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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for GE Vernova Inc. (GEV) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -22 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 51 · Value -82 · Sentiment 47 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $437.99 vs $990.29 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
GE Vernova Inc.
GEV NYSEGE Vernova Inc. is an energy technology and services company specializing in products and systems that generate, transfer, orchestrate, convert, and store electricity across global power markets. The company operates through three primary segments: Power, Wind, and Electrification. The Power segment designs, manufactures, and services gas, nuclear, hydro, and steam technologies, supplying dispatchable power solutions to industrial, government, and other institutional customers. The Wind segment provides onshore and offshore wind turbines and blades, supporting utility-scale renewable power generation. The Electrification segment delivers grid solutions, power conversion equipment, electrification software, and solar and storage technologies that enable efficient transmission, distribution, conversion, storage, and orchestration of electricity from generation to end use. Headquartered in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and incorporated in 2023, GE Vernova Inc. plays a central role in modern power infrastructure by serving utilities and large energy users across the United States, Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 17.69
Total Equity: $12.30B
Shares: 276,000,000
Total Debt: $63.00M
Cash: $8.85B
EBITDA: $2.00B
Total Debt: $63.00M
Cash: $8.85B
Revenue: $38.07B
Revenue: $38.07B
Revenue: $38.07B
Total Equity: $12.30B
Tax Rate: -72.5%
Equity: $12.30B
Total Debt: $63.00M
Cash: $8.85B
Current Liabilities: $40.97B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $63.00M
Total Equity: $12.30B
Shares: 276,000,000
Shares: 276,000,000
CapEx: -$1.28B
Shares: 276,000,000
Stock Price: $990.29
Net Income: $4.88B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 5:38am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $29.7B | $33.2B | $34.9B | $38.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $26.2B | $28.4B | $28.9B | $30.5B |
| Gross Profit | $3.5B | $4.8B | $6.1B | $7.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $6.3B | $5.7B | $5.6B | $6.1B |
| Operating Income | -$2.9B | -$923.0M | $471.0M | $1.4B |
| Net Income | -$2.7B | -$438.0M | $1.6B | $4.9B |
| EBITDA | -$2.1B | -$199.0M | $1.4B | $2.0B |
| EPS | $-10.00 | $-1.60 | $5.65 | $17.92 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-10.00 | $-1.60 | $5.58 | $17.69 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:11am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.1B | $1.6B | $4.2B | $8.2B | $8.8B |
| Total Current Assets | — | $27.4B | — | $34.2B | $40.2B |
| Total Assets | — | $46.1B | — | $51.5B | $63.0B |
| Current Liabilities | — | $29.3B | — | $31.7B | $41.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | — | $37.7B | — | $40.9B | $50.7B |
| Total Equity | $11.6B | $8.4B | — | $10.6B | $12.3B |
| Retained Earnings | — | $0 | — | $1.6B | $6.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 5:38am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$114.0M | $1.2B | $2.6B | $5.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$513.0M | -$744.0M | -$883.0M | -$1.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$627.0M | $442.0M | $1.7B | $3.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | $0 | $0 | -$275.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | $0 | -$43.0M | -$3.3B |
| Net Change in Cash | $288.0M | $66.0M | $6.1B | $644.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 5:38am (23d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +12.1% | +5.1% | +9.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +39.3% | +26.3% | +23.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +68.0% | +151.0% | +194.7% |
| Net Income Growth | +84.0% | +454.3% | +214.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | +90.5% | +786.4% | +46.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:11am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-16 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-17 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-05 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-20 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-21 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-17 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-20 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 08:54Even the bull case prices 29% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 66%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($990.29) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +24% | 26.5% | $706.78 | -29% |
| Base — stabilizes | +16% | 23.0% | $494.07 | -50% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +8% | 19.6% | $336.96 | -66% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +4% | 22.5% | $334.33 | -66% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a specific story that the synthesis is partially misreading. GEV's TTM revenue is roughly $41.4B (Q3'25 through Q2'26), growing ~9% YoY, with genuinely improving operating leverage — gross margin went from 14.5% in 2023 to 19.8% in 2025. But the reported net income is deeply misleading: Q1'26 shows $4.75B net income on $9.34B revenue (50.8% margin), and Q4'25 shows $3.66B on $10.96B (33.4%). These are not operating results — almost certainly deferred tax asset releases, divestiture gains, or mark-to-market items on the insurance/legacy book. Strip those out and the underlying quarterly net margin is running 4-6%, consistent with Q2'26's normalized 6% and the FY2025 operating margin of just 3.65%. The $4.88B annual NI producing a 55x P/E is arithmetically real but economically fictitious; on ~$1.4B of true operating income against a $263B market cap, this is closer to 180x normalized operating earnings. The 130x EV/EBITDA anomaly flag is directionally right but understates the issue.
The synthesis DCF pinning fair value at $234 is almost certainly too harsh, but its directional call is correct. GEV has ~$8.85B cash, negligible debt ($63M), and $3.71B FCF — a genuine fortress balance sheet post-spin. The backlog dynamics in gas turbines and grid equipment are real; lead times for large power transformers and HDGT frames are now 3-5 years, which gives GEV pricing power the DCF likely doesn't capture. A more defensible fair value probably sits in the $400-550 range assuming operating margins expand to 10-12% by 2028 (from 3.65%) and revenue compounds at 8-10%. That still implies the stock is roughly 2x overvalued, not 4x. The narrative model's "75% narrative premium" framing is the right shape even if the anchor is off.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: this isn't a normal industrial cycle — it's a structural capex supercycle in electrification driven by AI datacenter load growth (unprecedented and non-cyclical over 5-7 years), coal-to-gas transition, and grid replacement. If gas turbine ASPs are re-rating 30-50% as capacity is sold out through 2028, and if services attach rates on the installed base compound at high-teens margins, GEV's steady-state operating margin could plausibly reach 15%+ rather than the 10-12% I'd model. Siemens Energy trades at ~35x forward earnings on similar tailwinds; the peer set has re-rated collectively. That said, quarterly revenue is decelerating (Q2'26 $11.1B was strong but Q1'26 was $9.34B, and the sequential trajectory since Q4'24's $10.56B → Q1'25's $8.03B shows the seasonality is severe), and the "sold out capacity" thesis is exactly what always precedes cyclical peaks in heavy industrial equipment. I've seen this movie in 2007-2008 with GE Power itself.
I partially agree with the synthesis: overvalued, yes, but the $234 fair value is model-brittle and will make readers dismiss the call. The pre-flight intelligence correctly identifies this as traditional-industrial-being-priced-as-secular-growth, and the narrative layer's "fragile durability" call is the sharpest read in the file — the story unwinds the moment gas turbine bookings show any sequential weakness or a competitor (Mitsubishi Power, Siemens Energy) takes a marquee hyperscaler contract. Weak FCF Quality flag deserves attention: $3.71B FCF against $4.88B NI is fine on the surface, but the massive customer advance payments funding working capital are what's driving reported cash flow — if orders soften, cash flow deteriorates faster than earnings. Insider activity isn't disclosed here but at these multiples with a fresh spin, I'd expect heavy selling; that absence in the data file is a gap. My verdict: overvalued with a fair value band of $450-575, not $242, but the direction and magnitude of the mispricing is real. Don't short (narrative stocks can double before they halve), but don't own at $990.
GPT Reading
At nearly $264B of market value on $38.1B of 2025 revenue, GE Vernova is being valued less like an industrial and more like a scarce strategic asset, and the raw numbers do not yet support that leap. The company has undeniably improved: revenue rose from $29.7B in 2022 to $34.9B in 2024 and $38.1B in 2025, gross profit expanded from $3.46B to $7.54B over that span, operating income swung from a $2.88B loss in 2022 to a $1.39B profit in 2025, and free cash flow reached $3.71B. The balance sheet is excellent, with just $63M of debt against $8.85B of cash. But the valuation is asking investors to pay 7.2x sales, 56x earnings, 22x book, and an effectively unusable 130x EV/EBITDA because EBITDA is still too thin relative to enterprise value. For a business whose 2025 operating margin was only 3.7% and gross margin 19.8%, that is extreme.
The biggest tell in the data is that headline earnings are flattering the underlying operating economics. Annual net income of $4.88B in 2025 sits far above operating income of $1.39B, and the quarterly pattern is even more revealing: March 2026 posted $4.75B of net income on $9.34B of revenue, a 50.8% net margin, after December 2025 showed 33.4%. Those are not normal industrial earnings prints; they look like one-time tax, separation, or other below-the-line benefits rather than evidence that the core business suddenly became software-like. If I normalize around the quarters without obvious noise, I see a company earning roughly 3% to 6% net margins in most periods: 3.2% in 1Q25, 5.6% in 2Q25, 4.5% in 3Q25, 4.6% in 4Q24, and 6.0% in 2Q26. On that basis, the market is capitalizing a modestly profitable cyclical equipment-and-services business as if double-digit clean industrial margins are already durable.
Even the good news needs framing. Recent growth is solid but not valuation-clearing: 2Q26 revenue of $11.10B was up about 22% from $9.11B a year earlier, while annual revenue growth from 2024 to 2025 was 9%. That is healthy, especially for a company coming out of restructuring, but not the kind of sustained 20%+ compound growth that can brute-force a near-$1T share price. Cash generation is also less pristine than the headline FCF suggests. $4.99B of operating cash flow versus $4.88B of net income looks fine superficially, but when net income is inflated by unusual items, “cash conversion” can mislead; the more relevant anchor is $3.71B of free cash flow against a $264B equity value, a roughly 1.4% FCF yield. That is venture-style valuation on industrial cash flow. If the bull case is that GE Vernova will become the indispensable picks-and-shovels winner of grid buildout, power equipment, and electrification, then I need to see that in sustained operating margin expansion first, not in episodic net income spikes.
The best case against my view is straightforward: this may be the rare industrial where backward-looking margins are the wrong metric because the installed base, service mix, and grid capex cycle are inflecting all at once. Revenue has compounded upward, profitability has moved from deeply negative in 2022 to clearly positive, ROE screens at 39.7% and ROIC at 68.2%, and the fortress balance sheet means the company can fund growth without financial strain. If power demand from data centers, grid reinforcement, and energy security spending drives a multi-year order supercycle, today’s 3% to 6% operating-like earnings power could be a trough, not a norm. On that view, paying up for a category leader before margins fully show up is rational. I weigh that less heavily because the same dataset shows a current ratio below 1, still-thin operating profitability, and valuation multiples that already discount not just improvement but near-flawless execution. When a company on 3.7% operating margin is priced like a compounder with structural 15%-plus margins, the burden of proof is very high.
What would change my mind is simple: two to three consecutive quarters where the weird below-the-line noise disappears and core profitability does the work. If GE Vernova can sustain quarterly revenue above $11B while delivering at least 8% to 10% operating margin and free cash flow that annualizes comfortably above $6B, the current premium would start to look more defensible. I would also revisit the stock positively on a major pullback; even with strong strategic positioning, a price closer to $500 would at least bring the sales multiple toward something industrial investors can underwrite. At $990, I think investors are paying for the end state before the income statement has actually arrived there.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a successfully restructured industrial that the market has entirely unmoored from its cash-flow reality. GE Vernova grew revenue from $29.7B in 2022 to $38.1B in 2025 — a respectable ~7% CAGR — and flipped from a $2.7B net loss to $4.9B of reported net income while generating $3.7B of free cash flow against only $63M of debt and $8.9B of cash. That turnaround is real. What is not real is treating the 2025 P&L as normalized earning power. Operating income was only $1.39B (3.7% margin) on $7.5B of gross profit (19.8% gross margin); the jump to $4.88B of net income, and the absurd 50.8% and 33.4% net margins in the two most recent year-end/early-2026 quarters, are dominated by non-operating items. Strip those out and you have a mid-single-digit operating-margin machinery business growing high-single-digits, throwing off roughly $3.5–4B of FCF, sitting at a $264B enterprise value — call it 65–75× FCF and roughly 7× sales. That is not how specialty industrial machinery clears, full stop.
The quarterly progression reinforces the same point. Revenue is grinding higher — $8.0B → $9.1B → $10.0B → $11.0B → $9.3B → $11.1B on a trailing basis — but the “earnings” line is noise: –$96M, +$254M, +$514M, +$452M, then $3.66B and $4.75B. Anyone anchoring a 56× P/E or a 130× EV/EBITDA on those prints is valuing a one-time gain stack, not a franchise. ROE of 40% and ROIC of 68% are accounting artifacts of a thin equity base ($12.3B) and inflated net income; ROA is a more honest 7.8%. The balance sheet is fortress-quality and FCF conversion is clean, which is why the stock deserves a premium to old GE Power — just not a 4× premium to any defensible DCF.
The strongest case against this read is the energy-transition scarcity narrative: Vernova is the only scaled pure-play with dispatchable power, onshore/offshore wind, and grid electrification under one roof, pointing at a multi-trillion TAM where utilities and governments have little choice but to spend. If Electrification and services mix shift the company toward 15%+ revenue growth and mid-teens EBIT margins within three years, and if the market continues to award platform-monopoly multiples to anything touching grid modernization and AI power demand, then $990 can be rationalized as early-stage infrastructure compounder pricing rather than industrial pricing. Bulls will also note the 215% earnings “growth,” the 190% FCF CAGR off the trough, and the fact that every missed quarter so far has been forgiven because the backlog story remains intact. I weigh that differently because none of the margin expansion required to support the price is visible in the 3.7% operating margin or 20% gross margin today, competition from Vestas, Siemens Energy, and backward-integrating utilities is structural, and the narrative durability itself is labeled fragile — 75% of the valuation is story premium with no services/software recurring-revenue evidence yet.
What flips me is simple and numeric: two consecutive quarters of operating margin at or above 10% with revenue growth re-accelerating above 12% year-on-year, or explicit multi-year guidance that puts 2027–28 EBIT above $5B with FCF conversion holding. Absent that, a sustained break of the $3.5B+ annual FCF run-rate on volume, not one-timers, would force a re-rate higher. Until then the asymmetry is clearly lower.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The financial trajectory is the story: revenue up from $29.65B (2022) to $38.07B (2025), gross margin expanding from 11.7% to 19.8%, operating margin from -9.7% to +3.6%, and net income from -$2.74B to +$4.88B. FCF turned positive in 2023 ($442M) and reached $3.71B in 2025. That is a genuine operating-leverage inflection in a heavy-industrial franchise (grid, gas power, wind), not a cosmetic recovery. Balance sheet is a fortress for the sector: $8.85B liquid cash, $8.79B net cash, Altman Z 3.92 (safe), Beneish M -2.35 (no manipulation flag), and diluted share count essentially flat (0.2% CAGR from 274M to 276M) - dilution is not eroding per-share value. Two soft spots keep this out of the top tier. First, OCF/NI reported as 0x and accruals -2.6% of assets, plus a 'Weak Cash Flow Quality' tag, suggest 2025 net income ($4.88B) runs ahead of cash generation ($3.71B FCF) - likely tax/working-capital or one-time items inflating GAAP NI. Second, operating margin is still only 3.6% - the business is improving fast but is not yet structurally high-return; durability of the ramp through a full power/wind cycle is unproven given only ~3 years of standalone history.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Segment-level profitability: is Wind now positive or still subsidized by Power/Electrification?
- Reconciliation of 2025 NI $4.88B vs FCF $3.71B - deferred tax release, pension, or working capital swings?
- Order backlog composition and pricing/margin on gas turbine orders driving the ramp
- Customer/geographic concentration in the grid electrification business
- Any warranty or wind-blade remediation reserves and their trajectory
- Pension and long-term service agreement accounting assumptions inherited from GE
Price is $990.29 against a composite fair value of $234.58 and a signal-adjusted FV of $242.58, implying roughly 76% downside on the blended math. Even the most generous input, an anchored P/E at $638.82, sits ~35% below the tape, while the DCF ($126.62) and EPV floor ($46.27) suggest the earnings base cannot remotely support today's cap. A $264B market cap on a business running 3.6% operating margins and net income that outruns cash means investors are paying today for margins, growth and durability that are still hypothetical. The Company-Quality lens rightly calls this Strong, and I will lift deserved value above the DCF for optionality on grid/electrification - but Strong is not Fortress, and there is no standalone track record through a downcycle. A fair deserved range of $300-$450 (giving generous credit to the anchored-PE and platform scarcity while discounting EPV as a runaway floor) still leaves the stock priced for perfection. The bear case - that heroic 15%+ growth and 30% margins are already in the price - is the honest read of the arithmetic. Margin of safety is negative; this is a quality tax, not a mispricing in your favor.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Multi-year segment margin bridge - is 10%+ segment margin actually in reach by 2026?
- Backlog conversion pace and pricing on new gas/grid orders
- Cash conversion trajectory - closing the gap between net income and FCF
- Guidance for through-cycle margin floor, especially on wind
The dominant force on GEV is a high-intensity platform-monopoly narrative tying it to two of the market's favorite stories: AI power demand and the energy transition. That narrative is doing enormous work at a $990 price against a fundamentals-implied fair value near $242 - the tape is paying for a story, not a DCF. Cult coefficient is high, news flow reinforces the AI-power framing, and the $176B backlog headline gives bulls a tangible anchor. That is a real tailwind on this specific name regardless of valuation reasonableness.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the post-earnings selloff extends or gets bought - a failed bounce would signal narrative fatigue
- Analyst target revisions after the recent print - cuts would be the first crack
- AI-power theme breadth (peers like VST, CEG, NRG) - if the cohort rolls over, GEV follows
- Any margin or execution stumble that lets bears reframe the spin story
- Rates trajectory - a move above 4.8-5% on the 10y pressures the multiple directly
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 2, 2026, GEV was $990.29. We expect it to be $870.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $450.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 2, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.