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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Expedia Group, Inc. (EXPE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -10 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 40 · Value -51 · Sentiment 23 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $296.05 vs $321.63 at analysis
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reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Expedia Group, Inc.
EXPE NASDAQExpedia Group, Inc. is a global online travel and travel technology company headquartered in Seattle, Washington. It operates a diversified portfolio of consumer and business brands that facilitate the discovery, booking, and management of travel worldwide. Through its flagship brands such as Expedia, Hotels.com, and Vrbo, the company enables travelers to book lodging, flights, car rentals, cruises, and a wide range of destination services and activities, serving both leisure and business customers. Expedia Group also runs a significant B2B operation, providing travel technology, inventory, and booking capabilities to airlines, travel agencies, online retailers, corporate travel managers, and financial institutions, integrating its platform into partners’ offerings. In addition, it owns trivago, a hotel metasearch business that generates advertising revenue by referring users to online travel agencies and hotel providers. Today, Expedia Group plays a central role in the digital travel marketplace, connecting travelers and suppliers through data-driven, multi-brand platforms across many countries and segments.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 9.81
Total Equity: $2.55B
Shares: 131,943,000
Total Debt: $6.16B
Cash: $5.41B
EBITDA: $2.76B
Total Debt: $6.16B
Cash: $5.41B
Revenue: $14.73B
Revenue: $14.73B
Revenue: $14.73B
Total Equity: $2.55B
Tax Rate: 18.2%
Equity: $2.55B
Total Debt: $6.16B
Cash: $5.41B
Current Liabilities: $16.66B
Long-Term Debt: $4.47B
Total Debt: $6.16B
Total Equity: $2.55B
Shares: 131,943,000
Shares: 131,943,000
CapEx: -$770.00M
Shares: 131,943,000
Stock Price: $321.63
Net Income: $1.29B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:32pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $8.6B | $11.7B | $12.8B | $13.7B | $14.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.5B |
| Gross Profit | $7.1B | $10.0B | $11.3B | $12.2B | $13.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $6.9B | $8.9B | $10.2B | $10.9B | $11.4B |
| Operating Income | $186.0M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.9B |
| Net Income | $12.0M | $352.0M | $797.0M | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| EBITDA | $1.0B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.8B |
| EPS | $-1.80 | $2.24 | $5.50 | $9.39 | $10.32 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-1.80 | $2.17 | $5.31 | $8.95 | $9.81 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:14pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.1B | $4.1B | $4.2B | $4.2B | $5.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $8.2B | $8.8B | $9.2B | $9.8B | $12.2B |
| Total Assets | $21.5B | $21.6B | $21.6B | $22.4B | $24.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $9.5B | $10.8B | $11.8B | $13.6B | $16.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $7.7B | $6.2B | $6.3B | $5.2B | $4.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $18.0B | $17.8B | $18.9B | $19.6B | $21.9B |
| Total Equity | $3.6B | $3.7B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $2.5B |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.8B | -$1.4B | -$632.0M | $602.0M | $1.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:32pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.7B | $3.4B | $2.7B | $3.1B | $3.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$673.0M | -$662.0M | -$846.0M | -$756.0M | -$770.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.1B | $2.8B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $3.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $258.0M | -$2.1B | $0 | $0 | -$59.0M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$165.0M | -$607.0M | -$2.1B | -$1.8B | -$1.9B |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.7B | $46.0M | -$190.0M | -$87.0M | $1.4B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:32pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +35.7% | +10.0% | +6.6% | +7.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +41.5% | +12.5% | +8.7% | +8.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | +483.3% | -4.8% | +27.7% | +41.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +2,833.3% | +126.4% | +54.8% | +4.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | +87.7% | -2.0% | +17.2% | +27.9% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 4:14pm (1d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-27 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-28 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-05 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-19 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-28 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-29 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-06 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2020-03-09 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2019-11-18 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-21 | $0.34 | — | — | — |
| 2019-05-22 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2019-03-06 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2018-11-14 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2018-08-22 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2018-05-23 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2018-03-07 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2017-11-15 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2017-08-22 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2017-05-23 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2017-03-07 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-22 16:41Even the bull case prices 20% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 46%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($321.63) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +21% | 14.9% | $257.11 | -20% |
| Base — stabilizes | +14% | 13.0% | $185.73 | -42% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +7% | 11.0% | $131.34 | -59% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +9% | 14.3% | $173.36 | -46% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-22 16:40The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Starting from the raw numbers: Expedia is doing $14.73B TTM-ish revenue growing ~7.6% YoY, with the last four quarters showing genuine operating leverage — Q3'25 net margin of 21.7% and Q2'26 at 20.3% are real, not noise, though these are seasonally the strongest quarters (bookings-heavy summer). Annual op margin has climbed from 1.6% (2021) to 12.7% (2025), NI from $12M to $1.29B. FCF of $3.11B against a $38.6B market cap is a ~8% FCF yield — that is not expensive for a mature earner. The 32.8x PE is misleading because it's on trailing NI that lags; on FCF the multiple is ~12.4x. ROIC of 46% and ROE of 51% are flattered by the tiny $2.55B equity base (buybacks have eaten it), but the capital efficiency is genuinely high because this is a working-capital-negative float business.
Where I diverge from the prior stack: the Market Forces "value trap / financial engineering" call is overwrought. Buybacks compressing equity is not financial engineering when $3.1B of FCF is real cash and capex is only $770M. The Thesis Evaluation's claim that $322 embeds "$18.5–19B revenue by 2030 and 14% FCF CAGR" is doing a lot of work — at 7% revenue CAGR you get to ~$20B by 2030 anyway, and FCF growth of 14% off a rising margin base is not heroic given operating margin went from 7.5% to 12.7% in three years with room to 15%+ (BKNG runs ~30%). The bear case that Vrbo is structurally losing to ABNB is correct but Vrbo is a minority of the mix; the B2B segment (roughly a quarter of revenue and growing double-digits) is the real story the models under-weight. Synthesis fair value of $296 vs $322 is a 7% overshoot — that's within noise, not a sell signal.
The genuine contrarian argument cuts the other way from Market Forces: EXPE trades at ~12x FCF while BKNG trades at ~20x and ABNB at ~30x. If you believe the B2B pivot (powering Chase, Walmart, etc. travel storefronts) is even half-real, the multiple gap is a re-rating setup, not a value trap. The bear counter is that OTA disintermediation via AI agents (ChatGPT booking direct, hotels' own apps) collapses the whole take-rate model — this is real, but it's a 3-5 year risk, not a 2026 risk, and it hits BKNG equally. Insider activity is nothing: 2,000 share sale against option exercises is boilerplate, not a signal. The "Market Headwinds" call reading insider skepticism into routine RSU mechanics is analytical malpractice.
Data quality flags: the file dates go through 2026-06-30 with an August 2026 insider transaction, so we're mid-2026 with FY2025 as the last full year — the model is using stale annual ratios (PB 16.7, D/E 2.4) that don't reflect another year of buybacks and earnings. The Q1 seasonality is severe (Q1'26 NI of -$6M, Q1'25 -$200M) — anyone reading quarterly deceleration signals without seasonal adjustment is confused. "Decelerating quarterly trend" in Revenue Confidence is a seasonal artifact. Also the CEO name in the narrative layer ("Ariane Arpin-Synnott") appears fabricated — Ariane Gorin is CEO — which undermines confidence in that layer's specificity.
GPT Reading
Expedia’s numbers say “good business, full price.” The operating recovery since 2021 is real: revenue has climbed from $8.6B to $14.7B in 2025, operating income from $186M to $1.87B, and free cash flow to $3.11B. That is not financial engineering; it is a materially better earnings base. The quarterly run-rate also shows continued growth into 2026, with June-quarter revenue of $4.32B up from $3.79B a year earlier, and net income of $878M versus $330M. Over the last four reported quarters, revenue is about $15.7B and net income about $2.04B, which means the trailing earnings power is already well above the 2025 annual figure. At $38.6B market cap, that’s roughly 19x trailing run-rate earnings and about 12x trailing free cash flow if you annualize the current cash generation ballpark conservatively. For a scaled OTA with strong margins, that is not demanding on an absolute basis.
What keeps me from calling it clearly cheap is that Expedia is still a highly seasonal, cyclical intermediary being valued as though the margin gains are fairly durable. The annual operating margin improved from 8.0% in 2023 to 9.6% in 2024 and 12.7% in 2025, and the latest June quarter printed a very strong 20.3% net margin. But the March quarters remain near breakeven or loss-making, with -6.7% net margin in 1Q25 and -0.2% in 1Q26. That pattern is normal for travel, yet it matters: the business still needs robust leisure demand and healthy supplier relationships to support the richer summer/fall profit pool. The balance sheet is acceptable, not pristine: $6.16B debt against $5.41B cash means net debt is modest, but equity is only $2.55B, so the 16.7x book and 2.4x debt/equity ratios look ugly because the equity base is thin. I would not use ROE of 50.8% as proof of a moat; it is mostly a capital structure artifact.
The valuation metrics also look less attractive than the cash flow headline suggests once you remember Expedia is not a structural hyper-grower. Revenue growth has been good but not spectacular: 6.6% in 2025 and about 7.6% in the latest quarter. The market is paying 2.8x sales, 14.9x EV/EBITDA, and 32.8x reported annual earnings. Even if the quarterly run-rate makes that P/E look too high, this is still a business where upside depends on holding margins near recent highs while continuing mid-single- to high-single-digit revenue growth. That is plausible, but it leaves limited room for disappointment. My read is that the stock deserves a quality premium to a generic cyclical because the cash conversion is excellent—$3.88B operating cash flow on $1.29B 2025 net income is outstanding—but not a premium that assumes Expedia can compound like the category winner.
The best counterargument is straightforward: if you focus on the most recent four quarters rather than the 2025 annual line, the stock already looks cheaper than the standard screen implies. Using roughly $2.0B of trailing net income from the last four quarters, the P/E drops into the high teens; using the latest FCF base, the FCF yield is healthy for a platform business with 90% gross margins. A bull will also point out that revenue has advanced steadily from $12.8B in 2023 to $13.7B in 2024 to $14.7B in 2025, while quarterly profitability has stepped up sharply in peak periods—$684M in 3Q24, $959M in 3Q25, $878M already in 2Q26. On that view, the market is not overpaying for a turnaround; it is paying a normal multiple for a normalized earnings stream that could exceed $2B annually. I think that argument is credible, and it is why I am not bearish. I just weigh cyclicality and competitive pressure more heavily than the trailing-quarter math does.
What would change my mind is a clearer signal on whether 2026 is becoming a sustainably higher-margin year or just a favorable point in the cycle. If the next two quarters can keep revenue growth around 8% while converting it into operating margins above 14% on a trailing basis, I would move more constructive and accept a fair value above $340. If instead revenue slips back toward low-single-digit growth or a coming weak quarter falls meaningfully below breakeven after the recent margin gains, then today’s multiple is too generous and I’d pull fair value toward the high $200s. Right now, around $322, I see Expedia as approximately fairly valued with a slight positive tilt because the cash generation is real, but the stock no longer offers much margin of safety.
Grok Reading
Expedia’s numbers describe a mature OTA that has finished the easy post-COVID catch-up and is now converting incremental revenue into cash at a high rate. Full-year 2025 revenue of $14.73B grew 7.6% from $13.69B, continuing a mid-single-digit trajectory (seven-year-ish CAGR near 7%), yet free cash flow hit $3.11B—more than double net income of $1.29B—on only $770M of capex. Trailing four-quarter revenue is already running near $15.7B, and the last two peak summer quarters (Q3 2025 and Q2 2026) printed 21.7% and 20.3% net margins, lifting TTM net income above $2.0B. That compresses the real earnings multiple closer to 19× than the stated 33× annual PE and puts FCF yield near 8% at a $38.6B equity value. Net debt is trivial (~$0.75B against $5.41B cash), so the EV/FCF multiple sits around 12–13×. Operating leverage is visible and real: operating income rose from $1.32B to $1.87B while revenue added only about a billion. The balance-sheet optics (debt/equity 2.4×, equity only $2.55B, current ratio 0.73) are distorted by years of buybacks and intangibles, not by cash-burn risk; ROIC at 46% confirms the economic engine is intact.
What the models under-weight is the speed of recent margin expansion versus the slow top-line. Earnings CAGR of 27% and FCF CAGR of 30% are partly base-effect recovery, but the step-up from 2024’s $1.23B NI to a $2B TTM run-rate is not just seasonality. Gross margin remains ~90%, classic platform economics. Against that, revenue confidence is flagged as decelerating and the competitive set (Booking’s scale, Airbnb on alternative stays, supplier direct channels) has not gone away. Insider filings are routine option-related flow, not a tell. At $321 the stock is essentially pricing continued high-teens FCF growth that history cannot simply extrapolate once travel normalizes; the 14% FCF growth the thesis layer says is embedded looks ambitious against 7% revenue growth and a cyclical consumer.
The strongest contrary case is straightforward: composite fair value near $298 already flags ~7% overvaluation, EV/EBITDA of 15× is full for a second-tier OTA, and the market-forces layer correctly notes share loss risk that margin expansion can mask only temporarily. If Vrbo remains structurally behind Airbnb and B2B wins prove slower than hoped, the 8% FCF yield compresses quickly in the next downturn; PE on 2025 earnings still looks rich, and ROE is mechanically inflated by the shrunken equity base. I weigh those points as real but secondary to the cash conversion already demonstrated—$3.1B FCF is hard to dismiss as engineering when working-capital and capex intensity stay low.
I would flip to a clear undervalued stance if the next two print quarters sustain mid-teens revenue growth with net margins still above 15% on a trailing basis, or if management guides FCF above $3.5B while buying back stock aggressively below $300. I would flip decisively overvalued on a sub-5% revenue print accompanied by margin compression below 10% operating, or any evidence that take-rate is structurally rolling over.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Expedia looks like a genuine mature earner that has quietly repaired itself post-COVID. Revenue has climbed from $8.6B (2021) to $14.73B (2025), operating margin has expanded from 2.2% to 12.7%, and net income has gone from a rounding error ($12M) to $1.29B. Gross margin sits at 90.1%, consistent with an asset-light OTA model. FCF of $3.11B in 2025 comfortably funds operations and aggressive repurchases: diluted share count has fallen from 161.8M (2022) to 131.9M (2025), a -3.1% CAGR, with buybacks running 324% of SBC (SBC only 2.7% of revenue). Per-share value is being concentrated, not eroded. Earnings quality signals are constructive: accruals -11.9% of assets, Beneish M -2.76, and OCF running well ahead of NI - reported earnings appear real and cash-backed. The soft spot is the balance sheet. Despite $5.73B liquid cash, net debt is roughly $428M and the Altman Z of 1.79 sits in the distress zone. For an asset-light travel platform Z is a noisy signal, but it flags that leverage is meaningful relative to tangible book, and any severe travel shock (as 2020 proved) hits this model hard. Insider tape is neutral - option exercises with tax withholding and one modest Dzielak sale ($661K); no open-market conviction buys but no meaningful dumping either. Durability is decent (scale, brand portfolio - Expedia, Vrbo, Hotels.com) but the moat is contested by Booking, Airbnb, and Google, which caps the quality ceiling.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity schedule and covenants - how much of the $6B+ gross debt comes due inside 24 months
- Vrbo and B2B segment growth rates vs. core Expedia/Hotels.com to gauge whether mix is improving durability
- Room-night growth and take-rate trend versus Booking to test competitive positioning
- Buyback authorization remaining and whether pace is sustainable if travel demand softens
- Barry Diller / IAC-related governance and any dual-class or control dynamics
The composite FV of $296.05 and signal-adjusted FV of $297.84 sit ~7-8% below the $321.63 price. The DCF ($316.32) roughly corroborates the current quote, while the EPV floor of $105.09 flags what you'd be left with in a no-growth, capital-cost world - a reminder that a lot of the deserved value here is growth-and-margin-expansion equity, not steady-state cash. The anchored P/E print of $446.48 looks like an outlier extrapolating the recent margin doubling and buyback tailwind; I would not lean on it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward B2B segment growth and take-rate trend in the next 10-Q
- Buyback pace vs FCF - is the share shrink sustainable at current leverage?
- Any guide-down on Vrbo or hotel supply-side direct-booking pressure in transcript Q&A
- Management commentary on AI/agentic booking disintermediation risk
The tape is mildly constructive: risk-on regime with VIX at 15 and the S&P just off highs, which suits a 1.25-beta consumer cyclical like EXPE that needs a benign macro to keep travel demand narratives intact. Higher rates and a 25.7 market PE are a background drag on all equities, but they are not the dominant force on this name right now. What IS pressing on EXPE is a fresh beat-and-raise print (the fifth consecutive) with Wedbush explicitly flagging B2C top-line strength and margin improvement, and coverage highlighting aggressive buybacks near the highs. That is a real positive push on sentiment. The narrative itself is a moderate-intensity, moderate-durability steady-compounder story with low cult coefficient - meaning the stock benefits from execution but does not have a euphoric story to ride, and it is equally not being actively de-rated by a breaking bear thesis. The AI-disintermediation and direct-booking bear angle exists in the background but is not the active market conversation this week. Net: recent news flow and analyst tone are clearly supportive, macro is neutral-to-mild-tailwind, narrative is warm-not-hot. That is a Tailwind, not a Strong Tailwind - the pressure is real but not decisive.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether Booking/ABNB commentary or any AI-agent booking data point revives the disintermediation narrative into a real de-rating force
- Sell-side target revisions in the two weeks post-print - are estimates catching up or is the beat already priced
- Any softening in consumer travel data (TSA, hotel RevPAR) that would flip the cyclical read
- VIX behavior and 10y direction - a spike above 20 or yields above 4.9% would meaningfully press a beta-1.25 discretionary name
Global travel demand is still normalizing upward and the industry is in an expansion phase with widening margins — a supportive backdrop that lifts all OTAs. The change happening around Expedia is where demand is discovered: search-based intent is migrating toward AI assistants and supplier-direct apps, which threatens the acquisition economics of an intermediary whose edge is inventory breadth plus paid distribution. Expedia's hedge is structurally sensible — sell the plumbing (B2B supply/tech) and the attention (advertising) rather than only the transaction — and that hedge is where its earnings growth is actually coming from. The macro layer (higher long rates, discretionary spend pressure) is a volume risk but not the deciding variable; the deciding variable is whether the share gap versus faster-growing peers narrows.
When we made this prediction on Aug 23, 2026, EXPE was $321.63. We expect it to be $305.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $260.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 23, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.