Business Description
Fate Therapeutics, Inc., a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company, develops programmed cellular immunotherapies for cancer and immune disorders worldwide. Its NK- and T-cell immuno-oncology programs under development include FT516 for the treatment of acute myeloid leukemia (AML) B-cell lymphoma, and advanced solid tumor; FT596 to treat B-cell lymphoma and chronic lymphocytic leukemia; FT538 to treat AML and multiple myeloma; FT576 to treat multiple myeloma; FT819 to treat hematologic malignancies and solid tumors; FT536 to treat solid tumors; and FT500 for the treatment of advanced solid tumors. The company has a collaboration and option agreement with Ono Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. for the development and commercialization of two off-the-shelf iPSC-derived CAR T-cell product candidates; strategic research collaboration and license agreement with Juno Therapeutics, Inc. to screen for and identify small molecule modulators that enhance the therapeutic properties of genetically-engineered T-cell immunotherapies; and a collaboration and option agreement with Janssen Biotech, Inc. Fate Therapeutics, Inc. was incorporated in 2007 and is headquartered in San Diego, California.
Business History
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -1.15
Total Equity: $207.18M
Shares: 118,789,974
Total Debt: $77.85M
Cash: $46.63M
EBITDA: -$127.02M
Total Debt: $77.85M
Cash: $46.63M
Revenue: $6.65M
Revenue: $6.65M
Revenue: $6.65M
Total Equity: $207.18M
Tax Rate: 0.0%
Equity: $207.18M
Total Debt: $77.85M
Cash: $46.63M
Current Liabilities: $36.07M
Long-Term Debt: $73.29M
Total Debt: $77.85M
Total Equity: $207.18M
Shares: 118,789,974
Shares: 118,789,974
CapEx: -$5.95M
Shares: 118,789,974
Stock Price: $2.39
Net Income: -$136.32M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $55.8M | $96.3M | $63.5M | $13.6M | $6.6M |
| Cost of Revenue | $5.9M | $13.8M | $157.2M | $0 | $12.9M |
| Gross Profit | $50.0M | $82.5M | -$93.7M | $13.6M | -$6.3M |
| Operating Expenses | $267.0M | $390.9M | $96.9M | $223.9M | $141.4M |
| Operating Income | -$217.0M | -$308.4M | -$190.5M | -$210.3M | -$147.7M |
| Net Income | -$212.2M | -$281.7M | -$160.9M | -$186.3M | -$136.3M |
| EBITDA | -$211.1M | -$294.6M | -$172.2M | -$176.6M | -$127.0M |
| EPS | $-2.24 | $-2.91 | $-1.64 | $-1.64 | $-1.15 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $133.6M | $61.3M | $41.9M | $36.1M | $46.6M |
| Total Current Assets | $633.4M | $502.1M | $331.5M | $291.9M | $208.7M |
| Total Assets | $921.5M | $705.6M | $506.2M | $440.7M | $318.9M |
| Current Liabilities | $81.3M | $114.1M | $39.1M | $38.5M | $36.1M |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $73.3M |
| Total Liabilities | $242.6M | $221.6M | $137.8M | $122.0M | $111.8M |
| Total Equity | $678.8M | $483.9M | $368.4M | $318.7M | $207.2M |
| Retained Earnings | -$769.1M | -$1.1B | -$1.2B | -$1.4B | -$1.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$162.9M | -$248.2M | -$132.3M | -$122.9M | -$106.1M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$50.7M | -$35.6M | -$6.2M | $-730,000 | -$6.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$213.6M | -$283.8M | -$138.4M | -$123.6M | -$112.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $362,000 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$33.8M | -$72.3M | -$19.5M | -$5.8M | $10.6M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$5.8M $3.9M – $8.7M
|
$6.8M $4.5M – $10.2M
|
$64.7M $43.1M – $97.0M
|
$182.4M $121.6M – $273.5M
|
| EBITDA |
-$5.8M -$8.7M – -$3.9M
|
-$6.8M -$10.2M – -$4.5M
|
-$64.7M -$97.0M – -$43.1M
|
-$182.4M -$273.5M – -$121.6M
|
| Net Income |
-$153.5M -$177.4M – -$44.3M
|
-$184.0M -$204.7M – -$68.6M
|
-$112.9M -$186.2M – -$63.9M
|
-$63.4M -$104.7M – -$35.9M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +72.4% | -34.0% | -78.5% | -51.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +65.1% | -213.5% | +114.6% | -145.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -42.1% | +38.2% | -10.4% | +29.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -32.8% | +42.9% | -15.7% | +26.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -39.5% | +41.5% | -2.5% | +28.1% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-06 | TAHL CINDY | M-Exempt | 44,444.00 | $1.05 | $46,666 |
| 2026-05-06 | TAHL CINDY | M-Exempt | 122,220.00 | $1.32 | $161,330 |
| 2026-05-06 | TAHL CINDY | M-Exempt | 44,444.00 | $1.05 | $46,666 |
| 2026-05-06 | TAHL CINDY | M-Exempt | 122,220.00 | $1.32 | $161,330 |
| 2026-05-05 | EPSTEIN ROBERT S | M-Exempt | 25,000.00 | $1.69 | $42,250 |
| 2026-05-05 | EPSTEIN ROBERT S | M-Exempt | 25,000.00 | $1.69 | $42,250 |
| 2026-05-05 | RASTETTER WILLIAM H | M-Exempt | 25,000.00 | $1.69 | $42,250 |
| 2026-05-05 | RASTETTER WILLIAM H | M-Exempt | 25,000.00 | $1.69 | $42,250 |
| 2026-04-20 | Redmile Group, LLC | J-Other | 266,280.00 | $5.84 | $1.6M |
| 2026-04-20 | Redmile Group, LLC | J-Other | 266,280.00 | $5.84 | $1.6M |
| 2026-04-20 | Redmile Group, LLC | J-Other | 8,977,624.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-20 | Redmile Group, LLC | J-Other | 3,691,324.00 | $0.00 | $3,691 |
| 2026-04-20 | Redmile Group, LLC | J-Other | 162,013.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-20 | Redmile Group, LLC | J-Other | 266,280.00 | $3.02 | $804,166 |
| 2026-04-20 | Redmile Group, LLC | J-Other | 3,691,324.00 | $0.00 | $3,691 |
| 2026-04-20 | Redmile Group, LLC | J-Other | 266,280.00 | $3.02 | $804,166 |
| 2026-04-20 | Redmile Group, LLC | J-Other | 162,013.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-20 | Redmile Group, LLC | J-Other | 8,977,624.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-15 | TAHL CINDY | A-Award | 100,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-01-15 | TAHL CINDY | A-Award | 400,000.00 | $1.05 | $420,000 |
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw tape first: revenue collapsed from $96.3M (2022) → $63.5M (2023) → $13.6M (2024) → $6.6M (2025), a 93% peak-to-trough destruction. Quarterly trajectory is worse than the annual suggests — Q4 2025 printed $1.4M, the lowest in the series, with deceleration through every quarter of 2025 ($1.6M → $1.9M → $1.7M → $1.4M). This is not "moderate revenue confidence with accelerating quarterly trend" — that secondary signal is flatly wrong, or measuring something other than top-line dollars. The only good news is burn discipline: net loss narrowed from -$52.2M (Q4'24) to -$32.4M (Q4'25), implying annualized cash burn closer to $130M down from $190M. But against $46.6M cash and -$112M FCF, the runway math is brutal — roughly 5 months at the 2025 burn rate, maybe stretched to 9-12 months if the Q4 run-rate holds and they've raised since (the data file doesn't show a recent raise). Gross margin going negative (-94%) on the annual line is a tell that whatever collaboration revenue remains is now below the cost of delivering it.
The synthesis verdict ("Disconnected from Fundamentals") and Market Forces ("Strong Market Headwinds, terminal decline, fire-sale acquisition") are directionally right but I'd push back on internal contradictions across the model stack. The Pre-Flight thesis pegs market cap at $200M vs $110M burn and frames it as a "lottery ticket"; at $1.53 and $180M cap with $46.6M cash, EV is ~$130M — you are paying $130M of enterprise value for a platform that has lost 93% of its revenue, has negative gross margin, and whose partners have voted with their feet. That's not a lottery ticket priced at pennies; that's still a meaningful asset valuation on a husk. The P/B of 0.56 is the single bull data point — book is roughly $320M, mostly cash and IP — but book equity in a cash-burning biotech evaporates by ~$100M/year, so today's 0.56x is next year's 1.5x absent a raise. The classification model calling this "pre-profit growth" with 0.78 confidence is the worst miss in the stack: this is post-peak decline, not pre-profit growth. Revenue CAGR of -67.7% should have automatically disqualified the growth archetype.
A careful contrarian would argue three things. First, allogeneic/iPSC cell therapy IP has strategic value to large pharma (Sana, BMS, Sanofi all have programs), and a $130M EV could be cheap if the platform gets acquired for the science — historical cell-therapy M&A has happened at 2-5x cash for less-developed assets. Second, insider J-Other transactions on 2026-04-20 totaling ~27M shares look like grant/award activity rather than open-market sales; not a bearish tell, possibly a retention package signaling the board still sees option value. Third, the burn-down from -$52M to -$32M quarterly losses is real cost discipline — management is clearly preparing the company for either a deal or a much smaller restated trial focus. The bear retort: every failed biotech looks like this on the way down, and "strategic value" is the cope that retail clings to while the equity goes to zero in a recap.
I dissent partially from the synthesis. "Disconnected from fundamentals" implies overvaluation, and at $1.53 with 5-12 months of runway and a ~$130M EV, I agree the equity is still too expensive for the fundamentals as-presented — fair value is probably $0.50-$0.80 absent a catalyst, reflecting cash-per-share minus expected dilution. But I disagree this is uninvestable; it's a binary at a price where the binary becomes interesting only below ~$1.00, and only if you size it as a 1-2% position you're prepared to zero. The data file is materially thin on the most important variable: clinical pipeline status and any 2026 financing. Without the FT522 / FT819 readout calendar and post-period cash, the entire thesis is unanchored. The models did not flag this gap loudly enough — they treated the income statement as the story when the story is actually the trial calendar and the next raise. I'd refuse to underwrite long here at $1.53; I'd watch for either (a) a dilutive raise that resets the runway and the share count, after which the option becomes cleaner, or (b) a clinical update.
GPT Critique
Fate Therapeutics' financial data paints a grim picture of a company in sharp decline. Revenue has plummeted from $96.3M in 2022 to a mere $6.6M in 2025, resulting in a staggering 93% drop. The quarterly figures corroborate this downward spiral, with Q4 2025 posting the lowest revenue of $1.4M. The net margin is deeply negative, reflecting the company's inability to generate profit from its operations, and the gross margin has turned negative as well, indicating that current operations are unsustainable. The company is burning cash rapidly, evidenced by a free cash flow of -$112M and a current cash reserve of only $46.6M, suggesting a runway of less than a year without new funding or a significant operational turnaround.
I agree with Opus's assessment that the company's situation is dire. He rightly points out that the revenue trajectory contradicts the "moderate revenue confidence with accelerating quarterly trend" signal, which seems an error in the model. The narrative that Fate Therapeutics is a "lottery ticket" is misleading; the company is more accurately described as a high-risk, distressed asset rather than a promising growth story. The valuation metrics underscore this disconnect, with an enterprise value of approximately $130M for a company whose revenue base has effectively evaporated and whose gross margins are severely negative. Opus's skepticism of the "pre-profit growth" classification is justified; the data clearly indicates a post-peak decline, not a growth phase.
However, I diverge from Opus's conclusion regarding the potential for the company's science and IP to attract acquisition interest. While the insider transactions might suggest some internal optimism, they do not negate the fundamental weaknesses. Opus mentions that historical M&A in cell therapy has occurred at 2-5x cash for less-developed assets, but with the current financial trajectory and lack of late-stage clinical data, it's speculative to assume Fate can attract such interest without substantial positive developments in its clinical pipeline. Moreover, the P/B ratio of 0.56 is not a compelling bull point when considering the rapid rate at which the company's cash reserves are depleting.
A careful skeptic might argue that despite the severe financial decline, the intrinsic value of Fate's technology in the cell therapy space holds potential for strategic interest. They could posit that the insider transactions suggest management confidence in future developments, possibly hinting at positive clinical data or partnerships in the pipeline. Yet, this optimism must be tempered by the reality of the company's financial burn rate and the absence of significant new clinical or financial developments in the data provided.