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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Elevance Health, Inc. (ELV) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -23 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -27 · Value -20 · Sentiment -16 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $443.57 vs $397.70 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Elevance Health, Inc.
ELV NYSEElevance Health, Inc. is a diversified health company headquartered in Indianapolis, Indiana. The company focuses on supporting health at every life stage by integrating medical, pharmacy, behavioral, and complex-care services. Elevance Health operates through several key segments. Its Health Benefits segment provides a broad range of commercial, Medicaid, Medicare, and specialty health plans to individuals, employers, and government programs. Through CarelonRx, it offers pharmacy benefit management solutions, including prescription management and related pharmacy services. Carelon Services delivers care management, analytics, and other clinical and administrative services aimed at coordinating and improving care quality. Together, these businesses enable Elevance Health to serve as a major player in the U.S. healthcare system, connecting health plans, care providers, and consumers to streamline access to care and support better health outcomes across diverse populations.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 25.21
Total Equity: $44.03B
Shares: 224,600,000
Total Debt: $31.90B
Cash: $9.49B
EBITDA: $7.29B
Total Debt: $31.90B
Cash: $9.49B
Revenue: $199.13B
Revenue: $199.13B
Revenue: $199.13B
Total Equity: $44.03B
Tax Rate: 15.6%
Equity: $44.03B
Total Debt: $31.90B
Cash: $9.49B
Current Liabilities: $41.04B
Long-Term Debt: $30.80B
Total Debt: $31.90B
Total Equity: $44.03B
Shares: 224,600,000
Shares: 224,600,000
CapEx: -$1.12B
Shares: 224,600,000
Stock Price: $397.70
Net Income: $5.66B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 4:43am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $138.6B | $156.6B | $171.3B | $177.0B | $199.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $10.9B | $13.0B | $17.3B | $19.8B | $21.2B |
| Gross Profit | $127.7B | $143.6B | $154.0B | $157.3B | $177.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $120.3B | $135.1B | $145.5B | $149.4B | $170.7B |
| Operating Income | $7.5B | $8.5B | $8.5B | $7.9B | $7.2B |
| Net Income | $6.1B | $6.0B | $6.0B | $6.0B | $5.7B |
| EBITDA | $7.6B | $8.6B | $8.6B | $8.0B | $7.3B |
| EPS | $25.04 | $25.10 | $25.38 | $25.81 | $25.28 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $24.73 | $24.81 | $25.22 | $25.68 | $25.21 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:05am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.9B | $7.4B | $6.5B | $8.3B | $9.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $51.1B | $55.6B | $60.0B | $58.9B | $63.0B |
| Total Assets | $97.5B | $102.8B | $108.9B | $116.9B | $121.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $34.9B | $39.7B | $41.8B | $40.6B | $41.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $21.2B | $22.3B | $23.2B | $29.2B | $30.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $61.3B | $66.4B | $69.5B | $75.5B | $77.5B |
| Total Equity | $36.1B | $36.4B | $39.4B | $41.4B | $44.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $27.1B | $29.7B | $31.7B | $33.5B | $35.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 4:43am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $8.4B | $8.4B | $8.1B | $5.8B | $4.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.1B | -$1.2B | -$1.3B | -$1.3B | -$1.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | $7.3B | $7.2B | $6.8B | $4.6B | $3.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$3.5B | -$649.0M | -$1.6B | -$4.8B | $88.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $3.7B | $2.5B | $890.0M | $6.3B | $2.3B |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.1B | -$1.2B | -$1.4B | -$1.5B | -$1.5B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.9B | -$2.3B | -$2.7B | -$2.9B | -$2.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$861.0M | $2.5B | -$861.0M | $1.8B | $1.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 4:43am (16d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +13.0% | +9.4% | +3.3% | +12.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +12.4% | +7.3% | +2.1% | +13.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | +12.9% | +0.6% | -7.5% | -8.4% |
| Net Income Growth | -1.3% | -0.6% | -0.1% | -5.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +12.5% | +0.4% | -7.4% | -8.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 12:05am (16d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-10 | $1.72 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-10 | $1.72 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-05 | $1.71 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-10 | $1.71 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-10 | $1.71 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-10 | $1.71 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-05 | $1.63 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-10 | $1.63 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-10 | $1.63 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-07 | $1.63 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-05 | $1.48 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-07 | $1.48 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-08 | $1.48 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-09 | $1.48 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-02 | $1.28 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-08 | $1.28 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-09 | $1.28 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-09 | $1.28 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-02 | $1.13 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-09 | $1.13 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:50Recovery pays +160%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 53%. Ratio 3.0:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($397.70) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +5% | 9.2% | $1,035.53 | +160% |
| Base — stabilizes | +3% | 8.0% | $852.80 | +114% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 6.8% | $687.27 | +73% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +3% | 1.6% | $186.52 | -53% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-11Administrative expense is the largest AI-addressable line in a company running roughly 199B of revenue, and because MLR rules govern medical spend rather than SG&A, automation of claims adjudication, prior authorization, appeals handling, call centers and Carelon service delivery drops to pretax income rather than being rebated. Roughly one point of admin ratio is about 2B pretax against 5.66B of net income.
The counterparty gets the same tools: hospital systems and revenue-cycle vendors are deploying AI coding, documentation and automated appeal generation, which raises billed acuity and overturn rates faster than payers can automate review, and regulators are simultaneously restricting algorithmic coverage denials in Medicare Advantage.
Whether Elevance's SG&A ratio falls faster than provider AI-driven billing intensity raises the benefit expense ratio. It shows up in the spread between reported operating expense ratio improvement and benefit expense ratio drift in the same quarters.
Blue Cross Blue Shield trademark licenses across 14 states, contracted provider rate schedules built over decades, statutory capital and state licensure, CMS star ratings and Medicaid contract incumbency - none of which cheap software reproduces.
AI Lens thesis
Elevance is a regulated risk-bearing balance sheet wrapped in an enormous clerical operation, so AI reaches it through cost of goods sold in the clerical layer and almost nowhere else. The underlying need - financing and rationing care - is untouchable, the entrant threat is near zero given the insurtech graveyard proved capital and network rates beat technology, and the responsibility for actuarial and compliance risk is exactly what customers pay to hand off. The real exposure runs the other way: an arms race where providers automate billing and members automate appeals, plus the structural oddity that under MLR floors the profit pool scales with medical spend, so genuine AI-driven healthcare deflation would shrink the premium base Elevance earns on. Net effect is modestly positive on margin, neutral to negative on the revenue unit, and second-order next to utilization trend.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Carelon Services and CarelonRx are labor-intensive service businesses where AI compresses cost per case directly, and unlike premium revenue those margins are not MLR-capped, so the mix shift toward Carelon amplifies whatever automation gains Elevance actually captures.
Downside Under MLR floors, insurer profit dollars are roughly proportional to medical spend, so a world where AI genuinely lowers cost of care shrinks Elevance's revenue base and absolute profit pool even if the margin percentage holds - the company is structurally short healthcare deflation.
Outcome range spread 41
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw tape: revenue is fine — $199B FY25 vs $138B FY21 is a 7.8% CAGR, and recent quarters ($50B run-rate) show 12.5% YoY growth. But everything below the top line is deteriorating. Net income went $6.10B → $6.03B → $5.99B → $5.98B → $5.66B over five years — an outright decline while revenue grew 44%. Operating margin collapsed from 5.4% in 2021 to 3.6% in 2025. The Q4 seasonality is brutal and worsening: Q4'24 NI was $418M (0.9% margin) and Q4'25 was $547M (1.1%) — these are MLR blowouts, not noise. And 2026 is not healing: Q1'26 margin 3.5% vs Q1'25 4.5%, Q2'26 2.9% vs Q2'25 3.5%. That's roughly 100bps of margin compression YoY on a base that's already thin. FCF fell from ~$8B historically to $3.17B in FY25 — a 60%+ drawdown that ev_to_ebitda of ~15x doesn't reflect if EBITDA quality is deteriorating via reserve/working-capital timing.
The synthesis says "fair value $405 vs $397" and the narrative model says fundamentals anchor price. I dissent — mildly. The composite treats the 15.7x P/E as reasonable for a mature earner, but that P/E is on TTM earnings that are still rolling off a higher base. If I annualize the last four quarters (Q3'25 $1.19B + Q4'25 $0.55B + Q1'26 $1.76B + Q2'26 $1.46B = $4.96B), forward EPS is closer to ~$22-23 vs the ~$25 implied by trailing, pushing real P/E to ~17-18x on a business whose earnings are shrinking. The Market Forces model calling this "deteriorating franchise… avoid" is closer to the truth than the narrative model's "steady compounder." You can't be a steady compounder with -2.8% earnings CAGR and -31.5% FCF CAGR. Those two models contradict each other and the narrative model is wrong on the label.
The contrarian bull case — which the Thesis Evaluation flags as Carelon SOTP mispricing — is real but unquantified here. If Carelon does ~$55B revenue at even 6% margins, that's $3.3B of operating income embedded inside a company generating $7.2B total op income, and pure-play services peers trade at richer multiples than 15x. The insider buying on 7/17/2026 (three separate purchases, ~3,700 sh) after the Q2 print is a genuinely positive tell — insiders don't open-market buy managed care names into MLR panic unless they think 2H is inflecting. Debt is manageable in absolute terms (D/E 0.72, $9.5B cash against $31.9B debt), but interest coverage on a $7.2B op income base is fine — the "high debt risk" flag in synthesis feels overwrought. Where I'd push back on my own bear read: the 12.5% recent revenue YoY plus stable membership suggests pricing catch-up in 2026 renewals is real; managed care margin cycles historically resolve in 4-6 quarters once rate adequacy is restored.
Net verdict: I lean bearish-to-fair on the current $397 print but not aggressively so. The synthesis fair value of $405 assumes earnings normalize back toward $25-27 EPS; if that happens by 2027 renewal cycle, the stock works and the insider buying is prescient. If MLR pressure is structural (Medicare Advantage rate notice cycles, Medicaid redetermination overhang extending), forward EPS stalls at $20-22 and fair value is $320-350 at a deserved 16x. I'd want to see one clean quarter — ideally Q3'26 above 3.5% net margin — before committing. The narrative model calling this "durable steady compounder" is the read I most disagree with; this is a cyclical margin story misclassified as a utility. Weight of evidence: I'd rather own UNH at a premium than ELV at a "discount" that's actually fair for a compressing-margin #2 player. Not a short — cash flows, dividend (1.72%), and insider buying prevent that — but not a buy at $397 either. Wait for either $340 (margin of safety) or a print confirming inflection.
GPT Reading
Elevance’s numbers read like a business getting bigger without getting better. Revenue has climbed from $138.6B in 2021 to $199.1B in 2025, and the latest two quarters are still running above $50B each versus $48.9B and $49.8B in the comparable 2025 quarters. But that scale has not translated into earnings leverage. Net income was $6.10B in 2021 and only $5.66B in 2025 despite $60B of added revenue; operating income has slid from $8.50B in 2023 to $7.86B in 2024 and $7.20B in 2025. That is the central fact here. On a quarterly basis the same pattern persists: Q2 2026 revenue grew to $50.47B from $49.78B a year ago, but net income fell to $1.46B from $1.74B and margin compressed from 3.5% to 2.9%. Q1 2026 showed the same issue, with revenue up to $50.18B from $48.89B but earnings down to $1.76B from $2.18B. For an insurer, a few tenths of margin matter enormously, and Elevance is losing them.
That is why I’m less comforted than the “mature earner / fair value” framing suggests. A 15.8x P/E does not look demanding in isolation, but on 2025 free cash flow of just $3.17B, the equity is trading around a 27x FCF multiple and roughly a 3.7% FCF yield. That is not cheap for a company with negative earnings CAGR over the last five years, declining operating profit, and visible quarterly margin pressure. The balance sheet is manageable rather than distressed—$31.9B debt against $9.5B cash and $44.0B equity—but it removes the case for a premium multiple when cash conversion is this soft. Operating cash flow of $4.29B versus $5.66B of net income is also not what you want to see from a supposedly defensive compounding model. If this were a clean high-quality insurer compounding earnings mid-single digits, the current valuation would be fine; but the reported data show a low-margin revenue grower whose profit pool is shrinking.
What stands out to me is that the market may actually still be giving Elevance too much credit for stability. The recent quarters are not disastrous, but they are consistent: approximately flat sequential revenue around $50B, paired with earnings that bounce around a low base and a recurring ugly Q4. Net margins of 4.5% in Q1 2025, 3.5% in Q2 2025, 2.3% in Q3 2025, and 1.1% in Q4 2025 show how little cushion there is. Annual net margin was 2.84% in 2025. When a business lives on sub-3% net margins, underwriting discipline and medical cost trend have to be excellent; otherwise “cheap on sales” is meaningless. EV/revenue at 0.55x and P/S at 0.45x look optically low because this is an industry where most of the revenue base passes through with very thin economic spread. On returns, 12.9% ROE and 9.1% ROIC are respectable but not special enough to justify paying up for a business whose free cash flow has reportedly compounded down sharply. My read is that this is closer to a pressured utility than a stealth compounder.
The best argument against my skepticism is that the stock already reflects much of this. At under 16x earnings, 2.0x book, and with a modest dividend payout ratio of 27%, Elevance is not being priced like a premium growth healthcare platform. Revenue growth remains solid at 12.5% on the recent annualized comparison, the latest two quarters still produced over $3.2B of combined net income, and insider activity recently tilted to purchases rather than sales. If the 2025 cash flow weakness was timing-related rather than structural, then valuing the company off one depressed FCF year is too harsh. A smart bull would also say that comparing net income across insurers can overstate deterioration because reserve movements and seasonal utilization can distort quarter-to-quarter readings, while the franchise still generates acceptable ROE with a current ratio above 1.5 and debt-to-equity under 0.75. In that framing, paying a market multiple for a defensive healthcare payer with nearly $200B of revenue is perfectly reasonable.
I weigh those counterpoints less heavily because I do not see evidence yet that margin compression has bottomed. To change my mind, I would want to see at least two things in the next few quarters: first, operating and net income growth resuming alongside revenue growth, specifically a return to quarterly net margins consistently above 3.5% and annual operating income back above the 2023 level of $8.5B; second, cash conversion recovering, with operating cash flow materially exceeding net income and free cash flow moving back toward $5B-plus. If Elevance can produce that while holding debt roughly stable, then 15-16x earnings would look attractive. Without that, I think the stock deserves a discount, not a “steady compounder” multiple.
Grok Reading
Elevance’s numbers describe a scale compounder whose top line is still working while the earnings engine is grinding lower. Revenue climbed from $138.6B in 2021 to $199.1B in 2025 (roughly 7.8% CAGR), and the last four reported quarters have held in a tight $49.8–$50.7B band with recent year-over-year growth still near 12.5%. That is not a demand problem. The problem is conversion: operating income has slid from a $8.45–$8.50B peak in 2022–23 to $7.20B in 2025, net income has drifted from $6.10B to $5.66B, and free cash flow printed only $3.17B against $5.66B of reported earnings. Operating margin at 3.6% and net margin at 2.8% are a clear step-down from the mid-cycle levels of a few years ago, and the seasonal Q4 collapse (0.9% and 1.1% net margins in the two most recent year-ends) shows medical-cost and mix pressure is still biting hard. At $397.70 the stock screens at 15.8x earnings, 0.45x sales and 14.9x EV/EBITDA—cheap relative to historical managed-care averages, but only if the margin line stops falling.
What stands out against the cleaner model outputs is the cash-flow fracture. A mature earner archetype with “adequate” FCF quality is hard to square with a –31.5% FCF CAGR and operating cash flow of just $4.29B on nearly $200B of revenue. Net debt sits near $22.4B (total debt $31.9B less $9.5B cash) against equity of $44.0B; the 0.72 debt-to-equity ratio is manageable, but interest coverage and refinancing risk flagged in the valuation layer are real when FCF has halved relative to the earnings power of the early decade. Insider purchases in July 2026 (small open-market buys totaling a few thousand shares) are a mild positive signal, not a thesis. Carelon and the “health platform” story remain largely invisible in the consolidated margins; until services mix or MLR improvement shows up in the operating line, the diversification premium is aspirational.
The strongest case against a constructive read is simply the trajectory the bears already own: earnings CAGR of –2.8% while revenue grows, structural Medicare Advantage rate pressure, extended Medicaid redetermination noise, and a market that has already compressed the multiple to utility-like levels because it expects more of the same. A smart opponent would also note that the valuation synthesis’s unadjusted composite near $497 collapses to roughly $405 once risk flags are applied—barely above the current print—and that EV/EBITDA near 15x is not a bargain if EBITDA itself is still eroding. I weigh those points seriously; they keep conviction from rising. I simply put more weight on the fact that 15.8x trailing earnings already embeds a gloomy margin path, revenue remains resilient, ROE is still 12.9%, the dividend (1.7% yield, 27% payout) is covered, and H1 2026 net income of $3.22B annualizes above the depressed 2025 full-year result if the usual Q4 air-pocket is not worse than last year.
I would flip to a clear undervaluation call on two consecutive quarters of operating margin back above 4% with FCF conversion above 70% of net income, or on evidence that Carelon is contributing measurable margin expansion rather than just revenue. I would flip bearish if 2026 full-year FCF falls below $2.5B or if net margins settle sustainably under 2.5% amid another MA rate cut cycle.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Elevance is a $199B revenue health insurer that has grown the top line from $138.6B in 2021 to $199.1B in 2025 (about 9.5% CAGR), while diluted share count fell from 246.8M to 224.6M (-2.3% CAGR) via buybacks that dwarf SBC (buyback/SBC 972%, SBC only 0.1% of revenue). Earnings quality is clean: OCF/NI of 1.17x, accruals -1.1% of assets, Altman Z 3.13 (safe), no mechanical red flags. Insider activity skews to net buying with recent open-market purchases by Boudreaux and Peru totaling over $1.3M in July 2026.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Medical loss ratio trend and driver commentary in the 10-K to confirm margin pressure is cyclical vs structural
- Debt maturity schedule and interest coverage given $22.4B net debt
- Segment mix shift between Health Benefits and Carelon and profitability by segment
- Buyback authorization remaining and capital allocation priorities given falling FCF
- Any regulatory or Medicare Advantage rate exposure driving the margin squeeze
The e2e synthesis lands at a signal-adjusted FV of $405.25 vs a $397.70 price - a 2% gap that is statistical noise, not a margin of safety. The composite $496.79 leans heavily on an anchored-PE of $690.50 which is out of family with the other methods and should be discounted given the four-year margin compression flagged by the quality lens; strip that and you get a DCF at $462 and an EPV floor at $372, bracketing today's price. That bracket is the honest read: the market is paying roughly what the cash flows deserve for a mature managed-care compounder whose operating and FCF margins are still drifting the wrong way.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Medical loss ratio trajectory in next 10-Q and any guidance reset
- Carelon segment margin and revenue disclosure to test the integration thesis
- 2025 EPS guide vs consensus - a cut would reset the anchored-PE input
- Buyback pace relative to FCF given the FCF compression
Elevance sits in the quietest corner of the sentiment map right now. The narrative intensity on the name is minimal - there is no cult, no mania, no active de-rating story either. The tape is mildly risk-on (+47), which mechanically favors higher-beta names; ELV's 0.69 beta means it captures only a fraction of that lift, and managed care is not the sector traders reach for in a risk-on rotation. So the market-wide tailwind lands as a light breeze here at best.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any CMS rate notice or MLR commentary that could ignite the bear 'margin erosion' narrative
- Carelon integration milestones - a stumble here is the one story crack that could turn sentiment negative
- Sector rotation signals: if defensives start bleeding relative strength, ELV underperforms even a flat tape
- Analyst target revisions post next print - currently quiet, which is the sentiment status quo
Elevance is a regulated risk-bearing balance sheet wrapped in an enormous clerical operation, so AI reaches it through cost of goods sold in the clerical layer and almost nowhere else. The underlying need - financing and rationing care - is untouchable, the entrant threat is near zero given the insurtech graveyard proved capital and network rates beat technology, and the responsibility for actuarial and compliance risk is exactly what customers pay to hand off. The real exposure runs the other way: an arms race where providers automate billing and members automate appeals, plus the structural oddity that under MLR floors the profit pool scales with medical spend, so genuine AI-driven healthcare deflation would shrink the premium base Elevance earns on. Net effect is modestly positive on margin, neutral to negative on the revenue unit, and second-order next to utilization trend.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Operating expense ratio year over year
- Medicaid and MA bid margin trends
- Headcount versus membership growth
- CMS rules on algorithmic denials
- AI-denial litigation against peers
- Appeals overturn rate disclosures
- Contracted rate spread versus peers
- Blue licensing or antitrust rulings
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 11, 2026, ELV was $397.70. We expect it to be $418.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $340.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 11, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.