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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Iamgold Corporation (IAG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -41 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -7 · Value -69 · Sentiment 40 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Iamgold Corporation
IAG NYSEIamgold Corporation is a mid-tier mining company specializing in the exploration and production of gold. Its primary function is to develop and operate strategically located gold mines across the globe, with a focus on ensuring sustainable and responsible mining practices. The company is known for its operations in diverse regions, including North America, South America, and West Africa, where it manages multiple mines producing gold bullion. A notable aspect of Iamgold Corporation is its commitment to environmental stewardship and its initiatives to minimize the carbon footprint of its mining activities. This focus aligns with the growing trend toward sustainable investment practices within the financial markets. Iamgold plays a significant role in the commodities market as a key supplier of gold, a metal that serves as both an industrial component and a financial hedge against inflation and currency devaluation. The company's activities impact the industries of fine jewelry manufacturing, electronics, and central bank reserves. Additionally, Iamgold's projects and financial health are closely watched by investors who seek exposure to the gold mining sector, an asset class well-regarded for its potential to provide stability during economic fluctuations.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
Iamgold Corporation is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 9 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-02-18, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.14
Total Equity: $4.25B
Shares: 581,700,000
Total Debt: $649.80M
Cash: $421.90M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $649.80M
Cash: $421.90M
Revenue: $2.85B
Revenue: $2.85B
Revenue: $2.85B
Total Equity: $4.25B
Tax Rate: 24.5%
Equity: $4.25B
Total Debt: $649.80M
Cash: $421.90M
Current Liabilities: $517.10M
Long-Term Debt: $648.80M
Total Debt: $649.80M
Total Equity: $4.25B
Shares: 581,700,000
Shares: 581,700,000
CapEx: -$293.50M
Shares: 581,700,000
Stock Price: $18.30
Net Income: $664.40M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:26am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.2B | $958.8M | $987.1M | $1.6B | $2.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.1B | $810.9M | $863.0M | $1.1B | $1.6B |
| Gross Profit | $2.7M | $147.9M | $124.1M | $549.9M | $1.2B |
| Operating Expenses | $377.2M | $106.6M | $124.4M | -$394.1M | $112.6M |
| Operating Income | -$374.5M | $41.3M | $-300,000 | $944.0M | $1.1B |
| Net Income | -$254.4M | -$70.1M | $94.3M | $819.6M | $664.4M |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $-0.53 | $-0.15 | $0.19 | $1.52 | $1.16 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.53 | $-0.15 | $0.19 | $1.50 | $1.14 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:26am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $544.9M | $407.8M | $367.1M | $347.5M | $421.9M |
| Total Current Assets | $951.1M | $1.5B | $753.7M | $668.3M | $903.7M |
| Total Assets | $4.0B | $4.4B | $4.5B | $5.4B | $5.9B |
| Current Liabilities | $581.7M | $646.2M | $630.8M | $550.6M | $517.1M |
| Long-Term Debt | $456.9M | $910.0M | $825.8M | $1.0B | $648.8M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.0B | $1.6B |
| Total Equity | $2.3B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $3.4B | $4.2B |
| Retained Earnings | -$562.2M | -$632.4M | -$538.3M | $259.4M | $872.6M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:26am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $285.0M | $408.7M | $159.4M | $486.0M | $1.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$623.8M | -$742.7M | -$907.3M | -$558.6M | -$293.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$338.8M | -$334.0M | -$747.9M | -$72.6M | $849.1M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | $0 | -$30.8M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$7.7M | -$7.4M | -$9.2M | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | -$18.4M | -$13.7M | -$18.0M | -$128.3M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$396.6M | -$96.3M | -$39.9M | -$20.1M | $74.4M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:26am (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -16.7% | +3.0% | +65.4% | +74.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +5,377.8% | -16.1% | +343.1% | +119.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +111.0% | -100.7% | +314,766.7% | +15.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +72.4% | +234.5% | +769.1% | -18.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 10:28am (8d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013-07-01 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2012-12-19 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2012-06-29 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2011-12-16 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2011-06-30 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2010-12-21 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2009-12-22 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2008-12-22 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-15As a pure price taker on a globally quoted ounce, IAG keeps 100% of any cost reduction — autonomous haulage and fleet-dispatch optimization at Côté, predictive maintenance, mill throughput and recovery control, and ML-assisted grade control all land directly in unit costs with no offsetting price concession from customers.
Nothing AI does repairs the two things that actually govern the five-year outcome: reserve grade and jurisdiction. Essakane's finite mine life and Westwood's seismic-constrained underground are geological and political problems, and every competing miner buys the same vendor automation, so cost gains diffuse into the industry cost curve rather than into a durable edge.
Whether Côté's automation-heavy design actually converts into sustained throughput and falling all-in sustaining cost per ounce, versus remaining a commissioning drag. Watch quarterly Côté tonnes milled, mill availability and AISC per ounce.
The Côté–Gosselin orebody and its district-scale Ontario land package, permits, tailings and water licences, and an operating mill — none of which are reproducible by cheap software at any price.
AI Lens thesis
AI reaches IAG almost entirely through the cost line and the drill bit, not through revenue: gold's price is set by monetary and central-bank demand that machine intelligence does not intermediate, so the monetized unit is untouched, while automation, predictive maintenance and ML-driven mill control compress operating cost, and ML applied to legacy geophysics and drill databases lowers the cost of finding the next ounce on ground IAG already controls. Because the company is a price taker, those savings are retained rather than competed away in the product — the leakage instead occurs industry-wide as all producers adopt the same tools, flattening the cost curve. The exposure is genuinely low and the direction mildly positive; the material risks in the name — grade decline, Burkina Faso jurisdiction, capital discipline, gold price — sit outside the AI lens entirely, and the honest read is to score this cheaply and not manufacture a causal story.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside ML re-interpretation of the historical geophysical and drill database around Côté/Gosselin can cut discovery cost per ounce on land already permitted and adjacent to a built mill — brownfield ounces are the cheapest reserve growth in the sector and the market prices exploration as an expense, not an asset.
Downside The AI datacenter buildout competes for exactly what IAG consumes in Ontario and Quebec: firm industrial power, grid interconnection queues and skilled electrical trades. That is an AI-driven input-cost and schedule risk that never appears in a mining company's AI discussion.
Outcome range spread 27
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:17The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers on IAG tell a striking story that deserves independent scrutiny before I trust anyone's verdict. Revenue jumped from $987M (2023) to $1.63B (2024) to $2.85B (2025) — a 75% YoY tear driven by Côté commissioning colliding with gold ripping past $2,600/oz. Operating margin went from -0.03% (2023) to 38.3% (2025); ROIC hit 18.5%; FCF flipped from deeply negative to $849M. Debt-to-equity of 0.15 and current ratio of 1.75 mean the balance sheet is no longer a concern. On trailing numbers at $18.30 the stock trades 16x earnings, 3.8x EV/sales, 2.5x book — genuinely cheap for a producer printing $1.14B in operating cash flow. But — and this is the entire debate — that trailing multiple is a fossil. Gold-miner earnings are 100% a function of the spot price minus roughly-fixed AISC, and 2025's $664M in net income was earned against a gold tape that few sober analysts would extrapolate.
The synthesis verdict of $11.95 fair value (-35%) is where I want to push back hardest. That number appears to normalize gold toward $1,700-1,800/oz per the narrative layer's own admission — which is a defensible long-run assumption but also assumes ~30% gold price mean-reversion. If gold holds $2,400-2,600, IAG at $18.30 is not overvalued; if gold reverts to $1,800, IAG is probably worth $10-12 and margins compress violently because AISC at Côté is not $900. So the synthesis isn't wrong so much as it's making a hidden macro call and calling it a valuation call. The market-forces "neutral" and narrative layer's "fragile durability" are more intellectually honest: this is a bet on gold, dressed up as a bet on a company.
A careful contrarian would note several things the models glossed. First, the market cap of $10.45B against $4.25B equity and $664M NI implies the market is already pricing well above book and above trailing earnings on a P/E basis that's actually rich for a mid-tier gold miner in a peak-cycle print year — Barrick and Agnico trade at similar-to-cheaper forward multiples with better asset bases. Second, "poor cash flow quality" flagged by the FCF signal is puzzling given OCF of $1.14B against $664M NI (ratio 1.7x, which is normal for miners with heavy D&A) — I suspect this flag is misfiring on working-capital or reclamation timing, and the models are over-weighting it. Third, recent earnings YoY is -18.9% despite revenue +74.7% — that's the tell. Margins are already compressing at the quarterly level even as gold stayed elevated, which suggests cost inflation at Côté ramp is real. Fourth, the insider selling clustered on 2026-02-27 (three sales same day) is small in size but directionally consistent with management not seeing the stock as cheap here. Fifth, the "market cap $10.45B" against a $18.30 print implies ~570M shares — worth double-checking, because dilution during the 2021-2023 trough was significant and share-count creep is a hidden tax on per-share value.
I land in partial agreement with the synthesis but for different reasons. The $11.95 fair value is too low because it under-weights the probability gold stays elevated for structural reasons (central bank buying, de-dollarization flows are not purely cyclical). But $18.30 is not undervalued either — it's fully pricing peak-cycle earnings extrapolated, and the -18.9% earnings YoY at the quarterly level is a leading indicator that the models mostly ignored. Fair value in a probability-weighted sense sits around $13-15: give 40% weight to gold reverting ($10), 40% to gold holding current ($17-18), 20% to gold breaking higher ($22+). At $18.30 you're paying for the upper-tail outcome. This is not a compelling entry; it's a hold-if-you-own-it, don't-chase-if-you-don't. The pre-flight "deep value turnaround" framing is stale — the turnaround happened, the stock ran from $7.89 to $24 and back to $18, and now it's just a leveraged gold call with mid-tier execution risk and aging non-Côté assets. Wait for either a gold pullback that takes IAG to $12-13, or two more quarters proving margin resilience below $2,400 gold, before adding.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say Iamgold is no longer a distressed developer story; it has become a very profitable gold producer in a very favorable tape. Revenue nearly tripled from $987 million in 2023 to $2.85 billion in 2025, while operating income went from essentially breakeven in 2023 to $944 million in 2024 and $1.09 billion in 2025. That is not cosmetic improvement. The 2025 cash profile is especially strong: $1.14 billion of operating cash flow, $849 million of free cash flow, and only $649.8 million of debt against $421.9 million of cash. On those figures, the equity is not being asked to fund a turnaround anymore; it is being asked to value a company already throwing off cash at roughly an 8% FCF yield on the current $10.45 billion market cap. For a miner with net debt of only about $228 million and ROIC of 18.5%, that is a healthier setup than the “show-me” framing implies.
What stands out, though, is how much of the 2024-2025 earnings step-up looks tied to an exceptional margin regime rather than just a clean structural reset. A 42.3% gross margin and 38.3% operating margin are huge for a gold miner, and the oddity is 2024: revenue was only $1.63 billion, yet operating income was $944 million and net income $820 million, implying unusually favorable cost and/or non-operating line items. In 2025, net income actually fell to $664 million despite revenue jumping 74.7%, which tells you incremental revenue was not converting to incremental earnings at the same rate. So while the business is unquestionably better, the quality of the earnings ramp is less linear than the headline growth suggests. I do not buy the harsh “poor cash flow quality” critique given 2025 FCF of $849 million versus $664 million of net income, but I do think the market is correctly refusing to capitalize 2024-2025 margins as if they are permanent.
At $18.30, the stock looks closer to fairly valued than overvalued. A 16.1x trailing P/E and 3.7x sales multiple are not obviously cheap for a commodity producer, but they are not reckless either if 2025 is anywhere near sustainable. On EV, the company sits around $10.7 billion after net debt, which is roughly 9.8x 2025 operating income and about 12.6x 2025 FCF. For a cyclical miner, that is not a bargain-basement multiple; for a delevered producer with a transformed asset base and strong gold exposure, it is not demanding. The valuation synthesis pointing to $12 feels too anchored to normalized gold and perhaps too dismissive of the fact that the balance sheet has materially improved and capex has already come down to $293.5 million. If the company can hold annual revenue above $2.4 billion and FCF north of $600 million, $18 is supportable.
The best argument against this view is that the market is paying for a peak. On the company’s own five-year history, 2021-2023 was ugly: gross profit was $2.7 million in 2021 on $1.15 billion of revenue, operating losses were large, and net income was negative in two of the three years before the rebound. That means there is little evidence yet that the current earnings base is durable across a weaker gold tape or normal operating hiccups. The stock also trades at 2.5x book, which is not cheap for a miner with a history of capital intensity and execution risk, and the recent insider sales, while small, do not help the “undiscovered deep value” case. If gold retreats materially and margins compress from 38% operating margin toward something in the mid-teens, the stock would quickly look expensive and the $12-$14 bear case becomes plausible.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next annual run-rate shows revenue holding above roughly $2.5 billion but operating cash flow dropping below $800 million or FCF falling under $500 million, then 2025 was much more peak-driven than structural and I would move bearish. Likewise, if net debt starts rising again or margins roll over sharply despite stable gold prices, that would signal operational underperformance rather than macro normalization. On the other hand, if the company can put up another year with $700 million-plus FCF, keep debt contained, and show that 2025’s margin structure does not collapse as volumes normalize, then the current price likely understates a new, higher earnings base and the stock deserves to trade through $20.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a completed ramp, not an ongoing growth story. Iamgold roughly tripled revenue from the 2022–2023 trough ($959M–$987M) to $2.85B in 2025, with gross margin expanding from low-teens to 42% and operating margin landing at 38%. Free cash flow of $849M on a $10.45B equity value is an 8.1% FCF yield, supported by operating cash flow of $1.14B against only $294M of capex and a light balance sheet ($650M debt, $422M cash, debt-to-equity 0.15). ROIC at 18.5% and ROE at 15.7% are real for a mid-tier gold miner that has finished the heavy lifting at Côté. The 2024 net income print of $820M looks cleaner once you notice operating income ($944M) far exceeded gross profit ($550M)—non-core items inflated that year—so the step-down to $664M NI in 2025 on much higher revenue is the truer run-rate, not a collapse. At 16× trailing earnings and roughly 3.7× sales, the market is no longer treating this as a distressed turnaround; it is underwriting a going concern.
What stands out against the prior models is the tension between the “poor cash flow quality” flag and the actual statements: OCF exceeds net income by ~70%, FCF conversion on 2025 earnings is above 125%, and the balance sheet did not lever up to buy the result. The 70% revenue CAGR and 165% earnings CAGR are mathematically correct and economically misleading—they are the arithmetic of a single mine commissioning into a high gold-price tape, not a repeatable organic engine. Recent earnings are already −19% year-on-year. The valuation composite at ~$12 (implying ~10× earnings and sub-7× FCF) looks too punitive relative to demonstrated cash generation unless one forces a deep mean-reversion in the gold price and haircuts the new production base. Conversely, treating $18.30 as cheap ignores that the easy multiple expansion from the $8 sub-basement has already happened and that the stock has already tagged $25.
The strongest case against a fair-value read is straightforward: strip out the gold-price tailwind and the Côté volume step-function, and you own a mid-tier producer with execution history that includes multi-year value destruction, margins that are almost pure commodity beta, and a narrative premium the engine itself pegs near 50% above a normalized DCF at $1,700–$1,800 gold. Insider sales in late February 2026, sector-relative underperformance signals, and a “cyclical-late-stage” narrative with fragile durability all argue the 16× multiple is full. If gold revisits the levels embedded in conservative DCFs, $12–$14 is not a fantasy drawdown from here; the −35% gap the synthesis flags is the bear case in one number. I weigh that risk as real but already partially discounted in the retreat from $25, and I refuse to overwrite $849M of actual FCF with a single composite that the synthesis itself labels as mixed and cautionary.
My base case is that $18.30 is roughly where a cleaned-up, FCF-positive Iamgold should trade while gold holds in a $2,000-plus regime—neither a gift nor a trap. What would flip me is sustained quarterly free cash flow below ~$150M (implying the margin structure is not durable), a decisive break in spot gold that sticks below ~$1,900, or another year of earnings erosion while the multiple refuses to compress. On the upside, two more clean quarters of $200M-plus FCF with stable all-in costs and no guidance cuts would justify leaning through $20–$22 rather than fading strength.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Iamgold has transformed operationally over the five-year window. Revenue nearly tripled from $1.15B in 2021 to $2.85B in 2025, gross margin expanded from ~0% to 42.3%, and operating margin swung from -32.5% to 38.3%. Net income moved from a $254M loss to $664M profit, and FCF finally flipped from a $748M outflow in 2023 (Cote build) to a $849M inflow in 2025. Altman Z of 5.29 signals safe zone, accruals are clean at -5.6% of assets, and Beneish M at -1.9 shows no manipulation flags. This is a classic post-capex ramp: Cote Gold coming on stream while the gold price cycle cooperates.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Cote Gold ramp status, throughput, and AISC vs guidance in the latest 10-K/MD&A
- Reason for 5.1% share growth — equity raises, stream/royalty settlements, or convertible conversion?
- Hedging book and gold price sensitivity of 2025 margins
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant headroom given net debt of $227.9M
- Reserve life and sustaining capex profile beyond the Cote ramp
- Whether the 57.8% operating margin in 2024 includes a one-time gain (impairment reversal, disposal, tax item)
The e2e composite fair value sits at $12.12 with a signal-adjusted $11.95, implying roughly -35% downside from $18.30. The method spread is wide and telling: DCF at $1.13 is a runaway low (likely reflecting reinvestment/capex drag and should be discounted, not taken literally), EPV floor at $6.99 anchors a sober through-cycle earnings power, and the anchored-PE at $39.21 extrapolates a peak-cycle earnings print onto a normal multiple, which for a cyclical miner overstates deserved value. Splitting the difference between EPV (~$7) and a more reasonable normalized multiple lands you in the low-to-mid teens at best - broadly consistent with the $12 composite. Even generously weighting the current gold tape, deserved value is below spot.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Cote steady-state AISC and sustaining capex to firm up normalized FCF
- share issuance cadence and any equity/streaming financings pending
- hedge book and gold price sensitivity disclosures
- reserve life and grade profile at Essakane and Westwood
IAG sits at the intersection of two active tailwinds: a risk-on macro tape (VIX 14, S&P near highs) that rewards high-beta cyclicals, and a durable-feeling but fragile gold-bull narrative built on central bank buying, debasement fears, and geopolitical risk. With beta 2.26, this name amplifies whatever the tape does - and right now the tape is calm and bid, which is a real, persistent press upward. The Q2 news flow (Cote hitting nameplate, buybacks) feeds directly into the bull story that IAG offers cleaner leverage to sustained $2,000+ gold. Momentum confirms it: 70% CAGR, deleveraging balance sheet, price well through the fundamental anchor. That is the market pricing the narrative, not the DCF. The catch is narrative durability is flagged fragile and cult coefficient is low - meaning there is no sticky retail base to defend the story if gold rolls or a risk-off shock hits. High beta cuts both ways; the same 2.26 that is helping now would gut this name in a VIX spike. Net: the current pressure leans clearly positive, but it is a rented tailwind, not an owned one.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any crack in the gold price above $2,000 - would immediately drain the narrative premium
- VIX regime shift or a growth scare that flips risk-on to risk-off (high-beta gets hit first)
- Analyst target revisions - are they chasing the price up or holding at fundamentals?
- Central bank gold buying data - the core pillar of the bull story
- Any operational stumble at Cote that would break the just-established credibility
AI reaches IAG almost entirely through the cost line and the drill bit, not through revenue: gold's price is set by monetary and central-bank demand that machine intelligence does not intermediate, so the monetized unit is untouched, while automation, predictive maintenance and ML-driven mill control compress operating cost, and ML applied to legacy geophysics and drill databases lowers the cost of finding the next ounce on ground IAG already controls. Because the company is a price taker, those savings are retained rather than competed away in the product — the leakage instead occurs industry-wide as all producers adopt the same tools, flattening the cost curve. The exposure is genuinely low and the direction mildly positive; the material risks in the name — grade decline, Burkina Faso jurisdiction, capital discipline, gold price — sit outside the AI lens entirely, and the honest read is to score this cheaply and not manufacture a causal story.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- AISC per ounce trend ex-gold price
- labour cost per tonne moved
- truck fleet utilization
- reserve and resource restatements
- permit progress on Gosselin
- Essakane mine-life extension news
- production guidance vs delivery
- realized price capture
Gold's demand engine — central bank accumulation, geopolitical hedging, currency-debasement flows — is a genuine multi-year structural bid, and with the 10y near 4.6% the price is holding despite real-rate headwinds, which is itself a signal of non-rate-sensitive buying. That backdrop lifts every producer's revenue line, so it is not a differentiator; the differentiator for IAG is that it is simultaneously adding ounces. The offsetting world fact is resource nationalism: West African fiscal regimes are tightening as gold prices rise, meaning host governments capture a growing slice of exactly the upside the boom creates. Net: the world is supportive of near-term growth and ambiguous about who keeps it in years 2-3.