For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for DoorDash, Inc. (DASH) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -16 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 54 · Value -74 · Sentiment 50 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $89.96 vs $216.26 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
DoorDash, Inc.
DASH NASDAQDoorDash, Inc. is a technology company that operates a logistics and local commerce platform focused on on-demand delivery and pickup services. Through its consumer app and web platform, DoorDash connects customers with restaurants, grocery stores, convenience retailers, and specialty shops for food, household goods, and other everyday items. The company enables merchants to build an online presence, manage menus and assortments, and access delivery and pickup fulfillment, helping local businesses reach a broader customer base. DoorDash also supports non-restaurant categories, including grocery, retail, and pet supplies, expanding its role in last-mile delivery across urban and suburban markets. Its marketplace is powered by independent delivery partners who fulfill orders placed through the platform. Founded in 2013 and headquartered in San Francisco, California, DoorDash today plays a significant role in the internet retail and on-demand delivery sector, serving consumers, merchants, and delivery partners across multiple regions in North America, Europe, and Asia.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.13
Total Equity: $10.05B
Shares: 439,686,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $4.38B
EBITDA: $1.47B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $4.38B
Revenue: $13.72B
Revenue: $13.72B
Revenue: $13.72B
Total Equity: $10.05B
Tax Rate: 0.7%
Equity: $10.05B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $4.38B
Current Liabilities: $6.15B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $10.05B
Shares: 439,686,000
Shares: 439,686,000
CapEx: -$257.00M
Shares: 439,686,000
Stock Price: $216.26
Net Income: $935.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 11:42pm (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $4.9B | $6.6B | $8.6B | $10.7B | $13.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.3B | $3.6B | $4.6B | $5.5B | $6.7B |
| Gross Profit | $2.6B | $3.0B | $4.0B | $5.2B | $7.0B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.0B | $4.1B | $4.6B | $5.2B | $6.3B |
| Operating Income | -$452.0M | -$1.1B | -$579.0M | -$38.0M | $723.0M |
| Net Income | -$468.0M | -$1.4B | -$558.0M | $123.0M | $935.0M |
| EBITDA | -$296.0M | -$755.0M | -$70.0M | $523.0M | $1.5B |
| EPS | $-1.39 | $-3.68 | $-1.42 | $0.30 | $2.19 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-1.39 | $-3.68 | $-1.42 | $0.29 | $2.13 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 11:42pm (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.5B | $2.0B | $2.7B | $4.0B | $4.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $4.6B | $4.7B | $5.6B | $7.4B | $8.6B |
| Total Assets | $6.8B | $9.8B | $10.8B | $12.8B | $19.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.8B | $2.5B | $3.4B | $4.4B | $6.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $2.1B | $3.0B | $4.0B | $5.0B | $9.6B |
| Total Equity | $4.7B | $6.8B | $6.8B | $7.8B | $10.0B |
| Retained Earnings | -$2.1B | -$3.8B | -$5.2B | -$5.3B | -$4.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 11:42pm (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $692.0M | $367.0M | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.4B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$129.0M | -$176.0M | -$123.0M | -$104.0M | -$257.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $563.0M | $191.0M | $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $71.0M | $0 | $0 | -$4.2B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | $0 | $0 | $2.7B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$400.0M | -$750.0M | -$224.0M | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.8B | -$318.0M | $584.0M | $1.4B | $460.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 11:42pm (16d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +34.7% | +31.2% | +24.2% | +27.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +17.5% | +35.1% | +28.0% | +34.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | -148.7% | +48.5% | +93.4% | +2,002.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -191.7% | +59.1% | +122.0% | +660.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | -155.1% | +90.7% | +847.1% | +181.1% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-23 02:42Even the bull case prices 61% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 90%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($216.26) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +56% | 9.2% | $84.16 | -61% |
| Base — stabilizes | +37% | 8.0% | $46.26 | -79% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +19% | 6.8% | $23.99 | -89% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +33% | 3.9% | $21.89 | -90% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw trajectory first: revenue went $2.71B → $2.87B → $3.03B → $3.28B → $3.45B → $3.96B → $4.04B → $4.45B across the last eight quarters — that's genuine 28% YoY growth with a clean sequential print. But the margin story is the opposite direction and nobody upstream emphasized it enough. Net margin ran 6.0% → 4.9% → 6.4% → 8.7% → 7.1% → 5.4% → 4.6% → 4.5%. Peak profitability was Q2 2025 ($285M NI on $3.28B); the most recent quarter shows $200M NI on $4.45B — absolute earnings are down 30% from peak while revenue is up 36%. That is not "crossed the profitability inflection." That is margin compression during a growth push, likely Wolt integration and grocery/new-vertical drag. The pre-flight narrative of "consistent scale economics" is contradicted by the actual sequential margin path.
On valuation: TTM revenue annualizes to roughly $16.9B and TTM net income to about $800M (declining). At $94B market cap that's 5.6x sales and ~118x trailing earnings on a decelerating margin profile. FCF of $2.17B against $94B is a 2.3% yield — you're paying a growth multiple for a business whose incremental margins just turned negative. The synthesis's $85 fair value implies roughly 20x FCF and ~4x sales, which is defensible for a platform growing 25%+ but harsh if you believe Wolt/grocery eventually work. I think $85 is too punitive and $216 is too generous; a $120-140 range (25-30x FCF, ~6x forward sales on $19-20B) is where I'd triangulate. So I partially dissent from the synthesis magnitude while agreeing on direction.
The contrarian case the models undersell: DASH is one of the very few consumer-internet platforms that actually converted GMV growth into free cash flow, and $2.43B operating cash on zero debt with $4.4B cash is a genuinely strong position. If the recent margin compression is Wolt-integration and category-mix (grocery has structurally lower take-rates but higher frequency), then 2026 exit margins could snap back — the bull case isn't crazy. The market-forces model's "5.35x accrual ratio" and "existential regulatory risk" framing feels overwrought; gig-worker reclassification has been litigated for five years and DASH has adapted. The insider selling is small in absolute share count (sub-5k lots) and looks like routine 10b5-1 option-exercise-and-sell, not a signal. Calling this "extreme insider selling" is wrong — I'd flag that model as overcalibrated to bearishness.
Where the models contradict each other usefully: pre-flight says "crossed the profitability inflection," synthesis says "vulnerable to disappointment," and market-forces says "profitability appears fragile and accounting-driven." The quarterly data sides with the latter two — margins are compressing right now, not expanding. Revenue confidence flagged "decelerating" quarterly trend which is directionally right on the margin side but wrong on revenue (Q2 2026 accelerated sequentially to $4.45B from $4.04B, +10% QoQ, which is not deceleration). The data thinness worth flagging: no debt line reported, insider identities masked as "?", and the 2026-dated quarters imply we're deep into the fiscal year with limited forward guidance visibility from this file alone. ROE of 9.3% and ROIC of 12.7% are mediocre for a "platform monopoly" — Visa/Mastercard run 30%+ ROIC. That tells you the "Amazon of logistics" framing is aspirational, not descriptive.
Net verdict: I agree with the synthesis direction (overvalued) but dissent on severity. The $85 fair value assumes terminal margins stay near current 5% and growth normalizes to 10-12% — that's too bearish given the 28% YoY revenue print and $2.17B FCF base. But paying $216 requires believing net margin expands to 12-15% (pre-flight's stated bull case) while revenue keeps compounding at 20%+, and the most recent four quarters show margins going the wrong way. Fair value is $120-140; current price bakes in flawless execution on Wolt, grocery accretion, and multiple compression resistance simultaneously. I'd want to see one quarter of margin re-expansion before committing capital. Not a short — the FCF and balance sheet are too strong and the narrative durability is real — but not a buy at 118x trailing earnings while earnings are declining sequentially.
GPT Reading
DoorDash’s numbers show a real business, not a concept stock: revenue has scaled from $4.89B in 2021 to $13.72B in 2025, a roughly 29% annualized climb, while operating income swung from -$452M to +$723M and free cash flow reached $2.17B. The latest two quarters keep that growth engine running, with revenue up from $3.28B to $4.45B year over year in the June quarter, about 36%, and net income rising from $285M to $200M only looks worse until you notice the comparison issue: margins have compressed from an unusually strong 8.7% last year to 4.5% now, but the business is still profitable in each of the last eight quarters. What stands out to me is that this is no longer a “can they make money?” debate. They can. Gross margin has held around 51% in 2025, capex is light at $257M, and with $4.38B of cash and no debt burden shown, the balance sheet is excellent. This is a high-quality platform in financial terms.
But the stock is priced for something materially better than what the current earnings profile supports. At $94.2B market cap, investors are paying about 6.9x 2025 sales, roughly 43x trailing free cash flow, 101x earnings, and 61x EV/EBITDA for a company whose 2025 net margin was 6.8% and operating margin 5.3%. That multiple set only makes sense if margins are on a clear glide path much higher while growth remains elevated. The raw quarterly data actually cuts the other way on margins: net margin peaked at 8.7% in 2025-06, then stepped down to 7.1%, 5.4%, 4.6%, and 4.5% over the next four quarters even as revenue kept climbing. That says DoorDash is choosing growth, adjacency expansion, or competitive reinvestment over near-term profit harvesting. Fine operationally, but dangerous for valuation when the market is capitalizing the company like a future dominant logistics utility. If I annualize the first half of 2026, revenue is running around $16.98B and net income around $384M, implying only ~2.3% net margin year-to-date versus 6.8% for full-year 2025. Even allowing for seasonality and investment timing, the earnings power embedded in the current price looks stretched.
The bull case against my skepticism is straightforward and serious. A smart long would say the market is correctly looking through temporary margin noise because the core engine has crossed scale. Revenue growth has reaccelerated, not decelerated, in the latest quarter; operating leverage from a software-and-marketplace model can show up nonlinearly; and $2.43B of operating cash flow on $13.72B of revenue is evidence that GAAP margins understate economic strength. They would also point to the strategic option value: grocery, convenience, retail delivery, and international can all ride the same demand, merchant, and driver network. On that view, valuing DoorDash on today’s 5-7% operating architecture misses that a winner-take-most local commerce platform could plausibly earn low-teens margins later. Zero debt and billions of cash give management room to keep compounding. I take that argument seriously because the improvement from 2023’s -$579M operating loss to 2025’s +$723M profit is dramatic and real.
I still weigh it differently because the stock already discounts much of that blue-sky scenario. To justify a $94B equity value on conventional growth math, I think DoorDash needs to prove it can sustain 20%+ revenue growth for several years while expanding operating margins toward at least 10-12%. The current evidence is mixed at best: growth is there, but the last four quarters show profit margins moving the wrong direction. A 43x trailing free cash flow multiple is not absurd for a pristine compounder, but it is rich for a business exposed to consumer cyclicality, delivery competition, and structurally low-margin adjacency categories like grocery. The insider activity listed is not enormous in dollar terms, so I would not overread it, and I also would not lean too hard on the “accounting-driven” warning when cash flow is clearly robust. My issue is simpler: this is a good company whose stock price implies it is becoming a great economics business, and that leap is not yet in the reported data.
What changes my mind is specific. If the next few quarters show revenue holding above 25% year-over-year and net margin recovering back above 6-7% despite continued category expansion, I would concede the current premium is more justified than I think. More importantly, if full-year earnings power starts to track toward $1.5B+ of net income or free cash flow moves sustainably above $3B without a slowdown in top-line growth, then $216 would no longer look unreasonable. Absent that, I think the market is paying too much for optionality and mistaking successful scale for proven end-state economics.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a clean growth-to-cash story that has already been priced as if the ending is guaranteed. DoorDash scaled revenue from $4.89B in 2021 to $13.72B in 2025, flipped operating income from deep losses to +$723M, and generated $2.17B of free cash flow on only $257M of capex with a fortress balance sheet ($4.38B cash, zero debt). Trailing growth remains robust—26% revenue CAGR, 27.9% recent YoY—and the latest two quarters printed $4.04B and $4.45B. That is real operating leverage materializing. Yet the same quarterly series shows net margins rolling over hard: 8.7% → 7.1% → 5.4% → 4.6% → 4.5%. Scale is rising while unit profitability is slipping, exactly the opposite of the “winner-take-most platform” margin-expansion thesis the 101.5× P/E, 60.9× EV/EBITDA and 6.9× sales multiple require. At $216 the equity is capitalizing roughly $94B for a business still earning mid-single-digit net margins and whose revenue trend is already flagged as decelerating. The DCF and multi-method fair-value work landing near $85–87 is not an outlier; it is the arithmetic consequence of current cash generation and plausible terminal margins.
The strongest counter-argument is that FCF quality is excellent, the competitive position in U.S. restaurant delivery is entrenched, and category expansion plus Wolt can re-accelerate both growth and margins from here. A bull would note that $2.17B of FCF already supports a higher multiple than a classic low-margin marketplace, that ROIC of 12.7% is respectable for this stage, and that the market is simply paying for the optionality of becoming the logistics layer for grocery and retail. Those points have merit on the cash-flow side, but they do not close a 150%+ gap to fundamental value. Margin compression is occurring now, while the company is still in its highest-growth restaurant phase; if take-rates and contribution margins cannot expand under today’s mix, the probability they expand under lower-margin grocery and retail is lower, not higher. Insider activity has been a steady drip of sales, and the accrual-heavy profitability signal adds another reason to treat the recent earnings quality with caution. The narrative premium of roughly $130 per share is therefore doing almost all the work.
I would reverse to a constructive stance only if two things appear in the next several prints: sequential net-margin stabilization or expansion back above 7% while revenue growth holds ≥25%, and clear evidence that non-restaurant categories are accretive to contribution margin rather than dilutive. Absent that, the stock is a high-quality compounder being valued as a finished monopoly.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
DoorDash has completed a clean operational inflection: revenue compounded from 4.89B in 2021 to 13.72B in 2025 (roughly 29% CAGR), gross margin rebuilt from a 2022 trough of 45.5% to 50.9%, operating margin swung from -17.1% in 2022 to +5.3% in 2025, and net income turned positive at 935M. Free cash flow scaled from 563M to 2.17B, and OCF/NI of 3.04x with accruals of -15.7% of assets indicate the earnings are cash-backed and conservative. Balance sheet is a fortress relative to the operation: 4.38B liquid cash, zero net debt, Altman Z 6.55, and Beneish M -2.34 - no mechanical red flags. The business is self-funding with a widening FCF margin (roughly 16% of revenue in 2025). The one clear structural drag is capital returns to shareholders. Diluted share count grew from 336.8M to 439.7M (a 6.9% CAGR), SBC runs at 7.7% of revenue, and buybacks offset only ~30% of SBC - so per-share economics lag the impressive business-level compounding. Insider tape is heavy on the sell side (65 sales vs 1 tiny buy), though most sales sit alongside option exercises and 10b5-1-style patterns, which reads as normal comp monetization rather than a directional alarm. Durability inference: scaled two-sided marketplace with clear operating leverage now showing up in the P&L; still a category with regulatory (gig-worker classification) and competitive overhangs that the numbers alone can't refute.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment/geography detail on international (Wolt) contribution to margin expansion vs core US
- Customer/merchant concentration and cohort retention disclosures in the 10-K
- Detailed SBC schedule and any authorized buyback program size vs anticipated future grants
- Exposure to gig-worker reclassification (Prop 22-style) legal contingencies
- Whether 2025 net income includes material tax-valuation-allowance releases or other one-timers
The e2e synthesis pins deserved value at roughly $85-87 (DCF $91.97, anchored PE $100.19, EPV floor $10.76) against a $216.26 price - a ~60% implied downside. Even generously weighting the anchored-PE method and giving the strong-quality business a premium above DCF, deserved value lands somewhere in the $100-130 range; the market is paying $216. The EPV floor of $10.76 is clearly a runaway low-end method (it capitalizes current earnings power and ignores the profitability inflection the quality lens confirms), so I discount it heavily - but even ignoring it entirely, the two credible methods still say the stock is 50%+ above fair. What has to be true to justify $216: DoorDash must not only hold 60%+ US share but successfully monetize grocery, retail, and Wolt-driven international logistics at platform economics for a decade, while diluted shares stop creeping at 6.9%/yr. That is the platform-monopoly bull case fully priced in. The quality lens is right that this is a real cash-generative business, but paying ~2.5x DCF for a thin-margin marketplace with Amazon and Uber competing means the upside is already extracted.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Wolt and international take-rate trajectory and contribution margin in latest 10-Q
- Grocery and new-verticals order growth vs restaurant core - is mix shift accretive or dilutive to margin
- SBC as % of revenue and net buyback pace - is diluted share count finally flattening
- Guidance on incremental EBITDA margins - are they still expanding or plateauing
The tape is calmly risk-on (VIX ~15, S&P at highs), and with a 1.77 beta DASH is exactly the kind of high-multiple internet name that benefits disproportionately from a low-vol, momentum-friendly regime. Momentum is strong-positive (26% CAGR, +13pp over 3y) and the price at $216 sits well above the ~$85 fundamentals-only anchor, which itself tells you the narrative is doing heavy lifting - and that narrative (platform-monopoly, 60%+ share, Wolt/enterprise optionality) is currently intense and holding. This is a stock the market wants to own in this tape. On the other side, the macro backdrop is not free: 10y at 4.69% and market PE at 26 are a persistent drag on long-duration story stocks, and the narrative's durability is only 'moderate' - meaning the premium is vulnerable if the story cracks. News flow is quiet and neutral-to-mildly-quirky (the CringeMart headline is brand noise, not a catalyst); a competitor read-through (Serve Robotics cutting guidance on Uber delivery volume) is a small yellow flag on category demand but not directed at DASH. Net: the pressure vector points up, but it is riding on narrative rather than fresh catalysts, so it is a tailwind, not a euphoric one.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any sell-side downgrade or price-target cut that challenges the platform-monopoly framing
- Sector rotation out of high-beta consumer internet if VIX pushes above 18-20
- Next print's grocery/new-vertical order growth - the key pillar holding up the narrative premium
- Regulatory or labor-cost headlines (gig-worker classification) that could puncture the moat story
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 10, 2026, DASH was $216.26. We expect it to be $194.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $130.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 10, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.