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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Five9 Inc. (FIVN) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -47 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -7 · Value -80 · Sentiment 26 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $16.45 vs $27.57 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Five9 Inc.
FIVN NASDAQFive9 Inc. is a provider of cloud-based contact center software and customer experience solutions headquartered in San Ramon, California. The company delivers the Five9 Intelligent CX Platform, a unified, cloud-native suite designed to run inbound, outbound, and blended contact centers across voice and digital channels. Its platform enables organizations to manage omnichannel customer interactions, including phone, web, chat, email, mobile, and social media, with integrated tools for interaction routing, workforce engagement, quality management, and analytics. Five9 integrates AI extensively through capabilities such as Genius AI, intelligent virtual agents, conversational AI, and AI Agent Assist to support hyper-personalized, automated customer journeys while augmenting human agents. The offering includes workforce optimization, reporting and dashboards, compliance-focused features, and pre-built integrations with leading CRM and enterprise systems, serving mid-market and enterprise clients across multiple industries. Founded in 2001 in the United States, Five9 today plays a prominent role in the Contact Center as a Service market by helping organizations transform traditional call centers into broader customer engagement centers focused on efficient, high-quality customer experiences.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.45
Total Equity: $785.82M
Shares: 88,002,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $232.08M
EBITDA: $90.61M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $232.08M
Revenue: $1.15B
Revenue: $1.15B
Revenue: $1.15B
Total Equity: $785.82M
Tax Rate: 12.3%
Equity: $785.82M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $232.08M
Current Liabilities: $213.01M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $785.82M
Shares: 88,002,000
Shares: 88,002,000
CapEx: -$24.96M
Shares: 88,002,000
Stock Price: $27.54
Net Income: $39.42M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:44pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $609.6M | $778.8M | $910.5M | $1.0B | $1.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $271.1M | $367.5M | $432.7M | $477.5M | $516.2M |
| Gross Profit | $338.5M | $411.3M | $477.8M | $564.4M | $632.9M |
| Operating Expenses | $394.7M | $498.9M | $576.4M | $615.7M | $604.0M |
| Operating Income | -$56.3M | -$87.6M | -$98.6M | -$51.3M | $28.9M |
| Net Income | -$53.0M | -$94.7M | -$81.8M | -$12.8M | $39.4M |
| EBITDA | -$17.5M | -$42.9M | -$50.1M | $1.6M | $90.6M |
| EPS | $-0.79 | $-1.35 | $-1.13 | $-0.17 | $0.51 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.79 | $-1.35 | $-1.13 | $-0.17 | $0.45 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:37pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $90.9M | $180.5M | $143.2M | $362.5M | $232.1M |
| Total Current Assets | $617.2M | $778.7M | $924.1M | $1.2B | $959.7M |
| Total Assets | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $1.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $157.6M | $150.8M | $167.2M | $641.7M | $213.0M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $981.8M | $934.5M | $956.5M | $1.4B | $1.0B |
| Total Equity | $211.1M | $310.0M | $538.1M | $622.2M | $785.8M |
| Retained Earnings | -$228.4M | -$323.1M | -$404.9M | -$417.6M | -$378.2M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:44pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $28.5M | $88.9M | $128.8M | $143.2M | $226.2M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$42.2M | -$52.3M | -$31.2M | -$42.4M | -$25.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$13.7M | $36.6M | $97.6M | $100.8M | $201.2M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | $0 | $0 | -$167.2M | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | $0 | $0 | -$50.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$129.5M | $89.6M | -$36.1M | $219.3M | -$130.1M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:44pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +27.8% | +16.9% | +14.4% | +10.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +21.5% | +16.2% | +18.1% | +12.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -55.7% | -12.6% | +48.0% | +156.2% |
| Net Income Growth | -78.6% | +13.6% | +84.4% | +408.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -145.0% | -16.7% | +103.2% | +5,556.3% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:53Even the bull case prices 27% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 76%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($27.57) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +16% | 12.9% | $20.10 | -27% |
| Base — stabilizes | +11% | 11.3% | $14.95 | -46% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +5% | 9.6% | $10.86 | -61% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +8% | 4.9% | $6.61 | -76% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw trajectory first: revenue went from $252M (Q2'24) to $305M (Q1'26), a ~21% jump over seven quarters, but sequential growth has decelerated meaningfully — $285.8M → $300.3M → $305.3M is 5.1% then 1.7% Q/Q. Recent YoY is 10.3%, well below the 12.3% three-year CAGR and nowhere near the "20%+" the pre-flight model claims. The pre-flight's "30%+ CAGR" is flat wrong — actual is ~17% (2021→2025 rev of $610M → $1.15B is 17% CAGR, not 30%). That's a foundational error that inflates the bull thesis.
Margin story is real but subtler than presented. Net margin went from -5.1% (Q2'24) to 6% (Q1'26), and FCF of $201M on $1.15B revenue is a 17.5% FCF margin — genuinely healthy. But note Q1'25 and Q2'25 net income collapsed to $576K and $1.2M before rebounding — this is not a clean linear improvement, it's lumpy, likely stock-based comp and restructuring timing. The 55% gross margin is mediocre for SaaS (best-in-class is 75-80%); this is a structurally lower-margin business than pure software, closer to a communications platform. Operating margin of 2.5% GAAP is thin, and the P/E of 61x on marginal GAAP earnings is not the right lens — EV/FCF at ~$1.85B EV / $201M FCF ≈ 9.2x is far more flattering and undercuts the synthesis's "overvalued" claim.
Here's where I break with the synthesis: a $15.90 fair value implies EV/FCF of ~5x, which would price Five9 like a melting ice cube. That's too harsh for a business growing 10-17% with expanding FCF margins in a real (if competitive) CCaaS market. The narrative layer's $16.50 DCF anchor is doing heavy lifting on assumptions I can't verify. Conversely, the bull case that this is a "platform monopoly" is nonsense — Amazon Connect, Genesys, NICE, and Microsoft Teams-integrated offerings are direct commoditization threats, and Five9's 10% recent YoY growth is the tell that share gains are slowing. Insider activity is unambiguously bearish: six sales in two days (June 4-5, 2026) with zero open-market buys, and the July "awards" are just RSU grants, not conviction signals. The "Neutral Insider Activity" tag is generous.
My read: fairly-valued-to-modestly-overvalued, not deeply overvalued. At $27.54 and ~$1.85B EV, you're paying ~9x forward FCF (assuming $210-220M run-rate) and ~1.6x sales for a business with double-digit growth, real FCF, no debt, and $232M cash. That's not expensive by SaaS standards — it's cheap by SaaS standards. The catch is that Five9 may not deserve SaaS multiples given 55% gross margin and CCaaS commoditization. Fair value probably sits in the $22-28 range: below current if you weight decelerating growth and hyperscaler competition, at/above current if FCF compounds at 20%+ and the M&A premium (Zoom bid attempt in 2021 at ~$200/share pre-split-adjusted context) reappears. The synthesis's -40% downside is overstated; the narrative layer's $11/share "story premium" ignores that FCF alone justifies most of the current price. I dissent from "overvalued" but I'm not a buyer here either — the deceleration in sequential growth is the number that matters most, and I want to see Q2'26 before committing.
GPT Reading
What stands out to me is not “high-growth profitable” but a maturing, operationally improved software/communications hybrid whose valuation now rests on whether cash generation is truly durable. Five9 has clearly repaired the P&L: annual revenue rose from $609.6M in 2021 to $1.15B in 2025, while operating income swung from -$56.3M to +$28.9M and net income from -$53.0M to +$39.4M. The balance sheet is clean, with $232.1M cash and no debt, and 2025 free cash flow of $201.2M is the single most important number here. But the revenue shape matters just as much: quarterly sales grew from $252.1M in Q2’24 to $305.3M in Q1’26, yet the recent cadence has flattened badly, with only $5.0M of sequential growth in the latest quarter after a stronger $14.5M step-up prior quarter. That is what a business looks like when the growth engine is no longer earning a premium narrative on autopilot. At $2.08B market cap and about $1.85B enterprise value, the stock is not priced for disaster, but it is also not obviously cheap if this settles into a 7-10% grower with 3-6% GAAP net margins.
I also think the quality of the cash flow deserves a more skeptical reading than the headline margin suggests. Yes, $201.2M of FCF on $1.15B revenue is a robust 17.5% margin, and that sharply exceeds the 3.4% annual net margin and 2.5% operating margin. But when cash conversion so dramatically outruns GAAP profitability in a business with only 55.1% gross margin, I do not automatically capitalize that FCF at a software-style multiple. This is not a 75%-gross-margin application software model with huge incremental margins waiting to emerge; it is a lower-margin contact-center platform where service delivery economics and competition likely cap upside. The quarterly earnings progression reinforces that caution: Q1’25 and Q2’25 were barely profitable at $576K and $1.2M, then the back half improved to roughly $18-20M a quarter. That rebound is good, but it is too recent and too uneven to treat as a stable base. My read is that the stock is roughly fully valued to modestly expensive, with fair value centered a bit below the current quote because the business has outgrown “turnaround” status but not yet earned confidence in sustained margin expansion.
On Opus specifically, I strongly agree with the claim that the pre-flight framing of Five9 as a “30%+ CAGR” business is simply wrong. Revenue CAGR from 2021 to 2025 is about 17%, and recent growth at 10.3% YoY is nowhere close to the bull framing embedded in that label. I also agree with Opus that the “platform monopoly” narrative is nonsense and that the insider read should skew negative rather than neutral; six sales on June 4-5 with no open-market buys is not a bullish signal, and the July awards are compensation, not demand. I further agree that 55% gross margin is mediocre for software and supports a lower multiple than premium SaaS peers. Where I part ways is with Opus’s comfort level around the valuation they derive from free cash flow. Opus argues that at roughly 9x EV/FCF, “that’s not expensive by SaaS standards — it’s cheap by SaaS standards.” I think that comparison is the wrong frame. Five9 should not be benchmarked to high-quality SaaS on FCF alone when its gross margin is 20-plus points lower than elite software and its top-line growth is decelerating toward low double digits or worse. Cheap relative to SaaS is not meaningful if the business model does not deserve SaaS comparables.
I also disagree with Opus’s verdict that the shares are “fairly valued near $27” in a $22-28 range. That range gives too much credit to current FCF while understating the risk that the market is already capitalizing peak conversion during a slowdown. If revenue growth slips from 10.3% toward high single digits while GAAP operating margin remains around 2-3%, the market will not keep paying a complacent multiple just because the company has no debt. A no-debt balance sheet is helpful, not thesis-defining. Opus says a $15.90 fair value would imply “like a melting ice cube,” and I agree that the synthesis’s 40% downside call is too punitive. But rejecting $16 does not get me to $27. On these facts, I land closer to $20-24. That still acknowledges the balance sheet strength and meaningful cash generation, but it demands a discount for the weak gross margin profile, shrinking incremental growth, and the possibility that 2025 FCF was a high-water mark rather than a normalized earnings proxy.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus’s would say we may both be underestimating how valuable a debt-free, $1.15B-revenue CCaaS asset is in a consolidating market. If FCF holds near $200M and revenue merely stays around 10%, strategic optionality alone could justify the current stock. The skeptic would also point out that we are leaning heavily on one year of annual cash flow and a handful of quarterly margin datapoints without detail on stock comp, working capital, or deferred revenue, which are crucial for judging software cash earnings. That is fair. But with the data in hand, the burden of proof is on the bull, not the bear: the business has improved enough to avoid a collapse multiple, but not enough to deserve Opus’s near-full valuation call.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Five9 has crossed a real inflection: revenue scaled from $609.6M (2021) to $1.15B (2025), gross margin recovered to 55.1%, operating margin turned positive (2.5%) for the first time in the window, and net income flipped to $39.4M. FCF doubled to $201.2M, giving a self-funding profile with $232.1M net cash and no solvency question (Altman Z 2.14 grey but improving). Earnings-quality checks are clean: Beneish -2.72, accruals -10.7% of assets, OCF materially exceeding net income - the reported profit looks real, if anything conservative.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Cause of the 74.5M to 88.0M share jump in the latest year - convertible conversion, secondary, acquisition currency, or pure SBC vesting?
- Net revenue retention and enterprise vs commercial mix from the 10-K to gauge moat durability
- Customer concentration and any large-customer churn disclosures
- AI product traction disclosures and gross-margin impact of AI-agent cannibalization vs seat-based pricing
- Convertible note balance and dilution overhang from any outstanding notes/warrants
The composite fair value is $15.90 and the signal-adjusted FV is $16.47, implying roughly -40% downside from $27.57. The EPV floor is negative (-$0.65) and the anchored PE lands at just $7.01, meaning current earnings power does not remotely support the price; only a growth-heavy DCF at $24.57 gets in the neighborhood, and even that is 11% below spot. In other words, you are paying entirely for future growth and AI-driven CCaaS share gains, not for what the business earns today.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward revenue growth guidance and any deceleration below ~13% - the DCF hinges on it
- SBC as % of revenue and diluted share count trajectory - direct hit to per-share deserved value
- Enterprise subscription revenue mix and net revenue retention - proxy for competitive position vs Teams/Connect
- Free cash flow conversion excluding SBC add-back - real owner earnings
The immediate non-fundamental pressure on FIVN is net positive despite a risk-off market. Two concrete catalysts are pulling capital into the name right now: index inclusion in the S&P SmallCap 600 effective Aug 3 (forced passive buying, visibility bump) and a sector-wide rally in enterprise software tied to falling Treasury yields and a rekindled AI-investment narrative. FIVN sits squarely in the 'customer AI' cohort being repriced favorably, and recent coverage is framing it as the profitable, cash-generative, cheaper alternative to speculative peers like SoundHound - a flattering narrative shift. The platform-monopoly story (cloud CCaaS displacing Avaya/NICE, AI-native upsell) is intensity-strong and getting airtime. Countering that, the tape itself is hostile: VIX at a 1-year 97th percentile, S&P off recent highs, and FIVN's 1.46 beta means any risk-off flare hits harder than the index. Rates at 4.61% and a 26x market PE are a background drag on all long-duration SaaS multiples, and the bear frame (Teams/Copilot, Service Cloud, Amazon Connect commoditization) is a latent narrative risk that could resurface fast. Net: narrative and flow tailwinds are dominant this week, but they are riding on a fragile macro floor. Analyst tone (not directly provided) appears constructive given the comparison pieces and the post-Q1 beat plus buyback still echoing.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the enterprise-software AI rotation persists past index-inclusion day or fades into a sell-the-news
- Any Microsoft, Salesforce, or Amazon product announcement in contact-center AI that reactivates the commoditization bear case
- VIX trajectory - if stress deepens beyond a 1-day flare, the beta drag overwhelms the flow tailwinds
- Analyst target revisions post-inclusion and into next print - direction of estimate changes will confirm or break the current tone
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. No usable fair-value anchor — composite, DCF and anchored-PE are all absent from valuation-synthesis. Typical for pre-profit / narrative-platform names where those methods don't apply.