For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for General Electric Company (GE) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -13 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 51 · Value -65 · Sentiment 38 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $146.66 vs $360.14 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
General Electric Company
GE NYSEGeneral Electric Company, operating as GE Aerospace, is a leading provider of aircraft engines and related services. The company designs, manufactures, and maintains commercial and military turbine engines, integrated components, electric power systems, and aircraft technologies. Through its Commercial Engines & Services segment, it develops jet engines for commercial airframes, business aviation, and aeroderivative applications, while offering maintenance, repair, overhaul services, and spare parts. The Defense & Propulsion Technologies segment focuses on engines and propulsion solutions for military applications. GE Aerospace supports a vast global installed base of engines, generating significant recurring revenue from long-term servicing contracts. Its products serve airlines, defense organizations, and aviation operators worldwide, operating across the United States, Europe, Asia, the Americas, the Middle East, and Africa. Headquartered in Evendale, Ohio, General Electric Company plays a pivotal role in the aerospace and defense industry, powering commercial and military aviation with advanced propulsion technologies.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 8.14
Total Equity: $18.90B
Shares: 1,068,000,000
Total Debt: $22.16B
Cash: $12.39B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $22.16B
Cash: $12.39B
Revenue: $45.86B
Revenue: $45.86B
Revenue: $45.86B
Total Equity: $18.90B
Tax Rate: 14.1%
Equity: $18.90B
Total Debt: $22.16B
Cash: $12.39B
Current Liabilities: $38.98B
Long-Term Debt: $20.47B
Total Debt: $22.16B
Total Equity: $18.90B
Shares: 1,068,000,000
Shares: 1,068,000,000
CapEx: -$1.27B
Shares: 1,068,000,000
Stock Price: $355.04
Net Income: $8.70B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 12:33am (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $74.2B | $76.6B | $68.0B | $38.7B | $45.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | -$6.5B | $225.0M | $9.5B | $6.6B | $8.7B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $-6.16 | $-0.06 | $8.44 | $6.04 | $8.20 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-6.16 | $-0.05 | $8.36 | $5.99 | $8.14 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:07am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $15.8B | $17.3B | $17.0B | $13.6B | $12.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $66.3B | $66.2B | $59.8B | $37.6B | $40.6B |
| Total Assets | $198.9B | $187.8B | $163.0B | $123.1B | $130.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $52.0B | $56.9B | $50.9B | $34.4B | $39.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | $20.9B | $19.3B | $20.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $157.3B | $150.2B | $134.5B | $103.6B | $111.3B |
| Total Equity | $41.6B | $37.6B | $28.6B | $19.6B | $18.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $85.1B | $84.7B | $86.5B | $80.5B | $87.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 12:33am (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.3B | $5.9B | $5.2B | $4.7B | $8.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.1B | -$662.0M | -$1.6B | -$1.0B | -$1.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.2B | $5.3B | $3.6B | $3.7B | $7.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.6B | -$30.0M | -$365.0M | -$135.0M | -$360.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | $0 | $0 | $2.0B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$107.0M | -$1.0B | -$1.2B | -$5.8B | -$7.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$20.8B | $2.2B | $664.0M | -$3.9B | -$1.1B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 12:33am (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +3.2% | -11.2% | -43.0% | +18.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +103.5% | +4,113.8% | -30.9% | +32.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:07am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-06 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-09 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-29 | $0.36 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-29 | $0.36 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-07 | $0.36 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-10 | $0.36 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-27 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-26 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-11 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-12 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-27 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-25 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-10 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-06 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-14 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-26 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-27 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-07 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-20 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-24 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:53Even the bull case prices 73% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 72%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($360.14) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +12% | 20.4% | $95.76 | -73% |
| Base — stabilizes | +8% | 17.7% | $75.30 | -79% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +4% | 15.1% | $58.23 | -84% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +18% | 17.7% | $100.64 | -72% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Independent read first: GE Aerospace post-spin is running at ~$50B annualized revenue (Q2'26 $13.35B, Q1'26 $12.39B) with net margins expanding into the 17-20% band and NI trending to ~$9.5-10B run-rate. Sequential growth is real — Q2'26 rev up 21% YoY vs Q2'25's $11.02B, and Q1'26 $12.39B was up 25% YoY vs $9.94B. FCF at $7.26B on $8.54B OCF is high-quality (capex-light aftermarket business). At $355 and $368B market cap, you're paying ~38-40x forward earnings and ~50x FCF for a business growing earnings 25-30% with structural aftermarket tailwinds. That's rich, but not absurd for a scarce pure-play compounder — RTX trades at ~25x on inferior margins, TDG trades at ~35x with similar aftermarket economics. ROE of 46% is real (though flattered by thin $18.9B equity base post-spin).
Where I diverge from the synthesis: the $130 DCF fair value is not credible. It implies GE Aerospace should trade at ~$135B market cap, or ~14x earnings and ~18x FCF — that's a distressed-industrial multiple, not an aerospace aftermarket franchise multiple. The revenue_cagr of -17.9% is a spinoff artifact (2022 rev $76.56B included GE HealthCare + Vernova); using it as a valuation input is garbage-in. The FCF CAGR of 42.4% and recent earnings YoY of 32.8% are the honest numbers, and they suggest a fair value closer to $220-260 (25-30x forward FCF of ~$8-9B), not $130. The synthesis, market forces (unavailable), and thesis evaluation are all leaning on the wrong denominator. That said, at $355 the stock is still trading ~35-60% above even my more generous fair value — so the direction (overvalued) is right, the magnitude (-64%) is wrong.
The contrarian bull case worth taking seriously: LEAP installed base is only just entering its high-margin shop-visit cycle (peak service revenue is 2027-2032), GE9X on 777X is a decades-long annuity that hasn't started, and defense (military engines, hypersonics) has real optionality that DCFs never capture. If services margins hit 30%+ and installed base grows as scheduled, 2028 FCF could realistically be $12-14B, making $355 look reasonable at 25x. The bear counter — and it's the one I weight higher — is that this is exactly what everyone knows, the multiple already reflects it, and any Boeing production hiccup (already happening), LEAP durability issue (already surfaced in hot/sandy environments), or airline capex cut on a recession compresses the multiple by 30% in a quarter. Insider activity is unambiguously selling on option exercises — small dollars but zero conviction buying.
Data gaps to flag: gross and operating margin lines are missing from the annual file, which is where the aftermarket mix-shift thesis actually gets validated or falsified — I'm working off net margin only. The "recent revenue confidence: low, decelerating" signal is wrong on its face — Q2'26 rev of $13.35B is the highest print in the series and up sequentially from $12.39B. Someone's model is confused by the spin discontinuity. Current ratio of 1.04 is tight for an industrial with $22B debt vs $12.4B cash, though FCF covers it easily. My verdict: I partially agree with the synthesis (overvalued) but strongly dissent on the fair value anchor. $130 is wrong; $220-240 is the honest number, implying ~35% downside not 64%. Not a short (aftermarket tailwind is too real, narrative too durable, and squeeze risk on any beat), not a buy here. Wait for a $260-280 print on any cyclical wobble — that's where risk/reward inverts.
GPT Reading
GE today is not the old conglomerate the long-term revenue series makes it look like; the 2023-2025 revenue collapse from $67.95B to $45.86B is mostly portfolio change, not operating deterioration. On the actual continuing business, the picture is strong: quarterly revenue has climbed from $9.84B in 2024-09 to $13.35B in 2026-06, and the latest quarter was up 21% year over year versus $11.02B. Net income growth has kept pace, from $2.03B to $2.37B over that same comparison, with margins holding in a very high 15%-20% band every quarter. That consistency is what matters here. This is a cleaner, more predictable aerospace asset with real earnings power, and the market is right to award it a premium to a generic industrial. Free cash flow of $7.26B against $8.70B of net income is not pristine, but it is solid enough for a business with long-cycle production and service economics. Net debt of roughly $9.8B is manageable against that cash generation.
What stands out to me is that the stock price is still outrunning even a favorable fundamental read. At a $368B market cap, investors are paying about 8.3x sales, 43.6x earnings, and roughly 50x free cash flow. Those are software-like multiples being attached to an aerospace franchise, however good the franchise is. To justify $355, GE likely needs to grow earnings at a mid-teens clip for years while preserving near-20% net margins and converting that into much higher cash flow. The recent numbers support growth, but not that degree of perfection. Annual net income rose from $6.56B in 2024 to $8.70B in 2025, a strong 33%, yet the equity value rose to a level that capitalizes the company at more than 42x that income. Even if 2026 annualized earnings land near $9.0B-$9.5B based on the first two quarters, the forward multiple still looks around the mid-to-high 30s. For a cyclical end market exposed to OEM rate timing, supply chain friction, and airline health, that is too aggressive.
The quantitative models calling the stock overvalued are directionally right, but some of the supporting framing is sloppy. The negative multi-year revenue CAGR and weak earnings CAGR are distorted by separations and make the business look worse than it is; they should not be used as primary evidence against the stock. Likewise, the “turnaround” label is stale. This is no longer a restructuring hope trade. The real bear case is simpler and stronger: GE is now a high-quality aerospace compounder, but the market is already paying a luxury multiple for that quality. Price-to-book above 20x also tells you the 46% ROE is not evidence of extraordinary incremental economics so much as a function of a thin equity base of $18.9B. When a business with a current ratio near 1.0 and debt-to-equity of 1.17 trades on narrative as much as fundamentals, small execution misses can matter a lot.
The best case against my caution is that aerospace aftermarket economics really can sustain a much richer valuation than old industrial heuristics allow. Quarterly margins staying between 17.6% and 20.0% while revenue steps up by more than $3.5B over seven quarters suggests genuine operating quality, not just cycle uplift. If the installed base is entering a service-heavy monetization phase, cash conversion could improve from the current $7.26B FCF level much faster than I’m assuming, and a company earning $10B-$12B with modest balance-sheet risk might deserve a market cap well above where conventional screens would place it. The latest year-over-year quarter growth of 18.5% in revenue and 32.8% in earnings is exactly the kind of print that keeps premium multiples intact. I also would not overread the insider sales; these are tiny relative to market value and accompanied by option exercises, so they do not signal fundamental concern.
What would change my mind is evidence that GE can translate this earnings strength into materially better cash generation while sustaining growth. If the next few quarters show revenue holding above 15% year-over-year, net margins remaining at 18%-20%, and annualized free cash flow moving convincingly toward $9B-$10B, then the current multiple would look less stretched. Conversely, if growth falls back toward high single digits or FCF lags net income again, the valuation should compress sharply. My issue is not business quality; it is paying a peak multiple for a business that still has to prove its cash flow can match the stock’s expectations.
Grok Reading
The post-spin numbers paint a clear picture of a high-quality aerospace engine and services franchise that has shed the conglomerate drag. Full-year 2025 revenue of $45.86B and net income of $8.70B already show the step-up from 2024’s $38.70B and $6.56B, while the latest quarter (June 2026) delivered $13.35B revenue and $2.37B of net income at a 17.8% margin. Trailing twelve-month run-rate is now approaching $51B of sales with net margins locked in the high teens; free cash flow of $7.26B on only $1.27B of capex underscores the aftermarket-heavy model. Recent year-over-year growth of 18.5% in revenue and 32.8% in earnings is real, and the balance sheet is serviceable with net debt around $10B. Yet the market capitalization of $368B equates to 43.6x trailing earnings, 8.3x sales and an EV/revenue of 8.2x—multiples that treat a still-cyclical aero OEM/services business as if it were a software compounder. ROE of 46% is flattered by the post-spin equity base of only $18.9B; the absolute cash generation simply does not support a 2% free-cash-flow yield at this price.
The quantitative models flagging a $130–136 fair value are directionally correct even if their absolute floor is harsh: they correctly identify that current pricing embeds mid-teens earnings growth for half a decade plus margin expansion toward 25%, leaving zero room for the normal aerospace air-pocket. Quarterly revenue momentum is already labeled decelerating, cash-flow quality is weak, and the current ratio of 1.04 leaves little liquidity cushion. Insider activity is a string of option exercises followed by open-market sales—hardly a vote of confidence at these levels. The narrative layer’s “pure-play scarcity” premium explains the 175% gap to DCF, but that story is already fully discounted.
The strongest counter-argument is that the installed base of LEAP and GE9X engines is only now entering its high-margin aftermarket phase, commercial narrow-body rates are still ramping, and defense budgets provide a multi-year floor. If free cash flow can compound at 25%+ for three to four years while operating margins structurally re-rate above 20%, today’s 44x multiple compresses organically into the mid-20s and the stock can simply grow into its valuation; peers such as RTX have shown the market will pay up for aero-defense scarcity. I weigh this less heavily because even those generous assumptions start from a 2% FCF yield and require flawless execution through a full cycle—exactly the fantasy math the thesis evaluation already scores as the top bear point. Cyclicality, Boeing production fragility, and supply-chain constraints have not been repealed.
Sustained quarterly revenue above $14B with net margins clearing 20% and trailing FCF run-rate above $10B within the next two prints, or an explicit multi-year guide that puts 2028 earnings above $15B, would force a re-rating of the growth duration and could neutralize the overvaluation call.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The financial trajectory reflects the massive restructuring into GE Aerospace: revenue stepped down from $74.2B (2021) to $38.7B (2024) as GE HealthCare and GE Vernova were spun out, then rebounded to $45.9B in 2025. Net income has swung from a $6.52B loss in 2021 to $8.70B profit in 2025, and FCF nearly doubled year-over-year to $7.26B. Earnings quality looks genuinely clean: OCF/NI of 5.61x, accruals at -0.7% of assets, Altman Z of 3.3 (safe zone), and no mechanical red flags. Diluted share count is drifting down (-0.7% CAGR), so per-share value is being concentrated rather than diluted.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Composition of the $7.26B FCF - how much is customer advances / long-term service agreement billings vs. underlying earnings
- Remaining GE Capital / insurance run-off liabilities and any residual off-balance-sheet exposures
- Gross and operating margin detail (the table shows 0s, which is a data gap) - actual segment profitability for Commercial Engines & Services vs Defense
- LEAP engine delivery ramp and warranty/durability reserves given known technical issues
- Pension and OPEB obligations post-spin and their cash funding trajectory
- Buyback pace and capital return policy going forward
The composite fair value comes in at $136 (signal-adjusted $131) against a $360 price — nominally a 64% downside. The DCF anchor at $53 is almost certainly a runaway low (it appears to under-credit the aftermarket annuity and defense backlog, so I discount it heavily), but the anchored-PE at $302 is the more defensible read and it still sits about 16% below spot. Averaging a skeptical view of these methods lands deserved value somewhere in the $250-320 range for a high-quality, duopoly aerospace pure-play with strong earnings quality and clean cash conversion.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- LEAP shop-visit cadence and durability charge disclosures in next 10-Q
- Services vs OE mix and services margin trajectory
- Defense segment book-to-bill and backlog conversion timing
- Management guidance on 2025-2026 FCF and buyback pace
- Any exposure to widebody engine cycle timing (GE9X ramp)
The dominant force on GE right now is narrative, not macro. The market has embraced GE Aerospace as a clean, high-margin, recurring-revenue play on commercial aviation recovery and rising defense spend, and that story is doing the heavy lifting well above a $130 DCF anchor. Intensity is strong, durability moderate, and the cult factor medium - enough to keep the bid firm on dips, as evidenced by the rebound off technical support this week after an earnings letdown. Analyst tone reinforces the push: consensus Buy, GE picked over Northrop in head-to-head columns, and IBD flagging it as Stock of the Day in a buy zone. That is textbook positive sentiment flow. The macro tape is mildly constructive (regime +22, VIX 16, S&P near highs) but rates at 4.68% and a market PE of 26 are a modest drag on high-multiple industrials. With beta 1.35, GE would feel a real risk-off shock, but today's tape is calm enough that the narrative pressure dominates. Net: sentiment is pushing this name up, not down - a genuine tailwind, though not a euphoric one, since the story is a turnaround-bet at a 175% premium to DCF and any narrative crack would bite hard given the beta.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether commercial aerospace order/delivery cadence stays supportive through next earnings
- Any downgrade or target cut that would crack the one-sided Buy consensus
- A VIX spike above 20 or regime flip to risk-off - would bite this beta hard
- Peer read-throughs from RTX/LMT/HON that could compress the 'scarcity' premium
- Supply-chain or engine-quality headlines that feed the bear case
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 1, 2026, GE was $360.14. We expect it to be $322.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $275.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 1, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.