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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Hyatt Hotels Corporation Class A Common Stock (H) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Hyatt Hotels Corporation Class A Common Stock
H NYSEHyatt Hotels Corporation Class A Common Stock represents an ownership stake in Hyatt Hotels Corporation, a global hospitality company focused on lodging, resort, and travel-related services. Hyatt operates a diverse portfolio that includes full-service hotels, luxury properties, select-service hotels, extended-stay accommodations, and all-inclusive resorts under a range of recognized brands. The company also provides hotel management, franchising, and licensing services, allowing it to serve both property owners and guests across business travel, leisure travel, and group events. Its current business model emphasizes an asset-light approach supported by branded hotel operations, loyalty programs, and distribution capabilities that help connect travelers with accommodations worldwide. Hyatt Hotels Corporation plays a significant role in the hospitality market by serving consumers, owners, and partners through a broad network of properties and services across multiple regions.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics TTM · through Jun 30, 2026
EPS (Diluted): 0.82
Total Equity: $3.62B
Shares: 96,362,221
Total Debt: $4.28B
Cash: $537.00M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $4.28B
Cash: $537.00M
Revenue: $7.15B
Revenue: $7.15B
Revenue: $7.15B
Total Equity: $3.62B
Tax Rate: 64.8%
Equity: $3.62B
Total Debt: $4.28B
Cash: $537.00M
Current Liabilities: $3.29B
Long-Term Debt: $3.68B
Total Debt: $4.28B
Total Equity: $3.62B
Shares: 96,362,221
Shares: 96,362,221
CapEx: -$191.00M
Shares: 96,362,221
Stock Price: $165.85
Net Income: $79.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 5:38pm (30d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.0B | $5.9B | $6.7B | $6.6B | $7.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | $435.0M | $578.0M | $548.0M | $555.0M |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | -$222.0M | $455.0M | $220.0M | $1.3B | -$52.0M |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $-2.13 | $4.17 | $2.10 | $12.99 | $-0.55 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-2.13 | $4.09 | $2.05 | $12.65 | $-0.55 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 5:38pm (30d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $960.0M | $991.0M | $881.0M | $1.0B | $787.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $2.7B | $2.2B |
| Total Assets | $12.6B | $12.3B | $12.8B | $13.3B | $14.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.2B | $3.3B | $3.6B | $3.3B | $2.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.0B | $2.5B | $2.3B | $3.3B | $4.3B |
| Total Liabilities | $9.0B | $8.6B | $9.3B | $9.5B | $10.4B |
| Total Equity | $3.6B | $3.7B | $3.6B | $3.8B | $3.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $3.2B | $3.6B | $3.7B | $3.8B | $3.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 5:38pm (30d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $315.0M | $674.0M | $800.0M | $633.0M | $379.0M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$111.0M | -$201.0M | -$198.0M | -$170.0M | -$220.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $204.0M | $473.0M | $602.0M | $463.0M | $159.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.9B | -$174.0M | -$175.0M | -$609.0M | -$1.3B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | $0 | $0 | -$47.0M | -$60.0M | -$57.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$369.0M | -$453.0M | -$1.2B | -$293.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$172.0M | $2.0M | -$148.0M | $96.0M | -$227.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 5:38pm (30d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +94.6% | +13.2% | -0.3% | +6.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +305.0% | -51.6% | +489.1% | -104.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 7, 2026 5:38pm (30d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-27 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-29 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-24 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-27 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-29 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-28 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-22 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-27 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-29 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-27 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-21 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-24 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-26 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2020-02-25 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2019-11-25 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-26 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2019-05-28 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2019-02-26 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2018-11-27 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly data tells a story the models partially capture but misframe. Revenue has been essentially flat for eight quarters — $1.60B in Q4 2024, $1.63B in Q3 2024, $1.72B in Q1 2025, $1.81B in Q2 2025, $1.79B in Q3 2025, $1.79B in Q4 2025, $1.75B in Q1 2026, $1.83B in Q2 2026. That is a 14% range over two years on a base that should be compounding with the management-contract pipeline. The TTM revenue of roughly $7.16B is up 8% from 2024's $6.65B, but the quarterly trajectory shows no acceleration; Q1 2026's $1.75B was a sequential dip. Net income over the TTM window sums to $79M — a 1.1% margin — in a year that included a $471M one-time gain in Q3 2024 that inflated the 2024 annual figure to $1.30B. Strip that out and the "normal" earnings run-rate is closer to the $220M (2023) to $455M (2022) range. The 2025 annual loss of $52M is the more honest number, and the TTM loss-to-thin-profit swing is a cyclical trough, not a structural break.
The balance sheet and cash flow are where the valuation problem concentrates. Operating cash flow of $379M against $7.10B of revenue is a 5.3% conversion rate, and after $220M of capex, free cash flow is $159M. At a $15.63B market cap, that is 98x trailing FCF. Even normalizing FCF to the $400–500M range suggested by 2022–2023, the multiple is 31–39x, which is two to three times what Marriott or Hilton command on the same metric. The current ratio of 0.62 means current liabilities exceed current assets by roughly 60%, a liquidity posture that is unusual for a company holding $787M in cash against $4.28B in total debt. Debt-to-equity of 1.18x is manageable but not conservative, and the 72% payout ratio against a 0.36% dividend yield means the company is paying out more than it earns on a TTM basis — the dividend is being funded from the balance sheet, not from operations.
The insider tape is a small but telling data point. In the two weeks of mid-June 2026, eight separate sale transactions totaling roughly 120,000 shares (about $20M at $165.85) were executed, with only two token 125-share awards and zero purchases. That is not a pattern of routine 10b5-1 diversification; it is a cluster of selling into a price that sits 20% below the 52-week high. The names are redacted, but the volume and timing matter: insiders are exiting at $165, not at $120 or $90.
Now, the prior models. The Valuation Synthesis pegs fair value at $36.08 (signal-adjusted $32.42), implying an 80% overvaluation. I disagree with the magnitude, not the direction. A $36 fair value implies an equity value of roughly $3.4B on ~94M shares, which is less than the $3.49B net debt — meaning the operating business itself has negative value. That is not a defensible DCF output for a company with $7.1B in revenue, a global luxury brand portfolio, and a loyalty program with a multi-million-member base. The synthesis is anchoring too heavily on the depressed TTM FCF without any cyclical normalization, and the three "valuation methods" are clearly variants of the same depressed-earnings DCF. A more honest framework: apply 12–15x to normalized FCF of $400M (midpoint of 2022–2023), get $4.8–6.0B enterprise value, subtract $3.49B net debt, add back the intangible brand and loyalty value that a pure DCF strips out, and you land in the $90–130 range. The P/S of 2.23x is actually in line with Marriott (~2.5x) and Hilton (~2.0x), so the revenue multiple is not the problem. The FCF multiple is.
The contrarian case is real but thin. World of Hyatt is a genuine retention moat, the Park Hyatt and Grand Hyatt portfolio carries pricing power that economy brands cannot replicate, and the asset-light pipeline is a quantifiable growth engine that a static DCF undervalues. The 2025 loss is cyclical, not structural. But "cyclical" is doing a lot of work in that sentence: FCF has declined 73% from its 2024 peak, revenue is flat, the current ratio is below 1, and insiders are selling. A cyclical recovery requires RevPAR growth, and the quarterly data shows no evidence of that yet. The market is paying $165 for a recovery the P&L has not started.
The synthesis verdict of "overvalued" is correct in direction. I dissent on the $36 fair value, which is an artifact of un-normalized inputs. My fair value is $105–120, which still represents a 30–40% overvaluation at $165.85. The stock is not a value trap, but it is not a value either. It is a quality company priced for a margin story the trailing twelve months have not yet delivered.
GPT Reading
Grok Reading
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Hyatt has grown revenue from $4.69B in 2022 to $7.15B in 2026 and is aggressively shrinking its share count from 108.7M to 96.4M (roughly -11% over four years) with buybacks running 728% of stock-based comp. The company is self-funding: trailing-twelve-month FCF of $252M covers its obligations without external capital. However, the earnings trajectory is deeply concerning. Net income peaked at $975M in 2024, then fell to $432M in 2025 and just $79M in 2026, a 92% collapse in two years. FCF followed a similar path, dropping from $654M to $132M before partially recovering to $252M. The OCF-to-net-income ratio of 2.4x suggests heavy non-cash charges (depreciation on the owned hotel portfolio, possible impairments) are masking the cash reality, but the direction of travel is unmistakably negative. Net debt of $3.68B against $606M of cash leaves a thin cushion, and the Altman Z of 1.66 sits in the distress zone, a real warning even if the model is less calibrated for asset-heavy lodging firms.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- 10-K segment detail: what share of the $79M 2026 net income is attributable to owned vs. managed vs. franchised properties, and whether any one-time impairments or restructuring charges drove the collapse
- Convertible or preferred debt terms embedded in the $3.68B net debt figure, including maturity wall and covenants
- Customer and brand concentration: whether a small number of managed-property contracts or a single brand (e.g., Grand Hyatt, Andaz) drives a disproportionate share of revenue
- Whether the OCF/NI gap of 2.4x is driven by routine depreciation on the owned portfolio or by unusual non-cash charges (impairments, deferred tax adjustments)
- CEO Hoplamazian's remaining shareholding after the June 2026 sales and whether the selling is tied to a pre-set 10b5-1 plan or discretionary liquidation
- Pipeline and development commitments: capital expenditure obligations that could pressure the $606M cash balance in the next 12-18 months
The e2e composite fair value is $36.08 (signal-adjusted $32.42), with DCF at $39.36 and anchored-PE at $29.53. Against the $165.85 price, the stock trades at roughly 4.6x the model FV, implying an 80% overvaluation. Even if I discount the FV by half to account for model conservatism, the stock is still 2x+ above a generous deserved value. The earnings-quality score is good (1), so no haircut applies, but the quality lens is damning: net income has collapsed 92% from peak, the balance sheet sits in Altman distress territory with $3.7B net debt against only $600M cash, and the CEO is liquidating at scale. At $165.85, the market is pricing Hyatt for earnings to significantly exceed its historical peak of roughly $1B, at a premium multiple, for a business that is fundamentally a RevPAR-tied cyclical. That is a heroic assumption, not a base case.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest 10-Q for RevPAR trends and whether the earnings collapse is stabilizing or accelerating
- CEO insider-sale filings (Form 4) for pace and size of liquidation
- Debt maturity schedule and refinancing risk on the $3.7B net debt
- Franchise contract renewal pipeline and any owner re-contracting activity
- Guidance language on 2026-2027 EBITDA trajectory in the next earnings call
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.