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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. (HLT) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -15 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 60 · Value -77 · Sentiment 31 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc.
HLT NYSEHilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. is a global hospitality company that manages and franchises a diversified portfolio of hotels, resorts, and timeshare properties. Headquartered in McLean, Virginia, it operates multiple brand families that span luxury, lifestyle, full-service, focused-service, and extended-stay segments, serving both business and leisure travelers across many regions worldwide. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. primarily focuses on brand management, franchise relationships, and property-level support rather than owning the underlying real estate, enabling an asset-light business model centered on fees and service delivery. Its brands are present in key urban centers, resort destinations, airport hubs, and suburban markets, making the company a significant player in global travel and tourism. The group supports owners and operators with reservation systems, revenue management, loyalty programs, and marketing platforms, aiming to enhance occupancy and guest experience while maintaining consistent standards across its network.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.12
Total Equity: -$5.35B
Shares: 238,000,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $918.00M
EBITDA: $2.87B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $918.00M
Revenue: $12.04B
Revenue: $12.04B
Revenue: $12.04B
Total Equity: -$5.35B
Tax Rate: 29.5%
Equity: -$5.35B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $918.00M
Current Liabilities: $4.51B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: -$5.35B
Shares: 238,000,000
Shares: 238,000,000
CapEx: -$101.00M
Shares: 238,000,000
Stock Price: $314.24
Net Income: $1.46B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:39pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.8B | $8.8B | $10.2B | $11.2B | $12.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $4.8B | $6.7B | $8.0B | $8.8B | $9.3B |
| Operating Income | $1.0B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.7B |
| Net Income | $410.0M | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.5B | $1.5B |
| EBITDA | $1.2B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.9B |
| EPS | $1.47 | $4.56 | $4.36 | $6.20 | $6.18 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.46 | $4.53 | $4.33 | $6.14 | $6.12 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:29pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.4B | $1.2B | $800.0M | $1.3B | $918.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.6B | $3.3B | $3.0B |
| Total Assets | $15.4B | $15.5B | $15.4B | $16.5B | $16.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.0B | $3.4B | $3.7B | $4.7B | $4.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $16.3B | $16.6B | $17.7B | $20.2B | $22.1B |
| Total Equity | -$819.0M | -$1.1B | -$2.3B | -$3.7B | -$5.3B |
| Retained Earnings | -$6.3B | -$5.2B | -$4.2B | -$2.8B | -$1.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:39pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $109.0M | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$35.0M | -$39.0M | -$151.0M | -$96.0M | -$101.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $74.0M | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | $0 | $0 | -$236.0M | -$4.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | $0 | -$123.0M | -$158.0M | -$150.0M | -$143.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$1.6B | -$2.3B | -$2.9B | -$3.2B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.8B | -$226.0M | -$411.0M | $501.0M | -$406.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 2:39pm (12d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +51.6% | +16.7% | +9.2% | +7.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +107.3% | +6.3% | +6.5% | +13.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +206.1% | -9.1% | +34.5% | -5.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +88.3% | +5.1% | +6.1% | +14.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:29pm (12d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-22 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-27 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-21 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-29 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-23 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-21 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-15 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-23 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-16 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-22 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-16 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-24 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-18 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-27 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-09 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-25 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-26 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2020-02-27 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2019-11-07 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2019-08-08 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-11AI-driven labor automation at the property level (front desk, housekeeping scheduling, F&B, revenue management) lands on the franchisee's P&L, where labor is the dominant cost — better owner returns support new-build ROI, conversions and net unit growth, which is the actual driver of Hilton's fee revenue.
If AI assistants become the default trip-planning and booking interface, they can commoditize brand choice and re-intermediate demand the way OTAs did — raising effective customer acquisition cost and weakening the distribution argument Hilton sells to owners for 10%+ of room revenue.
AI Lens thesis
Outcome range spread 0
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue went $2.95B → $2.87B → $2.78B → $2.70B → $3.14B → $3.12B → $3.09B → $2.94B. That's not a clean growth story — it's seasonal noise with a step-up in mid-2025, then a Q1'26 print of $2.94B that is only 8.9% above Q1'25's $2.70B and actually *down* sequentially from four consecutive $3B+ quarters. Net income is lumpier: Q4'24 was $505M (18.1% margin) but Q4'25 collapsed to $297M (9.6%) — a 41% YoY earnings drop in the most recent seasonally-comparable quarter. The synthesis models are averaging through this and calling it "decelerating"; I'd call it "the earnings CAGR of 13% is backward-looking and the forward print is negative." Recent earnings YoY of -5.1% confirms this. On a mature franchisor trading at 51x trailing earnings, that Q4 miss matters enormously.
The negative equity ($-5.35B) is a red herring the models are half-flagging — for Hilton it's a feature of aggressive buybacks against an asset-light model, not distress. FCF of $2.03B on $101M capex is the real story: this is a genuine cash machine with ~17% FCF margin and near-zero reinvestment needs. But that's also *why* the multiple is stretched — everyone knows this. At $314 and $70B market cap, the market is paying 34x FCF for 6.3% FCF CAGR. Even generous — 8% fee growth, stable margins, continued buyback shrink — gets you to maybe $200-220 fair value on a DCF with a reasonable discount rate. The synthesis's $135-146 fair value feels too punitive (it likely under-weights the moat and buyback compounding), but the direction is right.
Where I diverge from the prior models: the Market Forces layer calls this "Market Tailwinds" while simultaneously flagging full valuation and no margin of safety — that's contradictory framing. The Narrative layer nails it better: this is an anchored-but-stretched platform story with moderate durability, and the $170 of narrative premium is exactly the kind of thing that unwinds on one bad RevPAR print or a corporate travel wobble. The contrarian argument I'd steelman: Hilton's fee model has *actually* proven recession-resilient (2020 was a wipeout but the model recovered fast), room pipeline visibility is real (they add units regardless of cycle), and in a cutting-rates regime lodging cyclicals get bid. But that steelman doesn't justify 51x — it justifies maybe 28-32x, which would be $200ish.
Data gaps: total debt is missing from the file, which is material for a negative-equity buyback machine — I can't independently check leverage. Insider "transactions" are all tiny director share awards, not signal. The 2026-Q1 datapoint sits alone against 2024/2025 comparables and the Q4'25 earnings miss is the single most important number in this file and the models mostly glossed it. I agree with the synthesis *direction* (overvalued) but think their fair value ($135-146) is too low — a quality franchisor with 17% FCF margins and buyback-driven per-share compounding deserves a premium multiple, just not this one. Fair value is more like $210-230. At $314 you're paying ~40-50% premium to a defensible number, with a decelerating earnings trajectory as the near-term catalyst pointing the wrong way. Not a short (too high-quality, buybacks provide a floor), but not a buy here. Wait for $240 or a genuine RevPAR reset.
GPT Reading
Hilton is an excellent business priced like an exceptional one. The operating model is exactly what investors usually want in lodging: revenue rose from $5.79B in 2021 to $12.04B in 2025, operating income expanded from $1.01B to $2.69B, and free cash flow reached $2.03B in 2025 on just $101M of capex. That is elite capital intensity. Even the latest quarter was solid on the surface: Q1 2026 revenue of $2.94B was up 8.9% from $2.70B a year earlier, and net income rose to $385M from $300M. The problem is not business quality; it is that at $314 the market is capitalizing this as if high-single-digit growth and very high conversion are both durable through the cycle. On 2025 numbers, you are paying roughly 51x earnings, 24x EV/EBITDA, and about 34x free cash flow. For a cyclical travel-exposed company growing revenue 7-8% and earnings 13% off a pandemic-recovery base, that is too rich.
What stands out in the raw data is that growth is good but not explosive, while profitability is more mixed than the premium multiple implies. Annual revenue grew 7.8% in 2025, but net income actually fell from $1.54B in 2024 to $1.46B in 2025 despite operating income improving from $2.37B to $2.69B. Quarterly margins are also not marching upward: net margin was 18.1% in Q4 2024, then 11.1% in Q1 2025, 14.0% in Q2 2025, 13.5% in Q3 2025, 9.6% in Q4 2025, and 13.1% in Q1 2026. Some of that is normal lumpiness, but a stock at 51x earnings should show cleaner earnings compounding than “revenue up, cash flow good, but bottom-line volatility persists.” The latest trailing four quarters from Q2 2025 through Q1 2026 produce about $12.29B of revenue and $1.54B of net income, essentially flat earnings power while the stock trades at a growth-stock valuation.
The balance sheet optics also matter more than bulls admit. Negative equity of $5.35B is not automatically a red flag for an asset-light franchisor that buys back stock, but it does mean there is less room for macro error when the current ratio is only 0.66 and cash is $918M. Hilton’s model is resilient relative to hotel owners because capex is low and fee streams are diversified, but it is still ultimately tethered to room demand, corporate travel, consumer confidence, and development activity. If the market were paying 20-25x earnings for that setup, I would shrug at the cyclicality. At 51x, cyclicality becomes the entire issue. This is a wonderful compounder if bought at a sensible price; at $314 it looks more like a high-quality duration asset priced for a near-perfect travel backdrop.
The strongest pushback is straightforward: Hilton deserves a premium because accounting earnings understate the quality of the model. A business that can produce $2.03B of free cash flow on $12.04B of revenue, with only $101M of capex, should not be judged like a conventional hotel operator. Revenue has nearly doubled since 2021, operating margin is a healthy 22.4%, and the latest quarter’s 8.9% revenue growth and 28% net income growth show there is still demand strength. A bull would also argue that the 2024-to-2025 net income decline is noise from below-the-line items, because operating income rose 13.5%, and that the market is correctly valuing a branded network with durable fee streams rather than a cyclical real-estate-heavy business. I take that seriously. But even if I give Hilton full credit for being a superior franchise and value it on free cash flow instead of net income, the multiple is still in the mid-30s on FCF for a business whose recent revenue trend has already decelerated from recovery rates to ordinary high-single digits.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of respectable growth; it would take evidence that Hilton can sustainably grow into this valuation. Specifically, I would want to see revenue growth re-accelerate into the low teens while maintaining operating margins above 22% and converting that into at least $2.4B-$2.5B of annual free cash flow, or alternatively a much lower share price that brings the stock closer to 25-30x earnings and under 25x free cash flow. If upcoming quarters show revenue slipping back toward 5-6% growth or net margins hovering around 10-13%, the premium multiple should compress. My bias is that fair value is far below the current quote, though not as low as the most punitive model outputs; a range around $220-$240 feels more defensible for this quality level and growth profile.
Grok Reading
Hilton’s operating engine is clean and recognizably high-quality: $12.04B of 2025 revenue, $2.69B of operating income (22.4% margin), and $2.03B of free cash flow against only $101M of capex. That is the textbook asset-light franchisor print. Revenue has compounded at roughly 8.5% from the post-pandemic base, and the trailing four quarters still show mid-to-high single-digit top-line growth, with Q1 2026 revenue at $2.94B versus $2.70B a year earlier. The problem is not the business; it is the price. At $314 the stock clears 51× trailing earnings, 24× EV/EBITDA and 6.2× sales while net income actually slipped year-over-year from $1.54B to $1.46B and recent earnings growth prints negative. Paying growth-stock multiples for a mature earner whose revenue trend is already flagged as decelerating is the central contradiction in the tape.
The balance-sheet optics look ugly—negative equity of $5.35B and a current ratio of 0.66—but that is largely the residue of aggressive buybacks rather than operating distress; cash flow quality remains strong and the dividend is a token 0.19% yield with a 10% payout. What the numbers actually say is that management has already harvested a large share of the capital-return story, so the residual equity claim is levered to continued fee growth and multiple support. With FCF CAGR at only 6.3% and the most recent annual NI down, the $70B enterprise is discounting a multi-year stretch of high-single-digit fee expansion and stable-to-rising margins that the quarterly run-rate does not yet confirm.
The valuation models’ ~$146 fair-value anchor is directionally right even if the precise DCF is debatable; a 50%-plus premium to that level requires the market narrative of permanent RevPAR elevation and “platform monopoly” status to hold without interruption. I weigh the narrative as real but fragile: lodging is still cyclical, labor costs are a known margin pressure, and the 115% story premium leaves almost no room for a soft landing in corporate or leisure demand. Secondary signals (macro headwinds, decelerating revenue confidence, sector-average positioning) reinforce that the easy post-pandemic catch-up is behind the company.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward: Hilton is one of the cleanest compounders in consumer discretionary, the franchise model converts incremental rooms into high-margin fees with almost no capital, operating income is still rising ($2.69B versus $2.37B), and Q1 2026 net income rebounded sharply to $385M. A patient bull can argue that 8–10% system growth plus buybacks justifies a mid-20s EV/EBITDA forever and that negative equity is irrelevant for an asset-light royalty stream. I discount that case because the current 51× P/E and 24× EBITDA already embed the optimistic end of that distribution; any reversion in RevPAR growth or multiple compression toward historical lodging norms produces large downside from $314 before the fundamental thesis is even wrong.
I would flip to neutral or constructive only if successive quarters re-accelerate revenue growth sustainably above 10% with operating margins holding above 23%, or if the stock corrected into the low-to-mid $200s while FCF stayed near $2B. Until one of those arrives, the asymmetry is unfavorable.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Hilton is a mature, asset-light franchisor throwing off real cash: revenue grew from $5.79B (2021) to $12.04B (2025), operating margin has held in a tight 21-24% band post-COVID, and FCF has climbed every single year from $74M to $2.03B. OCF/NI of 1.22x and accruals at -2.6% of assets say the reported earnings are backed by cash, not accruals. Altman Z of 2.91 sits in the grey zone, which is normal for a franchise model that runs a levered capital structure by design.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Net debt and maturity ladder — how much of the buyback is debt-funded and refinancing risk
- Franchise vs. owned-hotel revenue mix and fee-based EBITDA share
- Pipeline of contracted rooms and net unit growth trajectory
- Any off-balance-sheet guarantees to hotel owners or JV obligations
- Concentration by geography/brand and exposure to any single large owner-operator
The e2e composite pins deserved value at $134.86 and the signal-adjusted read at $145.83, implying roughly -54% versus the $314.23 print. Even the most generous input, anchored-PE at $214.91, still sits ~32% below today's price, while the EPV floor at $78.46 says the run-rate cash engine alone supports only about a quarter of the market cap. The DCF at $123.04 clusters with the composite. That is a consistent, multi-method message: the market is paying for years of continued RevPAR strength, unit growth and buybacks with essentially no cyclical discount.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward RevPAR and net unit growth guidance versus consensus
- Franchise fee take-rate trend and any signs of owner pushback
- Buyback pace and net leverage trajectory
- Any one-time items inflating recent EBITDA/EPS
- Group and business-transient booking pace into next year
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (score +47, VIX ~15.5, S&P near highs) and HLT's beta of ~1.06 means it participates cleanly in that lift without the whiplash of higher-beta names. More importantly, the active narrative on HLT is a strong 'platform-monopoly / irreplaceable global franchise' story with moderate durability, and the just-reported Q2 2026 print (revenue $3.34B, net income $482M) plus upgraded guidance, a reaffirmed dividend, and buybacks are actively feeding that story rather than cracking it. News flow in the last 72h is net constructive: an 'undervalued on earnings and buybacks' piece and a 'bull case could change following strong Q2' piece, with the one negative-tinged headline (Airbnb surging while the rest of travel did not) being an Airbnb idiosyncratic story, not a lodging-sector rotation away from HLT. The offsets are real but secondary: 10y at 4.65% and market PE ~26 are a background headwind for a name trading at a premium multiple on a permanent-travel-inflation narrative, and the bear framing (2.15x DCF, ~$170 of premium on story) means any crack in RevPAR or corporate travel would hit sentiment disproportionately. Cult coefficient is low, so there is no fanatical bid to defend it if the narrative wobbles. Net: the tape and the story are pushing this specific name up right now, but the pressure is a steady tailwind, not a mania.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether sell-side target revisions after Q2 skew upward (would confirm tailwind) or stall (narrative maturing)
- RevPAR trend and corporate travel commentary in the next monthly STR/industry data - the key crack point
- Any rotation out of premium-multiple consumer cyclicals if 10y pushes above 4.75-5%
- Whether Airbnb-style alt-lodging strength starts pulling narrative share from branded hotel platforms
None surfaced.
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for HLT — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.