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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for CSX Corporation (CSX) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -40 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 2 · Value -74 · Sentiment -27 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $22.50 vs $50.27 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
CSX Corporation
CSX NASDAQCSX Corporation is an American transportation company that provides rail-based freight services across the eastern United States and parts of Canada. The company operates through core rail and associated logistics activities, moving a broad mix of commodities, including coal, chemicals, agricultural products, automotive cargo, and various industrial and consumer goods. CSX Corporation also offers intermodal transportation, integrating rail with trucking to handle containers and trailers, as well as rail-to-truck transfers and bulk commodity operations that support complex supply chains for industrial customers. Through brands such as CSX Transportation, CSX Intermodal Terminals, and Transflo Terminal Services, the company serves manufacturers, energy producers, agribusinesses, and distribution centers, helping facilitate domestic trade and international import-export flows. Founded in 1980 and headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, CSX Corporation today plays a significant role in North American freight logistics, providing high-capacity, land-based transport infrastructure that supports regional and national economic activity.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.54
Total Equity: $13.16B
Shares: 1,873,000,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $670.00M
EBITDA: $6.20B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $670.00M
Revenue: $14.09B
Revenue: $14.09B
Revenue: $14.09B
Total Equity: $13.16B
Tax Rate: 23.3%
Equity: $13.16B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $670.00M
Current Liabilities: $3.13B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $13.16B
Shares: 1,873,000,000
Shares: 1,873,000,000
CapEx: -$2.90B
Shares: 1,873,000,000
Stock Price: $50.27
Net Income: $2.89B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 9, 2026 11:39pm (13d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $12.5B | $14.9B | $14.7B | $14.5B | $14.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $5.6B | $6.0B | $5.6B | $5.2B | $4.5B |
| Net Income | $3.8B | $4.2B | $3.7B | $3.5B | $2.9B |
| EBITDA | $7.0B | $7.5B | $7.2B | $6.9B | $6.2B |
| EPS | $1.68 | $1.95 | $1.85 | $1.79 | $1.54 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.68 | $1.95 | $1.85 | $1.79 | $1.54 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:39am (17d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.4B | $1.4B | — | $933.0M | $670.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $3.3B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $2.8B | $2.6B |
| Total Assets | $41.6B | $42.4B | $42.5B | $42.8B | $43.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.0B | $3.3B | $3.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $29.8B | $30.3B | $30.0B | $30.3B | $30.5B |
| Total Equity | $11.8B | $12.1B | $12.4B | $12.5B | $13.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $9.5B | $9.8B | $10.0B | $10.0B | $10.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 9, 2026 11:39pm (13d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $5.1B | $5.6B | $5.5B | $5.2B | $4.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.8B | -$2.1B | -$2.3B | -$2.5B | -$2.9B |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.3B | $2.7B | $1.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$541.0M | -$227.0M | -$31.0M | -$70.0M | -$16.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$426.0M | $1.8B | $447.0M | -$8.0M | $287.0M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.9B | -$4.7B | -$3.5B | -$2.2B | -$1.4B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$890.0M | -$281.0M | -$605.0M | -$420.0M | -$263.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 9, 2026 11:39pm (13d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +18.6% | -1.3% | -0.8% | -3.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +7.7% | -7.7% | -5.7% | -13.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +10.2% | -10.8% | -6.6% | -16.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +7.3% | -4.7% | -3.8% | -10.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:39am (17d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-31 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-29 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-27 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-28 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-29 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-30 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-28 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-29 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-30 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-31 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-28 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-29 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-30 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-30 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-27 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-29 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-30 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-27 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-25 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-29 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:46Even the bull case prices 59% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 79%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($50.27) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +5% | 31.5% | $20.77 | -59% |
| Base — stabilizes | +3% | 27.4% | $17.45 | -65% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 23.3% | $14.42 | -71% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -1% | 18.0% | $10.75 | -79% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly tape tells a more interesting story than the "distressed turnaround" framing suggests. Q2 2026 revenue of $3.94B is the highest print in the dataset, up 10.4% YoY from $3.57B, and net income of $1.00B at a 25.5% margin is the strongest quarter shown — a genuine acceleration from the Q1 2026 trough ($3.48B rev, 23.2% margin) and materially above Q3 2025's ugly 19.3% margin. The annual figures the synthesis models are anchoring on (2025 rev $14.09B, NI $2.89B, down from $3.72B in 2023) are backward-looking and capture the operational nadir. If you annualize the last two quarters you get roughly $14.8B revenue and $3.6B net income — back to 2023 levels. That materially changes the P/E arithmetic: on run-rate earnings CSX trades closer to ~26x, not 32.6x, still not cheap for a railroad but not the caricature the DCF models are attacking.
The synthesis verdict of $19-20 fair value is, frankly, not credible. That implies ~7x earnings on a Class I railroad with 32% operating margins, 27.8% ROIC, and irreplaceable Eastern US network assets — a multiple you'd apply to a secularly declining commodity producer, not to a duopoly infrastructure asset. The bear thesis engine is double-counting: it uses trailing depressed FCF ($1.71B in 2025, down from >$3B historically) to compute a growth rate (-27.6% FCF CAGR) and then extrapolates that forward, when the entire investment case rests on FCF normalizing as the operational disruptions (hurricane rebuild capex, service issues) roll off. The $2.90B capex in 2025 is elevated versus historical ~$2.3B; normalize that and FCF is closer to $2.3B, not $1.7B. The market's 32x multiple isn't pricing in "42% FCF growth" — it's pricing in a return to $3B+ FCF over 2-3 years, which is a much less heroic assumption.
That said, the contrarian case against my contrarianism: one strong quarter doesn't make a trend, and CSX has printed head-fakes before. The insider tape is not encouraging — the "net insider buying" tag looks wrong; I count ~190k shares sold against essentially zero open-market buys, with awards and option-exercise-and-sell being the dominant pattern. That's normal comp behavior but it isn't a bullish signal. Debt is listed as zero which is clearly a data error (CSX carries ~$18B in long-term debt); the 0.81 current ratio and 7.15 P/B are real and reflect a leveraged capital structure that amplifies both upside and downside. Coal secular decline and truck modal competition are real bear points, and the 5-year revenue trajectory ($14.85B → $14.09B) shows no organic growth engine — this is a margin-and-buyback story, not a compounder.
I dissent from the synthesis's $19 fair value but only partially from the "overvalued" direction. Applying a defensible 22-24x multiple (in-line with UNP and rail peers, discounted for CSX's slightly weaker franchise) to normalized $3.3-3.5B earnings gets you to roughly $38-45/share fair value, versus $50.27 today. That's a 10-25% overvaluation, not 62%. The narrative-economics framing is right that a premium is embedded, but the premium is 15-20%, not 160%. The Q2 acceleration is the single most important data point in this file and the models are underweighting it because their inputs are annual. If Q3 2026 confirms >$3.8B revenue and >23% margins, the re-rating case strengthens materially; if it reverts to Q1's 23.2% margin on flat revenue, the bears win. Wait for the print — starter position only below $45, full weight below $40, trim above $55.
GPT Reading
At $50.27, CSX is being valued like a growth-plus-quality compounder while the underlying record is a shrinking, cyclical railroad that has only recently shown a partial earnings rebound. The annual numbers are the core problem: revenue fell from $14.85B in 2022 to $14.09B in 2025, operating income from $6.02B to $4.52B, and net income from $4.17B to $2.89B. That is not a temporary cosmetic wobble; it is three years of compression in both volume/revenue and profitability. The quarterly trend is better in 2026, but the improvement is from depressed levels. First-half 2026 revenue of $7.42B is up about 7% versus first-half 2025 at $6.99B, and net income of $1.81B is up roughly 23% versus $1.48B. Good, yes—but even that recovery pace does not justify 32.6x earnings, 14.9x EV/EBITDA, and 6.7x sales for a mature rail franchise with low-single-digit long-run top-line potential.
What stands out most is the mismatch between quality and valuation. This is undeniably a good business in the abstract: 2025 operating margin was still 32.1%, net margin 20.5%, ROIC 27.8%, and ROE 22.0%. Those are elite industrial returns, reflecting the structural advantages of a rail network. But the market is paying a premium multiple for those returns precisely when free cash flow is weak relative to enterprise value. 2025 operating cash flow was $4.61B, but after $2.90B of capex, free cash flow was only $1.71B. Against a $93.1B market cap, that is an FCF yield of about 1.8%. For a capital-intensive railroad with declining 2022-2025 earnings, that is simply too rich. Even if I annualize the stronger first-half 2026 earnings run-rate to something like $3.6B, the stock is still around 26x forward earnings—hardly cheap for a business that has not yet proven it can sustainably return to its prior $4B+ earnings base.
The recent quarter does tell a more constructive operational story than the annual history alone. Q2 2026 revenue of $3.94B was up about 10% from $3.57B a year earlier, while net income rose from $829M to $1.00B and net margin expanded from 23.2% to 25.5%. Sequentially, revenue moved from $3.48B in Q1 to $3.94B in Q2 and margin from 23.2% to 25.5%, which suggests the business is regaining pricing and/or network efficiency. That is why I do not buy the most extreme bear take that fair value is somewhere near $20; that would imply a far more impaired franchise than the numbers show. CSX is not broken. It remains a scarce asset with durable economics. But scarcity alone does not make any price sensible, and at the current valuation the market appears to be capitalizing a recovery as though it is both durable and near-complete.
The best argument against my view is that railroads often deserve to screen “expensive” at the wrong moment because earnings troughs understate normalized power. A bull will point to the clear 2026 rebound, strong incremental margins in the latest quarter, high returns on capital, and the fact that replacement value of the network is effectively impossible to replicate. They will also argue that a 1.1% dividend yield understates total capital return because these businesses can convert earnings to cash once capex normalizes, and that 2025 free cash flow was depressed by $2.90B of capex that may not persist. I take that seriously. If 2026-2027 can sustain something like $15B+ revenue and push net income back toward $3.8B-$4.0B with better cash conversion, today’s multiple would look less absurd. My pushback is that investors are already paying for that normalization before it is in hand, and the 2022-to-2025 trend shows how vulnerable “normalized” rail earnings are to mix, volume, and operating slippage.
What would change my mind is straightforward: if CSX can post another two to three quarters showing revenue holding above roughly $3.8B per quarter, net margins staying in the 24%-25% range, and full-year free cash flow recovering toward at least $2.8B-$3.2B, then the case for a structurally higher earnings base strengthens materially. I would also want to see annual operating income clearly inflecting back above $5.0B, because that would show 2025 was a trough rather than a new lower plateau. Absent that, I think this is a premium-priced infrastructure asset whose business quality is real but whose stock already discounts most of the good news.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a clear story of a mature railroad whose earnings power has been eroding for four straight years while the market refuses to mark it down. Revenue slipped from $14.85B in 2022 to $14.09B in 2025; operating income fell from $6.02B to $4.52B; net income compressed from $4.17B to $2.89B. Free cash flow of $1.71B against a $93B market cap produces a 1.8% FCF yield—unacceptable for a capital-intensive industrial with a -2% revenue CAGR and -11.8% earnings CAGR. The 32.6x P/E and 14.9x EV/EBITDA sit well above historical Class I norms in the low-to-mid 20s and low teens, respectively. Recent quarters show a bounce—Q2 2026 revenue of $3.94B and a 25.5% net margin are the best prints in the dataset—but two strong quarters do not reverse a multi-year downtrend in volumes, pricing power, or cash conversion when capex remains elevated at $2.9B.
What stands out most is the disconnect between improving sequential margins and collapsing absolute free cash flow. Operating cash flow of $4.61B looks healthy until the $2.90B capex bill leaves only $1.71B of FCF, down sharply on a multi-year basis (FCF CAGR -27.6%). ROE of 22% and ROIC of 28% remain respectable and confirm the franchise still generates economic profit, yet the balance sheet shows only $670M cash against an equity base of $13.16B and a current ratio of 0.81, leaving little buffer. Insider activity is mixed—option exercises followed by sales of 13k, 30k, and 136k shares—offering no strong vote of confidence at these levels. The market is paying infrastructure-utility multiples for what is still a cyclical bulk-and-intermodal hauler exposed to coal decline and truck competition.
The strongest case against an overvalued read is the recent operating inflection and the structural moat. Q1 and Q2 2026 delivered sequential revenue acceleration and net margins back above 23%, suggesting PSR discipline and intermodal recovery may finally be biting. A 32% operating margin franchise that cannot be replicated, combined with reshoring and nearshoring optionality, could justify a re-rating if FCF recovers toward the $3B+ levels of earlier years. Bulls will correctly note that rails trade on operating ratio trajectory more than trailing earnings, and that the 7.2x P/B premium has been durable for high-quality Class I names. I weigh this less heavily because the multi-year evidence shows margin compression and FCF decay, not sustained improvement; one or two quarters of relief do not validate a 42% implied FCF growth rate embedded in the current price, nor do they erase coal and modal-shift headwinds.
I would flip to neutral or constructive if trailing-twelve-month FCF reclaims $2.8B+ with operating margins holding above 33%, or if 2026 full-year revenue stabilizes above $14.5B with volume growth turning positive for two consecutive quarters. A sustained sub-14x EV/EBITDA on improving cash flow would also force a reassessment.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
CSX is a mature Class I railroad throwing off real cash — $1.71B FCF in 2025 on $14.09B revenue, with OCF/NI of 1.46x and accruals of -3.8% of assets, consistent with clean earnings. The franchise is inherently durable (regulated duopolistic Eastern U.S. rail network) and management is disciplined on the capital structure: diluted shares shrank at a -4.5% CAGR (2.26B in 2021 to 1.87B in 2025), meaningfully concentrating per-share value. However, the operating trajectory is unambiguously negative. Operating margin has fallen every single year, from 44.7% in 2021 to 32.1% in 2025 — a 1,260 bp compression. Revenue peaked in 2022 at $14.85B and has drifted down to $14.09B. Net income has slid from $4.17B (2022) to $2.89B (2025), and FCF has nearly halved from $3.49B to $1.71B in three years. That is not a stable mature earner; that is a business quietly losing operating leverage. Balance sheet: liquid cash is only $675M against a $93B market cap and this is a heavily leveraged railroad, but Altman Z of 2.82 (grey) and consistent positive FCF plus investment-grade rail economics make solvency a non-issue. Insider tape is mixed-to-negative in dollars (about $16.6M sells vs $1.0M buy from Director Angel), but the open-market purchase is a genuine signal, and most sells follow option exercises — routine.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Root cause of the 1,260 bp operating margin decline — labor costs, fuel, service disruptions, or coal/intermodal mix shift?
- Capex trajectory and whether 2025 FCF weakness reflects a step-up in network investment vs a permanent earnings reset
- Debt maturity schedule and interest coverage given only $675M liquid cash
- Volume trends by commodity segment (coal decline vs intermodal/merchandise) in the 10-K
- Whether the 2024/2025 revenue decline reflects the Baltimore bridge disruption or structural demand loss
- Pension/OPEB obligations and any off-balance-sheet leverage typical of rails
The e2e work triangulates a composite fair value of $20.05 and a signal-adjusted $19.17, with DCF at $13.65, EPV floor $19.03, and anchored-PE $33.87. Even taking the most generous of those (anchored-PE $33.87) the price of $50.27 sits ~48% above it; against the composite the implied downside is ~60%. I discount the DCF somewhat (rail DCFs are terminal-value sensitive and can run low), but three independent methods clustering in the high-teens to low-thirties while the stock trades at $50 is a strong signal the tape is pricing in a margin/FCF recovery that the recent trajectory does not support.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Operating ratio trajectory and whether recent service disruptions are one-off or structural
- FCF conversion vs capex guidance for next 2 years
- Volume/pricing mix commentary in latest transcript to test the margin-recovery thesis
- Any buyback pace change signaling management's own valuation view
The macro tape is mildly supportive: VIX at 14.9, S&P near highs, and a building risk-on regime typically lift cyclicals with beta above 1, and CSX at 1.21 beta should catch some of that bid. Rails are a classic risk-on cyclical proxy, so a calm tape and firm equity backdrop is a modest tailwind here. But higher rates (10y 4.69%) and a stretched market PE cap the upside for capital-intensive, rate-sensitive infrastructure names like rails. The narrative is where the pressure gets murky. CSX carries a fallen-angel framing with strong intensity but only moderate durability - the market is still paying up for an operational-discipline and 'strategic infrastructure' story, yet momentum has rolled over (-2% CAGR, weakening cash generation, 3y trend negative). That combination - a story running well ahead of the tape's actual price action - is the classic setup for narrative fatigue, and it presses down on sentiment even as the macro backdrop is friendly. Analyst tone and news flow are not showing a clear catalyst either way, so the net read is a wash: macro tailwind roughly offset by a tiring narrative and negative price momentum.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether analyst target revisions turn negative on next earnings - would confirm narrative crack
- Volume-weighted sector rotation into or out of rails and industrials
- Any operational miss or service disruption that punctures the margin-discipline story
- Bond yields breaking higher, which would compress rail multiples further
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 10, 2026, CSX was $50.27. We expect it to be $45.40 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $38.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 10, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.