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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for CrowdStrike Holdings, Inc. (CRWD) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -29 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 18 · Value -75 · Sentiment 40 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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CrowdStrike Holdings, Inc.
CRWD NASDAQCrowdStrike Holdings, Inc. is a cybersecurity technology company that delivers cloud-native security solutions to enterprises, governments, and other organizations worldwide. Its core offering is the CrowdStrike Falcon platform, which provides endpoint and workload protection, identity security, and threat intelligence through a single, unified architecture. The platform is delivered as software-as-a-service, allowing customers to deploy and scale security capabilities quickly across on-premise, cloud, and hybrid environments. CrowdStrike’s technology focuses on detecting and preventing breaches by combining behavioral analytics, real-time threat monitoring, and a cloud-based data engine that correlates signals from millions of endpoints. The company supports security operations centers with tools for incident response, threat hunting, and vulnerability management, helping organizations reduce cyber risk and respond more effectively to attacks. CrowdStrike serves a broad range of industries, including finance, healthcare, government, and technology, and generates revenue primarily from recurring subscriptions to its security modules. Founded in 2011 and headquartered in Austin, Texas, CrowdStrike is regarded as a key player in the modern cybersecurity market.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.65
Total Equity: $4.47B
Shares: 250,576,000
Total Debt: $745.47M
Cash: $5.23B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $745.47M
Cash: $5.23B
Revenue: $4.81B
Shares: 250,576,000
Revenue: $4.81B
Revenue: $4.81B
Revenue: $4.81B
Total Equity: $4.47B
Tax Rate: -26.9%
Equity: $4.47B
Total Debt: $745.47M
Cash: $5.23B
Current Liabilities: $4.18B
Long-Term Debt: $745.47M
Total Debt: $745.47M
Total Equity: $4.47B
Shares: 250,576,000
Shares: 250,576,000
CapEx: -$302.11M
Shares: 250,576,000
Stock Price: $202.54
Net Income: -$162.50M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:22pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.5B | $2.2B | $3.1B | $4.0B | $4.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $383.2M | $601.2M | $755.7M | $990.2M | $1.2B |
| Gross Profit | $1.1B | $1.6B | $2.3B | $3.0B | $3.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.2B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $3.1B | $3.9B |
| Operating Income | -$142.5M | -$190.1M | -$2.0M | -$116.4M | -$293.3M |
| Net Income | -$234.8M | -$183.2M | $89.3M | -$15.2M | -$162.5M |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $-1.03 | $-0.79 | $0.37 | $-0.06 | $-0.65 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-1.03 | $-0.79 | $0.37 | $-0.06 | $-0.65 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:22pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.0B | $2.5B | $3.4B | $4.3B | $5.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $2.6B | $3.6B | $4.8B | $6.1B | $7.4B |
| Total Assets | $3.6B | $5.0B | $6.6B | $8.7B | $11.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.4B | $2.1B | $2.7B | $3.5B | $4.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $739.5M | $741.0M | $742.5M | $744.0M | $745.5M |
| Total Liabilities | $2.6B | $3.5B | $4.3B | $5.4B | $6.6B |
| Total Equity | $1.0B | $1.5B | $2.3B | $3.3B | $4.5B |
| Retained Earnings | -$964.9M | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:22pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $574.8M | $941.0M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$112.1M | -$235.0M | -$176.5M | -$254.9M | -$302.1M |
| Free Cash Flow | $462.6M | $706.0M | $989.7M | $1.1B | $1.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$414.5M | -$18.3M | -$239.0M | -$310.3M | -$382.3M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $78.0M | $460.3M | $920.7M | $947.1M | $990.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:22pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +54.4% | +36.3% | +29.4% | +21.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +53.5% | +40.2% | +28.9% | +21.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | -33.4% | +99.0% | -5,734.6% | -152.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +22.0% | +148.7% | -117.1% | -966.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 20:15Even the bull case prices 76% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 100%. Caveat: the company is pre-profit — scenario margins are a glide-path assumption, not a track record.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($202.54) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +46% | 9.2% | $47.71 | -76% |
| Base — stabilizes | +31% | 8.0% | $27.16 | -87% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +15% | 6.8% | $14.51 | -93% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +26% | -0.6% | $0.00 | -100% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
CrowdStrike's raw numbers tell a cleaner story than the models suggest. Quarterly revenue went $963.9M → $1.01B → $1.06B → $1.10B → $1.17B → $1.23B → $1.31B → $1.39B — eight straight sequential increases through and beyond the July 2024 Falcon outage, with recent YoY at 21.7% and the last quarter accelerating sequentially by 6%. Net income flipped from four consecutive losses back to positive ($53.4M then $27.8M), and FY26 generated $1.61B operating cash flow and $1.31B FCF on $4.81B revenue — a 27% FCF margin while GAAP operating income is still -$293M. Gross margin sits at 74.7%. This is not a company in crisis; it's a company that ate a once-in-a-decade self-inflicted wound and kept compounding. The "trust crisis" narrative the Market Forces model leans on is not visible in the revenue print.
That said, valuation is doing extraordinary work. At $206B market cap on $4.81B trailing revenue, we're at ~43x sales and ~157x trailing FCF. To justify $202 with even a generous 3% terminal FCF yield, CRWD needs to reach ~$7B annual FCF — roughly 5x today's level. At 25% revenue CAGR that's ~$15B revenue by FY31 at ~45% FCF margins (higher than any scaled security peer). Achievable, but the Thesis Evaluation's -7 net score is directionally right: the bull and bear mass are both large because binary outcomes dominate. The synthesis verdict of "high conviction required" is a hedge, not a call — I'd push harder toward overvalued given that even the base case requires PANW-plus margins and no share loss to Microsoft E5 bundling, which is the single most-cited bear factor and the one that historically kills specialized security vendors (McAfee, Symantec, Trend).
Where I disagree with the model stack: the pre-flight and narrative layers call this "narrative_platform" / "unanchored" with 70-80% story. That's wrong on the fundamentals split. $1.31B in real FCF and 25% CAGR are not story — they are anchor. The correct framing is that ~$80-100 of the $202 price is fundamentally supportable (call it 25-30x FCF on current $1.31B, generous for the growth), and the remaining $100-120 is the platform-monopoly premium. That premium is what's at risk, not the whole equity. The insider selling is small (all sales under 3,500 shares, no obvious cluster) and doesn't move the needle — the "neutral" tag is right. The "lagging sector peers" signal deserves more weight than the models give it: if CRWD is underperforming security peers while the fundamentals look this clean, the market is quietly re-rating the multiple down, which is exactly what should happen.
Contrarian counter to my own overvalued lean: FCF is inflecting hard ($1.31B FCF vs -$162M GAAP net income means stock-based comp and deferred revenue are doing heavy lifting, but the cash is real), net retention remains the industry's best per management commentary, and the Falcon platform's module attach rate is the one genuinely differentiated data point competitors can't replicate quickly. If module expansion drives NRR back above 120% next year, revenue re-accelerates to 25%+ and the multiple holds. My verdict: I partially dissent from the synthesis's non-committal stance and lean overvalued — fair value closer to $140-160 (30-35x FCF on $1.5B forward FCF), which still respects the platform premium but demands margin for the Microsoft-bundling risk and the fact that we're paying today for FY29 execution. Not a short — the momentum and cash generation are too strong — but not a buy at $202 either. Wait for either a $150-handle re-rating or evidence NRR is expanding, not compressing.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not that CrowdStrike is a bad business; it is that the stock price is still treating it like a much faster and cleaner business than the current numbers show. Revenue remains excellent in absolute terms, rising from $3.06B in FY2024 to $3.95B in FY2025 and $4.81B in FY2026, but the growth rate is clearly stepping down: about 29% in FY2025 and 22% in FY2026, with the latest quarter at $1.39B up 21.7% YoY. For a company worth $206B, that deceleration matters. At roughly 10.5x trailing sales and 9.7x EV/revenue, this is no longer being priced as a merely good security software company; it is still carrying a platform-premium multiple despite growth having moved into the low-20s. That can work if margins inflect sharply upward. But on GAAP they have not yet done so: FY2026 operating income was -$293M, worse than the -$116M in FY2025 despite nearly $900M of additional revenue. Net income for FY2026 was -$163M. The quarterly net margin trend is improving, from -9.4% in April 2025 to +4.1% in January 2026 and +2.0% in April 2026, but that is still a very thin earnings base relative to the valuation.
The real quality in the story is cash generation. Gross margin at 74.7% is strong, operating cash flow was $1.61B, and free cash flow was $1.31B in FY2026, about a 27% FCF margin on $4.81B of revenue. The balance sheet is also plainly not the issue: $5.23B of cash against $745M of debt gives them ample strategic flexibility. Those are the numbers that make the bull case credible. But even if I capitalize the cash and give full credit for the FCF, you are still paying roughly 157x trailing free cash flow at the enterprise level. That is too rich for a company whose reported revenue growth has already slowed from hypergrowth to “excellent large-cap SaaS” and whose GAAP operating leverage has not yet shown up consistently. The contradiction I care about most is this: the business is generating elite cash, yet the income statement is still messy enough that investors are effectively underwriting a future margin structure that the raw annual P&L does not currently evidence.
The strongest pushback to my view is that cybersecurity leaders often look expensive all the way up, and CrowdStrike has several markers of a category winner. Quarterly revenue has been remarkably linear, climbing from $963.9M to $1.01B to $1.06B to $1.10B to $1.17B to $1.23B to $1.31B to $1.39B with no real wobble. That consistency matters in a sector where spending is mission-critical and vendor consolidation can create durable share gains. The quarterly profitability trend is also undeniably getting better: losses of -$104M and -$78M in mid-2025 became profits of $53M and $28M in the last two quarters listed. If you believe GAAP operating losses are mostly an artifact of stock comp and that free cash flow is the right lens, then 27% FCF margins plus 20%+ growth can justify a premium. And with $5.23B of cash, even a couple of soft quarters would not threaten the business model. A smart bull would say this is exactly the kind of compounding platform investors chronically sell too early.
I weigh those positives differently because the current price already assumes they win most of those arguments. At $206B market cap, the market is not asking whether CrowdStrike is high quality; it is assuming the company can retain category leadership, keep growth above 20% for years, and ultimately translate a 74%-plus gross margin into much higher GAAP operating margins than today. That may happen, but the burden of proof is now high. If FY2026 had shown, say, $300M-$500M of GAAP operating profit on $4.81B of revenue, I would be more open to paying near-10x sales. Instead, operating loss worsened. The insider sales shown are small and not decisive, but they do nothing to offset the sense that the stock remains institutionally loved despite a less than pristine fundamental profile. My base case is that this is a great company priced like an inevitable one, and those are not the same thing.
What would change my mind is evidence that the valuation can be met by fundamentals rather than narrative. Specifically, I would want to see revenue reaccelerate back above 25% YoY while sustaining quarterly net profitability, or at minimum a clear GAAP operating margin inflection toward high single digits on the current revenue base. If the next few quarters move from roughly 2%-4% net margin into something like 8%-10% with revenue still compounding above 20%, the stock can earn its premium. Conversely, if growth slips into the mid-teens while GAAP profitability remains inconsistent, I would get more bearish because the multiple has much farther to fall than the business does.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a high-quality franchise being asked to carry an impossible multiple. CrowdStrike just printed $4.81B in trailing revenue with a 74.7% gross margin and $1.31B of free cash flow—a 27% FCF margin that most software peers would envy—while the balance sheet sits on $5.23B cash against only $745M of debt. Sequential quarters show the top line marching from $1.06B to $1.10B to $1.17B to $1.23B to $1.31B to $1.39B, and the last two quarters finally flipped net income positive at $53M and $28M. That is real operating leverage beginning to surface. But the market capitalization is $206B, which is roughly 43× trailing sales and roughly 157× trailing FCF. Recent revenue growth has decelerated to 21.7% year-over-year; the multi-year CAGR of 25.5% is already in the rear-view mirror. At 22% growth and still-negative operating margins (−6.1% annually), a 43× sales multiple prices in multi-year re-acceleration, flawless module expansion into identity and cloud, and eventual 25%+ operating margins with almost no competitive leakage. The data do not yet support that path.
The July 2024 outage is not a footnote; it is the central risk the valuation refuses to discount. Annual operating income went from nearly breakeven (−$2M in FY2024) to −$116M then −$293M even as revenue scaled, consistent with heavy remediation, customer credits, and reinvestment after the trust shock. Net retention and land-and-expand remain the bull case’s oxygen, yet the secondary signals already flag decelerating quarterly revenue trend and lagging sector peers. Insider activity is a steady drip of small sales with zero open-market buys. When 70–80% of the price is narrative—platform monopoly, vendor consolidation, “security layer of the internet”—and that narrative is still repairing itself, the asymmetry is ugly. A single quarter of net-retention compression or Microsoft bundling bite would re-rate this toward 20–25× sales and erase tens of billions of market value.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and deserves weight: free-cash-flow generation of $1.31B while still investing heavily proves the unit economics work, the Falcon architecture continues to win technical bake-offs, and platform consolidation is an observable enterprise budget trend rather than a slide-deck fantasy. Gross margin holding near 75% at scale, current ratio of 1.77, and debt-to-equity of 0.17 give management years of runway to restore trust and expand modules. If net dollar retention stays elevated and the outage becomes a case study in resilience rather than fragility, the path to $10B+ revenue with mid-20s operating margins is plausible and would eventually justify a premium multiple. I weigh this less heavily because the current 43× sales already capitalizes that entire optimistic trajectory; there is no margin of safety left for the competitive and execution risks that remain binary.
What flips the verdict is concrete: two consecutive quarters of revenue growth re-accelerating above 28% with operating margin turning sustainably positive above 5%, or clear evidence that net retention is expanding rather than merely holding, paired with a multiple compression toward 25–30× forward sales. Absent that, the stock is priced for perfection the fundamentals have not yet earned.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
CrowdStrike is a high-quality growth franchise: revenue compounded from $1.45B (FY22) to $4.81B (FY26), gross margin holds in a 73-75% band, and FCF has scaled every year to $1.31B on $4.81B revenue (27% FCF margin). The balance sheet is a fortress with $5.23B liquid cash, $4.48B net cash, Altman Z of 19.24, and accruals of -18.6% of assets with OCF/NI heavily positive - earnings quality checks are clean and Beneish M at -2.98 shows no manipulation flags. The business is self-funding and durable, with recurring subscription economics implied by the FCF-to-GAAP gap being driven by deferred revenue and SBC rather than aggressive accruals. The blemish is real: SBC ran 22.8% of revenue and diluted shares grew from 227.1M to 250.6M (about 2.5%/yr) with zero buyback offset - so a meaningful slice of that $1.31B FCF is effectively compensation. GAAP operating margin has actually regressed from -0.1% in FY24 to -6.1% in FY26 and net income swung back to -$162.5M, suggesting the July 2024 outage aftermath, customer commitment packages, and hiring have pressured true profitability even as cash collections stayed strong. Insider tape shows CEO Kurtz selling steadily (100 sells, $21.5M, no buys) - not alarming for a founder-CEO on a plan, but no conviction signal either.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Post-July-2024 outage: customer retention, gross retention rate, and any lingering commitment-package revenue drag or legal reserves in the 10-K
- Segment/module ARR mix and net revenue retention trajectory to confirm platform attach is intact
- Whether CEO sales are under a 10b5-1 plan and the size relative to total holdings
- True GAAP operating cost trajectory ex-SBC to test whether the margin regression is transitory (outage-related) or structural
- Any convertible notes or off-balance-sheet obligations not visible in the net-cash figure
CRWD trades at $202.54 with a $206B market cap on roughly 43x sales for a business growing ARR around 20%. Even for an elite security platform, that multiple bakes in years of flawless execution: sustained 20%+ ARR growth, meaningful platform attach, and eventual GAAP profitability. The e2e read explicitly frames the price as demanding 'uncontested endpoint plus identity dominance' - which is a bull case, not a base case, given Microsoft, Palo Alto, and SentinelOne all competing credibly. A reasonable deserved multiple for a 20% grower with strong FCF but 25% of revenue paid in SBC and deteriorating GAAP margins is closer to 20-25x sales, implying a deserved price roughly 45-55% below spot. Quality is real (score 18) and lifts the deserved multiple above software peers, but not to 43x. The SBC drag and unchecked dilution warrant a haircut, not a premium, to whatever multiple you assign. Bottom line: this is a great business at a full-to-stretched price. The gap runs the wrong way for buyers here - you are paying today for outcomes that must materialize over the next 3-5 years, with competition and macro cyber-spend both as live risks.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Net new ARR trajectory next 2-3 quarters - is 20% growth holding or decelerating further
- Share count and SBC as percent of revenue - is dilution being addressed
- Module attach rates and identity/cloud segment growth versus core EDR
- Any commentary on Microsoft Defender competitive displacement in renewals
The tape is modestly risk-on (regime +34, VIX ~16, S&P near highs) and today's rotation is explicitly OUT of semis and INTO enterprise software - exactly the bucket CRWD lives in. The Amplify Cybersecurity ETF broke out as the group 'shrugged off AI fears,' which lifts the whole cohort and CRWD as its bellwether. Beta 1.23 amplifies this modest tailwind. The narrative is doing real work here: platform-monopoly archetype, strong intensity, and two same-day company-driven headlines (Fal.Con 2026 sold out at record pace; 2026 Threat Hunting Report positioning AI adversaries as the new spend driver) that hand the bulls a clean 'AI makes cyber non-discretionary' story. That is exactly the kind of self-reinforcing narrative that presses a story-stock higher regardless of the 50%+ implied growth already baked in. Offsets are real but secondary: 10y at 4.75% and market PE ~26.9 are a background drag on any premium-multiple name priced 70-80% on story, and a competing article flagging a cheaper cyber peer up 40% YTD hints at rotation-within-sector risk. Net: pressure leans up, not decisively.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Palantir print tonight - a strong software tape carries CRWD; a miss reverses today's rotation
- Whether the cyber ETF breakout holds or was a one-day rotation trade
- Analyst target revisions into Fal.Con and next earnings - upgrades would confirm the tailwind
- Any Microsoft Defender or Palo Alto customer-win headline that could crack the platform-monopoly narrative
- 10y yield behavior - a break above 5% would compress premium-multiple software regardless of story
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 4, 2026, CRWD was $202.54. We expect it to be $185.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $135.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.