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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score -7 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 79 · Value -64 · Sentiment -45 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Fair Isaac Corporation
FICO NYSEFair Isaac Corporation is a technology company that provides analytics, software, and decision-management solutions for businesses across financial services and other industries. Its best-known product is the FICO credit score, a widely used benchmark for assessing consumer creditworthiness and supporting lending decisions. The company also offers software for analytics, decision automation, customer workflows, and fraud detection, helping organizations improve risk management and operational efficiency. Fair Isaac serves banks, lenders, insurers, retailers, and other enterprises that rely on data-driven decisions in credit, fraud prevention, and customer engagement. Founded in 1956 and headquartered in Bozeman, Montana, Fair Isaac Corporation plays a central role in the modern credit and decisioning infrastructure used by financial institutions and business clients.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 26.54
Total Equity: -$1.75B
Shares: 24,561,000
Total Debt: $3.06B
Cash: $134.14M
EBITDA: $939.80M
Total Debt: $3.06B
Cash: $134.14M
Revenue: $1.99B
Revenue: $1.99B
Revenue: $1.99B
Total Equity: -$1.75B
Tax Rate: 18.8%
Equity: -$1.75B
Total Debt: $3.06B
Cash: $134.14M
Current Liabilities: $849.22M
Long-Term Debt: $2.66B
Total Debt: $3.06B
Total Equity: -$1.75B
Shares: 24,561,000
Shares: 24,561,000
CapEx: -$8.92M
Shares: 24,561,000
Stock Price: $1,086
Net Income: $651.95M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:36am (53d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $2.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $332.5M | $302.2M | $311.1M | $348.2M | $353.7M |
| Gross Profit | $984.1M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $478.6M | $532.7M | $559.7M | $635.7M | $712.3M |
| Operating Income | $505.5M | $542.4M | $642.8M | $733.6M | $924.9M |
| Net Income | $392.1M | $373.5M | $429.4M | $512.8M | $651.9M |
| EBITDA | $531.1M | $562.9M | $657.5M | $747.5M | $939.8M |
| EPS | $13.65 | $14.34 | $17.18 | $20.78 | $26.90 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $13.40 | $14.18 | $16.93 | $20.45 | $26.54 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:12am (53d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $195.4M | $133.2M | $136.8M | $150.7M | $134.1M |
| Total Current Assets | $551.0M | $484.7M | $556.4M | $617.4M | $705.2M |
| Total Assets | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $559.2M | $331.5M | $367.7M | $380.3M | $849.2M |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.0B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.7B | $3.6B |
| Total Equity | -$110.9M | -$801.9M | -$688.0M | -$962.7M | -$1.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.6B | $3.0B | $3.4B | $3.9B | $4.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:36am (53d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $423.8M | $509.5M | $468.9M | $633.0M | $778.8M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$7.6M | -$6.0M | -$4.2M | -$8.9M | -$8.9M |
| Free Cash Flow | $416.2M | $503.4M | $464.7M | $624.1M | $769.9M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $550.0M | $0 | $0 | $1.5B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$874.2M | -$1.1B | -$405.5M | -$821.7M | -$1.4B |
| Net Change in Cash | $38.0M | -$62.2M | $3.6M | $13.9M | -$16.5M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:36am (53d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.6% | +9.9% | +13.5% | +15.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +9.2% | +11.9% | +13.9% | +19.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +7.3% | +18.5% | +14.1% | +26.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -4.7% | +14.9% | +19.4% | +27.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +6.0% | +16.8% | +13.7% | +25.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:12am (53d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017-03-01 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2016-11-30 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2016-09-12 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2016-05-23 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2016-03-07 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2015-11-30 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2015-09-14 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2015-05-22 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2015-03-05 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2014-12-01 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2014-09-08 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2014-05-23 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2014-02-20 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2013-12-02 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2013-09-05 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2013-05-23 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2013-02-21 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2012-12-03 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2012-09-06 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2012-05-10 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:34The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers first: FICO's FY25 revenue of $1.99B grew 15.7% YoY with FCF of $770M — a ~38.7% FCF margin, which is genuinely exceptional. The most recent quarter (Mar-2026) at $691.7M revenue and $264.5M NI is a step-function jump from the $498-536M range of the prior four quarters — that's +35% sequential vs Dec-2025 and +39% YoY vs Mar-2025. Either something structural changed (Scores price hike flowing through) or there's a lumpy Scores-royalty true-up. If sustainable, run-rate revenue is $2.7B+ and FCF closer to $1.1B, which drops the P/FCF from ~30x to ~21x — not cheap but not egregious for a monopoly. If it's a one-off, the models' overvaluation call tightens. Nobody in the prior stack addressed this quarter's discontinuity, which is the single most important number in the file.
On the balance sheet: $3.06B debt against $134M cash and negative $1.75B equity looks scary but is a deliberate buyback-financed capital structure, not distress. At $770M annual FCF, net debt/FCF is ~3.8x — manageable for a business with 82% gross margins and near-zero capex ($8.9M). The synthesis flag "interest coverage dangerously low" is wrong on the numbers: operating income of $925M against ~$150-180M interest expense is 5-6x coverage. The pre-flight's "28:1 debt-to-cash ratio" framing is also misleading — FICO doesn't need cash because it generates cash. This is a Moody's/S&P/Autozone-style negative-equity compounder, not a leverage risk. Prior models over-index on the ratio and under-index on the coverage.
Where I side with the bears: at $1,086 and $23.5B market cap, EV is ~$26.4B, EV/FCF ~34x on trailing, and P/E 40.9x. Even granting monopoly economics, this requires ~15% FCF growth for a decade to justify. The 28.7% FCF CAGR is real but decelerating math — Scores pricing has finite headroom before CFPB/political intervention becomes non-hypothetical (mortgage lobby is already agitated about the tri-merge fee hikes). The synthesis DCF at $687 fair value implies terminal growth expectations of maybe 3-5% and a discount rate that penalizes the political risk — reasonable but probably too punitive given the moat's demonstrated durability across three decades and multiple attempted disruptions (VantageScore has existed since 2006 and gone nowhere). My contrarian read on the models: they're triangulating to "overvalued" using the right skepticism but wrong magnitude. Fair value is $750-850, not $687, and the Q1-2026 print — if it holds — could re-rate this to $1,000+ legitimately.
The insider activity is uninformative — pure comp-driven option exercises and RSU vests, no discretionary sells or buys of note. The 46% drawdown mentioned in pre-flight has done real work: this stock was $2,000+ and is now $1,086, so the market has already meaningfully de-rated the pricing-power narrative. That's important — buying at $1,086 is not buying at peak euphoria. My verdict: I partially agree with the overvalued call but dissent on the magnitude and on the debt-risk framing. The right trade is patience — wait to confirm whether Q1-2026's $692M revenue is the new baseline or a one-time step. If baseline, fair value is $1,100-1,200 and the market is roughly right. If lumpy, fair value is $800 and there's another 25% downside. The thesis is binary on a single data point, which argues for waiting one more quarter rather than committing capital now. The synthesis "$671 fair value" understates the moat's demonstrated durability; the narrative bulls at $1,500+ overstate the transformation story. Truth is boringly in between.
GPT Reading
FICO’s raw numbers are much better than the “mature earner” label implies, but the stock is still asking investors to pay a growth multiple for a business that, however exceptional, remains fundamentally concentrated and already optimized. Revenue went from $1.32B in 2021 to $1.99B in 2025, a solid 10.8% four-year CAGR, while net income climbed from $392M to $652M, and operating margin expanded from 38.3% to 46.5%. That is elite software economics. The latest quarterly run-rate is even stronger: March 2026 revenue of $691.7M was up 38.7% from $498.7M a year earlier, and net income jumped to $264.5M from $162.6M, lifting net margin to 38.2%. But that quarter also looks like an outlier against the prior three quarters clustered around $512M-$536M of revenue. If I annualize the last four reported quarters, I get about $2.26B of revenue and roughly $760M of net income. On today’s $23.45B market cap, that is still around 10.4x trailing run-rate sales and roughly 31x run-rate earnings for a company whose long-term revenue growth profile has mostly been low-teens, not hypergrowth.
The quality of the business is obvious in cash flow. In fiscal 2025, FICO generated $778.8M of operating cash flow and $769.9M of free cash flow on just $1.99B of revenue, implying a stunning 38.7% FCF margin. Capex was only $8.9M, so earnings largely convert. Gross margin of 82.2% and operating margin of 46.5% are the kind of numbers that justify a premium. What stands out to me, though, is that the business is already running near peak efficiency. There is no obvious hidden margin unlock left when you are already at 30%+ net margins every quarter and nearly 47% operating margins annually. From here, sustaining the equity story requires continued pricing power and continued top-line growth, not just better execution. At 40.9x annual earnings and 31.1x EV/EBITDA, investors are not merely paying for quality; they are paying for quality plus durability plus further growth acceleration.
The balance sheet is the main friction against paying that kind of premium. Debt is $3.06B against only $134M of cash, equity is negative $1.75B, and the current ratio is 0.83. Negative equity by itself is not automatically alarming for a buyback-heavy, high-margin software company, but the capital structure does matter when you are already paying more than 30x earnings. Enterprise value is meaningfully above market cap because net debt is real here, and that is one reason EV/revenue sits near 14.7x. The business can service leverage because free cash flow is strong, but debt removes some of the “software multiple immunity” investors might otherwise grant. If the market ever decides this is a 20x-25x earnings compounder rather than a 40x one, leverage will amplify the equity downside more than many shareholders appreciate.
The best case against my caution is that FICO may deserve to break conventional valuation frameworks because the business behaves less like ordinary application software and more like a private tax on credit formation. The annual numbers show consistent acceleration: revenue growth was 4.4% in 2022, 9.4% in 2023, 13.9% in 2024, and 15.7% in 2025, while net income growth reaccelerated to 27.1% most recently. The latest quarter’s 38.7% revenue growth and 62.7% earnings growth are not the profile of a stagnating toll-booth. Free cash flow of $770M means the stock is trading around a 3.3% FCF yield on trailing figures, which is not absurd for a business with this moat, this margin structure, and this level of recurring demand. If that March 2026 quarter marks a genuine new baseline rather than a one-off surge, then the earnings power could be stepping up faster than the backward-looking multiples suggest, and a 30x-plus multiple would be easier to defend.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next two quarters hold revenue above $650M and net margins stay north of 35%, then the run-rate would move decisively beyond $2.5B revenue and $900M earnings power, and I would accept that the market is paying for a real reacceleration rather than just a great franchise. I would also want to see debt come down materially from $3.06B or at least cash build faster, because today the valuation leaves little room for a regulatory, cyclical, or refinancing stumble. Conversely, if revenue falls back toward the prior $500M-$540M range, then the March quarter was a spike, and the current price looks far too rich for a business growing in the low-to-mid teens.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a cash-compounding machine with genuine pricing power, not a software growth story in the SaaS sense. Annual revenue climbed from $1.32B in FY2021 to $1.99B in FY2025 at a 14.7% CAGR while earnings compounded at 23% and free cash flow at nearly 29%, landing at $770M of FCF on barely $9M of capex. Gross margin sits at 82%, operating margin at 46.5%, and net margin at 33%—and the March 2026 quarter just printed $691.7M of revenue at a 38.2% net margin, a 39% year-over-year jump from the $498.7M prior-year quarter. That step-up is the single most important data point in the set: it looks like a Scores pricing reset landing in full, not organic volume. On a TTM basis the business still trades at 41x earnings, 13.4x sales, and roughly 30x FCF; those multiples only clear if mid-teens revenue growth and continued margin expansion are durable for years. The balance sheet is the counterweight—$3.06B of debt against $134M of cash and negative equity of $1.75B—which means this is a leveraged capital-return vehicle riding a monopoly toll booth, not an unlevered compounder.
What stands out against the prior models is that the composite fair-value work around $670–$690 appears to underweight the March quarter’s run-rate implication and the operating leverage already visible in the annuals (operating income from $506M to $925M over four years). If the $691.7M quarter is closer to the new baseline than a one-off, FY2026 revenue could clear $2.4B+ with net income well above $800M, which would compress the forward multiple meaningfully. The archetype label “mature earner” is directionally right, but the earnings power is still expanding faster than a classic mature utility. Insider activity is noise—option exercises and tax withholds, no open-market selling signal either way. Cash conversion is pristine: $779M operating cash flow against $652M of net income.
The strongest case against this more constructive read is straightforward and quantitative. Even giving the March quarter full credit, you are still paying 14.7x EV/revenue and 31x EV/EBITDA for a business whose core product is a regulatory and political target; the bear case that Scores pricing invites congressional and CFPB scrutiny is not theoretical. Debt service and refinancing risk are real with a current ratio of 0.83 and a debt-to-cash ratio near 23x—any sustained higher-rate regime or credit-cycle slowdown that hits mortgage and auto originations directly hits Scores volumes. The valuation synthesis flag that almost no scenarios support $1,086 is directionally correct if growth reverts to high-single-digits; the narrative premium (platform-monopoly, “Visa of credit decisions”) has already been paid, and the stock has previously de-rated hard when that story wobbled. A smart opponent would also note that software adjacency (decision management, analytics) has never carried the P&L the way Scores has, so the multiple embeds a transformation that the income statement has not yet proven at scale.
I would flip toward fair value or undervalued if two consecutive quarters hold revenue above $600M with net margins at or above 35%, confirming the pricing step-up is structural, or if net leverage is visibly reduced below 2.5x EBITDA while FCF stays above $800M. A clear regulatory green light on Scores fee structures, or a material decision-platform contract win that shows up as a distinct revenue line growing faster than Scores, would also move the needle. Conversely, any guidance cut tied to originations volume or a political intervention on pricing would confirm the overvaluation case immediately.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
FICO is running at rare software-franchise intensity: revenue compounded from 1.32B to 1.99B over five years (roughly 11% CAGR), gross margin expanded from 74.7% to 82.2%, and operating margin lifted from 38.4% to 46.5%. Net income grew from 392M to 652M and FCF from 416M to 770M, with OCF/NI of 1.19x and accruals at -5.6% of assets - earnings are cash-backed, not accrual-inflated. Beneish M of -2.65 and Altman Z of 9.91 corroborate clean mechanics. Capital allocation is disciplined for a mature earner: diluted shares shrank at -4.3% CAGR (29.3M to 24.6M), buybacks ran 702% of SBC, and SBC at 7.9% of revenue is contained given the growth. The one real qualifier is the balance sheet: net debt of ~2.92B against only 134M of liquid cash, with 399.5M short-term debt exceeding cash on hand. Given 770M annual FCF this is easily serviceable, but it means the company is levering the equity aggressively to fund buybacks rather than sitting on a cash fortress. Insider tape shows only routine option-exercise/withhold mechanics and awards - no P (open-market buys) and small S activity - so no directional signal. The overall picture is a durable, high-integrity analytics business firing on operating leverage.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment mix between Scores (mortgage-sensitive) and Software - concentration and cyclicality of Scores revenue
- Customer concentration (top-10 % of revenue) in the Scores business
- Debt maturity ladder and covenants behind the 2.92B net debt and 399.5M short-term portion
- Pricing actions on mortgage/auto/card scores and any regulatory or GSE pushback
- Detail of SBC grants vs. executive comp structure to confirm buyback truly neutralizes dilution long-term
The composite fair value sits at $686.76 and the signal-adjusted FV at $671.22, implying roughly -38% downside from the $1,085.78 price. The DCF pins it lower at $588.85 and the EPV floor is just $213.99, while the anchored-PE of $1,355.34 is the lone method supporting today's tape - and it does so only by capitalizing recent multiple expansion, which is exactly what a skeptic should discount. Even generously weighting the anchored-PE (given the Fortress quality grade, 79) to lift deserved value into the $800-900 range, the stock still trades above it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward guidance on Scores segment price increases and unit volume assumptions in the anchored-PE
- Sustainability of operating margin expansion vs one-time leverage
- Any regulatory or GSE commentary on alternative credit-score adoption (VantageScore)
- Mortgage origination sensitivity in the DCF revenue build
- Buyback pace vs free cash flow to validate per-share compounding rate
The macro backdrop is mildly supportive - VIX at 14.3, S&P near highs, risk-on regime - which normally helps a 1.32-beta software name. But that tailwind is small and market-wide; the stock-specific pressure on FICO is negative. The July 30 post-earnings 17% drop on soft forward guidance is the dominant recent tape event, and it punctured the platform-monopoly narrative at exactly the moment investors were paying 1.6x sales and 62% above DCF for perpetual pricing power. Once a monopoly-narrative stock guides light, the story's durability rating drops and multiple compression lingers for weeks. Recent news flow (Marketplace partnerships, Informative Research joining the Mortgage Direct License Program, Alogram AI fraud suite) is modestly constructive and feeds the 'expanding platform' angle, but these are incremental press releases, not narrative-resetting catalysts - not enough to overwrite a guide-down. Peer signal is mixed to negative for the cohort: TRU rallying on its own numbers doesn't help FICO, and the Upstart chatter reminds the market that credit-scoring adjacencies are being built around FICO, not through it. Analyst tone is not aggressive on either side, leaving the July print as the anchor. Net: risk-on tape is a minor tailwind, but the freshly-wounded narrative and the still-fresh guide-down are the bigger force. Pressure leans negative, not catastrophically so.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether next quarter's print re-affirms or re-cuts guidance - a second cut would deepen the de-rating materially
- Analyst target revisions post-July print - are cuts done or still filtering through
- Any concrete Marketplace revenue disclosure that turns partnership PR into a real number
- Rotation signals: if mortgage / credit-cycle names get bid, FICO gets a passive lift
High rates (10y 4.63) suppress mortgage unit volumes, so FICO's growth is currently a price story layered on a soft-volume base — a fragile-looking but genuinely effective combination while the mandate holds. The world is simultaneously trying to reduce the score's chokehold: agency acceptance of alternative scores and political attention to housing-transaction costs are the two forces that could convert an unlimited pricing lever into a negotiated one. Credit normalization raises demand for fraud and decisioning analytics, a modest offset. Net: the near-term world is supportive of earnings, the multi-year world is slowly eroding the exclusivity that makes the pricing lever work.