x earnings on the FY2026 print, or 11–12x FCF, which puts fair value in the $135–145 range. At $121, that is 12–20% upside. The Thesis Evaluation's "90% Apple dependency" headline is the single most important risk in the file, though the briefing does not provide a verified revenue-by-customer breakdown to confirm the exact percentage. The narrative layer's observation that the story is "holding price down, not up" is consistent with the data: the 33% drawdown has already discounted a fair amount of the concentration risk, and the FCF yield has compressed to a level where the market is paying you to hold the Apple binary.
The strongest case against my read is the revenue ceiling. Five years of data show revenue oscillating between $1.78B and $2.00B with no breakout. The 28.8% FCF CAGR in the momentum block is entirely a margin story, not a volume story, and if Apple's audio and haptics content-per-device plateaus or shifts in-house, the operating leverage that drove the 1,000-basis-point margin expansion reverses just as quickly. A smart bear would also point to the Q1 FY27 net margin of 16.7% versus the 24.2% peak in Q3 FY26 and argue that the "expanding margin" narrative is really a "seasonal margin" narrative that the market is over-extrapolating. I weigh this differently because the annual figures are unambiguous: FY2024 operating margin 19.2%, FY2025 21.6%, FY2026 23.0%. Three consecutive annual expansions is not seasonality. But I concede that the revenue base is not growing fast enough to justify a 20x multiple, which is why I cap my fair value below the prior models' $159.
What would change my mind in either direction. A Q2 FY27 print (September 2026) showing revenue below $500M year-over-year, or net margin compressing below 15% on an annualized basis, would confirm the margin-peak thesis and push fair value toward $105–110, making the stock overvalued at $121. Conversely, a guidance raise that implies FY2027 revenue above $2.15B (roughly 7–8% growth) with operating margin holding above 23% would validate the 17–18x multiple and push fair value toward $155–165. The insider transactions in the file are all option-exercise-and-same-day-sale pairs of 800 to 6,500 shares, totaling well under $1M in aggregate; this is tax-withholding mechanics, not conviction in either direction, and I assign it zero weight.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The financial trajectory is genuinely strong: revenue has grown from $1.78B (2022) to $2.00B (2026), gross margin has expanded from 51.8% to 52.8%, operating margin has climbed from 20.6% to 23.0%, and net income has risen from $326M to $414M. Free cash flow has more than 6x-ed from $98.6M to $636.6M, a FCF/revenue conversion of ~32% that comfortably exceeds net income (OCF/NI 1.35x, accruals -3.9% of assets). Beneish M of -2.92 and Altman Z of 12.19 corroborate clean, real earnings. Balance sheet is a fortress-lite: $800.9M liquid cash, zero net debt, self-funding with no external capital needs. Share count discipline is a standout for a semi: diluted shares fell from 59.1M to 52.8M (-2.8% CAGR), with buybacks 269% of SBC and SBC only 4.1% of revenue - shareholders are net accreted, not diluted. Insider tape is neutral-to-mildly-negative (9 sells / 0 buys, ~$4.9M), but volumes are modest and consistent with routine option-exercise-and-sell behavior rather than an exit signal. The main unmodelled risk is well-known customer concentration (Apple) in a fabless model - not visible in these numbers but structurally caps the durability grade.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- 10-K customer concentration disclosure - what % of revenue is Apple in FY2026
- Segment/product mix beyond smartphone audio - HPMS/high-performance mixed-signal traction
- R&D as % of revenue trend and whether it is sustaining product roadmap
- Any long-term supply/design-win commentary in the most recent 10-K risk factors
- 10b5-1 plan disclosures behind the insider option-exercise-and-sell pattern
- Inventory and days-sales trends given the fabless model and macro semi cycle
The e2e composite pegs deserved value at $153 (signal-adjusted $159) against a $121 price, roughly a 26-31% gap. The DCF at $135 is the most defensible anchor - it implies about 11% upside, which is a modest margin of safety rather than a screaming bargain. The EPV floor at $72 is a useful reminder that if growth stalls entirely the business is worth well below today's price, so you are paying for continued execution. The anchored P/E of $273 is a runaway output - it assumes prior multiple regimes hold - and I discount it heavily.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Apple content per device trajectory in next iPhone cycle
- non-Apple / laptop and HPMS revenue mix progression
- FY guidance on gross margin sustainability at current ~52% level
- any one-time inventory or customer prepayment items in recent quarters
The macro backdrop is mildly supportive: a risk-on regime (+52), VIX at 14.3, and indices near highs let a beta-1.18 semi like CRUS ride the tape rather than fight it. Semis have been a favored cohort, and CRUS just delivered a Q1 2027 print described as record earnings fueled by smartphone demand plus mixed-signal expansion - that is exactly the kind of headline that reinforces the steady-compounder narrative and keeps sellers passive. Momentum reads strong_positive, consistent with a name where the story and the tape are pulling the same direction. That said, the narrative is only moderate intensity with low cult coefficient, so this is a gentle push, not a squeeze. The bear whisper (China softness, smartphone maturity, customer concentration on Apple) is dormant but ready to reactivate on any guide-down, and higher-for-longer rates (10y 4.63%, market PE 26.2) cap multiple expansion for the whole semi complex. Analyst tone appears constructive post-print but not euphoric. Net: a real but ordinary tailwind - the tape is friendly, the last news cycle was positive, and no active negative narrative is pressing on the name right now.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Analyst target revisions in the days following the Q1 2027 print - upward revisions would confirm the tailwind, silence suggests the beat is already priced
- Any Apple supply-chain datapoint or iPhone unit guide - would immediately reactivate customer-concentration bear thesis
- VIX behavior and semi-sector relative strength - a break in the risk-on regime would hit high-beta semis first
- Whether mixed-signal / non-smartphone revenue commentary gets picked up as a fresh narrative angle
The world is shifting from more devices to richer devices. Handset units are saturated, so the growth available to an audio/mixed-signal IP owner comes from adding sockets per device — more amplifiers, smarter codecs, power conversion — and from carrying that same analog IP into laptops, spatial-computing headsets and cabins. That is a real, mechanically identifiable path and CRUS is on it. The countervailing world fact is vertical integration: the largest device makers keep pulling analog and power silicon in-house, and CRUS's fate is therefore decided inside one customer's bill of materials rather than by end-market demand. AI at the device level is a modest positive here (always-on voice sensing, more DSP content) but it is not the swing factor. Net: durable near-term growth, capped and single-point-of-failure structural growth.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for CRUS — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.